THE JESUITS AND THE SINO-RUSSIAN TREATY OF NERCHINSK (1689)

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JOSEPH SEBES, S. J.

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THE DIARY OF THOMAS PEREIRA, S. J.

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1961

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R. P. Renatus Arnou, S. I.
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† Aloysius, *Card. Provicarius.*

TYPIS PONTIFICIAE UNIVERSITATIS GREGORIANAE - ROMAE

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PROLOGUE

The attention of the world today is once again focused on the diplomatic, commercial and ideological relations of Russia and China. Heads of states, representatives of the Press and the general public would like to know the true nature of these relations. This knowledge, however, seems to elude the experts. Moreover, the problem is compounded by the fact that the objectives and policies of both Russia and China towards the rest of the world are just as enigmatic. If the old saying " Historia est magistra vitae " contains some truth then it might very well be that one should look into the past for clues towards a solution of this puzzle.

In this present work I shall attempt to study the initial stage of Sino-Russian relations. The conclusion of the treaty of Nerchinsk (Nipchu) in 1689 between Russia and China, the first treaty ever concluded by China with a European power is an important landmark in the relations between these two countries. The inner story of the Nerchinsk negotiations became known to the learned world through the publication by Father J. B. du Halde of Father Francis Gerbillon's Diaries and through some other works whose authors used, although never published in toto, the official report of the Russian negotiator at Nerchinsk, Feodor Alexeevich Golovin. Up to the present these works were our only source of knowledge concerning the genesis of this treaty. Gerbillon's companion and fellow Jesuit, the Portuguese Thomas Pereira, however, also wrote a Diary about these same events, which has not only never been published, but even the existence of which was unknown till the present. In this book I shall undertake the publishing and translating of this interesting and important document. Gerbillon was a Frenchman and Pereira a Portuguese and as such both must be considered neutral observers of these transactions. They were both westerners and observed these strange proceedings between two oriental states with some amazement. Pereira was, however, more intimately involved in these negotiations and his Diary is of a more confidential nature so that a careful reading of it might give western readers today a few hints towards an understanding of the present situation. Granting that communist ideology adds new elements of complication to the already difficult puzzle, yet the psychology of Chinese and Russian negotiators does not seem to have changed basically.

Before describing and evaluating it, we must answer some important questions that may come to the mind of the reader of the Pereira Diary. How did it happen that two Jesuit missionaries, aliens to both China and Russia, were involved in the negotiations leading up to this treaty and in the conclusion of it between two non-Catholic states ? What role did the Jesuits play in the conclusion of this treaty ? How did they conceive their roles themselves and how did they play them ? What role did the " Law of Nations ", frequently mentioned during the negotiations, play in the transactions and in the conclusion of the treaty. Why has historiography neglected this important event ? For more than two centuries and a half it did not receive full monograph treatment.

Different and divergent answers have been given to some of these questions while others have remained without an answer. Before attempting to answer them all it will be necessary to outline the activities of the three parties in this " strange three-sided association " (Russia, China and the Jesuits), as M. N. Pavlovsky calls it, that led up to the conclusion of the treaty of Nerchinsk. Thus this work is divided into two parts : an Introduction giving the historical background, and the original Portuguese text of the Diary with an English translation.

In the introductory part I endeavored to show, in general outline, the progress of Russian expansion eastward, China's attitude towards the " Northern Regions ", the conflicts that developed between them paving the way to Nerchinsk, and the interest and role of the Jesuits in Russo-Chinese diplomatic relations. This is followed by a short biography of Thomas Pereira and a technical description of the manuscripts of his Diary and other pertinent remarks as indispensable details for its understanding. Concerning this historical introduction the reader must be warned that since a good part of it is based on secondary sources, although primary sources were also used, the names of these authors and the titles of their works are not given in the footnotes every time I relied on them in my narrative. This was done in order to reduce the number of footnotes and to avoid making this first part too long, thereby degrading the Diary itself to a secondary role, and not in order to deny due recognition. I recognize my indebtedness to these authors and their works by indicating at the beginning of each chapter or each section of chapter the works used or than can be used and consulted for further details. While this might be considered high-handed it nonetheless seemed necessary as it has the added advantage of leaving the narrative free of too frequent interruptions and of being more easily readable.

The second part, containing the Diary in the original Portuguese with an English translation, needs no special explanation except that the footnotes begin on the pages where the words to which they are attached are found in the Portuguese text and not in the English text. The English translation does not always exactly coincide, line by line, with the Portuguese text but sometimes is a few lines behind it. Hence the discrepancy. Since, however, the Portuguese text is the primary one it seemed proper that it should be the guide.

A few remarks must also be made about the two Appendices. In the first Appendix, as throughout the text of the book, I tried to use that spelling for Mongolian names which is used by the specialists today. This, however, was not always possible as the Gregorian University Press did not have the letters with the required diacritical marks. For instance, it was impossible to put macron on the letters ö and ü, or the necessary diacritical mark on the letter j, etc. This shortcoming was unavoidable. The only alternative would have been to revert to a completely different spelling of all these names at the very last moment which time did not permit. In the Appendix of Chinese characters I did not include all Chinese and Japanese words that occur in the text. The better known names of Dynasties, Emperors and their reign titles, as well as the names of provinces, well known cities and rivers, etc., are not included.

Finally I must acknowledge my indebtedness to all those who with their generous help made the publishing of this work possible.

In the first place to the Harvard-Yenching Institute where in 1958 it was submitted as a Ph. D. thesis ; to Dr. Yang Lien-sheng who as my director and mentor guided the research that forms its basis and to Dr. John K. Fairbank and Dr. Benjamin Schwartz who as readers improved it with their criticism and valuable suggestions; to Dr. Francis W. Cleaves who generously assisted me with the Mongolian names and in many other ways; to Dr. John L. Bishop who encouraged my work and gave me technical assistance; and very especially to Dr. Glen W. Baxter, present Director of the Harvard-Yenching Institute for the very generous financial contribution that made the printing of this work possible as well as for the continued interest in my work.

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Also to Georgetown University, where I have been a member of the faculty for the last three years, for its financial assistance which enabled me for the past two summers to go to Rome and undertake the publishing of this book; and to Father James B. Horrigan, S. J. Dean of the Graduate School for having made it possible to have the more important documents reproduced in photostats.

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Washington, Georgetown University, October 24, 1961.

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——— *Johann Grueber. Die erste Durchquerung Tibets*, in Fr. KNOLL, *Österreichische Naturforscher, Ärtzte und Techniker* (Wien 1957) 11-14.

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2. PRINTED WORKS IN CHINESE AND JAPANESE

Note. — Certain large compilation and standard reference works are listed under title instead of compiler. In the case of official compilations or works published at imperial order the place of publication is not indicated, because it usually was the capital. The English titles do not intend to give a literal translation of the original title but rather a description of the contents of the work. For Chinese characters see Appendix II.

A KUEI, *Ch'in-ting Man-chou yüan-liu k'ao* (A historical study of Manchuria). 20 chüan. 1778.

CHA CHI-TSO, *Tsui-wei lu* (A complete history of the Ming Dynasty in 97 chüan. It was not printed in the author's life time for fear that it would offend the Manchus. Published in photographic reprint by the Commercial Press). Shanghai 1928.

CHANG CH'AO (enlarged by YANG FU-CHI and revised by SHEN MOU-TE), *Chao-tai ts'ung-shu* (Collectanea of the glorious Dynasty). 1697, 1833, 1876.

CHANG HSING-LANG, *Chung-hsi chiao-t'ung shih-liao hui-pien* (Materials concerning the history of Sino-foreign relations). 6 chüan. Peking 1930.

CHANG MU, *Meng-ku yu-mu chi* (A topographical study of Mongolia. The work was left unfinished by its author and was completed by HO CH'IU-T'AO and was printed by CH'I CHÜN-TSAO in 1867). I used the Japanese edition. Tokyo 1940.

CHANG P'ENG-HO, *Feng-shih O-lo-ssu hsing-ch'eng lu* (Record of an official trip to the Russians. 1 chüan. This work is included in the Collectanea *I-hai chu-ch'en.* In some other Collectanea it appears under the title: *Feng-shih O-lo-ssu jih-chi*). I used the text contained in *Man-Mō sōsho* (Edit. NAITŌ TORAJIRŌ) Vol. II. Tokyo 1920.

CHANG PO-YING, *Hei-lung-chiang chih-kao* (Draft Gazeteer of Heilungchiang). 62 chüan. Peking 1933.

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CHANG YÜ-SHU, *P'ing-ting Shuo-mo fang-lüeh* (Official history of the campaigns against the Ölöd Mongols). 1708.

——— *Wai-kuo chi* (A record of foreign countries. It is contained in the *Chao-tai ts'ung-shu, ts'e 104.* The author's collected prose works, entitled *Chang Wen-chen chi,* also called *Li-hsing chai chi,* were copied into the Imperial Manuscript Library, the *Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu* or Complete Library in Four Branches of Literature and printed in 12 chüan). Peking 1792.

Chao I, *Nien-erh shih cha-chi* (Twenty-two Dynastic Histories. 36 chüan. 1799, contained in *Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng ch'u-pien, ts'e 2543-2552*, edited by the Commercial Press). Shanghai 1935.

Chao-tai ts'ung-shu see Chang Ch'ao.

Chia-ch'ing ch'ung-hsiu i-t'ung chih (Gazetteer of the Empire, revision of the Chia-ch'ing period in 560 chüan). Commercial Press edition, Shanghai 1934.

Chia-ch'ing hui-tien shih-li (Collected Statutes and Precedents of the Chia-ch'ing reign). Peking 1818. It is part of the *Ta-Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li*, 4th edition was published in 920 chüan in 1818 ; the 5th edition of this same collection was published in 1220 chüan in 1899.

Ch'ien Liang-Tse, *Ch'u-sai chi-lüeh* (Record of his trip when he accompanied the delegation that was to meet the Russians at Selenginsk). I used the text contained in *Man-Mō sōsho* (Edit. Naitō Torajirō) Vol. II. Tokyo 1920.

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Chung-hua pien-fang yü-ti ts'ung-shu (Geographical Collectanea of the border regions of China). Shanghai 1903.

Chu Shih-Chia, *Ming-tai ssu-i shu-mu* (Bibliography of the Relations of the Ming Dynasty with the four Barbarians), in *Yü-kung* 5 (1936) 137-158.

Fu Heng, *P'ing-ting Chun-ko-ehr fang-lüeh* (Official history of the campaigns against the Jün Γar Mongols. It is a continuation of the *P'ing-ting Shuo-mo fang-lüeh* by Chang Yü-Shu which deals with the campaigns against the Ölöds under Galdan from 1677-1698). Peking 1772.

Ho Ch'ang-Ling, *Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien* (A Collection of essays and memorials of the Ch'ing Dynasty concerning economic matters). 120 chüan. 1886.

Ho Ch'iu-T'ao, *Shuo-fang pei-ch'eng* (Historical source-book of the Northern Regions. In it appeared for the first time the *P'ing-ting lo-ch'a fang-lüeh* or the official account of the campaigns against the Russians between 1682 and 1689 leading up to the traty of Nerchinsk. It was presented to the Throne in 1860. It was published by Huang P'eng-Nien). 1881.

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Hsia Hsieh, *Chung-hsi chi-shih* (Record of Sino-Western Affairs). 24 chüan. 1868.

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Hsü Tsung-Liang, *Hei-lung-chiang shu-lüeh* (A sketch history of Heilungchiang). 6 chüan. 1891. I used the text in *Man-Mō sōsho* Vol. V. Tokyo 1922.

Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien see Ho Ch'ang-Ling.

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Huang-ch'ao wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao 300 chüan. Contained in *Chiu-t'ung*. (Edited by the Commercial Press in 20 Vols.). Shanghai 1936.

Huang Po-Lu, *Cheng-chiao feng-pao* (Public praise of the true religion. A collection of public documents, acts and edicts of the Chinese Emperors between 1635 and 1829). 2 chüan. Shanghai 1904.

K'ang-hsi shih-lu (Veritable Records of the K'ang-hsi period), see *Sheng-tsu Jen huang-ti shih-lu.*

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——— *Ming-tai ti shang-t'un chih-tu* (The merchant settlement system of the Ming Dynasty), in *Yü-Kung pan-yüeh-k'an* 5 (1935).

Wang Hsien-Ch'ien (Editor), *Tung-hua ch'üan-lu.* 425 chüan. 1884.

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Wu Han, *Yu seng-po tao huang-ch'üan* (From the begging-bowl of a monk to the imperial crown. It is the biography of the Hung-wu Emperor of the Ming Dynasty). Chungking 1944.

YANO JINICHI, *Shina kindai gaikoku kankei kenkyū* (A study of modern Chinese foreign relations). Tokyo 1928.

YIN KUANG-JEN and CHANG JU-LIN, *Ao-men chi-lüeh* (A Record of Macao). 2 chüan. 1751.

3. UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS

A. From the Roman Archives of the Society of Jesus (ARSI : Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu) the following Codices or Boxes of documents :

Ep. NN. 25 : P. Secretarii, 1688-1689. Registrum. 285 × 210 mm., ff. 127. [Letters of Ours 25 : Of Father Secretary, 1688-1689. Register of the outgoing letters of Father General.]

Jap. Sin. 48 : Japonia. Res gestae, 1650-1740. 330 × 245 mm., ff. 177. [Japan-China 48 : Japan. Accomplishments, 1650-1740.]

Jap. Sin. 102-103 : [Thomas Ignatius DUNIN SZPOT.] *Historiae Sinarum imperii, 1580-1687.* 285 × 210 et 295 × 230 mm., ff. 260 et 250. [Thomas Ignatius DUNIN SZPOT. History of the Chinese Empire, 1580-1687.]

Jap. Sin. 104-105 I-II : Thomas Ignatius DUNIN SZPOT. *Collectanea Historiae Sinensis, 1641-1707.* 208 × 200 et 295 × 230 mm., ff. 436 et 478. [Thomas Ignatius DUNIN SZPOT. Collectanea for the History of China, 1641-1707.]

Jap. Sin. 109-111 : Thomas Ignatius DUNIN SZPOT. *Collectanea pro Historia Sinica, 1664-1691.* 200 × 135 mm., pp. 252 et 568+42 et ff. 345.

Jap. Sin. 128 : Relationes et Documenta, 1686-1802. [Relations and Documents, 1686-1802.] It is a box, size 380 × 255 mm., containing unbound fascicles ff. 263. It contains the manuscripts of the Pereira Diary, for a detailed description of which see pp. 142-147.

Jap. Sin. 134 : Sina. Catalogi breves et triennales, 1621-1755. 330 × 250 mm., ff. 456. [China. Short and Triennial Catalogues, 1621-1755.]

Jap. Sin. 143 : It is a box without a title, size 250 × 200 mm., containing unbound fascicles ff. 241. The principle contents are : Apologia P. Ferdinandi Verbiest pro calendario et officio P. Ioannis Adami Schall, [An Apology by Father Ferdinand Verbiest in which he defends the calendar and the office of Father John Adam Schall] and Historia P. Adami Schall [The Story of Father Adam Schall.]

Jap. Sin. 148-149 : Epistolae P. Antonii Thomae. 330 × 245 mm., ff. 322, 323-655. [Letters of Father Anthony Thomas.]

Jap. Sin. 162 : Sina. Epistolae, 1652-1674. 330 × 230 mm., ff. 395. [China. Letters, 1652-1674.]

Jap. Sin. 164 : Sina. Epistolae, 1687-1690. 330 × 230 mm., ff. 386.

Lith. 42 II : Lithuaniae historia, 1678-1689. 295 × 230 mm., ff. 230-507. [History of Lithuania, 1678-1689.]

Pol. 79 : Poloniae, Lithuaniae epistolae, 1627-1723. 330 × 225 mm., ff. 261. [Letters from Poland and Lithuania, 1627-1723.]

B. From the Collection "Jesuítas na Ásia" of the Ajuda Library in Lisbon, Codex :

49-V-20. It has no title and contains various documents. It also contains a copy of the manuscript of the Pereira Diary. See p. 142.

COMPENDIARY NOTES

add. = added in text.
AHSI = Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu, (A historical periodical published by the Historical Institute of the Society of Jesus in Rome).
ARSI = Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, (The Roman Archives of the Society of Jesus, located at the Curia, Borgo S. Spirito 5, Rome).
corr. = corrected.
ed., éd. = edition, édition, éditeur.
e. g. = exempli gratia.
ibid. = ibidem.
om. = omitted in text.
op. cit. = opus citatum.
P. = Padre.
S. = Sacra, Santo.
t1, *t2* = text 1, text 2.

INTRODUCTION
TO FATHER PEREIRA'S DIARY

CHAPTER I

RUSSIA'S EASTWARD EXPANSION

THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURES OF RUSSIAN EXPANSION [1]

Russia's expansion in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, which proved to be of lasting success, was in sharp contrast with the empire building of the Western European powers : Spain, Portugal, England, France and Holland. It was an overland and not a seaward expansion and was conditioned by four factors :

Seaboards. Though washed by a number of seas — in the north by the Arctic Ocean and the White Sea, in the northwest by the Baltic Sea and the Gulfs of Bothnia, Finland and Livonia, and in the south by the Caspian Sea, the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea — these waters have few locations suitable for seaports. Some of them are navigable for only a few months a year, and most of them, before the times of Peter I (the Great, 1689-1725) and Catherine II (the Great, 1762-1796), were not even permanent possessions of Russia.

River system. The excellent river system and the easy portage of the northern part of the Eurasian steppe zone (Pechora, Kama, Ob, Enisei, Lena, Amur rivers and their tributaries) appealed to the Russians who already had experience, and a long standing one, in this type of expansion. The Ural Mountains, rising from 1000 to 5500 feet above sea level, and their southern ranges, at the Kama — Chussovaya —

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[1] For detailed information see BADDELEY, *Russia, Mongolia, China* I. CH'EN FU-KUANG, *Sino-Russian Diplomatic Relations since 1689*, in *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review* 10 (1926). GAPANOVICH, *Russian Expansion on the Amur*, in *The China Journal* 15 (1931). KERNER, *The Urge to the Sea.* (This work is an excellent study of this phase of Russian development). KLEIN, *Der sibirische Pelzhandel und seine Bedeutung für die Eroberung Sibiriens.* LOBANOV-ROSTOVSKY, *Russia and Asia.* The characteristics of Russian expansion were observed as early as the Seventeenth Century by the Jesuit missionaries in China. See ARSI *Jap. Sin. 102* ff. 41v-43r.

Ob line, not much higher than 2000 feet, were not too difficult to cross. This facilitated Russia's eastward expansion, just as the treeless southern part of the Eurasian steppe zone had helped the westward migration of the Mongols into Europe in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries.

Sable. Sable and furs in general were, from early times, commodities in which Russia traded. And, indeed, as one German writer says: "Der Zobel hat die Erschliessung und Eroberung Sibiriens veranlasst; er hat auch einen grossen Teil der Kosten mit seiner Haut bezahlt."[2] It is true that in the later stages of the conquest of Siberia, the possibilities of agricultural colonization along with the acquisition of metallic treasures — gold, silver, and precious stones — added great attraction to it; yet the initial impulse was given by the seemingly unlimited riches in fur-bearing animals. When the number of these animals began to diminish in the Russian northeast, Siberia beckoned. This same process led ever farther eastward. This also accounts for another unique feature of the conquest of Siberia, namely, the rapidity with which it was accomplished.

Private enterprise. Unlike the explorers of the West, who were patronized in their undertakings by one government or another, the first Cossacks (Yermak, Koltso, etc.) were mere outlaws in the eyes of the Tsar. The Strogonov family of the Kama basin encouraged and assisted these pioneers. The Tsar rewarded them only after their achievements had become evident; he was too much occupied in European affairs to take an active interest. This, however, proved advantageous, since as a private enterprise it continued even while the Grand Dukes and Tsars were elsewhere engaged and even during the "Time of Troubles" (1603-1613).

EARLY EXPERIMENTS[3]

In the Sixteenth Century, at the time of Yermak's invasion, Western Siberia was not entirely unknown to the Russians.

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[2] KLEIN, *op. cit.*, pp. 5, 116.

[3] For further details, besides the works mentioned in n. 1, see COURANT, *La Sibérie colonie russe jusqu'à la construction du Transsibérien.* PAVLOVSKY, *Chinese-Russian Relations.* SEMIONOV, *La Con-*

Varagians and Novgorodians. The northeastern route of expansion had been prepared by the Varagians from the Ninth Century on. They were followed by the Novgorodians who were the first colonizers of these regions. The northern ranges of the Urals, however, presented some difficulties. Even after having made some headway the Novgorodians were faced with new adversities, the greatest of which was the inhospitality of the natives, called Yugras (Iougras), [4] who could not understand why they should pay tribute to these newcomers. Between 1032 and 1187 several expeditions were sent across the Urals without lasting success. As a result, very little was really known about this country of Yugria in Novgorod. The Mongol domination over the Eurasian steppe zone put an end to the exploration and exploitation of these territories by the Russians. We know that some of the Grand Dukes made trips to Saray, the capital of the Golden Horde on the Volga, and to Qara Qorum (Karakorum) in Mongolia, to the Court of the Great Qan, but not as exploiters of the native tribes, but as humble subjects of the Mongol Qans to be recognized and confirmed in their respective princedoms.

Moscovites. During the decline of the Mongol domination in Russia, Moscow tried to reopen the road towards the Urals. These new tentatives were made mostly after the final defeat of Novgorod by Moscow in 1478. The struggle between Novgorod and Moscow, which reached its height between 1471-1478, was fundamentally one of raw materials, that is furs, and of highways, river systems and portages. Ivan III (the Great) realized that for Moscow it meant empire, a new Russian developement, or disintegration. Thus, after their victory, the Moscovites lost no time in reopening the roads towards the Urals. This new tentative towards crossing the Urals was prepared by Bishop Stephen, later on venerated as a saint. A native of Ustiug, he built churches and monasteries in the region of Perm. And the expeditions were carried out by Moscow in the years 1465 and 1483. These campaigns brought the Moscovites in contact with the Voguls and other native tribes of Ural-Altaic extraction beyond the Urals and opened

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quête de la Sibérie du IX^e au XIX^e siècle. TREADGOLD, *The Great Siberian Migration.*

[4] Natives of Ugrian extraction. For these and other Ural-Altaic tribes to be mentioned later see Appendix 1.

the road for trade, if there were any private persons who dared to undertake trips into these territories. Since these newly opened territories in Permia and Yugria were harrassed by the Samojeds and other native tribes of Ural-Altaic extraction, Ivan III, in 1499, sent, an army four thousand strong under the leadership of Prince Semion Kurbsky against them. This army progressed as far as the Ob River and subjugated the northwestern part of what later became known as Siberia, bordered by the Frozen Sea, the Ural Mountains, the Konda and Ob Rivers. After this campaign, Ivan III assumed the title " Prince of Yugria " (Kniaz' Iugorskii) to which his son Basil IV added that of " Prince of Obdoria and Kondimia " (Kniaz' Obdorskii, Kondinskii). [5]

However, all these expeditions had dubious results, as the conquered territories were hard to maintain and the success hard to follow up. They also definitely proved the futility of trying to establish contact with the Trans-Uralian regions across the northern ranges of the Urals. Another century had to go by before a practicable route was discovered ; another element had to be added to the pattern of colonization before it led to success. In this task the Strogonov family played an important role.

Successful Invasion of Siberia [6]

The Strogonovs. Concerning the origin of the Strogonov family we have two different versions. According to some sources they were descendants of a Mongol, who, for treason had been subjected to the humiliating punishment of grating. According to others their ancestors were merchants from Novgorod. Whatever the truth, the first Strogonov, Spiridion, about whom there is documental evidence, was a merchant. He traveled between the region of the Dvina and Novgorod selling his merchandise to, or exchanging it with the Hansa merchants. His son Cosmas continued his father's business.

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[5] Treadgold, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

[6] Besides the works mentioned in nn. 1 and 3, see Barthold (transl. Donskis), *Histoire des Turcs d'Asie Centrale.* Barthold (transl. V. and T. Minorsky), *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia* I. Grousset, *L'Empire des Steppes.*

Cosmas in turn was succeeded by his son Luka, who set the destiny of the Strogonovs on its course. He foresaw the trend of the times, the rise of Moscow, and instead of turning his back on it he allied himself with the Prince of Moscow while maintaining good relations with Novgorod. Fiodor, the son of Luka, following his father's suggestion, transferred his home from the Dvina to the Vychegda and installed himself near a locality, which has since disappeared, called Solvychegodsk. Before his death Fiodor divided his holdings among his four sons. Anika, the youngest and the greatest of the Strogonovs, inherited the region around the paternal home Solvychegodsk, and at the age of seventeen concentrated his efforts on salt production, foundaries, and above all on fur trade with the Trans-Uralian territories, where he sent several expeditions. The route followed by these expeditions was still that of Stephen the Saint, from the Vychegda to the Vym, from there to the Pechora and its tributaries and from there across the Urals. He treated the natives with justice and they willingly sold their furs to him. Around this time fantastic legends were circulated in Moscow about the riches and the inhabitants of these territories called, by a name of unknown origin, " Magnaseia ". Ivan IV (the Terrible) had already sent an expedition into Siberia, which had gone as far as the Irtysh River. The Vogul and Ostiak population recognized Russian suzerainty, as did the Tartars [7] and the Prince of " Sibir " Ediger (Yadigar), chief of the Siberian Nogais. The principal locality of his territory, called Isker by the Tartars, stood on the right bank of the Irtysh, sixteen *versts* [8] downstream from where Tobolsk stands today. Ediger paid tribute to the Tsar in 1555 and 1556. It was at this time that Ivan IV assumed the title of " Lord of Sibir " (Povelitel Sibiri). To prevent any further direct intervention by the Tsar in these territories and to avoid misunderstandings, Anika Strogonov went to Moscow in 1557 to make a detailed report about Magnaseia. His loyal services and especially the presents he brought did not go unrecognized by the Tsar. Thus when, in 1558, Anika's sons Gregory and Jaka (Jakob) petitioned the Tsar to grant their settlers tracts of land along the Kama River which had already been penetrated by them under the guidance of Anika, they were authorized to build towns, develope industries and raise troops at their own expense. At this more southern point the Ural ranges proved less of an obstacle and it was from here that Maxim Strogonov sent Yermak on his successful expedition in 1578.

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[7] " Tartar ", since the Middle Ages, was a general term designating the Ural-Altaic tribes of Mongol and Turkish extraction.

[8] One *verst* is equal to 0.6629 mile, or 1.067 kilometers.

Sibir. The territories of Sibir (from which the name of Siberia is derived) had changed hands several times. During the reign of Ivan III (1462-1505) it was ruled by an Ostiak chief. Sixty years later it belonged to Ediger, who paid tribute to Ivan IV in 1555 and 1556 and continued to do so till 1563 when he was overthrown by Kuchum Qan. Kuchum belonged to the Uzbeks and was a descendant of Šiban (son of Joči and grandson of Činggis Qan). Šiban's descendants at this time ruled Hwârezm, Khiva and Bokhara, and Kuchum Qan extended his power over the Tartars of the Tobol-Irtysh region and over the steppes of Baraba. He accepted Russian suzerainty in 1569, but at the same time incited the natives against the Russians and forbade them to pay tribute to the Moscovites. He even sent his nephew, Mametkul, as far as the Chussovaya River to raid the Russians (1573). To free themselves from these harrassments, the Strogonovs obtained permission to raise troops. They hired the Cossacks. The leader of these Cossacks was Vasili Timofeevich Olenin, better known by his nickname " Yermak " (Millstone).

Yermak. The Cossacks had settled on the Volga River after they had helped Ivan IV in the subjugation of the Mongols of Kazan (1552) and Astrahan (1556). Since these Cossacks frequently held up and robbed the merchant caravans coming and going between Khiva, Bokhara, Persia and the Court of Moscow, Ivan sent his regular troops against them in 1557. The Cossacks were defeated and dispersed. Five *hatamans* (hauptman, headman) under the leadership of Yermak and Koltso with five-hundred and forty men ascended the Kama River and arrived at Orel Gorodok, the residence of Maxim Strogonov. He hired them and sent them into Siberia.

The first expedition of Yermak in 1578, which brought him and his men as far as the Silva River, was unsuccessful. So the next year they set out again. The first winter saw them at the Serebanka River. Then following the courses of the Tagil and Tura Rivers, they met the first Mongol troops whom they defeated. They passed the second winter in the region where Tiumen stands today. The natives were forced to provide Yermak and his men with food and furs. Then the Cossacks proceeded to the point where the Tobol enters the Irtysh and where Kuchum Qan had erected his residence. Here Yermak defeated Kuchum's forces on October 23, 1581. The result of this victory was that the Vogul and Ostiak population, which had been under Kuchum, submitted. Yermak received their hommage and collected the *iasak* (tribute). Up till then Yermak was no more than an outlaw in the eyes of the Tsar. For his further enterprises, however, Yermak needed reinforcements which only the Tsar could furnish. So he decided to send his lieutenant, Ivan Koltso, to Moscow with 2400 pieces of sable furs, 20 pieces of black fox furs and 50 pieces of beaver furs, informing the Tsar of his success in defeating Kuchum Qan and asking for reinforcements for further conquests. The Tsar, hearing about the success of Yermak, acquitted him of his punishment and sent him costly presents : two suits of armor and a considerable sum of money. From an outlaw Yermak became a hero. The following year Koltso returned to Sibir. Meanwhile Yermak had succeeded in defeating and capturing Mametkul, whom together with the newly collected *iasak* he sent to Moscow (1583). In the same year Ivan IV, in compliance with Yermak's request, sent the Voevode Simeon Bolshovskoy with five-hundred men to Siberia. There, however, things had taken a turn for the worse. The decimated forces of Yermak were overcome by the Tartars on a stormy night on an island of the Irtysh, where Yermak himself perished in 1584. Discouraged by these events, the remaining Cossacks left Sibir and Siberia which were taken over by Kuchum's son, who, however, was soon defeated by Sedjidsak, another Mongol Prince.

During his four years in Siberia, Yermak had brought all the Tartars of the Tura, Tobol and Irtysh under Russian domination, as well as the Ostiaks on the Irtysh and Ob, and the Voguls of the Tavda. Although these territories were lost again after Yermak's death, this loss was only temporary. A practicable road had been discovered, the pattern of invasion and expansion established.

Pattern of expansion. The enterprising Strogonov family had planned to occupy the territories into which Yermak had advanced. It was only after the successes of Yermak that the Tsar realized what a great opportunity had presented itself. For this reason, apparently, Moscow sent reinforcements to Yermak and completed the conquest of Siberia after Yermak's death. In so doing, the Russians abandoned the policy of raids, initiating one of planned domination of rivers and portages by the building of *ostrogs* (blockhouses or fortified places). All former enterprises, either those by the Novgorodians or those by the Moscovites (1465, 1483 and 1499), were in the manner of raids. Their pattern consisted in advancing into the native territories, in the levying of the *iasak* in furs and other such items as could be obtained from the natives, in the exacting of hommage and further promises of tribute, then withdrawal. Only after Yermak had undermined the power of Kuchum Qan in the Ob basin did the situation change. What had started as a private, chartered enterprise of the Strogonov family was taken over by the Tsar and became a state venture. The period of raids ended and the occupation of the territory began, thereby creating a defence for European Russia against raids from Asia and at the same time a profitable solid base for Russian expansion into Asia. By this planned movement, based on previous national experience, the Russians, during the first decade after Yermak's death, occupied nearly all the strategic bases along the Ob and subjugated the region. In the course of this process the native Ostiak, Vogul, Samojed and Qirghiz (Kirghiz) [9] tribes were forced to pay tribute in furs. The process of subjugation itself consisted in the control of rivers and portages by *ostrogs* from the Volga-Kama basin to the Ob. The same process led ever eastward. Thus, the successful pattern of expansion had emerged. In the pacification of the occupied territories the Russian Orthodox Church played an important role, by establishing churches and monasteries and by defending the interests of the natives. [10]

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[9] This name is spelled differently by different authors. BARTHOLD, *Histoire des Turcs d'Asie Centrale*, spells it Qirghiz, while GROUSSET, *op. cit.*, has Kirghiz.

[10] For a complete list of *ostrogs*, churches and monasteries see KERNER, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-190.

The Stages of Russian Expansion in Siberia [11]

The rapidity with which the occupation of Siberia was accomplished is a remarkable feature of Russian expansion and unique in the history of the world. In a decade and a half the western part of Siberia was under Russian control. But the great haste with which the first conquest proceeded made a thorough knowledge and description of these territories impossible. A complete description of all the individual campaigns of conquest is, therefore, also impossible : first, because these campaigns were of a chaotic nature emanating from different *ostrogs*, and second, because most of the descriptions or reports of these campaigns have been lost. All one can attempt to show are the main lines and the principal stages of the progress. These stages can be linked to the conquest of the great river basins and the establishment of strong central *ostrogs*, followed by a whole system of *ostrogs*.

The Ob basin. Yermak's death, which had taken place in 1584, was as yet unknown in Moscow. In 1585 Tsar Theodore decided to send a new Voevode, Ivan Mansurov, with a hundred men to take the place of Bolshovskoy who had been sent to Siberia in 1583. In the meantime, when Bolshovskoy learned upon his arrival in Siberia, about the death of Yermak and realized the difficulties of his own situation, he collected some *iasak* and then decided to return to Moscow. By 1586 Moscow had learned about Yermak's misfortune and new reinforcements, three-hundred men under two Voevodes, Vasili Shchukin and Ivan Masinoi, were sent out to aid Mansurov. However, by the time these reinforcements arrived, Mansurov had left Siberia. Shchukin and Masinoi decided to start operations on their own. Their first move was to establish a center of operations and thus in 1586 they founded Tiumen on the Tura River, settling the affairs of the native tribes on the Tura, Pisma, Islet, Tavda and Tobol Rivers. These successes moved the Tsar to send five hundred additional men to reinforce Tiumen. He also gave orders to establish another center on the Irtysh. In 1587 Tobolsk was founded at the point where the Irtysh and the Tobol Rivers unite. Kuchum Qan and other Mongol leaders were repeatedly defeated. Kuchum Qan fled to the Qalmuqs (Kalmuks, Kalmouks)[12] on the Upper Irtysh. In 1593 Pelym was founded in the heart of the country of the Voguls; Berezov on the banks of the Sosva as a center controlling the Ostiak and Samojed population on the Ob and Irtysh; Surgut on the right bank of the Ob as a center of the territories stretching as far as the Tom River. South of Tobolsk, Tara was founded in 1594 by Prince Andrei Eletsky at the special order of Moscow. It was an outpost between the steppes of Ishim and Baraba and aimed to protect Tobolsk from the Qazaq[13] and Nogai tribes, who roamed the Ishim, and against the Qalmuqs of the Upper Irtysh and Ob basins, who menaced Russian possessions from the Baraba steppes. In 1595 Obdorsk was founded at the mouth of the Ob. In 1596 the Surgut Cossacks established Narym at the confluence of the Ket and the Ob. controlling vast territories rich in sable but thinly populated by Ostiak natives. In 1600 Magnaseia was founded at the mouth of the Taz River. It was the center of control for a thinly populated country inhabited by Samojeds and very rich in sable. With these foundations settled, what later became the Province of Tobolsk, was under Russian domination.

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[11] Besides the works mentioned in nn. 1, 3 and 6, see Howorth, *History of the Mongols from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century*, 4 Vols. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period*, 2 Vols.

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[12] The Western Mongols, as distinguished from the Eastern Mongols, were known as the Qalmuq or Ölöd (<Ögeled). The Ölöd embraced the Qošūd tribe, the Turγūd tribe, the Qoros tribe, which in turn embraced the Jün Γar tribe, the Dörbed tribe and the Qoyid tribe. The Qošūd, Turγūd, Jün Γar and Dörbed were the four main tribes of the Western Mongols. Their alliance was called Oyirad or the Four Oyirad (Uriad) which, by a change of sound, was known to the Chinese of the Ming period as Wa-la or Wei-la. For the different spellings of these names: Oyirad (Oyrat, Öirat, Oirad, Urud); Qalmuq (Kalmuk, Kalmouk); Ölöd<Ögeled (Eluth, Eruth, Olot, Oeloet); Jün Γar (Jungγar, Dzunghar, Djoungar, Sungar) see W. FRANKE, *Yunglos Mongolei Feldzüge*, in *Sinologische Arbeiten* 3 (1945) 1-54. GROUSSET, *op. cit.*, pp. 582, 599-600. BARTHOLD, *opera citata*, passim. SAΓANG SEČEN (critical Introduction by MOSTAERT, edited by CLEAVES), *Erdeni-yin Tobči Mongolian Chronicle*. SERRUYS, *Genealogical Tables of the Descendants of Dayanqan*. The other great division of the Mongols were the Eastern Mongols. In Dayan Qan's day, and immediately thereafter, the Eastern Mongols divided themselves into Three Eastern (i. e. Left) Tümen, and Three Western (i. e. Right) Tümen. These Tümen, too, were divided into Left and Right " Patrols ". The Three Eastern Tümen were under the direct authority of the Qaγan (Great Qan), while the Three Western Tümen were governed, in the name of the Qaγan, by a jinong (loanword from the Chinese: chün-wang or lieutenant governor). The Three Western Tümen were the Ordos, the Twelve Tümed and a group including the Yüngsiyebü, the Asud and the Qaračin. The Three Eastern Tümen were the Čaqar, the Qalqa and the Uriangγan. As time went by, and especially at times when there was no strong Qaγan, these units tended to disintegrate and by the Seventeenth Century, when Legdan Qan of the Čaqar once more tried to reunify them, some of them preferred to submit to the Manchus. By 1600 the Ordos were divided into 42 groups; after their surrender to the Manchus (1635) around 1649-1650 they were organized into six Banners, to which, in 1736, a seventh was added. In the territory of the Twelve Tümed, besides the two larger divisions called Eastern and Western Patrols, there were four smaller divisions named after four tribes: Baya'ud, Üüsin (<Ügüsin), Urud (<Uruγud), and Bârin (<Baγarin). After their submission to the Manchus (1628), the Tümed Banner was created in 1635 and later on divided into two Banners. During the late Ming period, the territory of the Qaračin, together with that of the Asud, was said to be near Hsüan-fu and T'a-tung. The Qaračin allegedly formed a group under the control of the Yüngsiyebü, and at the end of the Ming period, they were divided into three groups: The Black, the Yellow and the Brown Qaračin. The same name " Qaračin " was given by the Manchus to a Banner in southern Jehol Province. The Jehol Qaračin

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may have come from the area north of Kalgan. Later, there were three Qaračin Banners. The Čaqar were the apanage of the Qaγan and at the end of the Sixteenth Century they resided in modern Jehol Province, north of the Sira-müren (upper course of the Liao River). Before 1550 they had lived farther west. The Čaqar were divided into five large camps. They did not become troublesome or oppress the other Mongols until the succession to the throne of Legdan Qan (r. 1604-1634). After the death of Legdan and the defeat of the Čaqar, Legdan's son surrendered to the Manchus in 1635. Legdan's successors ruled the Čaqar until 1675 when the line of the Qaγan of the Mongol people came to an end. From then on the Čaqar were governed by the Manchus through a resident directly responsible to the Peking government. There were Twelve Qalqa until Alču-Bolod separated from them and became the ruler of the Five Qalqa who, in turn, later formed part of the 49 Banners of Inner Mongolia. The remaining Seven Qalqa of Outer Mongolia were divided into the Qalqa ayimaγs of the Tüsiyetü Qan, the Sayin-Noyan Qan, the Sečen Qan, and the Jasaγtu Qan. After the surrender of the remnants of the Seven Qalqa to the Manchus in 1691, the four ayimaγs were further divided into 87 Banners. The Uriangγan in northwestern Mongolia had come under the Qalqa. For a more complete listing of the Mongol tribes see works cited above in this note and Appendix 1. For most of the spellings adopted here and hereafter I am indebted to Professor Francis W. Cleaves of Harvard University.

[13] Other spellings of this name are: Qazakh or Kazakh, see BARTHOLD, *opera citata*. GROUSSET, *op. cit.*, passim. HUMMEL, *op. cit.*, I pp. 265-266. Also see Appendix 1.

While the administrative organization of the already occupied territories proceeded, Russian expansion progressed in two directions: in a south-southeastern and a north-northeastern direction.

Even after the establishment of Tobolsk and Tara *ostrogs*, Kuchum Qan's family continued to resist. With the help of the Mongols of the Baraba steppes and of the Qalmuq they many a time raided Russian territory. Although new *ostrogs* were established, Abatskii on the Vagai River (1633), Isetskii on the Islet River (1650), these raids continued. Consequently in 1659 Tobolsk, Tiumen and Tara were ordered by the Tsar to undertake a joint expedition against these Mongols. After this expedition the descendants of Kuchum Qan are not mentioned any more. But other Mongol tribes still threatened. Beginning from the middle of the Sixteenth Century, the Qalmuq, chased out of Mongolia by the rising power of Dayan Qan's successors, expanded northwestward, trying to establish their suzerainty over the native tribes as well as over the Bashkir, Qazaq, Qirghiz, Nogai and Uzbek tribes. The Turγǖd, who in the Sixteenth Century lived in the Tarbagatai region, endangered by the rising power of the Jün Γar[14], moved westward. In 1616 they appeared on the Emba and Iaik Rivers and around 1650 settled on the Volga. In their wake came the Jün Γar pushed by Altyn (Altïn) Qan and the Western Qalqa[15], who at the beginning of the century camped around Obsa-nuur. These war-like Mongols in their own element, the steppes, could not be conquered by the Russians. Consequently in this direction the method of expansion had to be changed. Instead of invasion and control by *ostrogs*, the method of diplomatic missions, to obtain voluntary submission rewarded by promises of the Tsar's protection against their enemies, was put into practice.

In the meantime Russian expansion east north-eastward continued. Tomsk was founded in 1604 and Kuznetsk in 1618. In this direction the Russians entered a new river basin.

The Enisei basin. In 1605 some Cossacks discovered the Kas and Sym Rivers, both tributaries of the Enisei. The Ostiak population of the region, however, did not submit easily. They paid tribute to the Qirghiz, who in their turn were allies of the Qalmuq and Qalqa Mongols and frequently raided Russian controlled territories. The Tungusic tribes, who lived in the territories east of the Enisei and stretched as far as the Sea of Okhotsk and the Buriyad Mongols of the Lake Baikal[16] region, also intervened many times in these raids. To pacify these territories Peter Albitchev established Eniseisk (1619) at the point where the Upper Tunguska enters the Enisei, and Andrei Dubensky founded Krasnoiarsk (1627). Around these central *ostrogs* the *ostrog* system of the Enisei basin was constructed. However, the Tungusic peoples of this region were obstinate and revolted frequently, even after their subjection, as did the Buriyad Mongols. To ease the situation, Maxim Perfiliev, a Cossack *hataman* from Eniseisk, tried to penetrate the Buriyad country, but his campaign failed against the strong resistence of the Buriyad.

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[14] See n. 12.

[15] See n. 12 and Appendix 1.

The Lena basin. In a more northeasterly direction Russian expansion progressed more smoothly. The Iakut population offered less resistence. Maxim Perfiliev, who in 1631 had founded Bratsk *ostrog*, had previously discovered the territories between the Angara and the Lena. The authorities of Eniseisk granted permission for the foundation of Ilimsk *ostrog* (1631). From here Peter Beketov had set out with an expedition which descended the Lena into Iakut territory. He had no difficulty in establishing Iakutsk on the Lena in 1632. Now a conflict developed between the Russians coming from Eniseisk and those coming from Magnaseia (under the jurisdiction of Tobolsk), who had also explored these territories. This conflict lasted till 1641 when an independent Voevode was sent to Iakutsk in the person of Peter Golovin. The northeastern part of Siberia was now explored. But to safeguard these territories and their future progress, the Russians once more had to turn their attention to the Buriyad Mongols.

The Buriyad Mongols are first mentioned in the Russian annals in 1612 and 1622; but actual contact was not made with them till 1627, when Maxim Perfiliev visited them. Since he was unable to bring them into submission, he returned to Eniseisk in 1628. In that same year the Cossack captain Peter Beketov built the fort of Rybnoi (Rybenskoi), whence he visited the Buriyads who lived on the Oka River. The Voevode of Eniseisk, Yakov Khripunov, was also attracted by the rumours that the Buriyads were rich in silver. But both these expeditions were without lasting results. In 1631 the Russians built a fort near the mouth of the Oka which they called Bratsk (Bratskoi), after a native Buriyad tribe. From here Maxim Perfiliev led another expedition against the Buriyads to avenge the death of a Cossack killed by them. The Buriyad gave him and his men some presents which the Russians considered as tribute. The Buriyad resented this and not only refused to continue to pay tribute but also persuaded the Tungusic tribes to discontinue such payment. In 1635 the Buriyad killed Danaev and fifty-two Cossacks who had formed the garrison of Bratsk. A punitive expedition was sent out which finally reduced them. In 1639 Bratsk controlled the territories from the Vichorefka (a tributary of the Angara) to the Uda River. In 1647 the Uda Buriyads, threatened by other Mongols, sent envoys to Krasnoiarsk asking the Russians to establish an *ostrog* in their territories. This fort became known as Udinsk. However, as soon as the Mongol danger disappeared their zeal to pay tribute also diminished and in 1652 Bukanov had to bring them once more into submission. In 1654 Balagansk (named after a Buriyad tribe) was founded on the Angara by Dimitri Firsov. In 1658 the heavy hand of Ivan Pokhabov, Voevode of Balagansk, caused a rebellion among the Buriyads, who emigrated to the Mongols. In 1659 hardly any tribute was collected in Balagansk. Meanwhile the Russians coming from Iakutsk had already reached Lake Baikal (1643 and 1647), when the Cossack Kolesnikov built Verkhe-Angarsk at the point where the Angara enters Lake Baikal. In 1646 several expeditions were sent out from Eniseisk to explore the country beyond Lake Baikal where they came into contact with the subjects of Sečen Qan (of the Qalqa), from whom they learned that the gold and silver about which the Russians had heard came from China. In 1648 Ivan Galkin founded Barguzin. In 1652 Irkutsk[17] was established. While the subjection of the Angara and Baikal Buriyads was underway, from 1631 on, the Lena Buriyads were also being subjected. Vasili Vitisev built Verkholekns

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[16] In Mongolian the name of this Lake is Bayiγal.

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[17] According to some authors Irkutsk derives its name from the Erke'üd or Erkeküd Mongols, descendants of the mediaeval Nestorians. See SERRUYS, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-124.

(1642) to control the Lena Buriyads. They revolted several times but were finally pacified in 1655.

Thus, the stage was set for the last and most important act of Russian expansion : the invasion of the Amur basin. For the first time the Russians came face to face with the Chinese.

INVASION OF THE AMUR BASIN [18]

The Russians received the first news about the Amur River from a party of Cossacks who had come from Tomsk, in 1636, to the Aldan River to collect the tribute among the Tungusic population. Some of these Cossacks, led by Ivan Moskvitin, advancing eastward, reached the Sea of Okhotsk and built a fort there near the mouth of the Ulya River (1639). Here the Cossacks heard the news from the natives of the Ud River basin ; further south there lived tribes along the Zeya and the Shilka [19], who cultivated the soil and with whom the natives, themselves, traded sables for grain.

In the same year, 1639, some other Cossacks under Maxim Perfiliev, who had come from Eniseisk to the Vytim, heard similar reports concerning the Shilka basin. They learned about Lavkai, a Daurian Prince, who lived on the Urka and whose people kept cattle and cultivated the soil. Silver, copper and lead ores were also said to be found in his territory ; an active trade was being carried on with China.

When these reports reached the ears of the Voevode of Iakutsk, Peter Petrovich Golovin, and those of the Voevode of Eniseisk, Afanasei Pashkov, both determined to explore the Amur basin.

Expeditions emanating from Iakutsk. After a first expedition sent by Golovin, via the Vytim River, had proved unsuccessful, he assigned the *Dyak* (secretary) Vasili Poyarkov to lead another one. Poyarkov's expedition consisted of one hundred and thirty-two men and left Iakutsk on July 15, 1643. Poyarkov ascended the Aldan and its tributaries, the Uchora and the Gonoma, where at the end of September he was forced to set up his winter quarters. Leaving forty men to guard his provisions, he himself, with the remainder of his outfit, continued his journey by land. After four weeks he reached the Brianda, a tributary of the Zeya. Descending the Zeya he met Tungus natives who had reindeer and horned cattle. In eleven more days he reached the first Daurian village. At first the Russians were well received by these natives. Because of the cruel exploitation, however, the natives turned against them and the ranks of the Russians were thinned by famine. Nearly fifty men had died by the time the forty Cossacks arrived who had been left behind at the Gonoma. Poyarkov decided to pursue his journey without further delay. After passing a few more Daurian villages he came to the mouth of the Zeya. Here the Daurian population was more numerous and they tilled the soil. Three weeks later Poyarkov and his men reached the mouth of the Sungari. Twenty-three of his men, whom he had sent out to reconnoiter, were slain by the Ducher, inhabitants of the Amur banks from the Zeya to four days march beyond the Ussuri. In six more weeks Poyarkov and his men reached the mouth of the Amur. Four of these weeks were spent among the Achan a tribe inhabiting the lower course of the Amur, who like the Gilyak paid no tribute to any foreign power. Among the latter Poyarkov fixed his winter quarters and collected as tribute twenty-eight *sorok* (one sorok consists of forty pieces) of sable. In the spring of 1645 he embarked and by sea reached the mouth of the Ulya, where he wintered. Early in the following year he continued his journey to Iakutsk, and arrived there on the 12th of June, 1646. Poyarkov's report corrected the false impression about the riches of these territories and pointed out the possibilities in agriculture and fur trading. In his opinion three hundred men would have sufficed to subject all the territories visited by him. Three *ostrogs* with a garrison of fifty men each should be erected in the country of the Daur and the Ducher, and the remaining hundred and fifty men kept as a mobile force in case the collection of the tribute was opposed. Provisions were plentiful and no serious resistence was to be expected.

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[18] Besides the works listed in nn. 1, 3, 6 and 11 see SABIR, *Le Fleuve Amour.* DUDGEON, *Historical Sketch of the Ecclesiastical, Political and Commercial Relations of Russia with China.* LIU HSÜAN-MIN, *Russo-Chinese Relations up to the Treaty of Nerchinsk*, in *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review,* 23 (1940). A. KRAUSSE, *Russia in Asia.* VLADIMIR (ZENONE VOLPICELLI), *Russia on the Pacific and the Siberian Railway.* G. E. WRIGHT, *Asiatic Russia.* YAKOVLEVA, *Pervii Russko-Kitaiskii Dogovor 1689 goda.*

[19] Shilka is the name of the upper course of the Amur before it unites with the Argun River.

Poyarkov's account kept interest in the Amur region alive. When in 1647 some hunters on the Olekma heard of a shorter and easier route to the Amur, measures were taken to render it available. Cossacks were sent to establish an *ostrog* at the confluence of the Tugir and the Olekma, and some of them, crossing the dividing ranges (1648), reached the Urka, and descending from it reached the Amur. The information about Lavkai was confirmed. However, their party not being strong enough, they returned to the Olekma.

Next year Yerofei Pavlovich Khabarov proposed the subjection of these territories to the newly appointed Voevode of Iakutsk, Dimitri Andreevich Transbekov. Khabarov, a trader by profession, asked permission to undertake this expedition at his own expense, promising to send the *iasak* to Iakutsk. The Voevode consented, and Khabarov set out in the spring of 1649. He spent the first winter at the Tugir, and in January 1650 continued his journey to the Amur on sledges. The memories left by Poyarkov prompted the natives to flee. Instead of one fortress belonging to Lavkai, Khabarov and his men found five, most of them deserted. After destroying the others, Khabarov returned to the first one, which was the strongest and offered the most conveniences for communicating with Tugirsk. Here the Cossacks also discovered large pits of grain. Well satisfied with his success, Khabarov, with a few men, returned to Iakutsk, where he arrived in March 1650. He was well received by the Voevode, who gave him twenty more men and permission to enlist as many hunters and trappers as he could. Khabarov hastened back to the Amur with the intention of exploring it to its mouth. Destroying Lavkai's fort in June 1651, Khabarov set out by boat down the Amur. Having passed several Daurian villages, they came to one with a triple fortification the garrison of which was reinforced with fifty Manchu horsemen, sent out by the Shun-chih Emperor to collect the tribute. The Russians took the fort and repulsed an attack of the Manchu, who had left the fort to collect reinforcements. Some of the prisoners taken by the Russians were sent as messengers to the neighboring Princes ordering them to send in their submission to the Tsar. One of these Princes ordered to submit was Albaza (Albaju)[20]. In July

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[20] A Daur chief after whom the town of Albazin was named later on.

Khabarov and his men continued sailing down the Amur. Most of the Daurian villages were abandoned ; and from those where the population had remained and which were taken by the Russians, the population afterwards fled. The country around the mouth of the Sungari was inhabited by the Gogul and below the Sungari by the Ducher. Both tribes cultivated the soil and raised cattle. Several days journey below the Sungari they entered the country of the Achan, who depended mainly on the produce of fish for their sustenance. In September Khabarov came to a large village of the Achan where he resolved to winter, and built the fort Achansk (Achanskoi gorod). The addition of two hundred men to the population of a relatively small village, especially since these men were unwilling to pay for the provisions, formed a sufficient reason for hostilities on the part of the natives. The Ducher and Achan tribes also sought protection from the Manchus. The Shun-chih Emperor ordered Haise, the special defence commissioner at Ninguta, to march against them and to take them alive if possible. Haise, with 2020 horsemen armed with bows, matchlocks, and six iron cannons, attacked the Russians on March 24, 1652, but was defeated.

The country around Achansk was by no means fertile, and Khabarov, apprehensive of renewed attacks by the Manchus, resolved to reascend the Amur. In April 1652 he left his winter quarters. At the mouth of the Sungari he met an army of 6000 Manchu and Ducher but succeeded in avoiding them. Beyond the Bureya Mountains he met one hundred and eighteen Cossacks and hunters who had been sent from Iakutsk to reinforce him. They were led by Tretiak Yermolaevich Chechigin and Artemei Philippovich Petrilovsky.

These men had left Iakutsk in the summer of 1651, soon after Khabarov departed on his second journey. In September they arrived at the Amur but the approaching winter forced them to stop near the Kumara River. In May 1652 Nagiba was sent out to inform Khabarov of the arrival of these reinforcements, but was unable to make contact with Khabarov. Nagiba and his men were attacked several times by the natives and in July they arrived at the mouth of the Amur. Since it was considered unfeasible to return the way he came, Nagiba decided to return to Iakutsk via the Sea of Okhotsk, as Poyarkov had done. He arrived in Iakutsk in September 1653.

Khabarov, reinforced, considered himself strong enough to maintain himself on the Amur. He ascended the river, collected the *iasak* from the natives, and was just about to build a fort opposite the Zeya when a mutiny broke out in his camp. Out of three hundred and forty-eight men, one hundred and thirty six, led by Polyakov, Ivanov and Vasiliev deserted and sailed down the Amur. Some of them returned later, others might have died, slain by the natives, or gone over to the Chinese. At the beginning of August Khabarov sent for reinforcements to Iakutsk. He considered six thousand men sufficient to resist 40,000 Manchus. No such force was available at the time in Siberia, and the Voevode sent the messengers to Moscow, where the conquest of the Amur had already been under consideration for some time. After having sent for reinforcements, Khabarov, in 1652, seems to have ascended the Amur to the mouth of the Kumara, where he built Kumarsk (Kumarskoi) *ostrog* on an island opposite the mouth of the river.

Reports about the excesses committed by the Russians had reached even Moscow, and it was resolved to send an army of three thousand to occupy these newly explored territories in a more efficient manner. Prince Ivan Ivanovich Lobanov-Rostovsky was chosen to command the expedition, and Dimitri Ivanovich Simofiov with a small body of troops was sent in advance to prepare the way. The latter left Moscow in March 1652 and reached the Lena late in autumn. He continued his journey to the Olekma in the spring of 1653, and then went to Iakutsk to consult with the Voevode. Then, without further delay, he continued his journey and in August met Khabarov and his men on the Zeya. Small gold medals were presented Khabarov and his men in the name of the Tsar as an acknowledgement of their services. Simofiov then proceeded with the execution of the instructions he had from Moscow. Khabarov was to go to Moscow to report in person on these new territories. The command of all Russian forces on the Amur was handed over to Onufrei Stepanov. Tretiak Chechigin, with four men, was to lead an embassy to Peking. Three forts were to be built, one at the mouth of the Zeya, a second one at the site of Albaza's village and a third one at the mouth of the Argun River. The soil was to be cultivated, and one year's provision for an army of six thousand collected. The embassy for Peking departed, but Chechigin and his companions were killed on the road by their Ducher guides. Simofiov departed with Khabarov, who upon his arrival in Moscow was rewarded by the Tsar. He was ennobled (made a syn boyarsky), sent back to Siberia where all the villages on the Lena from Ust-Kut to Chinsk (Chinskoi) *volok* were placed under his superintendence. He never returned to the Amur. Only later was the town of Khabarovsk named after him.

Stepanov, however, failed to carry out Simofiov's orders. Instead of building the forts, he descended the Amur to the mouth of the Sungari where he wintered. In 1654 he visited the Sungari again but ran short of supplies. When he again mounted the Amur he met thirty Eniseisk Cossacks who had left their leader Beketov, and later encountered Beketov himself. He resolved to spend the winter at the mouth of the Kumara. The old fort built by Khabarov had been destroyed, so Stepanov had it rebuilt. The Russian garrison numbered five hundred men. In the spring of 1655 a Chinese army, 10,000 strong, with cannons and matchlocks besieged the fort for three weeks but could not take it. Before leaving his winter quarters, he sent the tribute he had collected directly to Moscow instead of to the Voevode of Iakutsk. Meanwhile, Feodor Pushkin, with fifty Cossacks, had been sent from Iakutsk to the Argun (1654) where Stepanov was to build an *ostrog*. He met Stepanov at the mouth of the Sungari, and together they ascended the river and collected provisions for a year. They then sailed down the Amur and built an *ostrog* in the country of the Gilyak, which they called Kosogirski (Kossogorskii). During the winter over 120 *sorok* of sable and other furs were collected. In the spring of 1656 he reascended the Amur, but found the villages of the natives deserted. He ascended the Sungari but here too found the villages deserted. He learned that the inhabitants had been ordered by the Chinese to move further up the Sungari and settle there. Thus, unable to collect supplies, Stepanov's provisions began running short. In July he sent Pushkin and Beketov to carry the tribute to Moscow. He seems to have spent the winter 1657 - 1658 at Kumarsk. When he again ascended the Amur he met a fleet of forty Chinese boats below the Sungari. Some of his men deserted before the battle; he and the rest of his men were either slain or taken prisoners by the Chinese. Fifty *sorok* of sable fell into the hands of the victors. Since the originally planned expedition under Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky was given up because of disturbances in Western Siberia, only a letter was sent to Stepanov, assuring him of the Tsar's special favor, urging him towards leniency with the natives, and warning him against unnecessary conflicts with the Chinese. The letter, however, arrived too late. And so the invasion of the Amur basin emanating from Iakutsk came to an end.

Expeditions emanating from Eniseisk. While the exploration of the Amur from Iakutsk was in progress, some Eniseisk Cossacks who had gone beyond Lake Baikal and had crossed the Iablonoi Mountains, brought back news about the rich Amur region to Pashkov, the able Voevode of Eniseisk (1652), who then proceeded to organize an expedition of his own. The command of this expedition was entrusted to Beketov. In June 1652 Beketov left Eniseisk with one hundred Cossacks. On his arrival at Bratsk he sent Maximov with twenty men in advance to Lake Irgen to collect tribute and make preparations for crossing the mountains the following summer. Beketov wintered at the mouth of the Selenga. In June 1653 he ascended the Selenga and was met by Maximov on the Khilok River. Here an *ostrog* was built and twenty-five *sorok* of sable collected and sent to Eniseisk. In the spring of 1654, descending the Ingoda and the Shilka to the Nercha River, they started to build an *ostrog* there. For a while the relations of the Russians with the native Daurian population and their chief, Ghantimur, were cordial. But soon Ghantimur became dissatisfied and left the region with his people. The remaining Tungusic tribes harrassed the Russians, whose provisions were running low. Thirty of his men left Beketov and descended the Amur. Beketov himself had no other choice but to follow them. He then met and joined forces with Stepanov.

Undeterred by the scant success of Beketov's expedition, Pashkov proposed to Moscow the founding of a town on the Shilka. His proposal was approved and he was made commander-in-chief of all the Russian forces on the Amur. The necessary ammunition for his expedition was to be supplied by Tobolsk and the provisions by Ilimsk. In July 1656 Pashkov left Eniseisk with five hundred and sixty-six men. He wintered at Bratsk. In the summer of 1657 he got as far as Lake Irgen and in the following spring he continued his journey to the Shilka, where, at the mouth of the Nercha, he founded Nerchinsk. Ammunition and supplies were running low, so he sent Potapov with thirty men down the Amur (1658) to inform Stepanov of the new situation and to order him to send a hundred men to Nerchinsk. They were, however, too late since Stepanov had already perished in the battle on the Sungari. Only seventeen of Stepanov's men joined Pashkov in 1661, and at the time the Russians had no forces on the Amur. Pashkov moved his headquarters to Irgensk, leaving only a small garrison at Nerchinsk, and in 1662 he returned to Eniseisk. Later on Larion Tolbuzin became Voevode of Nerchinsk. Under his and Daniel Archinsky's able command Nerchinsk rose to importance.

The founding of Albazin.[21] A new Russian era on the Amur was inaugurated by the founding of Albazin in 1669. Nikifor Chernigovsky, who in 1665 had killed Lavrenti Obukov, Voevode of Ilimsk, fled with eighty-four other outlaws to the Amur. He established himself at Albaza's village and the *ostrog* became known as Albazin. The outlaws at Albazin were reinforced by other parties and the *iasak* was regularly sent to Nerchinsk. In 1671 Ivan Okolkov was sent from Nerchinsk to assume the supreme command at Albazin. In 1672 some peasants arrived to till the soil. The outlaws now petitioned Moscow for pardon and their former sentences were commuted, and the bearer of their petition returned to Albazin with a substantial present from the Tsar. The exploitation of the natives was resumed. In 1676 Yashnoi *zimovie* had been built to collect the tribute on the Upper Zeya. Another *ostrog* Zeisk was built there in 1678. In 1679 Selembinsk was built on the Selemba River, and Dolonsk on the Dolonsa. But these were small stations and so in 1681 Feodor Demesevich Voikov, Voevode of Nerchinsk, directed Ignati Milovanov to explore the Zeya and the Selemba. In 1682 Milovanov in his report (accompanied by a map) proposed to found a town either at the mouth of the Zeya or in the neighborhood of the Argun River, positions well suited for trade with China. The government, however, decided to strengthen the already existing positions and ordered Milovanov to establish himself at Selembinsk and to collect the tribute. At the close of

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[21] For a list of works concerning the founding of Albazin see PAVLOVSKY, *op. cit.*, p. 176, n. 216.

1682 the Russian settlements on the Amur and its tributaries were : Albazin and a number of villages in its vicinity ; Novo Zeisk, Selembinsk and Dolonsk named after rivers of similar names ; Tugirsk and Udsk at rivulets falling into the Sea of Okhotsk.

However, in 1683 the Chinese launched an energetic campaign against the Russians on the Amur. By the close of it all the Russian settlements had been destroyed. Albazin alone remained : the Chinese concentrated their efforts there. The story of these campaigns is discussed in a later chapter.

Change of Strategy

Russian expansion, after its initial success in Western Siberia, progressed in three directions :

Northeastward. In this direction the Russians encountered tribes of a lower cultural standard and of a more primitive civilization. Their military organization was weak, and they were politically unprotected. Consequently the well-established pattern of Russian expansion was successful. The Russians raided these territories, levied *iasak*, exacted homage and promises of further tribute and then withdrew until such time as they could establish a planned domination of river and portage systems through the building of *ostrogs.* This was the pattern and method of colonization in the Ob, Enisei and Lena basins and it was successful.

Southward. However, when the Russians turned southward as in Western Siberia and in the Trans-Baikal region, they encountered steppe nomads. These tribes and especially the Mongols were more warlike and had a better military organization and in their own element, the steppes, they could put up a much stronger resistence. They also formed alliances, and some of them recognized Chinese sovereignity directly or indirectly. Against these peoples a new method of subjection, that of diplomatic missions, was put into practice.

Eastward. During the first years of the Russian exploration of the Amur the method employed was the same as that used in the Ob, Enisei and Lena basins. The natives, mostly Tungusic tribes, were not highly civilized and had no strong military organization. They were under Chinese suzerainty and sought help from the Manchu Emperors of China. Since, during the first wave of Russian invasion into the Amur basin, the Manchu government in China was tied down by internal affairs and in no position to send sufficient armies and military supplies, they tried to halt the Russian advance by creating a supply problem for the invaders through a " scorched-earth " policy. They advised the natives to destroy their grains and to leave their territories. When the Russians first arrived on the Amur, the natives cultivated fields and kept cattle. Ten years later the fields lay deserted and the country which formerly exported grains, could not even support its own reduced population. This was a planned strategy. Because of it the Russians were faced with the problem of themselves supplying their advances. Western Siberia was too far away and the transportation problem to support a full-scale invasion too difficult to solve. But the problem had to be solved, and the obvious solution would have been agricultural colonization. This, however, could not yet be implemented because the people needed for it were not available. Moreover, after the situation in China was under control, the Manchus were free to start their military campaigns against the Russians who were not prepared for such military endeavors. Consequently, the Russians were forced, for the time being, to settle for diplomatic and trade relations.

Administration and Social Conditions in Siberia [22]

The Administration. The central administration of this vast new empire became more and more complex as time went by. Up to 1599 Siberia was under the jurisdiction of the *Posolski* (Ambassadors') *Prikaz*, or Foreign Department. From 1599 till 1637 the central administration of these territories was given to the *Kazanski Prikaz*, dealing with the eastern territories. In 1637 a special *Sibirski Prikaz* (Department of Siberian Affairs) was created.

As for the local administration, the administrators of the colonial districts were the Voevodes. They were in command of the detachment of troops given them by the Tsar. To this military authority, which placed them above all others, even the Cossack *hatamans*, they also united the highest civil authority, which in the annexed territories transformed them into veritable governors. In legal matters the Voevode judged all civil and criminal cases excepting cases involving capital punishment, which had to be referred to Moscow. The Voevodes established their headquarters at important localities and their authority was unlimited, both over Russians and the natives. He was the one who executed the orders of the *Sibirski Prikaz*. Rifts, however, frequently developed between Voevodes concerning the yet unexplored territories. To forestall such conflicts, the settlement of which in faraway Moscow would have taken too long, Tobolsk and Tomsk were in 1629 made the two principal places in Siberia, or Provincial Cities, each one receiving an *état-major* sent from Moscow. This *état-major* consisted of a Voevode, a Lieutenant-Voevode, two or three *Dyaks* (assessors or secretaries, whose task, besides helping the Voevode, was also to supervise his activities), and some *Pismennie Golovy* (scribes inferior in rank to the *Dyaks* but with similar functions). The other places where Voevode resided were called *Voevodstvo* which had a similar but somewhat simpler organization (Voevode, Lieutenant-Voevode, one *Dyak* and one *Pismennie Golova*). The sphere of activity of the *Voevodstvo* was more limited than that of the two Provincial Cities, and in certain matters (e. g., leading expeditions into unexplored territories) they were subject to these, while in others they depended directly from Moscow. But conflicts and confusion still persisted, especially concerning the exploration of the Amur region. This was not remedied effectively till 1708, the time of the administrative reforms of Peter the Great, when Tobolsk became one of the eight capital cities of Governments (Provinces) and the commander of Irkutsk received the title of Lieutenant-Governor but with all the attributes of a veritable Governor of Eastern Siberia.

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[22] Besides the works listed in nn. 1, 3, 6, 11 and 18, see LANTZEFF, *Russian Colonial Administration.*

The main duty of these officials, high and low, consisted in the collection of taxes. The central government proclaimed a liberal policy. The Tsar enjoined his agents to act with consideration. The program was good but the reality far from good. This depended on the whole system of administration in the Moscow kingdom. Its officials did not receive a salary but a *korm* (or "nourishment"), levied on the population; and as they readily took bribes, they nourished themselves very well. This system was later on abolished but did not die out entirely, especially in the remote provinces. Taxation as practiced in Siberia was altogether arbitrary and the local officials secured greater advantages from it than the Tsar's treasury. Many officials were permeated with corruption. The Siberian natives were obliged to pay tax in furs (iasak), which even in itself and without being aggravated by the bribes to officials, was heavy enough; as it consisted of fifteen sables for a married man and ten for an unmarried one.

In these extortions the officials were not the only guilty ones. Every Russian settler wanted to share in the booty; and it was just here that the foreign invasion was most onerous. The newcomers, naturally, were unmarried men and needed women, whom they could only get by taking them forcibly from the natives. This privilege of conquest, called *iassyr*, supplied them at the same time with wives and slaves whom they could and did sell as it pleased them. This form of trade became so widespread that a Tungus girl could be bought for seven fox skins. The natives resisted this practice most vehemently. The historian of Siberia, Ogloblin, says that the practice of *iassyr* was the main cause of the numerous revolts of the natives in the Seventeenth Century. The situation became more favorable in the Eighteenth Century, when the government tried to abolish abuses. Enslavement on whatever basis was prohibited and the *iasak* regulated.

Population. The Russian program of colonization, at least in its initial stage, was carried out by private enterprise, that of merchants and Cossacks. The merchants, who were agents of rich Russian trading companies accustomed to trading in the north, represented the civilian side of the conquest, while the Cossacks, who had a share in the booty, represented the military side. This organization or arrangement was called *Pokruta* (Enlistment). After the central government stepped in, the military side of the conquest was strengthened by the addition of the *Streltsy* (the first regular troops in Russia, founded by Ivan the Terrible), while the civilian population was increased by the arrival of the *Promyshleniki* (hunters and trappers), artisans, peasants and deportees. As early as 1586, peasants were sent from Russia for colonization and were provided with horses, cows and ploughs. But apart from this, a regular stream of private emigration started attracting runaway serfs, adventurers, etc. The first group of deportees arrived in Siberia in 1653. New groups came year after year.

Their number increased noticeably after the abolition of capital punishment by the Empress Elisabeth in 1753. As a result of this influx, the Russian population of Siberia increased very rapidly. The approximative figures of the Russian population in Siberia at the different stages of the expansion are : in 1662, 70,000 ; around 1709 between 150,000 and 250,000 ; in 1824, 1,700,000 ; and in 1851, 3,600,000.[23] The native population under Russian control was : in 1622, 173,000 ; in 1662, 288,000 ; and in 1709, 200,000.[24]

Measures were taken to insure means of communication with Siberia. In 1601 a regular postal service with horses was opened at Tiumen, roads and post stations built. By 1710 there were seven thousand couriers in this service. Mileposts had been put up and distances measured as far as Iakutsk. By a law passed two years later the roads had to be twenty-one feet wide. The tariff of an ordinary letter in 1682 was thirty kopeks (approximately fifteen cents) to Krasnoiarsk and forty kopeks to Nerchinsk, over six thousand *versts* away. These rates compare favorably with those of England and France even a century later.

The Russian Orthodox Church. A few words must be said about the role of the Russian Church in the colonization of Siberia. Ever since the time of Yermak the Church had its representatives among the newcomers in Siberia. Organization was given these first tentatives, which were mostly private enterprises, by Michael Romanov, who at the insistence of his father, Patriarch Philaret Romanov, named Cyprian, a monk of Novgorod, the first Archbishop of Tobolsk. From this time on the Church in Siberia was protected and helped by the state. Churches and monasteries were built.[25] The work of the clergymen and monks, as far as the Russian population was concerned, consisted mainly in keeping the faith clean from the influence of the *Raskolniki*. These heretics, in order to avoid persecution in European Russia, came in great numbers to Siberia. As far as morals were concerned the main task of the Church consisted in refraining the faithful from excesses. They dispensed the Sacraments and performed the sacred functions on Sundays and Holy Days. But their work was not restricted to the Russian population. They proselytized and converted the natives whenever possible. They encountered difficulties among the Mongols who were either followers of Islam or belonged to Lamaism. The Western Siberian tribes were Mohamedans and the Buriyad Mongols Lamaists. Knowing their strong resistence, the Russian government left these Mongols freedom of religion. Thus the missionaries, though not hampered in their activities, were not supported by the state in these territories. The protection of the natives against the excesses of tax-collectors was also part of the missionary activity, as was the education of these rude natives as far as it was possible.

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[23] These figures are taken from Courant, *op. cit.*, p. 65. Lobanov-Rostovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

[24] Treadgold, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

[25] For a complete list of these churches and monasteries see Kerner, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-184.

The role of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in China began after the Treaty of Nerchinsk and consequently cannot be treated here at length. One of the services performed by it, however, must be pointed out. From the arrival of the first ecclesiastical mission in Peking in 1716 it was the only representation Russia had in China till 1858. Its function as an agency of observation, especially at times when even trade relations were interrupted, was invaluable to the Russian state. For this reason the Mission was under the jurisdiction of the *Sibirski Prikaz.* Only after 1858 (Treaty of Tientsin) did the Russians succeed in erecting a separate political mission, and henceforth the ecclesiastical mission was put under the jurisdiction of the Holy Synod.

The Siberian Fur Trade. Before concluding this chapter a few words must be said about the fur trade. As we have seen, the sable occasioned the opening and the occupation of Siberia, and it also paid the greater part of the expenses with its skin. Fur was to the Russian explorers what gold was to the Spanish conquistadores. Indeed, furs obtained from the Siberian tribes were ear-marked for the government a " Golden Fund ", as Professor Bakhrushin, who studied the occupation of Siberia, called it. The fur-bearing animals which played a role in the Siberian fur trade were : sable, tree marten, beach or stone marten, lynx, polecat or fitch, glutton, common otter, sea otter, wolf, fox, ice or arctic fox, bear, sea dog or sea calf, ursine seal, squirrel, beaver, hare and reindeer.

In connection with the exploration and exploitation of Siberia there were two distinct periods : the first one from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century which was the period of expansion into virgin territories ; and the second period from the Eighteenth Century on which might be called the period of colonization.

Among the furs two categories must be distinguished : the noble or expensive furs (sable, sea otter, black fox), and common furs (mostly gray furs and hares). In the former category sable played the most important role, at least up till the end of the Seventeenth Century. Sea otter became important only after the conquest of Kamtchatka, towards the end of the Seventeenth Century. In the other category squirrels were the most important item.

Since no record exists, it is impossible to determine the quantity of furs acquired, at least for the first period. We can, however, form an idea from scattered figures. Yermak, after his first campaign, sent sixty *sorok* (one sorok containing forty pieces) of sable to Moscow. The sable export from Archangelsk in the second half of the Seventeenth Century amounted to 29,160 furs and 18,742 tails, in one single year. The gray fur export was also considerable in this first period. In payment to Austria in 1594 we find 337,950 pieces. The export of gray furs in a single year from Archangelsk was close to 356,000 pieces (mostly squirrel furs).

Because of the seemingly unlimited quantity of these furs during the initial period of Russian expansion into Siberia and because of the limited European market, their price was not very high. One piece of sable came to about seventy kopek (about fifty kopek or half a ruble present money), and one piece of squirrel fur to about twenty kopek.

The acquisition of these furs by the Russians was first of all by the collection of *iasak.* Secondary ways of acquisition were : by exchange for other commodities which the natives valued (pots, knifes, clothing articles, tobacco, vodka, etc.) during the annual markets and fairs at Ostronovje and Anadyr in the northeastern part of Siberia, and Irbit in the Province of Perm ; and by hunting and trapping. For hunting and trapping, once the fur-bearing animals became rarer, companies were organized (e. g., the Russo-American Company). From the hunters and trappers as well as from the traders the state collected a ten percent tax in the best furs. On all furs in the hands of the traders and merchants, the state held the first option for purchase, if it so desired.

Europe and China became the two principal customers. The trade with China was transacted at Kiakhta, and in Europe Leipzig was the great center of fur trade. Since the government exercised a monopoly in this trade with foreign countries, it became one of the most important sources of revenue for the Russian state.

CHAPTER II

CHINA'S RELATIONS TOWARD THE "NORTHERN REGIONS"

TRADITIONAL CHINESE ATTITUDE[1]

General Principle. The importance of a policy or attitude on the part of China toward her neighbors in general and the "Northern Barbarians" in particular can be gathered from the fact that during the two thousand years of the imperial period of her history she was ruled, either partially or totally, for over seven hundred years, by dynasties of infiltration or invasion coming from the north. This policy consisted, especially at times when a foreign invasion was still in recent memory, in expansion into the territories of the "Northern Barbarians." Most of the time, however, and especially during the longer periods of peace, prosperity or decline, it consisted in or aimed at a recognition of Chinese suzerainty. This Chinese attitude was conditioned by the Chinese concept of the "Middle Kingdom" as the "T'ien Hsia," and the position of the Emperor as the "Son of Heaven," on the one hand, and on the other, the low esteem in which soldiers and merchants were held throughout the imperial period of Chinese history. Hence the basic difference between the traditional Chinese policy and the Russian policy which aimed at expansion and trade at all times. The Chinese considered trade missions as tribute-bearers come to acknowledge their subjection to the Son of Heaven. This general policy was translated into different practical devices as different times and different situations required.

Total occupation of China by "Barbarians."[2] If, as a consequence of this Chinese attitude, it is true that there was no period in all history when the Cinese conquered, or even controlled the whole of Mongolia before the establishment of the Manchu Dynasty, it is also true that never before the Mongol invasion and the establishment of the Yüan Dynasty did the steppe Mongols or other nomads succeed in occupying or controlling the whole of China. Historically, the success of barbarian invasions of China from the north depends on the success of the preliminary struggle among the Barbarians themselves. The characteristic feature of the period in which such invasions are in the making, is the internal weakness of China. In such periods the peoples outside the Great Wall are, politically, not in the least afraid of China, although economically they are affected to a certain extent in that their chiefs do not draw their subsidies regularly, and their people do not enjoy cheap trade in Chinese goods and in their purchase of grains for their winter supplies. In such periods the preliminary warfare that leads to conquest is never the warfare between Barbarians and Chinese ; nor does it depend on the ability of some Mongol leader to plunder China, for that is always common occurrence at such times, but rather on the ability to hold the conquest and to guard the plunder once it has been made. In order to establish this qualification and win a dependable following, this leader must prove his worth, not to the Chinese but to other possible invaders. It therefore follows as an axiom of Chinese history that a successful invasion of China must be preceded by several tribal wars to the north of China, and that such fighting is much more serious, in a military sense, than the subsequent operations attending the actual invasion. This explains the readiness of the Mongols to engage in the bitterest kind of fighting among themselves, since they are convinced that any Mongol horde which can master other Mongols can master anyone else in the world. If this preliminary fighting produces a number of tribes of fairly equal strength, then there will be no invasion of China or only a partial one. If from this preliminary fighting, however, there emerges a leader of real genius who can subdue other tribes, then the conquest of China will be total. Such was, for the first time in Chinese history, the conquest of the Mongols under Činggis Qan and Qubilai Qan.

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[1] For the traditional Chinese attitude see LATTIMORE, *The Mongols of Manchuria*, pp. 15-16, 54-58. WITTFOGEL and FENG CHIA-SHENG, *History of the Chinese Society Liao*, pp. 24-25. YANG LIEN-SHENG, *Topics in Chinese History*, p. 1.

[2] The best studies of this topic are LATTIMORE, *op. cit.*, and his other works.

The Attitude of the Ming Dynasty[3]

It would be interesting to trace the detailed application of these principles by the Ming Dynasty in the course of their relations with the Mongols. But this would carry us too far afield, so we must restrict ourselves to a shorter, synoptic view.

The traditional policy of China toward the Northern Barbarians required the maintenance of strong military forces. Since the Mongols succeeded in retaining considerable military strength after the fall of the Yüan Dynasty, and since their domination over China was of recent memory, it became even more imperative for the Chinese to look carefully at the state of their armed forces. How this war potential was maintained in peace time and used in war must now be examined.

Military strength of the Ming Dynasty in peace time. The Hung-wu Emperor, founder of the Ming Dynasty, maintained a powerful army. At one time the number of soldiers exceeded a million.

The military system of the Ming Dynasty, known as the *wei-so* system, was similar to the *fu-ping* system of the T'ang Dynasty. Under the *wei-so* system, a military district established in a prefecture was called *so*. A *so* numbered 1,128 soldiers. A military district covering two prefectures was called *wei*, numbering 5,600 soldiers. The military districts, the primary purpose of which was the strengthening of the border areas against invasions, were distributed according to the importance of the locality. Naturally, the northern border regions were among the most important ones. Several of these military districts were combined under the command of the *Tu chih-hui shih*, the highest military authority in the different localities. Over the *Tu chih-hui shih* was the *Wu-chün tu-tu fu*, who was in charge of all military districts and had all the military registers of the country. The highest military authority was the Board of War which delegated its power of directing the army to the *Wu-chün tu-tu fu*, but only in time of war.

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[3] For details see BADDELEY, *Russia, Mongolia, China* I. BRUNNERT and HAGELSTROM, *Present Day Political Organization of China*. HALDE (English transl. 1736), *The General History of China* IV. W. FRANKE, *Yunglos Mongolei Feldzüge*, in *Sinologische Arbeiten* 3 (1945) 1-54. W. FUCHS, *Der Jesuiten-Atlas der Kangshi-Zeit*. GROUSSET, *op. cit.* *Ming shih* 90 (ts'e 11). *Ming shih kao* (Ch'ing-shen t'ang edition) 86 (ts'e 22). RIEGER, *Zur Finanz- und Agrargeschichte der Ming Dynastie (1368-1643)*, in *Sinica* 12 (1937) 130-143, 235-252. SHIMIZU TAIJI, *Chugoku kinsei shakai keizaishi*. WU HAN, *Yu seng-po tao huang-ch'üan*.

This military system operated successfully during the first period of the Ming Dynasty because it was combined with the *t'un-t'ien* system. The Hung-wu Emperor, being aware of the great difficulties of maintaining and supplying a great army, adopted this ancient system of settlements. These State-Settlements were divided into three categories : military settlements, *chün-t'un* ; civilian settlements, *min-t'un* ; and merchant settlements, *sheng-t'un.* The first and third of these were of great importance in the Ming Dynasty's northern-border policy.

Military settlements were first established during the Han Dynasty. In the early Ming we find them only in the border areas, but the first Ming Emperor, Hung-wu, took the settlement policy very seriously. These military settlements were administered by the *t'un-kuan.* Since the office of the *t'un-kuan* was an important one and the danger of corruption always present, there were frequent inspections. The salaries of the officials of these military settlements were paid from the rent of the settlement, and it was paid in rice : twelve piculs a month. These military settlements were also divided into *wei* and *so.* The portion of land allotted to each soldier depended on the fertility of the soil, as well as on the density of the population. In general each man got forty to fifty *mou* as his portion. Those who could afford it supplied their own equipment ; otherwise, it was supplied by the government. The allotting of these settlements was under the supervision of a special office called the *t'un-t'ien ssu,* which was one of the departments of the Board of Public Works, the *kung-pu.* The activities of the soldiers in these settlements were conditioned by the specific requirement of each settlement. As a general rule thirty per cent of the personnel performed border duties and seventy per cent worked on the land ; in other places the proportion was twenty to eighty. In some places the younger and stronger men performed the military duties while the older ones worked on the land. For three years after their erection, these settlements were free from paying rent, *tsu.* After that the rent was kept low so as to further their establishment. Usually the rent was one *tou* per *mou.*[4] The payment of rent was in kind and according to the products of each region. Only from Hung-shih's reign (1488-1505) on, was the amount valued in silver. The erection of these settlements, as we have said, was undertaken with great fervor, first on the border regions and then in the Provinces. Conditions were favorable for the initiation of this system because, towards the end of the Yüan Dynasty, many of the farming areas were laid waste. Even Provinces like Shantung and Honan were thinly populated. Nevertheless, one hundred years after their erection a decline is noticeable. It is true that up till Chia-ching's reign (1522-1566) new settlements were established, but because of faulty administration they were not up to par. Under Wan-li's reign (1573-1619) the revenue of the Liao-tung settlements, which under Hung-wu's reign had provided 700,000 *tan*,[5] produced only 170,000 *tan*. The advantages of these settlements, when they were well administered, can easily be seen. The troops in the border areas were provided for, transportation problems of military supplies were solved, new agricultural land was gained on the border areas ; and finally, the rent paid by the settlements boosted the financial resources of the government. From these advantages one can also measure the dangers involved in their decline, especially in the border areas. This decline is of the greatest importance in China's relation with her northern neighbors.

Another important source of revenue destined for the support of the army was governmental sale of salt to merchants. Salt was, and had been, a state monopoly for a long time. The system known as *k'ai-chung* started in 1369 as an auxiliary measure of the system of the military settlements at the border areas. In some border areas, due to the poor quality of the soil, the land did not produce the expected amount of grains and these had to be supplied by the government. Consequently the contracts between the government and the salt merchants provided that the latter would have the grain, destined for these border areas, transported while, as a means of payment for this service, the government issued tickets or vouchers, *yen-yin*, to these merchants. With these tickets the merchants drew salt from the salt-producing establishments of the government and sold it to the people. For the merchants this transaction proved profitable, and a great number of them entered into contracts with the government. In order to save themselves the inconvenience of transporting grain to the border areas, the merchants devised the following method: they employed laborers to work and cultivate the land along the border and delivered these products instead of products shipped from the inner parts of the country. This system became known as the merchant settlements and greatly satisfied both the government and the merchants. It flourished up to the reign of Hung-chih (1488-1505). From there on, the merchants had to pay a fixed sum of money for the salt certificates. This, of course, precipitated the decline of the settlements. During the reign of Chia-ching (1522-1566) an effort was made to remedy this situation, but it had no success.

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[4] *Mou* is a Chinese land-measure of area ; it varies in different provinces but for general purposes it is reckoned as 240 sq. paces, or 733 and a half sq. yards. Thus 6.6 *mou* equal an acre. *Tou* is a Chinese dry measure, often called a peck in translation ; the size varies considerably, but it has been standardized to contain 316 cubic inches. See MATTHEWS, *A Chinese-English Dictionary* pp. 642, n. 4579, and 938, n. 6472.

[5] A dry measure of grain equal to 10 *tou*.

Another means of protecting the border areas of the Empire from attacks of foreigners or rebels was the placing, by the Hung-wu Emperor, of his sons in different Provinces as princes and generals. They were furnished with large armies, especially along the borders. Thus, to protect the Empire against the Mongols, nine princes, among them the one who later on became the Yung-lo Emperor, were stationed along the border of Mongolia. They held a vastly important military position and their armies in certain instances numbered as many as 80,000 men. They ranked next to the Emperor. But in spite of the honor and the military position they held, they possessed no territories. Civil officials were appointed to rule the people, over whom the princes consequently had no jurisdiction. Their salaries were paid in rice and they received other presents from the Emperor. Even their military power was considerably limited after the reign of Yung-lo. Having usurped the throne from his nephew by force, he realized what a prince could do if he possessed strong military power. Consequently, in order to safeguard himself and his descendants, he limited the power of the princes. To make up the loss in border defence, he transferred the capital from Nanking to Peking and led five campaigns against the Mongols to eliminate the danger.

Military strength of the Ming in time of war. The strong military system and army enabled the Chinese to lead military compaigns against the Mongols when required. During the reign of the Hung-wu Emperor nine campaigns were undertaken, two of them by Prince Ti of Yen who later became known as the Yung-lo Emperor.

The descendants of Qubilai having been defeated in China, in 1368, fled to their native Mongolia. The last Qaγan Toγon-Temür died in 1370. Not content with this, the Chinese kept on pressing and pursuing the Mongols. The losses inflicted on the Mongols discredited the House of Qubilai; and the Mongol tribes, for the most part, resumed their autonomy. Ügechi [6] was the first one to reject the suzerainty of the Qaγan of the House of Qubilai, Elbek, whom he defeated and killed in 1399 and usurped hegemony over some other tribes.

The Yung-lo Emperor, besides leading five campaigns against the Mongols, also followed the traditional Chinese policy of *divide et impera* towards them, and recognized Ügechi's conquest in order to further weaken the House of Qubilai. Ügechi's triumph, however, was shortlived. He was soon defeated by the chiefs of two rebellious tribes, Aruγtai [7] (A-lu-tai, according to Chinese sources) of the Alans and Ma-ha-mu [8], an Oyirad chief. In order to assure their independence from other Mongol pretenders, they rendered homage to the Ming Emperor. Meanwhile, Öljei-Temür, [9] a son of Elbek and direct descendant of Činggis Qan, known to the Chinese as Bunyašri [10]

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[6] For the different spellings of this name see GROUSSET, *op. cit.*, p. 581: Ügetchi or Ökätchi. BARTHOLD, *Four Studies* ... I p. 146: Ügechi-Khashagha. Moreover, according to GROUSSET, *op. cit.*, Ügetchi was a Qirghiz; according to BARTHOLD, *op. cit.*, he was an Oyirad; and according to COURANT, *L'Asie Centrale aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles* p. 11, he was a Turγūd chief.

[7] W. FRANKE, *op. cit.*, p. 4. GROUSSET, *op. cit.*, p. 581. BARTHOLD, *op. cit.*, I, p. 144.

[8] See Chapter I, n. 12.

[9] For the different spellings of this name see GROUSSET, *op. cit.*, pp. 582-583: Öldjäi Temür; W. FRANKE, *op. cit.*, p. 3: Öljei Temür; BARTHOLD, *op. cit.*, I p. 146: Öljey-Timur.

[10] Punyaçri (Pen-ya-cho-li) according to GROUSSET, *op. cit.*, p. 582; Punyashri (Pen-ya-shih-li or Pu-ni-ya-shih-li) according to W. FRANKE, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-4.

(his Buddhist name in Sanscrit), succeeded in reestablishing the power of the Qaγan (1403-1404). Aruγtai allied himself with Öljei-Temür. After all attempts of the Yung-lo Emperor to reach a friendly understaing with them had failed, and especially after Öljei-Temür had put to death the Ming ambassadors, the present-bearers of Yung-lo, a military conflict was inevitable. China's chances in this conflict were enhanced by the fact that some Oyirad and other Mongol chiefs, afraid of the rising power of Öljei-Temür, voluntarily sought Chinese vassalage. The highest chief of the Oyirads, Ma-ha-mu, was made *Shun-ning wang*, while other chiefs received other honorific titles from the Yung-lo Emperor. Thus reassured of the neutrality of the Oyirads, Yung-lo sent general Ch'iu Fu against Öljei-Temür and his allies (autumn 1409). Ch'iu Fu was, however, completely defeated on the lower Kerülen River in the region of Onuhu. As soon as the news of this defeat reached the Yung-lo Emperor, he started preparations for a new campaign led by himself personally (1410). Öljei-Temür was defeated on the banks of the Onon River and although he succeeded in escaping westward, was soon killed by Ma-ha-mu. Aruγtai, who, upon hearting the news of the arrival of the Ming troops, had separated from Öljei-Temür, was likewise defeated by Yung-lo.

The defeat of Öljei-Temür and Aruγtai strengthened the position of Ma-ha-mu, who now became *de facto* ruler of Mongolia, using Delbek, son of Öljei-Temür, as a puppet. Feeling strong enough after this turn of events, he changed his friendly attitude toward China. Now Aruγtai sought Yung-lo's protection once more and, in 1413, was made *Ho-ning wang.* Thus in 1414 Yung-lo led his second campaign into Mongolia and defeated the Oyirads on the banks of the Tula River. Although Delbek, Ma-ha-mu and their allies escaped, they were so weakened that they submitted and sent envoys to Peking.

After these events and especially after the death of Ma-ha-mu (1416), it was Aruγtai's turn to change his friendly attitude toward China once again. From 1421 on he threatened Northern China, so that in 1422, 1423 and 1424 Yung-lo led three campaigns against him. Although partial results were obtained, in that Aruγtai's allies were defeated and one of them, Toγon, son and successor of Ma-ha-mu, taken prisoner in 1423 (Toγon accepted Chinese suzerainty and was made Chung-ning wang), Aruγtai himself succeeded in escpaing ; and these campaigns of the Yung-lo Emperor, as far as their main objective was concerned, failed. Yung-lo himself died during the last campaign (1424).

The military campaigns of the Hung-wu reign and the first ones of the Yung-lo period are mentioned by Father J. B. du Halde in connection with the description of the ruins of the ancient city Aykom. Father du Halde says[11]: "About thirteen Lys[12] higher,[13] on the North side,[14] are the remains of an ancient city called Aykom, built by the first Emperors of the last family of Tai ming[15]; for, by a surprising turn of Fortune, the Western Tartars or Mongoux ta tse[16] were not only ousted by the Chinese, whose masters they had been for so many years, but also attacked with such Vigour in their own Country, that after a Retreat to the remotest parts of it they were obliged in their turn to draw lines and to raise Fortifications, some of the Ruins of which we have seen; neither even then could they defend themselves long against the Fury of their Enemies who were bent upon their destruction, but were forced to pass the Saghalien ula, at what time the city of Aykom was built to confine them there under Yung Lo."

The results of Yung-lo's later campaigns can be summed up in Father du Halde's words as follows: "Whence it appears that in his Pursuit of the Mongols he did not drive them beyond Kerlon,[17] but contented himself with chasing them beyond the Great Wall and the real Limits of the Empire."[18]

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[11] Halde, *op. cit.* IV, pp. 111-112.

[12] *Li*, a measure of length reckoned at 360 paces, about 1890 feet English measure. Matthews, *op. cit.*, p. 546, n. 3857.

[13] Thirteen *li* from Saghalien ula hotun.

[14] On the north side of the Saghalien ula i. e. Hei-lung-chiang or Amur River.

[15] Tai Ming refers to the Ming Dynasty (1368-1643).

[16] The Western Tartars or *Hsi t'a-tzu* or *Meng-ku t'a-tzu*. For a detailed description of their different divisions see Halde, *op. cit.* IV, pp. 139, 150. The Turkish and Mongol branches of the Ural-Altaic peoples are called Tartars in both the Jesuit and Russian reports of the time. The name Tartar was a survival from the Middle Ages. See Chapter I n. 7.

[17] Kerülen River. The text refers to the Yung-lo Emperor.

[18] Halde, *op. cit.*, IV, pp. 139, 150.

Thus can be seen a noticeable change between the campaigns of Hung-wu and the first campaigns of Yung-lo on the one hand, and the later campaigns of Yung-lo on the other. The first series of campaigns had driven the Mongols beyond the Amur, while the later campaigns contented themselves or had to limit themselves to keeping them beyond the Kerülen River.

All in all, Yung-lo's policy of war aiming at the elimination of the Mongol danger had failed, though it attained partial results. Father du Halde says :[19] " This Emperor[20] also went thrice in quest of them beyond the Desart, about two hundred Leagues North of the Great Wall, with an Intention to extirpate them entirely, but failed in his Enterprize, being prevented by Death at his Return from his third Expedition. "

About the period following Yung-lo's death, Father du Halde writes :[21] " His [Yung-lo's] Successors leaving them in quiet, they began to spread on every side from their Desart again, and the chief Princes of the House of Zinghiskan,[22] seizing each a particular Country for himself and People, formed different Hordes, which in time became so many little Sovereignities. "

And in another place he describes the situation as follows :[23] " It [Aykom] seems to have subsisted a considerable time, since it was not till twenty Year after that the Tartars, reentering their ancient Country, endeavored to revenge themselves of the Chinese by Sudden Incursions into the Northern Provinces ; if they were afterwards defeated, or rather overwhelmed by the vast Army of the Emperor Suen ti,[24] yet they still kept possession of their Country, the Chinese Generals either not knowing how, or being unwilling to take the Advantage of so great a Victory, to oblige them to repass the Saghalien oula, and rebuild Aykom. "

Diplomatic relations. A strong military system and a demonstration of aggressiveness enabled the Chinese to maintain balance of power among the Mongols and made it more advantageous for the Mongol Princes to submit and to seek their protection than to antagonize such a powerful Empire. Even Tamerlane, in a shrewd diplomatic move to enhance his prestige, acknowledged himself a vassal of the Hung-wu Emperor and thus obtained imperial sanction for his further conquests, and this in spite of the fact that his ultimate aim was the destruction of the Chinese Empire itself. Other Mongol Princes followed the same example. They sent envoys annually to the Ming court. These missions were at first diplomatic in recognition of Chinese suzerainty, but later on, as the Chinese military strength declined, they came only to enjoy the famous imperial hospitality.

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[19] HALDE, *op. cit.*, IV, pp. 145-146.
[20] Refers to the Yung-lo Emperor.
[21] HALDE, *op. cit.*, IV, pp. 145-146.
[22] Činggis Qan.
[23] HALDE, *op. cit.*, IV, pp. 111-112.
[24] Hsüan-te (1426-1435).

These more peaceful aspects of Mongolian affairs were handled by the *Meng-ku ya-men,* later succeeded by the *Li-fan-yüan.* The Manchus established this Court of Dependencies in 1683 in Mukden. Russian affairs — the Russians who approached China from the north fell under the category of the Northern Barbarians — were also managed by the *Li-fan-yüan* until 1861, though this court was originally established to handle Mongolian and Korean affairs. The *Li-fan-yüan* was replaced, at least as far as Russian affairs were concerned, by the *Tsung-li ko-kuo shih-wu ya-men,* called in shorter form *Tsung-li ya-men.* It was established by an imperial edict on January 31, 1861. This in turn was succeeded by the *Wai-wu-pu,* established in 1901 [25].

Decline of the Ming system. While the safeguards against the Northern Barbarians were kept in good working order the Empire was safe. But as soon as these safeguards and especially the *wei-so* system started to decline, the difficulties began. The *Ming shih* describes this decline as follows : " After Wen-huang [Yung-lo] transferred the capital to Peking, he still followed the tradition of T'ai-tsu. But when he employed the eunuchs to command the armies, the beginning of the change was in sight. After Hung-hsi [1425] and Hsüan-te [1426-1435] the country was so accustomed to peace that there soon came the disaster of T'u-mu [where Cheng-tung was captured by the Mongols in 1449]. Then, during the reign of the Emperors Hsien-tsung [1465-1487], Hsiao-tsung [1488-1505], Wu-tsung [1506-1521] and Shih-tsung [1522-1566], the military system underwent changes and the military power declined more and more. In the end, toward the last period of the Dynasty, the military records were neglected and the number of soldiers decreased. The rebels multiplied and the Empire collapsed; the eunuchs surrendered at the city gates and the palace guards fled, bringing the Dynasty to an end." [26]

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[25] Brunnert and Hagelstrom, *op. cit.*

The catastrophe of T'u-mu marks the beginning of the decline. After Yung-lo's death, Aruγtai was defeated and killed, in 1434, by the Qalmuq chief Toγon, who was, consequently, highly favored by the Chinese. In 1439 Toγon himself was killed and succeeded by his son Esen, with the title only of *tayiji*, [27] but with absolute power — Taissong, the legitimate Qaγan, being reduced to even more strict nominal sovereignty than before. The Qalmuq were now grown so powerful that China found war inevitable. Esen subdued Hami and raided the Korean border. In everything he did he professed to be acting on behalf of China, and for each addition to his own power, demanded rewards and supplies and even went so far as to ask for the hand of a Chinese Princess in marriage. The Chinese government's patience was at last exhausted, and when it refused Esen's latest demands in 1446, he collected vast forces, and in 1449 made an attack on China from various directions and succeeded in occupying the territories just outside the Great Wall from Liao-tung to Kan-chou. The Ming troops were unprepared for so formidable an engagement, but disregarding the advice of all the Emperor's ministers, the eunuch Wang Ch'en urged his unfortunate sovereign to lead a force against the aggressor. The army, hurriedly mobilized and badly equipped, was constantly thrown into even greater confusion on its northward march by false rumors originating from unknown sources. The *Ming shih* tells us, that "... when they arrived at Hsüan-fu there came a great storm and it rained very heavily. Again some of the officials tried to persuade the monarch to retreat. Wang Ch'en was exceedingly angry. It happened that Chu Yung, Prince of Ch'eng Kuo, and others came in to give their reports on affairs and they were made to walk on their knees. The presidents of two Boards T'ang Yeh and Huang Tso, because they had offended Wang Ch'en, were ordered to kneel on the grass ..."[28]. When at length the real strength of the Mongols became known to him, even Wang Ch'en quailed, and persuaded the Emperor to turn back. In their disordered retreat, however, the Ming troops were overtaken. The source of their water supply was cut by the enemy, so that they dug twenty feet into the ground without the smallest trickle of water as their reward. The Chinese army by now was utterly demoralized, and when the Mongols charged down upon them, they were hardly able to put up any resistance against them. Nearly a hundred thousand were killed or wounded; Wang Ch'en was killed and the Emperor carried off by the victorious enemy as a prisoner of war. Esen agreed, however, to a moderate peace and returned the Emperor and recognized himself as his son (vassal). Probably his own position was not too secure at home.

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[26] *Ming shih* 89 (ts'e 11) la.

[27] *Tayiji* or *t'ai-chi* ("noble") in Chinese.

[28] *Ming shih* 304 (ts'e 36) 4a.

After the Qalmuq, it was again the turn of the Eastern Mongols, especially after Dayan Qan (known in Chinese annals as the little king, *hsiao-wang-tzu*) became a strong ruler. Between 1497 and 1505 he made many successful raids in Chinese territories from Liao-tung to Tibet. Dayan's successor, Bodi-alaγ Qaγan, and his two cousins, Gün-bilig-mergen-jinong and Anda or Altan Qan (especially the latter), were very able leaders. At the same time the Ming Dynasty was further declining and the Mongols raided China on several occasions between 1529 and 1570. This decline of China in the face of the Mongols was mainly due to the further deterioration of military discipline. Soldiers in the capital and on the border were used as servants for the eunuchs and officials. Military registers were neglected, military and merchant settlements waned and, consequently, the food supplies of the army vanished. During the last twenty-five years of Chia-ching's reign (he reigned from 1522-1566), when the Emperor's time was taken up by Taoist practices and the government was left in the hands of the notorious Yen Sung, the Mongols under the leadership of Altan Qan were attacking the Empire. In 1550, when Altan besieged the capital and the fires kindled by his armies lit up the suburbs, the President of the Board of War had only fifty to sixty thousand men at his command. These soldiers were so reluctant to leave the city that force had to be used. Once outside the city and given orders to march on the enemy, they refused to do so. This caused alarm among the commanding officers. However, since Altan was unable to keep the other Mongol tribes under his control, he made peace with China (1571). [29]

In 1573, when Wan-li (1573-1619) ascended the throne at the age of ten, one of the greatest statesmen of the Ming Dynasty, Chang Chü-cheng, ruled the country. Under his able administration, military discipline was strengthened and the Mongols along the border once more submitted to the imperial power. This, however, did not last long. Rebellions broke out in the Provinces, the Mongols under the leadership of Busuγtu-jinong and others renewed their attacks (1592) [30] and the Manchus were growing stronger on the northern border. Even before the fall of the Ming Dynasty, the allegiance of many of the Mongol tribes was taken over by the Manchus.

Hence one can conclude that, great as was the resurgence of Chinese power during the initial period of the Ming Dynasty, it did not succeed materially in altering the Mongol situation north of the Great Wall. It is true that the Ming Emperors and generals campaigned far to the north. These campaigns never amounted to conquest, for the Mongols remained independent. From the nature and results of these campaigns it may be inferred that, rather than being genuine invasions, they were merely supporting one Mongol group against the others. The Mongols were driven from China in the first place largely because of disputes over the succession to the throne ; these disputes continued for three centuries and led to the recognition of the Manchus. The Ming Dynasty fell so far short of breaking the power of the Mongols that China was threatened on several occasions by new Mongol invasions.

In Manchuria the Chinese power was confined in direct administration to the territories within the Willow Palisade. Here the Chinese had been established for centuries, though at times they had been ruled by barbarian conquerors. Among the Tungusic tribes of the north, Ming China operated by the old device of granting titles and subsidies to certain chiefs and supporting them against possible tribal rivals. These subsidized chiefs were listed as tribute-bearers.

The rise of the Manchus in the Seventeenth Century also proved that the Mongols and other tribes had maintained during this period of Chinese ascendency approximately the same territories and tribal groupings. The changes that had taken place, and later on proved to be of the greatest importance in the rise of the Manchus, had occurred without Ming intervention. They had taken place in the Nonni valley and on the upper Amur, where outlying Mongols had begun to coalesce with Tungus tribes, thus founding the people later known as the Daghors or Daurs. Another change took place in Kirin Province, where the forests touched the central plains. From this fusion emerged the tribe usually called the Yehonola.[31]

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[29] SERRUYS, *Genealogical Tables of the Descendants of Dayanqan*, pp. 89, 103, 107, 116, 120-121.

[30] SAΓANG SEČEN (Critical Introduction by MOSTAERT, Edit. CLEAVES), *Erdeni-yin Tobči Mongolian Chronicle*, Part I, pp. 8-9.

Policy of the Ch'ing Dynasty[32]

With the accession of the Ch'ing Dynasty, new factors enter into the already old problem of dealing with the Mongols. Being themselves from the territories of the Northern Barbarians, the Manchus realized that it would not be enough for them simply to continue the traditional Chinese policy of supporting a balance of power in Mongolia by playing one group against the others ; rather, they recognized from their own experience with the Mongols, that it would also be necessary to impose and maintain military control of the area. Further extension of the ancient and received policy was dictated by the presence of the Russians on the Amur, for if the Ch'ing showed a soft hand here they would invite more southerly excursions. As their own insecure position in China rendered it impossible for the Manchus to confront simultaneously these two foes — the Russians and the Mongols — they saw the widsom of concluding a treaty with one in order to give undivided attention to the other. In none of these matters were they required to improvise tactics, for in all they could follow old precedents.

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[31] Lattimore, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.

[32] Besides the works mentioned in nn. 1 and 3, see Bantysh-Kamensky, *Collection fo Diplomatic Matters between the Russian and Chinese Governments from 1619-1792* (in Russian), p. 55. *K'ang-hsi shih-lu* 115 20a (23rd year, 5th month, 19th day - July 1, 1684) and 134 3b(27th year, 3rd month, 3rd day - April 3, 1688). Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, pp. 132-133. W. F. Mayer, *The Chinese Government. P'ing-ting lo-ch'a fang-lüeh* (Contained in *Shuo-fang pei-sheng* I). *Tung-hua-lu* (Shun-chih period, Institutions, Section 25).

How in their rise to power the Manchus became acquainted at first hand with the Mongols, and how they coped with the Russians form the subject of the present inquiry.

The rise of Manchu power. The rise of Manchu power began as a welding together of tribes widely scattered yet kin to each other, and ranging in culture and economy from such settled people as the Old Manchus to semi-nomad people and reindeer nomads, as the " wild " or New Manchus. The Yehonola held out most stubbornly against the Manchu unification. At this stage the Manchus were only one group among several possible claimants of power over China. The rise of Manchu power was accelerated by the fighting going on between the Mongols in West and Inner Mongolia. The Mongols produced a number of remarkable leaders : Bâtur qung-tayiji, [33] Galdan,[34] Guši Qan, [35] Dalai Qan, [36] Legdan Qan. [37] So unconquerable by Mongols or by anyone else were they, that none of these chieftains succeeded in establishing himself as a unifier of all Mongolia. Nor were the Manchus strong enough to conquer the Mongols, though the deadlock between the Mongols helped the Manchus to conquer China. Nurxaci and his Manchus won a few indecisive battles against the easternmost flank of the Mongols who lived between the Manchus in the east and the Čaqar Mongols on the west, while the latter were engaged in a bitter fighting with the Čaqar Mongols. The Čaqar were under Legdan, whose ambition, as a descendant of Qubilai, was to form a new Mongol Empire, so that the easternmost Mongols, fearful of the Čaqar more than of the Manchus and unwilling to come under Legdan, allied themselves with the Manchus [38]. This alliance was a more important factor in the

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[33] Bâtur qung-tayiji a Jün Γar chief. HUMMEL (*op. cit.*, I, pp. 265-266) writes Bâtur Kontaisha. For the title *qung-tayiji* see SAΓANG SEČEN, *op. cit.*, p. 13, n. 35 and SERRUYS, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

[34] Galdan, son of Bâtur qung-tayiji. See HUMMEL, *op. cit.* I, pp. 265-268.

[35] Guši Qan of the Qošūd Mongols. See HUMMEL, *ibid.*

[36] Dalai Qan grandson of Guši Qan. See HUMMEL, *ibid.*

[37] Legdan Qan of the Čaqar Mongols. For different spellings of this name see SAΓANG SEČEN, *op. cit.*, p. 5, n. 15.

[38] For Legdan Qan's attempts to unify the Mongols see SAΓANG SEČEN, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-19 ; SERRUYS, *op. cit.*, pp. 20, 26-27 ; LATTIMORE, *The Mongols of Manchuria*, pp. 58-59.

Manchu ascendency than were the Manchu victories over the Mongols.

In the meantime the Manchus succeeded in securing control over Liao-tung. This too was achieved by a mixed process of conquest and alliance, in which the enlistment of Chinese troops, resulting in the formation of the Chinese Banners, fortified the basis of Manchu power that helped the Manchus in their conquest of China. The importance of the Liao-tung Chinese in this alliance can be judged from the role of Wu San-kuei[39] who, after negotiations, admitted the Manchus into China in order to destroy the rebel uprisers and usurpers. Wu San-kuei was a native of Liao-tung. Considering his rank and importance he must have had both personal interests in Manchuria and personal connections with the Manchurian Chinese already serving with the Manchus. He evidently decided to strike out for himself rather than to take the place to which his Manchurian affiliation entitled him in the regional coalition of Manchus, Mongols, and Manchurian Chinese. His later career indicates that he may even have hoped to displace the Manchus eventually, as the leading power within the coalition. The Manchus, at any rate, insured themselves against such a possibility, for while keeping him in power and honor they kept him away from the Great Wall frontier. In the end, finding himself out of position, he turned against the Manchus and rebelled.

These, then, were the forces at work in the Manchurian region at the time when the Manchus were getting ready to break through the Great Wall and set up a new Empire in China. The Mongol Princes of the region, owing to their early alliance with the Manchus, had been given Manchu Princesses in marriage, and this kind of personal relation between the princely families of the Mongol and Manchu ruling classes strengthened their alliance. The result was that the Mongols never considered themselves as conquered subjects, but as free allies. Among some ancient Mongol documents, there has recently been discovered one dated 1636, according to which the Mongol chiefs recognized the suzerainty of the Manchus, with the stipulation, however, that in the event of the fall of the Manchu Dynasty, all the laws existing previously to this date should again come into force. [40]

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[39] HUMMEL, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 877-880.

Around 1644, after the subjection of Inner Mongolia and the invasion of China, the Manchus were faced with four problems. (1) Within China they had to restore economic stability and political unity, which had been shattered by the disorders in the last years of the Ming Dynasty. (2) They had to maintain and extend their military control along the Great Wall frontier. They needed Mongol military contingents while completing their administrative control over China, but they needed also to complete their military control over Inner Mongolia. (3) The northern and western Mongols were not yet subjugated and the Manchus were especially afraid that the western Mongols might create an independent military power challenging their own. (4) The Russians appeared on the Amur.

Of these four problems, the first two had to be settled first. Consequently, during the initial years of Manchu domination in China the Manchus were hard at work in bringing back into cultivation the acreage that had been laid waste in the civil war towards the end of the Ming Dynasty. They were also busy in suppressing rebellions. Lands along the Great Wall, just to the north and northwest of Peking, were largely allotted to the followers of the Manchu conquest. This put a screen along the Great Wall, ensuring that the Mongol sector along the edge of the frontier would actually be controlled by the Manchus rather than by the Mongols. To prevent the rise of a strong leader among the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, the Manchus started to put an end to the characteristic Mongol process of creating tribes ; breaking them up and forming them again, out of which process rose great leaders and conquests. In this the Manchus relied strongly on the assignment of definite frontiers to each tribe, or rather to each tribal unit ruled by a Prince, in the form of a Benner system.

While this was being accomplished, Jün Γar power under Galden rose to frightening proportions in the west and Russian progress in Siberia proceeded unhampered. The Russians had already entered into contact with the western section of the Qalqa Mongols whose Qan was known to the Russians as Altyn-(Altïn) qan (not the same as Altan or Anda of the

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[40] Lattimore, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61.

Tümeds). In an effort of their own, the Manchus had already established contact with the Tüsiyetü Qan, their neighbor, to obtain through him an agreement providing that all Mongol Qans send the Manchus annually the symbolic tribute of *chiu-pai* or " nine whites ", i. e., eight white horses and one white camel. The Altyn Qan thus sought after from both sides, in 1638 assumed an air of importance and played each party against the other. For several years he remained loyal to his agreement with the Russians and maintained commercial relations with them. In 1656, however, he sent one of his sons to Peking, to the court of the Shun-chih Emperor, to present the tribute. His other son Lobdzan suddenly advanced with a large army against the Russian Qirghiz. The Russian towns of Tomsk, Krasnoiarsk, and Kuznetsk, whose garrisons were weak, were in peril when the news of the Altyn Qan's death became known. Lobdzan returned to Obsa-nuur in order to assure his own succession. Lobdzan's reign, however, did not last long. In 1661 he quarelled with the Jasaγtu Qan and killed him. Defeated in turn by the other Qalqa, captured and handed over to the Dalai Lama for custody, he was still alive in 1691, when Father Gerbillon met him at the meeting of the Qalqa Princes. After Lobdzan's defeat the center of gravity moved further east, toward the domains of the Tüsiyetü Qan, whose brother was soon to become Qutuγtu, thus considerably enhancing the prestige of the Tüsiyetü ayimaγ.

Manchu diplomacy towards the Russians. Under these circumstances Sino-Russian tension and rivalry in Mongolia could not but increase. In Peking the Shun-chih Emperor died in 1661. His successor, K'ang-hsi, was not yet of age, and the regents were busy suppressing revolts in south China. For several years the only weapon the Manchus had against the Russians was propaganda. On no occasion did they fail to subject Russian envoys and couriers, as we shall see later on, to the ceremony of the *kotow* in the presence of Mongol envoys. All edicts concerning Russia invariably began with the recital, " Russia is situated far to the northwest. " But the Russians were not quite so far away, since they were moving closer and closer to the frontiers of the Tüsiyetü Qan, after having subdued the Buriyads of the Selenginsk region. Russian Cossacks advanced toward the Amur, and the Manchu armies were in no position to check them. The Mongols who were trading with Nerchinsk, the Cossacks' supply base, were well informed regarding the situation. Struggling with the Jasaγtu Qan and his ally, Galdan, the Tüsiyetü Qan could not remain isolated. He looked for a powerful defender and hesitated between China and Russia.

In 1682, after having defeated the rebels in south China, K'ang-hsi turned his attention northward. Two problems called for prompt solution there. The first was the Russian advance on the Amur. The second problem was posed by the situation in Outer Mongolia where dissension among the Mongol leaders continued, while from the west arose the menace of Galdan, who appeared to be on excellent terms with the Russians. Faced with these problems, K'ang-hsi decided on some diversionary tactics. He would send a strong army against the Russians, while trying to keep the situation in Outer and Western Mongolia under control by diplomacy, until having dealt with the Russians he could give his undivided attention to Mongolia. Thus, in 1682, the same year that K'ang-hsi started his campaign against the Russians on the Amur, a Chinese mission bearing rich gifts was sent to Qalqa. What exactly the aim of this mission was is not known, because the diplomatic activities in Mongolia at this time are overshadowed by the military operations. It seems that besides effecting a reconciliation between the Tüsiyetü Qan and the Jasaγtu Qan, for which K'ang-hsi had also sought the mediation of the Dalai Lama, some agreement concerning the Russians must also have been concluded. The *Shih-lu*, in fact, reveals that the Mandarin Mala, who had been assigned the task of effecting an economic blockade against the Russians on the Amur in order to cut off their supplies, suggested that the trade of the Mongols with Nerchinsk be stopped : " Your servants ask your Majesty to order the Qans of Qalqa to recall their subjects from the neighborhood of Nipchu (Nerchinsk) and to prohibit their trade with the Russians ... ". The Emperor ordered the transmission of Mala's report to the Qans to keep them informed.

For the same reason K'ang-hsi called the conference of 1686, hoping to effect a conciliation among the Qalqa Princes. Realizing, however, that Galdan and the Jün Γar intended to take advantage of the disunion among the Qalqa, K'ang-hsi had to reverse his policy. Now seeking a solution of the conflict with the Russians by diplomatic means, he was preparing to face the Jün Γar danger with his armies. Thus, in 1688 the negotiations with the Russians were initiated and Selenginsk was chosen as the place where the respective delegations were to meet.

On the eve of the prospective conference with the Russians, in 1688, K'ang-hsi sent Arani, head of the *Li-fan-yüan*, to Urga. The Chinese Annals give this version of the conference at Urga : " Inasmuch as the Emperor wanted to avoid alarming the population by the passing of the troops (accompanying the peace delegation to Selenginsk) through the country of Qalqa, he sent Arani to the Qutuγtu in order to ask him to reassure the inhabitants and to order them to live in peace by continuing their usual occupations. " [41] It seems improbable that the head of the *Li-fan-yüan* would have traveled across the Gobi to take care of a simple matter like that. W. Mayers' explanation seems more plausible when he states that in 1688, in a council of the Qalqa Princes, it was proposed that the Princes place themselves under the protection of Russia ; since the opinions of the Princes were divided, they called on the Qutuγtu, who declared himself opposed to this plan, asserting that the " Yellow Church " (Lamaist church) would not in that case be protected. The Qalqa thereupon agreed to place themselves under the protection of China. The word of Qutuγtu, to whom Arani had been sent, decided the issue.

Although the Russians were also active at this time in Qalqa, the Chinese diplomats were more successful. Ochiroi Qan (the Russians called Tüsiyetü Qan by this name), when he learned that Golovin's entire army consisted only of five hundred soldiers, sent against them a force of four thousand Mongols, under the command of his brother Bâtur. The Mongols carried rifles and cannons supplied by China. Selenginsk and Udinsk were besieged and Golovin's situation there was becoming more and more precarious, when Bâtur suddenly lifted the siege and hurriedly returned with his troops to Mongolia, where Galdan had begun his famous invasion of Qalqa.

In 1688 the Tüsiyetü Qan killed the Jasaγtu Qan for joining forces with Galdan, and killed Galdan's brother for pillaging. Galdan answered with a swift movement of his troops. This invasion took place at the very moment that the Chinese delegation was on its way to Selenginsk (which was the first place chosen for the Russo-Chinese peace negotiations), expecting to find Golovin in aserious and embarrassing situation on account of the troubles caused by the Qalqa. Now, instead of that, they themselves were forced to turn back on account of the Jün Γar invasion of Qalqa. The allied Qalqa Princes challenged Galdan at a place called Ologoi (Ologui alin). After a fierce battle lasting three days, Galdan emerged victorious. His opponents fled, some southward towards Inner Mongolia, some others north into the Trans-Baikal region of Siberia. The Tüsiyetü Qan and his brother the Qutuγtu sought refuge in Inner Mongolia, where it was granted by K'ang-hsi. Meanwhile, Galdan pressed eastward to the Kerülen River and demanded the surrender of the pair as the terms on which he would make peace with the Qalqa. Since the K'ang-hsi Emperor had accepted these two fugitives as his subjects, he declined to hand them over, though he acknowledged their guilt in starting the war.

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[41] *K'ang-hsi shih-lu* 134, 3b (27th year, 3rd month, 3rd day - April, 1688).

The Qalqa Mongols who had sought refuge in Trans-Baikalia, unaware of the negotiations to be opened at Selenginsk and later at Nerchinsk, attacked the Russian delegate, Golovin, who had already arrived at Selenginsk. This was the spontaneous answer to many years of ruthless, hostile acts by Russians against the Mongols and other Siberian tribes, such as the Buriyads, with whom the Qalqa were tied by bonds of racial affinity, culture and religion. Golovin succeeded in breaking out of Selenginsk and six months later, after considerable military preparations, made a sudden attack on the Mongols on the bank of the Khilok River (Kilko bira), a tributary of the Selenga. He defeated them and forced them to accept Russian suzerainty in a treaty signed on March 12, 1689.

This was the political and diplomatic situation and atmosphere which made both parties more amicable when they finally met at Nerchinsk. K'ang-hsi, understandably, was eager to make peace with the Russians. His desire was partly prompted by the hope that the Russians would not aid Galdan, with whom the Russians had carried on trade and diplomatic relations in the past. Meanwhile, the Emperor tried to settle the differences between the Qalqa and Galdan by asking the Dalai Lama to join him in calling another peace conference. But the Lama had died in 1682, though his death had been kept a secret by the *Tipa* (temporal administrator). K'ang-hsi wanted to gain time in order to effect the pacification of all Mongolia. For all practical purposes, the Qalqa had already recognized Chinese suzerainty so that only the Ölöd Mongols remained to be taken care of. This is the reason why, together with peace with Russia, K'ang-hsi also wanted a settlement of the Mongolian border. At Nerchinsk, however, the Chinese obtained only the delineation of the border in Eastern Mongolia. The Russians stalled for time. Had the border between the two countries been defined at this time, when the Jesuit advisers to the Chinese delegation had the geographical knowledge and the influence to safeguard Chinese interests, the future Sino-Russian diplomatic relations might have followed a different course.

From this short outline it is clear that even the Manchu extension of power into Mongolia was not accomplished by conquest only. In maintaining their control and a balance of power, the Manchus fell back on the age-old Chinese devices. They used their position in Inner Mongolia, where they had established themselves by alliances and military victories, as a basis from which they pushed their dominion into Outer Mongolia. It was by supporting the Qalqa in Outer Mongolia against the Ölöd that the Manchus extended their authority into that region ; thereafter, by supporting one Ölöd faction against another, they completed their expansion through gaining control of Chinese Turkestan.

Thus, the paramount interest of the Ming and Ch'ing Dynasties in the Northern territories is evident.

Chapter III

EMBASSIES AND MILITARY OPERATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND CHINA BEFORE 1689

Now that we have seen how Russia and China established their respective spheres of interest in Northeastern Asia, we are in a position to investigate the beginnings and the continuance of actual contact between the two Empires, first indirectly through the Mongols, and then face to face in the Amur region. These encounters were diplomatic when possible, military when necessary.

Indirect contacts between China and Russia [1]

There is no Russian text for the first of the Cossack narratives nor any record of one in the Russian Archives. The preservation of the contents of these records is due to Isaac Massa. This Dutchman of Italian extraction, born in Haarlem in 1587, was sent to Moscow around 1600. He remained eight years to learn the silk trade, later returning to Russia for several years, off and on, as agent of the States General. In his *Beschryvinghe vander Samoyeden Landt in Tartarien* (Amsterdam, 1612) Massa has a chapter, " Kort Verhael " or "Short Account, " on the roads and waterways from Moscowy to Siberia where he describes how the Russians travelled from Russia to the Enisei and beyond. In this report the first mention of China is found.

To the rear of the Buriyad, Qirghiz and Tungusic peoples the Russians encountered the Mongols, of both Qalqa and Ölöd extraction. From them they learned that beyond the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes there was a stable and great

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[1] For further details see Baddeley, *op. cit.* II, pp. 1-29. Yakovleva, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-80.

Empire with a highly developed civilization. This transpired from the report of Vasili Vasilievich Volinsky, Voevode of Tomsk, sent to Moscow in 1608. The limits of Russian expansion thus began to assume shape. Henceforth, the Chinese Empire would have to be reckoned with. And the Mongols served as a bridge whereby Sino-Russian contacts were first established. In the first half of the Seventeenth Century there was a succession of Russian missions to Mongolia.

In 1616 Tomilko Petrov and Ivan Kunitsin were sent on a mission to the Qalmuq tayijis. In the same year Vasili Tumenets and Ivan Petrov were sent to the Altyn Qan of the western Qalqa. In 1617 Ivan Saveliev was dispatched to the Qalmuq. In 1634-5 Yakov Tukhachevsky was sent on a mission to the Altyn Qan. In 1636-7 we find Grechanin in the camp of the Altyn Qan. In 1638-40 Vasili Starkov and Stepan Nevierov came to the same Altyn Qan. In 1649 Zabalotsky led a mission to the Sečen Qan of the Qalqa.

Often these various Mongol Princes were submissive towards the Tsar's envoys, promising to aid the Tsar against his enemies and to pay tribute. Just as often, they invaded Russian territories with their armed bands, threatening her dependencies and fortresses. These maneuvers were a reflection of the changing relations between China and the Mongols. The Qans, while promising loyalty to Moscow, were sometimes allies and sometimes enemies of Peking.

ESTABLISHMENT OF DIRECT CONTACT [2]

First Russian diplomatic mission to China. The reports of these missions to the Mongols increased the Russian knowledge of China. In 1618-19 two Russian envoys, Ivan Petlin and Ondrushka Mundov, were dispatched to China by Prince Ivan Semonovich Kurakin, Voevode of Tobolsk. They reached Peking via the Mongol desert and Kalgan. But having brought no presents, they could not see the Wan-li Emperor and were dismissed with a letter, [3] an extract of which is still preserved in the Moscow Archives. Great sensation was created by the report of this mission that China was rich in gold, silver, precious stones and silk. The letter of Wan-li, in spite of some expressions that no Chinese Emperor could or would have written, gives one an insight into the different aims both Empires had in mind. Moscow was eager, if she could not exploit China by collecting tributes and taxes as she did with other Asiatic territories, to acquire trade rights from China. The end Russia had in mind in her relations with China was commerce controlled by the state. China, on the other hand, looked at her relations with the Northern Barbarians — the Russians coming from the north were also considered as such — from precisely the opposite point of view. It was not commerce, a mere matter for the private person, which interested her, but political subjection and the recognition of Chinese suzerainty. Chinese merchants were not wont to go abroad to trade, as Wan-li's letter states, nor were Chinese ambassadors. Ambassadors to China were tribute-bearers and China, the Middle Kingdom, paid tribute to no one. Foreign ambassadors were admitted only if they brought tribute. Since Petlin and Mundov did not bring tribute, they were sent back with the letter telling the Russians that China was interested only in the tribute and the political submission it signified.

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[2] BADDELEY, *op. cit.* II, pp. 1-29. CAHEN (transl. RIDGE), *Some Early Russo-Chinese Relations*, pp. 4-5. *P'ing-ting lo-ch'a fang lüeh* (contained in *Chung-hua pien-fang yü-ti ts'ung-shu*, Shanghai 1903), pp. 1a-1b. YAKOVLEVA, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-126.

[3] No complete copy of this letter has been discovered so far.

This embassy also seems to have served another purpose. It gave the Chinese the first piece of concrete information about Russia.

First military encounters. As seen in the foregoing chapters, the Russians had met some opposition from the Tungusic people in the basin of the Enisei, and an even stronger opposition from the Buriyad Mongols around Lake Baikal, but no opposition was organized and obstinate until they entered the Amur region and came into contact with the Chinese Empire. The native Daurian population in the Amur region was subject to China and paid tribute to the Emperor of China. The Russians were, by that time, settled in the river valleys north of the outer Khingan Mountains. The climate there was severe and the land unproductive. The problem of food supplies became acute as the number of Russians increased. Reports that the plains to the south of these mountains were warm in climate and rich in food production, so attracted the attention of the Voevode of Iakutsk, Peter Petrovich

Golovin, that he decided to send an expedition to explore the region.

During the first expeditions led by the Russians, viz, that of Poyarkov and the first expedition of Khabarov, as we have seen, the Manchus were busily engaged in conquering China ; little or no attention was paid to border disturbances. But when the empire was gradually consolidated, the Court of Peking began to take drastic measures to cope with the Russians. In the ninth year of the reign of the Shun-chih Emperor (1652) the Chinese Court ordered Haise, the special defence commissioner stationed at Ninguta, to attack the Russians. In spite of their victory the Russians were checked and in April, 1652, they began their retreat up the Amur. Khabarov was then replaced by Stepanov, who, while ascending the Sungari, was met by an army of three thousand Manchus. He attacked and defeated them, but being obliged to retire to the mouth of the Kumara River he erected a fortification there called Kumarsk (Hu-ma in Chinese). A Manchu army under Minggadari followed him and in March, 1655, laid siege to the new fortification. Having bombarded it for three weeks, the Manchus finally retreated for lack of provisions. Meanwhile, however, the natives were instructed to abandon their homesteads, destroy their grainfields, and move into the interior. In the spring of 1658 Stepanov again descended the Amur and was met at the mouth of the Sungari by a fleet of forty-five armed barges under Sarhuda. Some of his men deserted, some together with Stepanov were killed in the ensuing battle, and only forty-seven escaped.

CONTINUED RELATIONS [4]

New diplomatic missions. While this was taking place on the Amur, two more missions were sent from Moscow to Peking. [5] The agent of the first mission, appointed by Tsar Alexei

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[4] Besides the works listed in nn. 1 and 2, see WANG HSIEN-CH'IEN, *Tung-hua ch'üan-lu* (Peking 1898-1900, 88 books) Shun-chih period, 34, p. 8a.

[5] The diplomatic representatives of Russia at that time can be divided into three groups : *gonets* or simple agent (such were Petlin, Mundov, Baikov, Perfiliev and Ablin) ; *poslannik* or envoy (as was Spathar) who were sometimes charged with important affairs ; and

Michailovich himself, was Theodore Isakovich Baikov.[6] He received his formal instructions on February 2, 1654, and on the eleventh was given a letter for the Emperor of China. His instructions enjoined him to present this letter in person; to refuse to bow or to act in any way that might imply the inferior status of the Tsar in relation to the Emperor of China; to give assurance that any Chinese envoy or merchant would be welcome to Moscow; to learn secretly the Chinese military strength and all routes into the country; to familiarize himself with Chinese ceremonial rites for the reception of ambassadors; to acquire information on the customs, population, financial conditions and economic wealth of the country. Thus directed, Baikov immediately sent Setkul Ablin to Peking to announce his coming. The Chinese mistook this advance agent for an ambassador, because the *Tung-hua ch'üan-lu* states that in 1654 a Russian envoy arrived in Peking but was not received by the Court because he brought neither letters nor presents. Baikov followed a route through Kansu, arriving in Peking on March 3, 1656. The officials of the *Li-fan-yüan* greeted him and requested that he present the "tribute" to the Emperor immediately. Baikov, however, replied that according to western custom the Emperor must first receive the envoy, who then delivers his letter of credence, and only following this ceremony are the gifts presented. The officials remarked that though this might be the Russian custom it was not the Chinese procedure, and they proceeded to take the gifts forcibly. Two days later they came again for the letter of credence, but Baikov refused, saying that he was accredited from the Tsar to the Chinese Emperor and, therefore, would not deal with the officials. On August 12 the envoy was asked to bring the Tsar's letter to the ministry where he would also be shown how to *kowtow* before the Emperor. Baikov refused, whereupon the officials warned him that the Emperor would order his execution if he continued to disobey the imperial command. Baikov, however, was unperturbed, saying, "though the Emperor should order that I be torn limb by limb, yet will I not go to the ministry ... nor give up

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posol or ambassador (Golovin held this rank). See CAHEN (transl. RIDGE), *op. cit.*, p. 2.

[6] For Baikov's mission see ARSI *Jap. Sin. 102* f. 42r. BADDELEY, *op. cit.* II, pp. 131-166. YAKOVLEVA, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-100.

to you the Tsar's gracious letter." This reply irritated the Chinese Court. The gifts were returned, and Baikov was ordered to leave Peking. Thus, the mission came to nought, and Baikov returned to Russia, reaching Moscow on July 19, 1658.

Before Baikov reached Moscow, the Tsar, acting upon Ablin's advice, dispatched another envoy, Ivan Perfiliev, to China. In February, 1658, Perfiliev and Ablin started for China and reached Peking in May, 1660. The Chinese Court, however, considered the letter from the Tsar lacking in humility and courtesy and dismissed the Russian envoys.

New military skirmishes. After the defeat of the Russians by the Chinese and after the death of Stepanov in 1658, the Russians abandoned the Lower Amur. By 1665, however, they again established themselves.

In 1652 Pashkov, the Voevode of Eniseisk, charged some of his lieutenants to investigate the Shilka region in order to establish a foothold on the Upper Amur. He then proposed to the government in Moscow that a town be built on the Shilka so that the surrounding territories might be subjugated with greater facility. His proposals were approved, and in 1656 he left Eniseisk with five hundred men and constructed a fortress at the mouth of the Nercha River, which came to be known as Nershinsk.

In 1665 a Polish exile, Nikifor Romanov Chernigovsky, who was wanted by the authorities for having murdered the Voevode Obukov of Ilimsk, fled to the Amur region accompanied by eighty-four fugitives from the law, and built the fort of Albazin on the northern bank of the River. These people continued to expand their holdings by building a chain of *ostrogs.* They also exacted tribute from the Daurian population. In 1669 they appealed to the Tsar to rescind the charges against them and humbly offered to submit themselves to his authority. The Tsar thereupon pardoned their former crimes.

In China the reappearance of the Russians on the Amur at once attracted notice. Moreover, the question of Ghantimur's [7] nationality only added fuel to the fire. Ghantimur was a Tungus Prince who had settled in the region of the Nercha. When the Russians came to that region he was dissatisfied with being made their subject and withdrew with his tribesmen to the right bank of the Argun River. In 1655 he joined the campaign against the Russians at Kumarsk, but in 1666-7 he foresook the Chinese and went over to the Russians. The Chinese Court insisted that Ghantimur was a Chinese fugitive and demanded his extradition, but the Russians rejected the claim. The whole importance of the question of Ghantimur's nationality lay in the fact that his inclination to either side would greatly influence the attitude of the Tungus Tribes nearby.

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[7] HUMMEL, *op. cit.* I, p. 269.

Milovanov's mission. [8] Because of the repeated encroachments of the Russians in the Amur basin and their refusal to surrender Ghantimur, the K'ang-hsi Emperor in 1670 issued an ultimatum. When Daniel Archinsky, the Voevode of Nerchinsk, received this ultimatum, he dispatched an illiterate Cossack, named Ignatii Milovanov, to Peking with a counter-ultimatum proposing that the K'ang-hsi Emperor accept Russian suzerainty.

This latter document is unique in the annals of China's foreign relations, since the traditional Chinese ideology considered all countries tributaries of the Emperor of China. How could such a proud court as the Chinese calmly receive a summons to submit ? The answer to this problem is found in Spathar's report after his own mission to China. This explanation was given him by Mala, vice-president of the *Li-pu*, through Father Verbiest, in an account concerning K'ang-hsi's own previous ultimatum to Archinsky. Mala had met Milovanov during his mission, and consequently was in a position to know the circumstances. Mala said : " ... in former years, when Baikoff, and Setkul, and Tarutin [9] and others were here, the Cossacks at that very time, roamed up and down the Amur, despoiling our subjects ; and when we spoke of this to Baikoff, complaining that while he came as Ambassador, the Cossacks made war, he answered that they were mere banditti, who acted without any orders from the Tsar.

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[8] Pavlovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-144. Yakovleva, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-110.

[9] This refers to Peter Yarishkin who together with Setkul Ablin had accompanied Baikov. Yarishkin and Ablin returned to Moscow before Baikov and on Ablin's advise the Tsar had sent Perfiliev to China. See Yakovleva, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

So we called them Luchi,[10] which means robbers, and at the command of the Bogdikhan[11] went against them by land and by water and destroyed them all, with troops sent from here. After that, one of the Khan's subjects, Gantimur, fled with his tribe to Nershinsk; and when His Majesty learnt that those same robbers had established themselves at Nerchinsk, on the river Shilka, he gave orders to me, the Askaniama,[12] then only a zarguchei,[13] to take 6,000 men and ten guns and march against them. Whereupon, Nagai-Timur[14] and I collected 6,000 troops and ten guns, marched from Peking to Naun, and from there to Nerchinsk, sending on in advance to Gantimur a Daur peasant, to find out what kind of people he had taken refuge with. Gantimur took that man and brought him to the Governor Danilo Archinsky, and he and Gantimur told the messenger that they (of Nerchinsk) were not Luchi but subjects of the Great White Tsar,[15] by whose orders they had built two forts, at Nerchinsk and at Albazinsk: also that the Tsar desired to live in love and friendship with the Bogdikhan, and that trade be established between their two countries. So that peasant came back and met me with the army on the river Unda,[16] two days short of Nerchinsk; and when I heard that those people were not robbers, but subjects of the White Tsar, and that they had sent back that messenger in friendly fashion, I sent to inform the Bogdikhan and to suggest that it would be better to keep the peace with such people than to fight them, since they profess to be the White Tsar's subjects, obeying his command and not, as formerly, behaving like brigands. Then the Bogdikhan ordered me ... to send to Nerchinsk and to obtain from there some Cossack by whom His Majesty might send a letter to the Tsar, to make sure of things. So they sent ten men from Nerchinsk, and I ... took them (to Peking) and presented them to the Bogdikhan, who thereupon wrote a letter to the Tsar, not only in regard to Gantimur, but especially in order to find out for certain who these people were, and to what sovereign they owed allegiance ... ".

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[10] *Lo-ch'a.* For the distinction between *lo-ch'a* and *o-lo-ssu* see PAVLOVSKY, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-136.

[11] Refers to the Emperor of China. HALDE (English transl.), *op. cit.* IV, p. 146 says: "... the Manchoux, called by the Moscovites, Bogdoyes, whose chief is the reigning Emperor of China."

[12] *Askaniama*, i. e., *askani-amban* a Manchu title corresponding to the Chinese *shih-lang* or vice-president of a Board. Mala whose words Spathar reproduces was in fact vice-president of the *Li-pu* or Board of Rites.

[13] *Zarguchei*, i. e., secretary.

[14] Is identified as governor of Ninguta in 1669; see PAVLOVSKY, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

[15] The Tsar of Russia.

[16] Unda, i. e., Um-du River of Pereira (see Diary) or Ouentou of Gerbillon or Undu bira according to W. FUCHS, *Der Jesuiten-Atlas der Kangshi-Zeit*, p. 187, n. 1429 and p. 270, n. 78.

But if Milovanov was invited to Peking to pick up a letter for the Tsar, whence came the idea to entrust him on this occasion with the mission of offering a Russian protectorate to the Emperor of China ? Voevode Archinsky acted in this instance without the knowledge of Moscow, which, when it learned of the action through his report, removed him from his post. The report of the unfortunate Voevode shows that he was quite aware that he had exceeded his authority, since he did not have the right to undertake diplomatic relations with China without instructions from Moscow. Obviously, however, K'ang-hsi's ultimatum, sent through the special defence commissioner at Ninguta, and the request to send some men to Peking for the purpose of bearing a letter for the Tsar, had caught him unawares. He did not dare to refuse the request, knowing that the Chinese troops were not far from Nerchinsk, and on the other hand he wanted to shield himself behind Moscow's authority and be able to act, as he himself states, according to the *ukaz* (decree) of the Tsar. Now, the only document at his disposal which appeared to give him such a prerogative was an old instruction that had been sent by the Tsar to Archinsky's predecessor, the Voevode Pashkov. This set of instructions contained, among other things, the speeches to be made to the native chiefs of the Daur, Ducher, Gilyak, etc. It was the text of these speeches that the Voevode Archinsky, lacking other official instructions, did not hesitate to insert into his directives given to Milovanov, as speeches he was to make to the Emperor of China. Hence, the strange document of 1670 asking the Emperor of China to submit to Russian suzerainty.

This curious document, however, did not reflect Moscow's policy toward China, nor was it the result of a well reasoned plan, but simply an enormous blunder made by the Voevode of Nerchinsk. The answer to the question of why Archinsky's error had no troublesome consequences for Milovanov is found in the *Chao-tai ts'ung-shu*, which contains the *Wai-kuo chi* of Chang Yü-shu, who has the following passage : " In the fourth moon of the ninth year (of K'ang-hsi) Russia sent an envoy to present his *piao* (official letter) as a sign of submission, but the text of it was uncomprehensible ; the script went from the bottom to the top, like the Taoist charm seals. Therefore, the Russian envoy was summoned to translate the document in order to present it to the Emperor. "

Consequently, it must have been Milovanov who had the good sense to improvise a translation which not only left out the dangerous passage in question, but transformed the entire text itself into a *piao* and presented it as a sign of submission. Milovanov must have had a sharp instinct for diplomacy. Apparently his capabilities were quickly appreciated, since thenceforth he was frequently made use of in various missions, and in 1676 attached to the Spathar embassy. It was also he who went to Peking in advance of Spathar to announce the ambassador's arrival, and who returned to Moscow with the latter's first report to the Tsar.

We may anticipate here later events by mentioning that the blunder of Archinsky seems to have caught up with the Russians later on, and would appear to have been the reason for the sudden change in attitude of the Chinese at the time of Spathar's mission.

Spathar's mission. [17] When K'ang-hsi's letter, transmitted by Milovanov, reached Moscow, the Russian Court decided to send another mission to Peking. On February 20, 1675, Tsar Alexei Michailovich appointed Nicolai Gavrilovich Spathar as envoy to China. He was instructed to find out whether in the future there could be friendship and peaceful intercourse between the two countries, and to seek the shortest and safest route to China. On May 15, 1676, Spathar reached Peking, where the mandarins tried to convince him that his credentials and gifts should be presented to the *Li-fan-yüan*. Spathar, however, refused emphatically and was finally allowed to present his credentials personally to K'ang-hsi. On June 8, in reply to an official of the *Li-fan-yüan* who asked him whether he had any preliminary oral message, Spathar handed over an abstract of twelve articles from his instructions: (1) that all letters formerly written by the Chinese in their own language to the Russian Court be translated; (2) that a definite language be agreed upon for future communications; (3) that there be a mutual agreement concerning the use of names and titles of the Tsar and the Emperor of China on the basis of model letters to be agreed upon; (4) that the Emperor of China should send an ambassador to Russia; (5) that Chinese and Russian merchants be allowed to move freely in either country; (6) that Russian prisoners, if any, be set free; (7) that each year 40,000 rubles worth of silver be sent from China to Russia in exchange for Russian goods; (8) that if China had any precious stones, they might likewise be exchanged for goods; (9) that Russia might borrow Chinese bridge-builders; (10) that Russia be permitted to buy goods in China, and that China should not levy any customs duty on such goods; (11) that the most convenient route — preferably by water — be mapped out, and that the goods be carried over this route; (12) and, finally, that these articles be accepted in mutual esteem and friendship.

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[17] For Spathar's mission the best studies are : PICOT, *Notices biographiques et bibliographiques sur Nicolas Spathar Milescu, Ambassadeur du Tsar Alexis Mihajlovic en Chine*, in *Mélanges Orientaux* (Sixième Congrès International 1883) p. 430-492. BADDELEY, *op. cit.* II, pp. 204-422. And especially PANAITESCU, *Nicolas Spathar Milescu*, in *Mélanges d'École Roumaine en France* P. I (1925). Also see ARSI *Jap. Sin. 102* f. 42v ; *Jap. Sin. 103* ff. 179r-180v ; and *Jap. Sin. 104* ff. 302v-304v.

On June 14 the *Li-fan-yüan* informed Spathar that he would be admitted to an audience with the Emperor the next day, but that he should *kowtow* according to the Chinese custom. This provoked a heated argument and the audience was postponed. The *kowtow* was finally waived and Spathar admitted on June 19. The audience was confined to only a few personal questions about the Tsar and the ambassador himself. On August 13 Spathar was asked to receive, on behalf of the Tsar, gifts from the Emperor, but he refused when told that he would have to receive them on his knees. On August 29 K'ang-hsi declared in an edict that he would not answer the Tsar's letter because Spathar had been disobedient, and because the main object of the reply would have been to request the extradition of Ghantimur, which seemed futile inasmuch as similar requests made before had gone begging.

The *Li-fan-yüan* further informed Spathar that the Chinese Court would in the future receive letters, ambassadors, envoys or merchants from Russia only if the following three conditions were met: Ghantimur must be extradited and sent to Peking accompanied by an ambassador, that the ambassador should be a reasonable man who would conform with the demands of the Chinese Court, and that Russians along the borders should cease disturbing the peace. Spathar, however, begged for a letter to the Tsar, saying that otherwise he did not dare to return to his own country. Not being able to get one from the Chinese Court, Verbiest wrote one to the Tsar intended to be a testimonial of the manner in which the ambassador had accomplished his mission. This seems to have been the custom of the Russian Court at this time, because Baikov in a similar situation had asked the Dutch embassy then present in Peking for a similar letter. The following day the Chinese Court, in a note to Spathar, added three more conditions by which Russia would have recognized her inferiority to China and her status as a dependency of China. On September 18 the Chinese Court decided to dismiss Spathar from the capital. While passing through Nerchinsk on his way to Moscow, he tried to persuade the Russians there and at Albazin, in accordance with the Chinese request, not to commit any further acts of violence along the Amur.

Final Encounters

By now K'ang-hsi realized that diplomacy alone would not stop the Russians from encroaching on the Amur region. They would have to be compelled by force. But as the Chinese government was occupied with affairs in South China, which had come to a head in the *Sanfan* rebellion (1673-1680), nothing was done about an expedition, at least not until 1681. Fully appreciating the fighting ability of the Russians, who by this time had occupied practically all the northern tributaries of the Amur and subjected the native population to all the burdens of ruthless exploitation, K'ang-hsi prepared the entire campaign with great care and thoroughness. Because of the failure, in 1655, to defeat the Russians at Kumarsk due to lack of provisions, special attention was paid to this item as well as to communications.

Military preparations. In 1681 Lieutenant-general Langtan and Pengčun were dispatched to the vicinity of Albazin to make a detailed study of the situation and to investigate the water route from Ninguta to the Ussuri and to the Amur. The Emperor gave personal instructions to Langtan: "The Lo-ch'a forcibly entered the district of the Hei-lung-chiang, and robbed and killed our hunters. I sent my troops against them, but they effected nothing. Since then many years have passed, and the number of Lo-ch'a on the Amur increases. I order you and those who accompany you that you shall conscript, in addition to the soldiers which you shall take along from the capital, a hundred men in Qorčin [18] and eighty men in Ninguta. When you reach the Daurs and Solons, you must immediately dispatch a courier to Nipchu [Nerchinsk], to spread the news that you have come on a hunting trip. While you are still on the way you shall make preparations for hunting, go to the Amur and then advance on Yaksa [Albazin] and with all foresight study the Lo-ch'a, their customs and their defence apparatus at Yaksa. I am sure that they shall not dare to attack you. If they offer you supplies, accept them and give them some presents in return. If they attack you, do not fight to kill but withdraw. This is my plan. On your way back you shall sail down the Amur until you reach the Ussuri. Having arrived there, send people to Ninguta and thus establish the shortest way thither."[19]

Again in 1682 another party was sent out to measure the volume of water in the Liao River, the knowledge of which was utilized in the building of a canal connecting the Liao with the Sungari that same year. Three years later, nineteen stations were established between Kirin and Aigun. Thus, two lines of communication, one by water and one by land, were established.[20]

Other preparations were also made. Already in 1680 two hundred and fifty transports were sent to the Liao, the Itung and the Sungari, with food supplies for the armies there, and one hundred and thirty to the Amur. In 1682 four granaries were established on the Upper Liao. In 1684-1685 the system of military farming was introduced in Aigun and rice exports from Manchuria were forbidden. These preparations are mentioned in an edict of K'ang-hsi in December 1681, after Langtan had completed his above mentioned survey and handed in his report.

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[18] For the Mongol tribes mentioned here see Appendix 1.

[19] *Ch'ing shih kao* (*Lang-t'an lieh-chüan*) 153, pp. 12b-13a.

[20] *P'ing-ting lo-ch'a fang-lüeh, loc. cit.*, pp. 4a, 21a.

Shortly after the Russians renewed their activities in 1676, the special defence commissioner at Ninguta moved to Kirin, which, being on the main course of the Sungari nearest the Liao, was more strategically located. In 1683 another new commissioner, the military governor of Heilungchiang Province, was stationed at Aigun, where the Zeya flows into the Amur. As the Chinese government realized that the expulsion of the Russians could not be successful without a fleet, a naval dockyard was built at Kirin in 1676. Many ships were constructed and sailors numbering in the ten thousands were chosen from among the exiles from the Southern Provinces.

When these preparations were finally completed, the K'ang-hsi Emperor still hoped that the dispute might be settled without an all-out war. The systematic raids of the Chinese against the Russian settlements had caused the disappearance of every vestige of Russian occupation on the lower Amur and its tributaries by 1683. Only Albazin, fortified and well stocked with provisions, remained to be taken. In 1683 K'ang-hsi sent an edict to Albazin by two Russian prisoners in which he again lists China's grievances (Ghantimur and Russian encroachment) and threatens an attack unless the causes of disagreement are eliminated. Receiving no answer, K'ang-hsi gave orders to start the campaign. On June 13, 1685, the Chinese army, which had come partly by land and partly by water, appeared before Albazin under the command of Langtan, numbering between two to five thousand. The Russian garrison under the brave and experienced Tolbuzin numbered four hundred and fifty men, with three cannons and three hundred guns. Lieutenant-general Pengčun sent in a demand for surrender written in Manchu, Russian and Polish and promised the greatest leniency. No reply was given and the bombardment opened on the 15th. During the first few days the Russians lost a hundred men. A Russian priest, Leontiev, considering that nothing could be gained by holding out, petitioned the governor to come to terms with the Chinese for a free retreat to Nerchinsk Tolbuzin acceeded, and a deputation sent to the Chinese camp arranged the terms of surrender. The Russian garrison was permitted to leave, but forty of them preferred to surrender to the Chinese. These might have been the people who had advocated the surrender and were afraid of retaliation. The Chinese then destroyed Albazin and returned to Aigun.

No sooner had the Chinese withdrawn than Tolbuzin reentered Albazin with new reinforcements led by Beiton, a German, and put the fort once more in a state of defence. The garrison totalled three hundred and thirty-six men with considerable provisions. When the news of the reoccupation of Albazin by the Russians reached Peking, another expedition was immediately sent to the Amur, again under the command of Langtan. On July 7, 1686, the Chinese army, assisted by a fleet that had sailed down the Sungari, laid siege to Albazin. The Russians defended themselves desperately. Tolbuzin was killed and his place filled by Beiton. Scurvy reduced the garrison to one hundred and fifty men. The siege lasted more than three months.[21]

New diplomatic moves. While this second campaign was under way, K'ang-hsi sent another letter to the Russian Court by the Dutch embassy which had come to Peking. The original text of this letter is found neither in the Chinese nor in the Russian annals. In an instruction to his ministers, however, K'ang-hsi explains his reasons, the same as those in his former letters to the Russians which had remained unanswered, i. e., past grievances and the situation at Albazin. K'ang-hsi also asked for an answer either through an envoy or through the Dutch.

The reports of the siege of Albazin impressed upon Moscow the fact that the people in the Amur valley were not so easy to deal with as the other nomads in Siberia. Acknowledging its ignorance concerning geographical conditions in the Far East, the Russian Court was in no position to send a military expedition so far away. Moreover, at this time it was occupied with military affairs in the Baltic. Consequently, the Russian Court prepared to enter into negotiations with the Chinese for the cessation of hostilities in the Amur basin. On November 15, 1685, the Chinese Court's edict to the garrison of Albazin, dated 1683, was received in Moscow and showed a conciliatory attitude. Russia wasted no time. By November 26 it was decided to send an embassy to China at once. The following day two messengers, Nikefor Venyukov and Ivan Favorov, were dispatched to Peking and arrived there in September 1686, a few months after the letter of K'ang-hsi to the Tsar had been sent through the Dutch embassy. Venyukov and Favorov announced the arrival, in the near future, of a Russian plenipotentiary and requested that the siege of Albazin be raised. The K'ang-hsi Emperor, in granting the second request, ordered the besieging Chinese forces to loosen the cordon around Albazin by moving back three *versts*, the siege to be completely raised only after the arrival of the Russian plenipotentiary. The order directing the Chinese to leave Albazin and return to Aigun came in August 1687. The messengers returned with two letters, one written in Mongolian briefly acknowledging the messages of the Tsar, while the other, in Latin, dated November 21, 1686, contained a detailed list of the Chinese complaints against the Russians.

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[21] For the preparation of this campaign and the campaign itself, besides the works mentioned above, see *Ta-Ch'ing hui-t'ien shih-li* (ed. 1899, 1220 chüan) 935. CHANG PO-YING, *Hei-lung-chiang chih-kao* 8 p. 2. HSÜ TSUNG-LIANG, *Hei-lung-chiang shu-lüeh* (contained in Man-Mō sōsho V), p. 110. DUDGEON, *op. cit.*, Part II, pp. 1-5.

Meanwhile, the Russian Court had appointed Theodore Alexeevich Golovin as High Ambassador Plenipotentiary[22] to meet the Chinese representatives and had provided him with two principal colleagues, Ivan Vlasov and Simeon Kornitskoy. The first instructions given Golovin, about the beginning of 1686, included commercial as well as political directives. He was instructed to propose the fixing of the boundaries along the whole length of the Amur. In case this proposal was rejected, he should make a small concession by fixing the line along the Amur and the Bystra. Should this alternative proposal also be rejected, the line could be fixed further north along the Amur and its tributary, the Zeya. The instructions relating to commerce are particularly important. The ambassador was to collect information concerning river routes to China, to ask for official regularization of trade between the two countries, both export and import, and to persuade the Chinese Emperor to send an embassy to Moscow. The Chinese were also to be urged to sell their silk, precious stones and other goods to Russia. He was further instructed to enter into communication with those Mongol Princes who might aid him in his diplomatic task.

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[22] Cahen (transl. Ridge), *op. cit.*, pp. 9-12. For the mission of Venyukov and Favorov see also ARSI *Jap. Sin., 105* I ff., 96v-103v. On ff. 100v-101r there is a detailed description of the overland route from Russia to China.

On January 26, 1686, Golovin and his mission left Moscow, with a military escort, on the long journey. He spent almost two years in various parts of Siberia. It was the first time that such a high official had been dispatched to survey the new territories annexed during the previous decades. While in Siberia he received from Venyukov and Favorov the good news that K'ang-hsi, after learning of Russia's peaceful intentions, had sent orders that the siege of Albazin be raised. This initial success delighted Golovin.

K'ang-hsi's letters, forwarded by Venyukov and Favorov, were received in Moscow on July 17, 1687, but the Russian government had already come to the decision, even before it received these letters ; further steps should be taken to conciliate China. On July 24, 1687, fresh secret instructions were sent to Golovin. He was to cede Albazin for satisfactory commercial relations. He was to avoid bloodshed at all costs, and if all efforts should fail, he was to request that another embassy be permitted to visit Peking at a convenient date. The two Russian agents, Venyukov and Favorov, who had just returned, seem to have been partly instrumental in making their government realize that these so-called concessions were of no particular consequence, since Albazin was Chinese territory and was on the point of falling. Thus, the government decided to furnish Golovin with new authority, enabling him to act on behalf of the Russian government at any conference which the Chinese Emperor might decide to hold. This official document was dated October 29, 1687, and Golovin was ordered not to leave Siberia until Ivan Loginov, who was bringing him these new instructions, had first been sent to Peking for the purpose of providing K'ang-hsi with a copy of them as proof of Russia's good will. Golovin was also instructed to obtain, if possible, the services of the Qutuγtu as a sort of diplomatic liaison between Russia and China. Since the close of 1686 Golovin had tried to win the favors of the Qutuγtu but had little success. Nor were subsequent Russian moves more successful. In 1687 Vasili Perfiliev came to Urga, sent by Golovin, with letters and presents ; another emissary of Golovin, Stephan Korovin, was there from the end of 1687 till the beginning of 1688. All without success. The Qutuγtu was suspicious of Russian overtures and knew that too familiar dealings with the Russians would displease the Emperor of China.

While these long journeys were under way, Ivan Vlasov, simultaneously Governor of Nerchinsk and adviser to Golovin, received information in October 1687 that the siege of Albazin had been raised and hostilities had come to an end.

Korovin, an agent sent by Golovin to China, arrived in Peking on March 14, 1688, and did not leave till April 17. He brought back a message from the Chinese Emperor designating Selenginsk as the site of the proposed conference between the representatives of the two countries. The Chinese government also proceeded to appoint its own plenipotentiaries. Before their departure from Peking, the Chinese delegates submitted to K'ang-hsi a memorial which included the terms on which they proposed to come to an agreement with Golovin. This memorial reads as follows : "Nipchu was originally the pasture land of our Muu Mingγan an (Maγu-mingγan)[23] tribe, and Yaksa was the old home of Pei Le-ehr, our Daurian chieftain. The territories occupied by the Russians are not theirs nor is it a neutral zone. The Amur has strategic importance which must not be overlooked. If the Russians descend it they can reach the Sungari. If they ascend the Sungari to the south they can reach Tsitsikar, Kirin and Ninguta and the land of the Sibo, the Qorčin, the Solon, and the Daurian tribes. If they descend the Sungari to the mouth, they can reach the sea. Into the Amur flow the Argun, the Bystra and the Zeya. Along these rivers live our peoples the Orochon, the Gilyak, the Birar, as well as the Ho-chen and Fei-ya-ko. If we do not recover the entire region, our frontier people will never have peace. Nipchu, Yaksa and all the rivers and rivulets flowing into the Amur being ours, it is our opinion that none should be abandoned to the Russians. Ghantimur and the other deserters must be extradited. If the Russians will accede to these points, we in turn shall give up their deserters, send back the prisoners, draw the boundary, and enter into commercial relations ; otherwise we shall return and make no peace with them at all."[24]

This memorial and its rigid conditions were sanctioned by the Emperor on May 10, 1688. The delegation, with a guard of eight hundred troops, departed from Peking for Selenginsk by way of Outer Mongolia on May 29.[25]

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[23] For this tribe see Appendix 1.

[24] *P'ing-ting lo-ch'a fang-lüeh*, pp. 27-28.

The stipulations for a peaceful settlement were based on the political situation at the moment. China had defeated the Russians on the Amur. She had succeeded in reaching an agreement with the Qalqa, and supplied with Chinese arms, they in turn were attacking Golovin himself. Thus, on their way to Selenginsk the Chinese expected to find Golovin in an embarassing situation and had every hope of obtaining what they wanted. However, something unforseen happened. Galdan attacked and invaded Qalqa, so that the Chinese delegation, after notifying Golovin, was forced to return to Peking. The conference had to be postponed until the following year. Golovin sent his answer through his messenger, Ivan Loginov, who arrived in Peking on May 13, 1689. Golovin asked the Emperor of China to designate another place for the conference. On May 18, in a note to the Russian messenger, K'ang-hsi named Nerchinsk as the site of the conference, further stating that the Chinese plenipotentiaries would leave Peking in June.

The Ölöd invasion of Qalqa created a new situation and lessened the advantageous position of China. There arose the danger of a Russian-Ölöd alliance, which the Ölöd sought. Consequently, a peaceful settlement became still more desirable for China, at least till such time as they could deal with the Ölöd danger. Therefore, K'ang-hsi decided to push forward with all haste to the opening of the negotiations. On the eve of the second departure of the delegation from Peking, the Emperor issued the following instructions: "If you insist on keeping Nipchu and not give it up to the Russians, then their missions and merchants will find no shelter place. At the opening of the conference you should still try to retain Nipchu. But if they beg for that city, you may draw the boundary along the Argun river."[26]

Accordingly the stage was set for the conference at Nerchinsk. China still held a better bargaining hand than the

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[25] About the trip of 1688 see the Diaries of CHANG P'ENG-KO, *Feng-shih O-lo-ssu hsing-ch'eng lu* (contained in *Man-Mō sōsho* II); CH'IEN LIANG-TSE, *Ch'u-sai chi-lüeh* (contained *ibidem*); GERBILLON in HALDE, *op. cit.* (original French edition) IV.

[26] *P'ing-ting lo-ch'a fang-lüeh*, pp. 28-29.

Russians. The natives around Nerchinsk were opposed to the Russians and the Chinese delegation, arriving ten thousand strong, created a basis for negotiating from strength. Moreover, the Moscow exchequer was depleted by military expenditures in Russia proper, and by the internal economic depression. Good trade relations with China could prove helpful. With this in mind the Russian delegation was ready to make concessions.

Chapter IV

INTEREST OF THE JESUITS IN EARLY SINO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Participation of the Jesuits [1]

The participation of the Jesuits in early Sino-Russian diplomatic relations is an astonishing historical phenomenon. It is, indeed, rather extraordinary that a small group of Europeans, foreigners to both Russia and China, missionaries of a religion hardly tolerated, if not persecuted in both countries, should have played the role of intermediaries in highly important diplomatic matters between these two great Empires.

How did this strange "three-sided association" come about ? Why did China and Russia have recourse to the services of the Jesuits ? How did the Jesuits conceive and perform their delicate and sometimes dangerous functions ?

Chinese contemporary sources make little mention of the members of the Jesuit Order. It is true that they held official positions in the capital ; nevertheless, they remained on the fringe of official Chinese life. They served rather as teachers and personal advisers of the Emperor, who met them privately in his palace or took them with him on his trips, but always in such a manner that they were not given much publicity. In the eyes of the general public they always remained, as all other westerners, " western barbarians. "

The information contained in Russian sources is somewhat more abundant, but here, too, the Russian representatives had to exercise the utmost circumspection, since " latinism " was suspect in religion as it was in politics. At the time of the Nerchinsk Conference, the Jesuits acted in a more official capacity and thus came more noticeably under the public eye.

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[1] Pavlovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 99-127. Pfister, *Notices biographiques et bibliographiques sur les Jésuits de l'ancienne mission de la Chine 1552-1773*, 2 Vols. passim.

The most abundant sources of information concerning this problem are the correspondence, the private memoirs, and the documents which were either edited or translated or written by the Jesuits themselves. Father Francis Gerbillon's Diaries [2] and Father Ferdinand Verbiest's correspondence, [3] together with some other scattered documents, have been published and made use of by sinologists. The studies of these sinologists furnish us with good specimens of what these documents can reveal; and it is thus possible to draw a preliminary conclusion that the Fathers, in their capacity as intermediaries, performed functions related more to true diplomacy than to simple interpreting. But the greater part of those documents which can shed light on this problem has not yet been published. One of these, the Diary of Father Thomas Pereira about the Nerchinsk negotiations, will be published for the first time in this present work. The rest of the documents, however, will have to wait for later publication.

In view of this it is not surprising that historians have been divided on the question of evaluating the true nature of the role of the Jesuits in Sino-Russian relations. Some, minimizing their contribution, see them as interpreters, pure and simple. Others, going to the opposite extreme, believe that they were genuine intermediaries and inspirers of political action. A third group, taking the middle road, characterize the activity and role of the Jesuits as that of scientific documentators and informants in both countries. For Russia they were, according to this opinion, the first orientalists and sinologists at a time when sinology hardly existed. For China they were the first occidentalists at a time when Chinese knowledge of the West was practically nonexistent.

Nor will it seem strange, on the basis of this incomplete evidence, that certain Russian historians, in view of later Russian successes, consider the treaty of Nerchinsk as a diplomatic defeat of Russia and try to find the reason for it in the baneful influence and intrigues of the Jesuits. [4] However, it is of interest to note that the principal Russian negotiator at

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[2] HALDE, *Description géographique, historique, politique et physique de la Chine et de la Tartarie Chinoise*, 4 Vols.

[3] JOSSON et WILLAERT, *Correspondance de Ferdinand Verbiest de la Compagnie de Jésus.*

[4] CAHEN (transl. RIDGE), *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8. PAVLOVSKY, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-101, 123.

Nerchinsk, Golovin, thanked the Jesuits for their services and promised them his intervention with the Tsar.

In China, the Jesuits' contribution to the treaty of Nerchinsk, which had for the first time divided the masses of Asia's peoples still on the move into respective spheres of interest of the two great Empires, gained the promulgation by K'ang-hsi of the first edict of toleration for Christianity. Chinese interests were safeguarded for the hundred and fifty years this treaty remained in force. Only after the disappearance of the influence of the Jesuits and of their geographical knowledge did Russia succeed in incorporating the Trans-Amur territories (an area almost as large as France and Germany combined) through the treaty of Aigun in 1858. Not the least among the reasons for Russian success was the deplorable ignorance entertained by the central government and the local officials of China about the conditions of the Trans-Amur region. They knew this territory was cold and unproductive and inhabited by a small number of hunters. [5] Only after its cession did the government realize its wasteness.

It was in 1676, during Spathar's mission, that the Jesuits intervened for the first time actively in the diplomatic transactions between Russia and China. The relations of these two countries had, as before seen, a long history. From the mere existence of the numerous contacts between the two countries prior to 1676 it is clear that these two countries did not absolutely need the services of the Jesuits. If there were reasons of convenience which made the participation of the Jesuits desirable, there were also, in view of their position in both countries, great inconveniences connected with it. Yet Father Ferdinand Verbiest established this strange " three-sided association " because he was aware of the possibility of establishing good relations with Russia, thus realizing one of the fondest plans of his Order : to establish across Russian territory a line of communication and an overland route to China.

But why were the Jesuits desirous to establish an overland route from Europe to China ? To find an explanation to this puzzle one must go far back in history.

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[5] *Kuang-hsü hui-tien shih-li* (1899) 167 pp. 6-7.

CONTACT AND ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

The Greco-Roman[6] interlude of cultural relations between East and West was not of a lasting nature, nor did it reach below the surface. To the Romans, China meant silk. Geographically, it was a vast entity on the dim eastern limits of the world. The Romans were not interested in discovering new lands far removed from the Mediterranean; and their knowledge of the Far East came through the Persian and Scythian intermediaries in the Oriental trade. The scanty findings of geographical exploration which they possessed, with all its errors, were collected and represented on maps by Marinus of Tyre and Ptolemy (second century A. D.). They were, for many centuries to come, the source of western knowledge concerning the Far East. When the Roman Empire fell, Europe forgot even what little knowledge the classical writers of Rome had gathered. During this period the line of communication between East and West had been overland.

The Nestorians. Soon a new spiritual power, Christianity, arose and expanded eastward.[7] In 635 the monk A-lo-pen established Christianity in the Middle Kingdom.[8] Thus the civilizations of East and West met again. But this slender link was soon to be broken. From the middle of the Seventh Century, Islam, the enemy of Christianity, penetrated the whole of the near East "like a broad crescent moon, one point of which stretched across the Straits of Gibraltar to Spain, the other over the Caucasus and separated the countries of the West from the Far East." [9] Christianity in the Far East, although cut off from its center in the West, still survived. The oldest and most civilized people of Mongolia, the Uyiγur Turks, had adopted Manicheism when they had been the ruling people of Mongolia in the Eighth and Ninth Centuries. They had become a sedentary people. A pacific culture of this type, however, could not maintain itself in Outer Mongolia, and the Uyiγur were forced to retreat to the Oases of Turfan and Hami where they remained throughout the Middle Ages. But they handed down their cultural tradition to their successors in Outer Mongolia, the Kereyid and Naiman. These in turn exercised a civilizing influence on the still more primitive Mongols. Thus this outlying province of Christendom experienced a brief period of revival and expansion during the Mongol period, which was due not only to the general Mongol policy of toleration but still more to the fact that the Mongols were determined to destroy the temporal power of Islam, which they considered the main obstacle to Činggis Qan's idea of world empire.

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[6] For the details of the Greco-Roman relations with China and the Far East see COEDES, *Textes des auteurs grecs et latins relatifs à l'Extrême Orient.* HIRTH, *China and the Roman Orient.* HUDSON, *Europe and China, A Survey of their Relations from Earliest Times to 1800.* TEGGART, *Rome and China.*

[7] About the alleged journey of St. Thomas the Apostle to the Far East see ROWBOTHAM, *Missionary and Mandarin*, pp. 3-4. DAHLMAN, *Die Thomas-Legende.* BROWN, *The Indian Christians of St. Thomas.*

[8] About the Nestorian Christians see MINGANA, *The Early Spread of Christianity in Central Asia and the Far East.* Reprint from the *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 9 (1925) 297-371. A. C. MOULE, *Christianity in China before the Year 1550.* SAEKI, *The Nestorian Documents and Relics in China.* ROWBOTHAM, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-9. About the Nestorian Monument of Sian see CARUS, *The Nestorian Monument* HAVRET, *La Stèle chrétienne de Si-gnan-fou.* HELLER, *Das nestorianische Denkmal in Singanfu.* PAUTHIER, *L'Inscription syro-chinoise de Si-gnan-fou.* SAEKI, *The Nestorian Monument in China.*

The Middle Ages. [10] During the Middle Ages, in the countries of the West, a community of nations had been formed under the leadership of the Church and the Holy Roman Empire, which soon engaged in Crusades against Islam. Thus, there existed a common basis for approachment between the West and the Mongols, which soon was to lead to an exchange of representatives. However, the first news about the Mongols reaching the West came from a widely different source, a most unexpected source. It was the envoys of the Ismailians (the Shi'ite sect of Islam) of Syria — better known as the Assassins — who in 1238 (after the first two Mongol campaigns in Russia) brought proposals to the king of France and England for a grand alliance of Christendom and Moslems against the common enemy, the Mongols. They met with little sympathy. The attitude of the West, before it knew what was coming, was expressed by the Bishop of Winchester to Henry III, "let these dogs destroy one another and be utterly exterminated, then we shall see the Universal Catholic Church founded on their ruins and there will be one fold and one shepherd." But in spite of this, there was a widespread feeling of disquiet in the West; for, in the same year, 1238, Matthew of Paris records that there was a glut of herrings at Yarmouth owing to the absence of the German fish merchants, who stayed at home in fear of the Tartars. During the following years, news of the latest Mongol campaigns which penetrated as far west as Hungary, as well as the desperate appeals from the Christians and their rulers in Georgia and Galicia, aroused the

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[9] PLATTNER, *Jesuiten zur See. Der Weg nach Osten.* (English transl. by SUDLEY and BLOBERG), *Jesuits Go East*, p. 10.

[10] Some of the principal works on this question are BREHIER, *L'Église et l'Orient au Moyen Âge.* CLOUGHERTY, *The Franciscan Contemporaries of Marco Polo.* in *Bulletin of the Catholic University of Peking* No. 5 (1928) 37-60. H. CORDIER, *Le Christianisme en Chine et en Asie Centrale sous les Mongols*, in *T'oung Pao* 18 (1917). HAMBIS, *La Déscription du Monde de Marco Polo.* KOMROFF, *Some Contemporaries of Marco Polo.* MOIDREY, *La Hiérarchie catholique en Chine, Corée et en Tibet.* DAWSON (edit.), *The Mongol Mission, Narratives and Letters of the Franciscan Missionaries in Mongolia and China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries.* VERNADSKY, *The Mongols and Russia.* A. C. MOULE, *Documents relating to the Mission of the Minor Friars to China in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries*, in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* (1914) 533-599. A. C. MOULE and PELLIOT, *Marco Polo, The Description of the World*, 2 Vols. O'TOOLE, *Random Notes on Early Christianity in China*, in *Bulletin of the Catholic University of Peking* No. 3 (1927) 31-39. PELLIOT, *Les Mongols et la Papauté*, in *Revue de l'Orient chrétien* (1924). WADDING, *Annales Minorum* (Lyons 1654, 8 Vols., Rome 1731-45, 19 Vols.). VAN DEN WYNGAERT, *Sinica Franciscana*, Vol. I: *Itinera et Relationes Fratrum*

Minorum saec. XIII et XIV. Yule and Cordier, *China and the Way Tither*, 4 Vols. Biermann, *Die Anfänge der neueren Dominikanermission in China.* Maas, *Die Wiedereröffnung der Franciskanermission in China in der Neuzeit.* C. R. Beazley, *The Texts and Versions of John de Plano Carpini and William Rubruquis.* Rockhill, *The Journey of William Rubruck ... with two Accounts of the Earlier Journey of John of Pian de Carpinc.* Risch, *Johann de Plano Carpini, Geschichte der Mongolen und Reisebericht.* Risch, *Wilhelm von Rubruck: Reise zu den Mongolen 1253-1255.* Cordier, *Les Voyages en Asie au XIV^e^ siècle du bienheureux Frère Odoric de Pordenone.* Van den Wingaert, *Jean de Monte Corvin, O. F. M., premier évêque de Khanbalig (1247-1328).* Budge, *The Monks of Kublai Khan: Life and Travels of Rabban Sawma and Markos.* Chabot, *Histoire du patriarche Mar Jabalaha III, et du moine Rabban Cauma.* Montgomery, *The History of Yaballaha III, Nestorian Patriarch and of his Vicar Bar Sauma, Mongol Ambassador at the End of the Thirteenth Century.* Markham, *Narratives of the Embassy of Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo to the Court of Timour at Samarkand, A. D. 1403-1406.*

West to the gravity of the situation. Unfortunately at this moment Western Christendom was split by the war between Frederick II and the Papacy. Only the death of the Qaγan Ögödei (December 1241) and the rivalry concerning his successor saved the West. Batu Qan remained encamped on the Volga. Christian Russia had become a province of the Mongol Empire under the rule of the Golden Horde and there was nothing to prevent a new onslaught on the West as soon as the question of succession in Mongolia had been settled. This fact, and the realizations of common interests against Islam, led to the renewal of contact between East and West and to the trips of envoys, missionaries and merchants from the West to the East and from the East to the West. Friar John of Plano Carpini and his companion Friar Benedict the Pole ; Friar Andrew of Longjumeau ; Friar William of Rubruck ; the Polos; Friar Odoric of Pordenone ; Friar John of Montecorvino and his successors ; John of Marignolli and others, went from the West to the East. The Eastern envoys sent to the West were also numerous. With the Friars, Ascellin and Simon of Tournai, who had been sent to Asia Minor, some Mongol envoys came to Rome in 1248. They had been sent by Eljigidei, the envoy of the Qaγan to Baiju. They came in order to establish relations with the West. At the same time Eljigidei took steps to establish friendly relations with the king of France, Louis IX, who had set out on his Crusade against Egypt. Eljigidei's envoys, David and Mark, met Louis in Cyprus and delivered a letter which declared that the Qaγan intended to protect all Christians, Latin, Greek, Armenian and Nestorian, and offered his help against the Saracens for the recovery of Jerusalem. The Mongol Qans of Persia (the Il-qans) especially regarded the Christians of the West their allies against Islam. In spite of repeated failures to cooperate, the Mongols continued to pursue negotiations for an alliance. In 1274 Abaγa, the Qan of Persia, sent his envoys to the Council of Lyons, where they were present for the union between the Eastern and Western churches. In 1277 he sent six envoys to England with apologies for his failure to give adequate support to the king of England when the latter was in Palestine. Finally in 1286 his son, Arγun, sent the most important of all Mongol embassies to the West under Rabban Sauma. The West was then absorbed in a quarrel over Sicily. No Crusade could be organized in spite of the tireless zeal of

Edward I; in 1291 the last Christian stronghold in Palestine, Acre, fell. By this time Arγun was dead and his son, Öljeitü, who had been baptized Nicholas in the name of the Pope Nicholas IV, became a Moslem. Thus, in the days of Arγun the closest contact between East and West was reached.

But this contact was broken once again. In China the Mongol power declined. The Mongols were overthrown by the Ming Dynasty, which built up a strict system of boundary police and became more and more isolationistic. In Europe, the Great Schism and the Plague had deprived Western Christianity of its vigor. Central Asian Christianity and the Eastern Provinces of the Nestorian Church were destroyed by Tamerlane. He was no illiterate barbarian, but a civilized oriental sovereign, the splendour of whose Court aroused the admiration of Clavijo. Nevertheless, he was one of the greatest destroyers in history. In the Middle East, meanwhile, Islam gained fresh power by the conversion of the Osman or Ottoman Turks. The West now appeared further removed from the East than ever before. The only lasting effects derived from this phase of contact were the reports of the envoys, missionaries and merchants about Cathay (as China was then known) and about the continued existence of a Christian kingdom in Asia under the legendary king, " Prester John. " Thus, a continued fight against Islam and a possible alliance with the alleged Christians of the East link this period of contact between East and West with the following one. This contact had been established either totally or partially by the overland route.

The Portuguese.[11] Now came a turning point in world history. On the Iberian peninsula the Christian Princes had gradually pressed back the Mohammedans; and the Portuguese under the leadership of John I (the Great) in 1415 had conquered Ceuta, the most powerful stronghold of Islam in African Mauretania. One of John's sons, Prince Henry the Navigator, made Portugal a sea power and a country of explorers. As the Popes and the kings of the Middle Ages had sent out the Friars to form an alliance with the Mongols against Islam, so the Navigator conceived the plan of sailing around Africa in order to contact and form an alliance with Prester John against Islam. The prince was strengthened in his plan by his studies of Marco Polo ; and as Grand Master of the Order of Christ, a powerful crusader army, his caravels penetrated farther and farther south. Around 1445 the tropics were reached. The Popes sponsored these endeavors and declared all territories hitherto unoccupied to be the inviolable crown property of Portugal and granted the Portuguese trade monopoly in these parts. When Henry died in 1460, his nephew John II took over the task and the day soon came when Bartholomew Diaz turned the southern end of Africa and faced the Orient with its riches. The foundation of world commerce was changed. Lisbon took the place of Venice as the center of Oriental trade.

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[11] C. R. Beazley, *Prince Henry the Navigator.* C. R. Beazley, *The Dawn of Modern Geography,* 3 Vols. Bensaude, *Lacunes et surprises de l'histoire des découvertes maritimes,* 1 Partie. Bensaude, *A Cruzada do Infante D. Henrique.* Bensaude, *Les Légendes allemandes sur l'histoire des découvertes portugaises* I. Bensaude, *Origine du plan des Indes.* Boxer, *South China in the Sixteenth Century.* Jann, *Die katholischen Missionen in Indien, China und Japan. Ihre Organization und das Portugiesische Patronat vom 15. bis ins 18. Jahrhundert.* Silva Rego, *O Padroado Portuguese do Oriente.* Cortesão, *The Suma Oriental of Tomé Pires.*

Before Portugal could consolidate her power, however, her rival, Spain, under the leadership of Columbus, had also achieved a great success. Columbus did not discover Asia as he had set out to do ; but he discovered America, which at the time was believed to be India and went at first by the name West Indies. This brought the two Iberian powers to the brink of war, as Portugal considered herself injured in her monopoly. Pope Alexander VI intervened and on May 4, 1493, he stipulated a line of demarcation which limited the rival spheres of interest. In the following year this line was revised in the treaty of Tordesillas. Through the arbitration of Alexander VI, a meridian line was established 370 miles west of the Azores. It was decreed that all lands west of this line should belong to Spain, while the lands east of it to Portugal. Both countries pledged themselves to propagate Christianity in their protectorate lands and to establish the ecclesiastical hierarchy for the spiritual needs of the natives. From these rights and privileges, as well as obligations, sprang the Spanish " Vicariato Regio " and the Portuguese " Padroado. "

Portugal now made a fresh effort to establish firm rule in the territories adjuged to her. After the explorers came the conquerors. Cabral and Diaz were followed by Vasco da

Gama and Alfonso de Albuquerque. On March 1, 1498, Vasco da Gama encountered in Mozambique the first Arab ships laden with Indian freight and on May 20 his fleet entered the Indian habor of Calicut. The African obstacle had been overcome and India reached. But it was still necessary to safeguard this achievement against Islam which was, then, at the zenith of its power. In Europe Islam was advancing triumphantly along the Danube. In Africa the last remaining Christian kingdom, Abyssinia, seemed about to succumb to the Mohammedans. On the Malabar coast the lucrative spice trade was in the hands of Arab merchants. Northern and Central India was ruled by the Great Moghuls, followers of Islam. Malacca, the trading center of India and Indo-China, was under their control. The Arabs, through the Mameluk sultans of Egypt, had grown rich on this Oriental trade and were not disposed to give it up without a struggle. But the Portuguese could not be stopped. In 1507 the two main channels of the old trade route with the East, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, were closed with two key fortresses: Socotra and Ormuz. They had been captured from the Moslems. The backbone of Islam's resistance was broken at Diu in 1509 when their fleet was defeated by the Portuguese. In 1510 Goa was taken by the Portuguese and made the capital of the colonial empire to be. In 1511 Malacca fell into their hands and, soon afterwards, a Portuguese fortress was erected on the Spice Island of Ternate. A trade mission went to China in 1514; and in the following year Raphael Perestello travelled in a Chinese junk to South China. Perez de Andrade, in 1517, sailed up the river to Canton. Tomé Pires, the first Portuguese ambassador, reached Peking in 1520. In 1542 three Portuguese were driven off their course by a storm and landed on a strange island. Thus Japan was discovered. In a few decades Islam's front had been turned by an outflanking movement and its communications severed in the rear. East once more was in direct contact with West. Europe had discovered Africa and Asia.

Truthfulness to historical reporting and not the desire to detract from the greatness of the Portuguese accomplishment makes the following intermezzo obligatory here. Long before Portugal had accomplished the astonishing feat of discovering Africa, China had beaten her there. Under the reign of the Yung-lo Emperor, from 1405 on, seven great expeditions with fifty or more junks and about twenty-seven thousand men had gone as far west as Africa.

The colonizing method of the Portuguese differed from that of other powers. Portugal was and remained a sea power. She was content to maintain everywhere a strong grip on important harbors and trade centers and to establish a chain of settlements.

These settlements were, in Africa, San Thome and Mozambique ; in the Indian Ocean, Socotra, Ormuz, Goa, Colombo, and Malacca ; in the China Sea, Macao and the free port of Nagazaki. The importance of these centers becomes obvious when they are compared with the modern English naval bases of Freetown, Capetown, Dar-es-Salaam, Aden, Bender-Abbas, Bombay, Comombo, Singapore and Hongkong. All these bases are situated in the immediate vicinity of the former Portuguese centers. But besides safeguarding their colonial Empire, the Portuguese had another task to perform : to convert the natives and to organize the Church in Asia. Missionary activity had to follow the pattern of colonization as the safety of the missionaries depended on the Portuguese centers. The trading centers and their mission stations were protected by the king's patronage. Lisbon had undertaken the duty of furthering the interests of the Church in her colonies, and at first carried out this task with zeal and devotion. The chain of strongholds was followed by dioceses and missions. After the explorers and the conquerors came the missionaries, at first the Franciscans and the Dominicans, who took up the arduous task where their mediaeval predecessors had left off, and then came the Jesuits.

Lisbon had become the gateway to the Far East and the king of Portugal held the key to all worldly and religious power in these territories. No ships could navigate the seas of Africa and Asia except the caravels and caracks of the Royal Indian Fleet. No missionary was allowed into these territories without the permission of the Portuguese Crown. Even after the Portuguese trade monopoly had been disputed, and more and more Dutch, English, French and Danish ships were finding their way into Indian waters, Lisbon claimed its ancient chartered right of Patronage. As her military power declined, she became increasingly jealous of her religious prerogatives. Spanish missionaries, with very few exceptions, were very rigidly excluded even during the years between 1580 and 1620 when Philip II of Spain and his successors were rulers of Portugal. Frenchmen, for the most part, were also unwelcome. On the other hand, Italians from the Papal States and its dependent principalities were received, as were the missionaries from Belgium, Switzerland, the Rhineland, Bavaria, Bohemia and Austria.

In the course of the Seventeenth Century the Papacy had regained much of its lost spiritual power and prestige and was again in a position to fulfil its missionary obligation. To unify missionary activity, the Congregation of the Propagation of the Faith (Congregatio de Propaganda Fide) was established in 1622. On the other hand, Portugal found it more and more difficult to provide missionaries for the vast territories under her dominion, yet was unwilling to let missionaries enter these territories unless they submitted to Portuguese control and were willing to clear their passage through Lisbon. Moreover, Portugal claimed the extension of her Patronate to China, though China was never penetrated by or subjected to the Crown of Portugal. This led to inevitable disagreements between Rome and Lisbon ; and the missionaries in these territories were caught between the two feuding parties. This was the situation in 1666, when Father Ferdinand Verbiest[12] took over the leadership of the Jesuit mission in China after the death of Father Adam Schall von Bell. From the beginning of his stay in China, Verbiest was torn by two opposite sentiments hard to reconcile : he recognized, on the one hand, the great services rendered by Portugal to the Society of Jesus and to the cause of Christianity, which seemed to oblige all missionaries to be sympathetic toward the interests of Portugal ; on the other hand, the interests of religion made him also realize that it was impossible to rely entirely on Portugal.

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[12] Bosmans, *Le problème des relations de Verbiest avec la cour de Russie,* in *Annales de la Société d'émulation pour l'étude de l'histoire et des antiquités de la Flandre* 63 (1913) 193-233 and 64 (1914), 98-101. See also Bosmans, *Documents relatifs à F. Verbiest. Les lettres annuelles de la vice-province S. J. en Chine,* in *Ann. Soc. d'émul.* 62 (1912) 15-61. Bosmans, *F. Verbiest, directeur de l'observatoire de Peking,* in *Revue des questions scientifiques* 3e Ser. 21 (1912) 195-273 et 375-464. Bosmans, *La notice nécrologique de Ferd. Verbiest par son secrétaire Ant. Thomas de Namur,* in *Ann. Soc. d'émul.* 64 (1914) 102-133. Van den Maele, *De blanke mandarijn. De jezuit Ferdinand Verbiest.* Pfister, *op. cit.,* p. 316. ARSI *Jap. Sin., 105* I ff. 141r-148r.

These two sentiments are reflected in Verbiest's actions. He rendered Portugal lasting services by defending the interests of Macao, but he also felt obliged to fulfil his obligations to the Roman Pontiff and to the mission of which he was superior. He had written several letters to Europe asking for missionaries. One of these letters had come to the hands of Louis XIV through his confessor, Père de la Chaize. Desiring to make his glorious name shine in the Far East, Louis acceded to the petition. It was also seconded by the Royal Academy of Sciences which wished as much information about far away countries as possible. Thus it was decided to send a group of Jesuits as "royal mathematicians" to China. Louis XIV, however, would never have permitted his envoys to subject themselves to the Portuguese Patronate and consequently a new route had to be found. This brought into focus once again the overland route by which the relations between East and West had been established in earlier ages. There was another reason, too, why the Jesuits were trying to find an overland route.

THE OVERLAND ROUTE [13]

Ever since the times of Father Matthew Ricci (d. 1610), the finding of an overland route was one of the great preoccupations of the Superiors of the Jesuit Order. The sea journey was a perilous one. The trip around Africa to India was long, dangerous, and full of drudgery. From there to China and other points east it was even more hazardous. The losses in men, [14] time, and energy were enormous. All these factors made it imperative to find another route to the Far East. Was it possible to get to India, or even to China, quicker and more safely by land?

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[13] Besides the works already mentioned see WALDACK, *Le Père Philippe Couplet, Malinois, S. J.*, in *Analects pour servir à l'histoire ecclésiastique de la Belgique* 9 (1872). DUFFY, *Shipwreck and Empire.* F. DE SOUSA, *Oriente Conquistado.* FRANCO, *Synopsis Annalium Societatis Jesu in Lusitania.* STREIT, *Bibliotheca Missionum* III p. 559 and V p. 476. WESSELS, *Iets over het Briefverkeer in de XVIᵉ en XVIIᵉ eeuw in 't bijzonder met Missiegebieden in Ost-Indie en China*, in *Studien* 116 (1931) 221-233.

[14] For detailed figures see PFISTER, *op. cit.*, p. 329. PLATTNER (transl. SUDLEY and BLOBERG), *op. cit.*, p. 190. ARSI *Jap. Sin. 105* I ff., 92r-96v.

From Europe to India. The great obstacle in the way of an overland route from Europe to India was Islam which, in the Near East, still maintained its old power. The ring which had encircled Christian Europe from Marocco to the Urals was, it is true, outflanked in the south, but it had not yet been pierced in the east. There were three possible overland routes by which the missionaries could attempt to reach Goa from Europe : by crossing the Red Sea ; the Euphrates route ; and the great Persian caravan road from Ormuz through Isphahan and Tabriz to Smyrna or Aleppo. The experiences of the Jesuit missionaries sent to Abyssinia had shown that it was impossible to make a safe crossing of the Red Sea. The rulers of Aden, Dafar, Suakim and Massana were fanatical opponents of Christendom. The Turks in Baghdad and Basra were no better ; moreover, they accused the Christians of having undermined their profitable trade with India. There was also constant warfare in Mesopotamia between Turks, Arabs and Persians. Thus the Euphrates route was also virtually closed. The only remaining road, therefore, was the great Persian caravan road. Along this there was constant coming and going of caravans. As a protection against highwaymen, strong caravanserais had been built along it by Shah Abbas, who had come to power at the beginning of the Seventeenth Century and under whose leadership one of Persia's happiest periods began. He did not want to see his trade policies interfered with by religious persecution and had allowed thousands of Armenian Christians to settle near his new capital, Isphahan. He had even allowed Catholic missionaries to enter his Empire. But even this most promising route between Europe and Goa had failed to produce the desired results. The experiences of Fathers Rigordi, de Rhodes, Storer, Roth and missionaries of other Orders had proved that this road, though practicable, was very difficult and took even longer than the sea journey. In Rome the Superiors were already counting up the number of their dead. Of the French Jesuits who had been sent out to the East at the instigation of Father de Rhodes in 1654 and 1655, five took the overland route through Persia but only three arrived at Surat.

It was clear that the Indian missionaries had nothing much to hope for in that direction. But soon another idea occurred : what about the overland route to China ?

Overland route to China. Could not travelers from Persia, whether they reached there by sea or overland, find connecting roads through Central Asia to Peking ? Time and misery might be saved that way. But here, too, there was a great difficulty to overcome, a great mystery to be solved ; the mystery of what lay in the middle of the vast continent of Asia, for deserts, mountains and hostile tribes had always barred this region to white explorers. The high plateaus to the north of the Himalayas were, until Sven Hedin's day, and indeed still are, the least known part of the world. The routes by which Marco Polo, John of Plano Carpini, William of Rubruck, John of Montecorvino and John of Marignolli had traveled during the period of the *Pax Mongolica* had fallen into complete oblivion. Geography, in the Sixteenth Century, instead of having made progress since the Middle Ages, had retrogressed a few centuries. All that remained was mysterious Cathay with a large contingent of Christian population mentioned by the travelers of the Middle Ages. [15] Though Father Matthew Ricci, in Peking, had to his own satisfaction established that Cathay was China and had so informed his confrères in India, they had refused to accept this identification because there were no Christians in China. According to what they considered reliable information from Agra, there were Christians in Cathay. Evidently the first step to be taken was to solve the riddle of Cathay.

In 1602 Brother Bento de Goes was sent out on his epochmaking expedition across the roof of the world, definitely identifying Cathay with China [16]. The rumours about Christian communities which were said to exist beyond the mountains continued to circulate in India in spite of the findings of Brother Goes. This led to a series of expeditions around the Himalayas to Tibet. The most famous of these expeditions were those of Father Antonio de Andrade and of Father Hippolito Desideri.[17] But all these trips did not find a shorter or safer route to China. Brother Bento de Goes' dying message was "that his journey had been very long, very wearisome and beset with dangers. Therefore should no member of the Jesuit brotherhood attempt to follow his example."

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[15] For the identity of these Christians see Rowbotham, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-15.

[16] Bernard, *Le Frère Bento de Goes chez les musulmans de la Haute Asie* (*1603-1607*). Brazão, *Em Demanda do Cataio. A Viagem de Bento de Goes a China* (*1603-1607*). Heras, *The Jesuits in Afghanistan.* in *New Review* 1 (Calcutta 1935), 62-74 and 139-153. Srinivasan, *Explorer of Cathay. Bento de Goes,* in *New Review* 3 (1936) 70-79. Wessels. *Early Jesuit Travelers in Central Asia 1603-1721*, pp. 1-24. Wessels, *The Grave of Brother Bento de Goes S. J*,. in *AHSI* 4 (1935) 337-338. D'Elia, *Fonti Ricciane.* Gallagher, *China in the Sixteenth Century.* ARSI *Jap. Sin. 102* ff. 149v-151v. Duyvendak *China's Discovery of Africa.* Pastor (English transl.) XXVIII, pp. 129-153.

Yet, as the Dutch influence in the Indian Ocean and the China Sea became stronger and stronger, it became even more imperative to find a shorter and safer overland route to China. In 1622 the Dutch attacked Macao and in 1623 they blockaded Goa. Father Adam Schall, who in 1622 had helped to defend Macao against the Dutch, while a missionary in Sian (1627-1630) gave his full attention to the question of the overland route. He was undoubtedly commissioned to do so by his Superiors, probably by the General of the Society of Jesus himself. This can be gathered from the exactitude of his inquiries and from his detailed report written in 1629, of which two abbreviated copies still exist in the Jesuit Archives in Rome.[18] What influence this report had on future attempts to open an overland route is hard to say. New endeavors were made and it was decided to make Persia the first stopping and resting place. France's influence in the Near East had for some time been increasing, so French missionaries were at first chosen to carry out the task. They could manage this better from their advance mission posts in Syria. It was from Syria that Father Chezaud had come to Isphahan in 1652 to lay the foundations of a Jesuit settlement. In 1654 Father Alexander de Rhodes became the Superior of the mission and under his leadership it started to prosper. He was then free to turn his attention eastward: "I consider that we should lose no time in discovering an overland route to China, for this is very much the wish of Rome," Indeed it was the wish of Rome. Two new men were assigned to carry it out: Father Bernard Diestel and Father John Grueber.

On February 18, 1656, the General Goswin Nickel gave the two explorers their instructions.[19] They started from Messina and shortly before Christmas 1656 arrived in Isphahan. But an impending war between the Shah of Persia and the ruler of Samarkand made the continuation of their trip along the " northern route " impossible. So they proceeded towards Goa. Before reaching it, in Surat, where they arrived in April 1657, they learned that Goa had just been blockaded by the Dutch. After a ten months' wait, a friendly English captain took them, without charge, and with four other Jesuits aboard his ship. In 1658 they all landed at Macao. Father Schall arranged with the Shun-chih Emperor to have the travelers invited to the Court of Peking. Father Diestel died in September 1660. As for Grueber, the General's order to explore an overland route still held and the Superiors in China told him that he should obey this order. Father d'Orville was assigned as his new companion. After completing their preparations, the travelers left Peking on April 13, 1661.[20] The first stage of their journey was from Peking to Lanchow (through Tayuan and Sian), along the eastern end of the " Silk Road. " In Lanchow, Grueber suddenly decided to leave the " Silk Road " which was well known to Schall, as he had described it in his report and certainly had communicated it to Grueber, and followed the less known (only shortly mentioned by Schall) road through Tibet. At the end of June they reached Sining, and, traveling around the northern shores of Köke-nuur, they passed through the Great Wall on July 13. After crossing the desert of the Qalmuq Tartars, the passes of the Tang-la mountain range (5,000 meters high) and the Trans-Himalayas, on October 8 they reached Lhassa. From here, passing through Shigatse, the high passes near Guarisaukar's peak and Katmandu, they arrived in Agra at the end of March 1662. Here d'Orville died and Father Roth took his place. Grueber avoided Surat for fear of the Portuguese, who did not approve of his trip. From Lahore the explorers sailed down the Indus to Tattah near the modern port of Karachi and through the Straits of Ormuz to Bender-Abbas. From here they traveled along the Persian caravan route through Shiraz and Isphaban to Smyrna. From Smyrna they sailed to Messina, and on February 20, 1664, they entered Rome. Grueber transmitted to the Jesuit Curia the letters and reports of the missionaries in China and drew up a memorandum describing the results of his expedition. He recommended the route he had taken as the best but said that missions should be founded in Nepal and Sining. If this were done, a chain of bases could be established : Smyrna or Aleppo, then Isphahan, Surat, Agra, Nepal, Sining, Sian. [21] However, the representative of the Portuguese Jesuits in Asia protested in the interest of the Royal Patronage. In March of the same year, 1664, this important matter was discussed at the Procurators' conference. The decision was in favor of the old sea route. The overland route should be used only on special occasions. The two travelers, however, were permitted to return to their missions overland. [22] Grueber's journey had not been the success everyone had hoped it would be. It was no recommendation for the route he had followed, that it had taken him three years to complete it. Meanwhile, Grueber and Roth had thought of a new plan : to go to Persia by way of Greater Russia and the Caspian Sea, thus avoiding Turkey where a war with Persia threatened. After separating, the two travelers met again in Vienna, where Leopold I received them twice in audience. The Emperor was so impressed by their report that he decided to patronize their plan to find " a better and safer route " to China. He wrote a letter to this effect to the General of the Order (September 17, 1664) saying in effect that the yearly allowance of 1,000 florins with which Ferdinand III had endowed the Jesuit mission in China, should no longer be sent to Lisbon but should be used for the discovery of an overland route. He also declared his intention to write to the Pope for the removal of other obstacles. But these plans met with cold reception in Rome. The Pope had received a letter from the king of Portugal protesting against such plans, as they would entail a violation of the vested rights of his kingdom. Allowances must be made for Portugal's sensitiveness. Her colonial Empire was crumbling, her military position weakening under the onslaught of the Dutch, while her religious and political influence in the Far East had waned owing to the foundation of the Congregation of the Propagation of the Faith (1622) and the nomination of Apostolic Vicars (1661-1663), mostly from France, who had secretly entered Portuguese Patronate lands by the overland route through Persia. Now the Jesuits, too, tried to break away from Portugal. Not to anger the king of Portugal, who had done great things for the Jesuits, the General of the Order, Oliva, sent an evasive answer to Leopold I, saying he could not exchange a safe route by sea for an unsafe one by land. Meanwhile, Grueber and Roth, armed with credentials from Leopold, had gone through Prague to Northern Germany in the hope of traveling through Moscow and Persia to the Far East. But in Mitan (near Riga) they were told that the Tartars of the Lower Volga, in alliance with the Poles, were preparing war against the Romanovs, and that consequently the road from Moscow to Astrahan was closed. They had to return. In 1665 they came with the Austrian ambassador to Constantinople. Grueber fell sick and never returned to the East. Roth returned through Persia and Surat to Agra, where he died in 1668.

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[17] De Filippi, *An Account of Tibet*. Petech, *Ippolito Desideri, S. J.* (In series *Il Nuovo Ramusio* II, *I Missionari Italiani nel Tibet e nel Nepal*). Bastaire, *Une grande figure missionaire: Hippolyte Desideri S. J. (1684-1733)*, in *Études* 288 (1956) 337-353.

[18] ARSI *Jap. Sin. 143* ff. 2r-7r and 9r-19v.

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[19] ARSI *Jap. Sin. 124* ff. 245ss.

[20] For details of this trip see WESSELS, *Early Jesuit Travelers in Central Asia 1603-1721*, pp. 164-202. KIRCHER, *China Monumentis qua sacris qua profanis ... Illustrata* (this work is based on the information given by Grueber). KLUG, *P. Johannes Grueber S. J. Die Reise eines Linzer in China und Tibet 1661-1664*, in *Heimatland* 12 (1935) 98-103. WESSELS, *New Documents relating to the Journey of Fr. John Grueber*, in *AHSI* 9 (1940) 281-302. ZIMMEL, *Johann Grueber in Lhasa*, in *Biblos* 2 (1953) 127-145. BOSMANS, *Documents sur A. Dorville de Bruxelles, missionaire S. J. au XVII^{e} siècle ...* in *Analectes pour servir ...* 3 Ser. 7 (1911) 329-383 et 470-497. HERAS, *The Tomb of Father Albert d'Orville S. I.*, in *AHSI* 2 (1933) 17-24.

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[21] The travelers actually drew up three memoranda dated March 18, 1664. ARSI *Jap. Sin. 124* ff. 242-244.

[22] ROULEAU, *The First Chinese Priest of the Society of Jesus Emmanuel de Siqueira. 1633-1673. AHSI* 27 (1959), 20-22. See also ARSI *Jap. Sin. 162* ff. 207-209. *Jap. Sin. 105* I f. 136r.

THE TRANS-SIBERIAN ROUTE[23]

In December 1673 a Papal Brief permitted all missionaries to use the overland route to India without going through Lisbon. Since Portugal's obstinacy had rendered the sea route impassable, Pope Clement X intended to keep the "lines of communication" with the Far East open by means of the overland route. It was some time, however, before the Jesuits took advantage of this concession. They still hoped to maintain good relations with Portugal and, above all, they were not too certain of this overland route. The journey to India across Persia was as long as the journey by sea. The road from India to China across Tibet was no longer considered, because it had nothing to offer which would have made it preferable to the sea journey. Thus, if the overland route had to be used, the vital question remained to be solved: did there exist a route north of the Himalayas? From now on the thought that this route might be entirely through Russian territory became uppermost in the minds of the leaders of the Jesuit Order.

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[23] BOSMANS, *Le problème ...* in *op. cit.* PIERLING, *op. cit.*, IV. AVRIL, *Voyages en diverses états d'Europe.* KRZYSZKOWSKY, *Entre Varsovie et Ispahan. Le P. Ignace-François Zapolsky S. J.*, in *AHSI* 18 (1949) 85-177.

Father Verbiest. Ferdinand Verbiest seems to have been the first one to think of searching for this route in Siberia. Grueber and Roth had intended to go to Moscow but only in order to get to Persia. After Schall's death (1666), Verbiest soon became the outstanding leader of the Jesuit mission in China. The arrival, in 1676, of the Russian embassy of Spathar in Peking provided Verbiest with the opportunity needed. He contacted Spathar and established cordial relations with him. In order to obtain Spathar's support and intervention with the Tsar, Verbiest rendered Spathar valuable services. When Spathar left Peking, Verbiest gave him a letter for the Tsar in which he not only testified that Spathar had been in Peking (the Chinese government refused him such a letter) but also offered his service and the services of the other members of the Jesuit mission in China to the Russian government. Meanwhile, Tsar Alexis had died. Tsar Theodore succeeded him and Spathar fell into disgrace. Since Spathar did not report from Russia and since the K'ang-hsi Emperor was dissatisfied with the Russians, success for the project seemed unlikely. This was the situation in 1678. But Verbiest did not give up trying. In 1680 Verbiest sent his fellow-countryman, Father Couplet, to Rome and Paris to get reinforcements for the mission. The authorities in Paris agreed, as before seen, to send a number of French Jesuits, the majority of whom traveled by way of Siam to China on a French ship (1686). At the same time a few specially chosen men were to explore the possibilities of the overland route once more.

Optimism rose even higher when, in 1684, Jesuits from Central Europe succeeded with the help of Father Charles Maurice Vota. He was an Italian Jesuit and the confessor of John Sobieski, king of Poland. Together with the Jesuits from Central Europe, he opened a Jesuit residence in Moscow, which subsisted till 1689. This was a giant step towards a possible opening of an overland route via Siberia. Through this valuable outpost the efforts for an overland route made in Rome and Peking could be evaluated, coordinated, and pressed at the Kremlin itself.

The French and Polish Jesuits. In answer to the appeals of Father Verbiest, Louis XIV decided to send a group of Jesuits to China. Two of them, Louis Barnabe, who since 1680 had been in Armenia, and Philip Avril, were to travel overland via Siberia. Father Avril had met Couplet after the latter's arrival in France and Couplet must have informed him about the difficulties of the sea journey. Of the six hundred missionaries hitherto detailed for China, only about a hundred had reached the country; "all the rest had either been destroyed by shipwreck, illness, murder or captured by pirates or other robbers." Impressed by these disastrous statistics, the young explorer vowed to himself that he would spare no pains to lessen the toll of valuable lives lost by opening a safe land route to China. At the beginning of 1686, Avril met Barnabe at Eriwan in Persia and on April 23, 1686, they started on their journey. After many adventures and sufferings they arrived in Moscow in January of 1687. Here they took up residence with the two German Jesuits at the recently established Jesuit House. The Tsar's ministers showed little sympathy toward them. The two Jesuits were forced to suffer the consequences of the alleged mistakes committed by their fellow Jesuits in Peking. In September 1685, when the Chinese transmitted their proposals for peace, the Chinese text was accompanied by a Latin translation. This translation in itself was considered by the Russians as treasonable to the interests of the West. From this time on, the Russians continually repeated this charge. In 1686 Father Nicolas Marmunth of Wilna also reported this Russian charge to Rome[24]. Marmunth was the chaplain of Martin Oginski, the chief negotiator on the Polish side for a treaty with Russia. At the insistence of his Superiors, Marmunth had urged Oginski to obtain from the Russians a concession which would permit the missionaries going to China to travel via Russia and Siberia. The Russian refusal was based on the aforementioned charge which Marmunth had transmitted to Rome. Indeed, the Jesuits were looked upon with the gravest suspicion as possible political spies. Moreover, the Russians at that time were settling people in Siberia to manage and develop the fur trade and did not wish to have foreigners prying into their affairs. Father Barnabe had some unpleasant experiences when he paid a visit to the Russian Court to ask for the necessary travel permits. The all-powerful Prince Galitsine paid the Jesuits some very gracious compliments, and, having done so, sent the two Jesuits to the Chancery. Here they were " cross-examined for four hours like criminals arrested for murder, and three or four sheets of paper were smeared over with an endless sequence of questions and answers. " While their petition for travel permits was making the rounds of red-tape officialdom, the two explorers took all steps to find a so-called Chinese embassy which was thought to be in town, and which was, in reality, some Mongol merchants. The Jesuits had hoped to join this caravan on its return journey ; however, they still had to wait for their official papers to be approved. Meanwhile, Avril was collecting all the information he could about the overland routes connecting China with the outside world. He finally drew up a carefully written memorandum for the headquarters of his Order in Rome, which he was later able to amplify with reports taken from documents belonging to the Polish secret service. He divided the overland routes into two groups, a northern and a southern group. His southern group is hardly an improvement over the reports of Goes and Grueber. His description of the Siberian routes is better.

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[24] ARSI *Pol. 79* f. 166v.

To their great sorrow, both Avril and Barnabe were denied the permission of putting their theories to a test. The Russian government invoked a legal proviso according to which no person or persons were permitted to travel through Siberia to China without having first given proof of their good standing. As citizens of France, therefore, they had to get these necessary papers from Paris. They left Moscow and arrived in Warsaw on March 12, 1687. Barnabe hurried to Danzig where he took a boat to France.

Meanwhile, Avril continued to plan the Siberian journey. The moment seemed promising. In December of the preceding year, 1686, at the meeting of the Senate in Lwow, Sobieski had ratified a treaty with Russia. It was known as the Treaty of Grzymułtowsky. One of the thirty-three articles, namely, the twenty-eighth, made direct reference to the overland route. Father Nicolas Marmunth, chaplain to the Grand Chancellor of Lithuania, Martin Oginski, who had been the chief negotiator on the Polish side, had strongly insisted that, in accordance with instructions received from the Jesuit General, Father de Noyelle, a special clause be inserted in the treaty guaranteeing explicitly that "the messengers of the Gospel shall have free passage across Moscovite territories on their way to China." The Russians declared such a special clause unnecessary since another clause (which became article twenty-eight) had already guaranteed this right to all who travelled with a passport issued by the king of Poland.[25] Avril also obtained an audience with Sobieski who was soon to leave for Moscow to negotiate with the Tsar. Sobieski promised his intercession with the Tsar and supplied Avril with valuable information from the archives of his secret service.

As soon as the news that the French Jesuits were preparing an expedition to China via Moscow and Siberia became known in Poland, the Roman Jesuit Curia was flooded with petitions from Polish Jesuits to join the expedition.[26] Since Avril himself had solicited the General for Polish companions, Fathers Zapolski and Terpilowski were picked for the task. Meanwhile Barnabe had equal success in Paris. Père la Chaize, confessor of Louis XIV, was well informed about affairs, as seen from one of his letters to Father Verbiest. Verbiest had written several letters to Paris asking that some Fathers be sent to China via Greater Tartary. As a result, the king had asked the Superiors concerned to provide him with two more French and two Polish Fathers. Thus Father Beauvollier and Father Nivard were added. Now new difficulties arose. Hardly had the parties set out for their meeting place in Poland when one misfortune followed another. Beauvollier missed his ship in Rouen. As it happened, this was fortunate for him, for the ship went down in the Baltic with Barnabe and Nivard aboard. Then a new threat of war came. In Paris and Vienna, in Moscow and Instambul, men were arming. In this dilemma, Avril appealed once more to his Polish patrons and went to the Diet of Grodno. In addition to the French ambassador, he found here a new friend in the person of Count Constantine Suleiman Syri Zigorski, ambassador extraordinary at the Court of the Shah of Persia, where he represented several European states. In this capacity he was going through Moscow to Isphahan. Avril was ready to join him and go as far as Persia or even to China if the Count was willing to go there as ambassador of the king of France. [27] The Count agreed. Avril had to return to Paris for the necessary documents. While this was going on, Beauvollier arrived in Warsaw with a copy of the documents Barnabe was supposed to bring. [28] When the General of the Society of Jesus, who had great interest in this overland project, heard about the change in the plans of the French Fathers, he communicated his desire to the Provincial of the Lithuanian Province that some other Lithuanian or Polish Fathers should continue trying to travel across Siberia. [29]

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[25] ARSI *Pol 79* f. 167.

[26] *Ibid.*, f. 169ss.

The date set for the French-Polish party to meet at the Polish-Russian border was September 1688. Everything seemed to be in order this time. In Rome, however, the General and his Curial staff did not share this optimism. In a letter to Verbiest, the Secretary of the Society of Jesus, Gilles Estrix, frankly revealed his doubts. He ended his letter with a practical suggestion : Could not Verbiest obtain a document from the Emperor of China recommending the travelers to the Russian government [30] ? His fears were justified. When the French-Polish party was ready to leave, one of the Polish Fathers was missing and Avril hurried back to Wilna. Count Syri Zigorsli refused to wait for him and proceeded. When

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[27] Scheffer has published a Ms. from the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a " Recommandation (de Louis XIV) au Roy de Perse pour le Sieur Comte de Syry et les missionaires Jésuites qui sont en Perse et qui vont a la Chine " contained in an Appendix to the *L'État de la Perse en 1660*, par le Père R. du Mans, pp. 538-539.

[28] About Beauvollier see Lebon, *Un grand marcheur. De France en Chine par terre. Le P. Antoine Beauvollier, S. J. (1657-1708)*, in *Collectanea Commissionis Synodalis* 9 (Peking 1936) 604-622. A. Brou, *Silhouettes de missionaires du Levant. Un grand marcheur devant le Seigneur, le Père Antoine Beauvollier (1657-1708)*, in *Revue d'histoire des missions* 13 (1936) 261-282. Pfister, *op. cit.*, pp. 538-539.

[29] ARSI *Ep. NN 25* f. 105.

[30] ARSI *Ep. NN 25* f 63 v. See also Krzyszkowski, *Entre Varsovie et Ispahan* AHSI 18 (1949) 95.

Avril arrived at the Russian border he was arrested by the order of the Voevode of Smolensk. The Russians were purposely separating him from his protector so that he could be more easily prevented from making his intended journey through Russia. Luckily for Avril, at that very moment the Polish ambassador to the Tsar's Court, Leszczinski, happened to be passing through the town and Avril had himself appointed chaplain. In this way he reached Moscow. Here he learned that Beauvollier, Zapolski and Terpilowski were on their way to Astrahan. The Poles, pointing to article 28 of the treaty of Grzymułtowsky, proclaimed their right to travel anywhere in Moscovite territory since their passports were issued by the king of Poland. Having signed the police protocols, they left for Astrahan. Prince Galitsine had agreed to let the Poles proceed through Siberia. After their departure for Astrahan, however, he changed his mind and excused himself saying that he could not expose them to the dangers of the Siberian trip because he was in no position to vouch for their lives. Peter the Great used this same excuse several times later on. [31] Beauvollier had been categorically refused and had left for Astrahan at the express wish of the Russian Government. Avril, too, was told to leave the country at once. He made a last attempt and reminded the Russian Government of its earlier consent if he had the necessary passes from Paris, which he had obtained. Again he was refused. In the spring of 1689 Avril and Beauvollier were back in Warsaw. They resolved to go to Armenia and try from there. They intended to travel through Istambul to Persia and, with the Count Syri's help, to reach their goal. In view of the threats of war between Turkey and Russia, they traveled with a Polish safe-conduct pass through Lublin, Lemberg, Jassay, Galate to Istambul, where Avril fell ill and had to return to Paris. Meanwhile, Father George David, superior of the Jesuit Residence in Moscow, informed the General of these happenings and added that he had heard that Zapolski intended to return to Moscow to try once more to obtain permission for the crossing of Siberia. Hearing this, the General ordered David to retain Zapolski in Moscow, should he really return there, adding that he had important reasons for this order.[32] These important reasons, or at least one of them, might have been the expected arrival of Father Philip Grimaldi.

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[31] PIERLING, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 109. FLOROVSKÝ, *Čeští Jesuité na Rusi*, p. 4, resumes the details given by Father George David, Superior of the Jesuit Residence in Moscow, in his *Status Modernus Moschoviae* which containes a chapter "De Patribus Societatis Jesu petentibus per Moscoviam transitum in Chinam". See also FLOROVSKÝ, *Ruská mluvnice českého Jesuity z. r. 1690*, in *Slovo a slovesnost* 4 (Praha 1938) 239-245.

Father Philip Grimaldi. In spite of the ill luck which they had met with so far, headquarters in Rome persevered in their efforts to find an overland route. So did Father Verbiest in China. Both in Peking and in Rome they set great hopes on Father Grimaldi, who was the man considered best qualified to make a lasting success of the overland route project. In 1686 Grimaldi received orders to travel to Europe. The K'anghsi Emperor nominated him as his personal ambassador in Rome and Moscow, while Father Verbiest appointed him *chargé d'affaires.* Thus he was entrusted with two duties. The Court of Peking had for many years been awaiting the Tsar's decision with regard to the Manchurian border dispute and Grimaldi was to get an answer. As *chargé d'affaires* of the mission he was to get a permit to travel through Siberia.[33] Grimaldi employed his time in Europe renewing his acquaintances with many distinguished scholars, first, with Leibnitz. Peter the Great admired Leibnitz ; and Grimaldi hoped that a letter of recommendation from him would secure a favorable reception. But the Tsar refused.

Meanwhile, in Peking Verbiest continued working hard towards the same end. In 1686, when the Russian envoys, Venyukov and Favorov, who had come to announce to the Chinese Court the coming of a Plenipotentiary to negotiate peace, were leaving Peking, besides the official dispatches they were also carrying a letter from Verbiest to Spathar. In this letter, dated November 29, 1686, Verbiest declares his own devotion and that of Father Thomas Pereira to Russia. He added that Venyukov, who could speak only the Russian or Western Tartar language, was unable to say much and should be replaced by another ambassador who knew some other language, or that an additional person who could speak Latin should be included in their group. Verbiest went on to say that the Emperor of China had entrusted Father Grimaldi, who was on his way to Rome, with a letter to the Tsar on the same subject as his preceding letters which had remained unanswered. Verbiest asked Spathar to assist Grimaldi in any way he could, should Grimaldi pass through the Tsar's dominions.[34]

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[32] ARSI *Ep. NN. 25* f. 114v.

[33] *Ibid.*, f. 123. *Jap. Sin. 105* I ff. 89-90v. *Jap. Sin. 102* ff. 43r-43v.

Not content with all this, Verbiest continued to make every effort to make the services of the Jesuits useful to Russia at the forthcoming peace negotiations. Should his plan succeed, Verbiest hoped that both parties would appreciate these services and that the Russians would finally open the Siberian route to the Jesuits. He could not hope to accomplish this himself. He was old and, after a fall from a horse, was obliged to spend the whole year of 1687 in convalescence. Therefore, he staked his hopes on Father Pereira whom he had recommended to the Tsar. In 1687 he wrote a letter to the General in which, among other things, he describes the Trans-Siberian route. Upon receipt of this letter, the General wrote to Father David in Moscow for more details of this route. David interviewed Spathar and in his report conveyed Spathar's answers to Rome. In connection with the question as to whether the Jesuits could ever hope to get free passage through Siberia, Spathar thought that the surest way to obtain it was through the intervention of the German Emperor whom the Russians esteemed very highly. He thought the Russians might prove a little difficult until they reached an agreement with China, even though the merchants claimed that war did not interfere with their travels. Spathar also indicated the shortest route. Verbiest succeeded in having Pereira appointed to the Chinese delegation, which after an abortive trip to Selenginsk in 1688, met the Russians at Nerchinsk in 1689. Pereira's companion was Father Francis Gerbillon.

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[34] BADDELEY, *op. cit.*, II, p. 436.

CHAPTER V

THE ROLE OF THE JESUITS AT NERCHINSK

The question of what role the Jesuits played at Nerchinsk is a very important one. Some writers see their role as that of interpreters pure and simple ; others believe that they were transactors, intermediaries and inspirers of political action ; a third group holds that the Jesuits were neither of the former two but scientific documentators, collators and informants in both countries. For Russia they were the first Orientalists and Sinologists at a time when Sinology hardly existed ; for China they were the first Occidentalists at a time when Chinese knowledge of the West was practically nonexistent. Besides this divergence of opinions there is another difference to be noted here. In view of later Russian successes, some authors, especially certain Russian historians, consider the treaty of Nerchinsk a diplomatic defeat of Russia and find the reason for it in the baneful influence or the intrigues of the Jesuits. [1] One must take up the different opinions and investigate their respective merits because it is precisely with respect to the role of the Jesuits that the Pereira Diary sheds new light and adds new facts to our knowledge of the treaty of Nerchinsk.

Gaston Cahen says : " According to Gerbillon, the Chinese showed themselves so eager and so exacting that the discussions were quickly broken off, and it was to the two Jesuit interpreters that the credit was due for the resumption of negotiations. The official journal of the Russian embassy puts the matter in a different light : the Jesuits favored China and placed difficulties in the way of Russia, and the Russian envoys tried to speak directly with the Chinese in Mongol ; the Jesuits opposed this on the ground that they were the official interpreters, that they alone held the office of intermediaries, and that the Mongol interpretations were inadequate ; the Russians addressed themselves in Mongol to the Chinese envoys, who replied that the Jesuits had exceeded their instructions. Then the Manchus intervened in Manchu between the two sides and would not permit the Jesuits to obstruct. On the other hand, the Russians brought the Jesuits to a better frame of mind by means of their promises for their Society, but the Jesuits refused to go too far in this direction and to betray the Emperor of China. They had the best reason, as a matter of fact, for supporting the Chinese on the one hand, and on the other for not pressing the Russians to a rupture ; in short for directing these peaceful negotiations to a conclusion advantageous to China : The Chinese Court could not be other than grateful for the success of the negotiation, and Russia would not be by any means displeased with a peaceful solution, so they would gain at a single stroke the good will of one side and possibly both. " Mr. Cahen also says, quoting the official Russian journal : " ... A cette même session les haut ambassadeurs, voyant que les Jésuites suscitaient toute sorte d'opposition et retenaient les ambassadeurs Chinois dans leur inclination à la paix éternelle ordonnèrent à André Belobotskii de parler aux Jésuites en sécret et de leur promettre la faveur des Hauts Souverains et un salaire ... "[2] One can only regret that Golovin's official report is not accessible in toto. Cahen gives only a one page excerpt from it concerning the role of the Jesuits. A more extensive study and comparison with Pereira's and Gerbillon's Diaries might prove rewarding. Under the circumstances, one has to accept the fact that the picture painted by Golovin about the activity of the Jesuits was an unfavorable one. This may be true of the official report of Golovin before he knew how the new Tsar, Peter the Great, would react to the treaty. Peter the Great had taken over the reins of government as sole ruler in 1689 while Golovin was at Nerchinsk. A similar change had taken place during Spathar's embassy to China, with the result that upon his return, the envoy had fallen into disgrace. Nor is this the first instance of blaming something, which may have aroused the ire of the Tsar, on the Jesuits. In 1685 there arrived in Moscow some letters from the K'ang-hsi Emperor containing his complaints and new proposals for peace. The Chinese text was accompanied by a Latin translation. This in itself was considered by the Russians as treason against the interests of the West committed by the Jesuits, whose presence in Peking was known in Moscow. From this time on, the Russians continually repeated the charges that the Jesuits instigated the Chinese against them, that they furnished China with firearms and instructed the Chinese in the art of war.[3] Thus Golovin's remarks, which put the blame on the Jesuits, was in complete harmony with the well-known line in Moscow. By the same token, one must dismiss the insinuation that the Russians bought the services of the Jesuits by bribing them. Gerbillon in his Diary (entry of August 24) says: "... nous sçûmes que nos Ambassadeurs avoient fait la proposition d'abandonner Selengha [Selenginsk] et Niptchou aux Moscovites, et qu'ils s'étoient servis pour cela d'un Interprête Mongou, paroissant ne se pas fier entierement à nous, peut-être parce que le Plénipotentiaire Moscovie [sic] nous marquoit de la confiance ... "[4] Moreover, the situation of the Jesuits was delicate and dangerous enough without making it more so by accepting a bribe which could hardly be kept clandestine or hidden from the Chinese.

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[1] PAVLOVSKY, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-101, 123.

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[2] CAHEN, *Histoire des relations de la Russie avec la Chine sous Pierre-le-Grand (1689-1730)*, pp. VII-IX and 47-48. See also the abridged English translation of this work by W. S. RIDGE, *Some Early Russo-Chinese Relations*, p. 31.

Be this as it may, it is also undoubtedly true that Golovin expressed his gratitude to the two Jesuits for their services, heaped favors on them and promised them his intervention with the Tsar.[5] It is also of interest to know that after his return from Nerchinsk, Golovin received official praise, was appointed *boyar* and viceroy of Siberia, and eventually became the principal negotiator of treaties entered into by Russia with various states of Europe.[6] In all fairness to Golovin it must also be said that the unfavorable remarks of his official report had no consequences with regard to the course of action which Peter the Great took against the Jesuits. He closed the Jesuit church and residence in Moscow and expelled them from his domains (October, 1689) before Golovin returned to Moscow.[7]

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[3] ARSI, *Pol. 79* f. 166v.

[4] HALDE, *Description* ... IV, p. 192.

[5] PEREIRA, *Diary* 288-291.

[6] PAVLOVSKY, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

[7] PIERLING, *La Russie et le Saint Siège* IV. In ARSI, *Lith. 42,*

These considerations in themselves dispose also of the theory that the Jesuits were mere and simple interpreters. How could they have exerted the influence, implied by their alleged " intrigues ", as simple interpreters ? Moreover, Pereira in his Diary states explicitly : " ... we were not invested with the office or title of interpreter. " [8]

Those who maintain that the Jesuits at Nerchinsk " accomplished their real historic mission in the domain of Sino-Russian relations as scientific collators more than as translators or inspirers of political action, " base their argument on the fact that " the instructions with which the delegates of both sides had come to Nerchinsk were couched in a way that indicated that a virtual agreement had existed between them well before the conference. " The bases of agreement, according to this theory, had been laid long before the intervention of the Jesuits, " not only in regard to determination of frontiers, but on the general question of relations between China and Russia. The really constructive ideas which finally triumphed and permitted both countries, in spite of their seemingly irreconciliable ideologies, to meet and negotiate on the basis of equality, originated with the work of documentation in which three men had collaborated : Krizanich, Spathar and Verbiest. " The differences which transpired at Nerchinsk between the two parties are put, by the proponents of this theory, in the following light : " Naturally, the fact that the agreement already existed in the minds of the two parties did not prevent the conference from being conducted in the Oriental fashion : excessive demands on both sides which were withdrawn the next day ; attempts at intimidation by the use of military demonstrations ; pretenses of breaking off ; and preparations to depart. " [9] Pereira and Gerbillon " acted as intermediaries; they often crossed the river to transmit from one camp to the other new demands and new objections ; sometimes they succeeded in brushing aside psychological obstacles which arose

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II ff. 431ar-431cv there is a detailed report of this expulsion under the title : *Brevis relatio revolutionis in Regno Moscovitico, et expeditionis repentinae Patrum Societatis Jesu, P. Georgii David et P. Thobiae Tichan sky missionariorum Augustissimi Romanorum Imperatoris, Moscua Anno 1689, 12a 8-bris ; in Fide Sacerdotali conscripta a P. David. Kadzini in limitibus Lithuaniae et Moschoviae.*

[8] Pereira, *Diary* 220-221.

[9] Pavlovsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-125.

but they produced no constructive idea of their own." "Undoubtedly it was necessary that the ideas which existed in the minds of the two delegates be formulated and stated precisely in terms acceptable to both parties but in this phase of the conference the role of Gerbillon and Pereira does not seem to have been more considerable than, for example, the role of the Latin-Russian translator Andrei Bielobotsky. Gerbillon was a newcomer to China; he could not have known either Chinese or Manchu well. As to Pereira, Gerbillon himself tells us that he did not know how to read Manchu. The Chinese Plenipotentiaries were all Manchu and the first draft of the agreement, as has recently been shown by Walter Fuchs, was written in Manchu."[10]

A simple reading of the Pereira Diary is sufficient to convince one that this theory oversimplifies the historical facts. It is true that Pereira's Diary was not known until now and in reading only Gerbillon's, one might agree that "in the light of information which we possess today, the role of Gerbillon (Pereira hardly intervened) in the negotiations at Nerchinsk appears less significant than one would be led to believe by his words."[11] However, as seen, it is precisely in this respect that Pereira's Diary sheds new light on the treaty of Nerchinsk. After reading it one can hardly agree that "a virtual agreement had existed between them [Russia and China] well before the conference," just as one would not agree that a heap of stones and bricks was virtually the Library of Congress. On the Chinese New Year's Day, 1690, the K'ang-hsi Emperor said to his ministers in regard to the treaty of Nerchinsk: "... And again in the Russian affair, did not both Manchu and Chinese ministers advise me that Russia was too far from China, and the negotiations could hardly by any possibility succeed? But I said, no. The matter cannot be allowed to stand in this uncertain stage; and I sent high officers to act according to my views, the result being that Russia was at once brought to terms."[12] These words prove that the success was not a foregone conclusion. In spite of the bases of agreement, the instructions of both rulers, it took much negotiating to make both sides agree to the necessary compromises. The negotiations were interrupted four times and on one occasion war was practically declared.[13] To call the clarification of these differences " brushing aside psychological obstacles " is an oversimplification. Pereira during his numerous talks and exhortations may not have produced any original ideas, since he had to keep in mind the K'ang-hsi Emperor's intentions, but he certainly contributed some constructive ideas. His exhortations, by which he tried to convince the Chinese delegates that the Russians were not savages but civilized people and that, according to the Law of Nations, one must have trust in them, seems to conflict with the statement " that the really constructive ideas which finally triumphed and permitted both countries to meet and to negotiate on the basis of equality originated with the work of documentation in which three men collaborated : Khrizanich, Spathar and Verbiest. " Had the Chinese delegation been pervaded with the idea of equality, Pereira would have been spared much trouble. Moreover, it is hard to believe that the ideas of a Siberian exile Khrizanich, of the disgraced Spathar, or of a Belgian Jesuit could have produced such results in such a short time in Moscow, much less so in Peking where they came into frontal conflict with age-old prejudices. That this was not so can be seen clearly from the statements of Pereira and Spathar himself. Pereira in one of his exhortations to the Chinese ambassadors said : " Only by trusting them (the Moscovites) can we believe that their agreement is authentic, and we may not jeopardize everything by denying the confidence due even to barbarians, which is a category that does not include the Moscovites. "[14] Spathar in an interview with Father George David in Moscow stated, as Father David reports to the General Thyrsus Gonzalez : " Ce monsieur croit la paix prochaine. Elle serait déjà conclue, si les Moscovites étaient aussi civilisés que les Chinois, dont il fait le plus grand éloge. "[15]

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[10] *Ibid.* For further details about Krizanich see PIERLING, *op. cit.* IV, pp. 1-39. About Spathar see PANAITEZCU, *Nicolas Spathar Milescu*, in *Mélanges d'École Roumaine en France*, Part I. About Verbiest see PFISTER, *op. cit.*, pp. 338-363 and the articles of BOSMANS.

[11] PAVLOVSKY, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

[12] CH'EN FU-KUANG, *op. cit.*, p. 508.

It is also an oversimplification to compare the role of the two Jesuits in the drafting of the treaty with that of Andrei

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[13] PEREIRA, *Diary* 225-227, 238-239, 256-257, 270-271.

[14] *Ibid.* 258-259.

[15] Letter of 30 March 1689. BOSMANS, *Le problème ...*, pp. 218-222. Latin original see ARSI *Jap. Sin. 164* ff. 148-149.

Bielobotsky. In whatever language the first draft was written, and much could be said about that, the influence of the Jesuits and their knowledge of geography left a more lasting mark on the treaty than that of Bielobotsky, as a simple reading of the Pereira Diary will reveal. The fact that, during the post-Nerchinsk period, their activities were restricted to collection of information from which both China and Russia benefited and for which their diplomatic history will gratefully preserve the names of Verbiest, Gerbillon, Pereira, Parrenin, etc. ... (the latter three having been elected corresponding members of the Academy of Sciences of Moscow)[16], does not necessarily mean that they played the same role at Nerchinsk. During the first few decades after the treaty of Nerchinsk, K'ang-hsi and his successors were busy pacifying the Qalqa and the Ölöd Mongols and had little use for the diplomatic skill of the Jesuits. By the time this skill could have been put to use again, the Jesuits and Christianity had fallen into disgrace in Peking because of the unhappy Rites controversy. Nerchinsk was the culminating point of their influence, as is shown by the promulgation of an edict of toleration for Christianity, the first of its kind, as a reward for their services.[17]

But if their role exceeded that of official documentators and interpreters, then we must accept the only remaining alternative : that they were intermediaries and participants in political action. With certain qualifications, this was, indeed, their role. It is true that contemporary Chinese chronicles make little mention of the members of the Society of Jesus. In 1688, the Chinese delegation which was to meet the Russians at Selenginsk, was accompanied by two Chinese secretaries whose names were duly recorded in the official documents, while the two Jesuits Pereira and Gerbillon were not mentioned, though their presence at Nerchinsk was considered necessary. They accompanied the second delegation in 1689, while the presence of the two Chinese secretaries was dispensed with, as they did not accompany the delegation to Nerchinsk. Being attached to the embassy as necessary and important members, they held no specific public position recognized as such by the official system of Chinese government. Though Pereira was publicly and officially appointed by an imperial edict, the edict did not specify his position. He and his companion were recommended to the care of the uncle of the Emperor, one of the ambassadors, to be treated as the Emperor himself would be treated ; the Emperor gave him his own dress and had one made for Gerbillon and heaped other favors on them, yet the office they held can be best circumscribed in a negative way : one can only conclude what they were not. Their position never being defined positively, they remained on the fringe of official Chinese life. Pereira served rather as a personal transactor and supervisor for the Emperor, who gave him his instructions in the privacy of his Palace in order that he would be not given too much publicity but only enough to enable him to carry out the Emperor's wishes. In the eyes of the general public, except for those persons concerned, Pereira and his confrères always remained " western barbarians. " The Chinese ambassadors listened to Pereira because they knew that he acted on behalf of the Emperor. After an initial period of acting independently of the advice of the two Jesuits, the Chinese ambassadors realizing their own mistake, did not want, during the later stages, to take any steps without consulting Pereira. The Russians, noticing this great deference on the part of the Chinese ambassadors, resented this influence of the Jesuits as they felt that it would be to their advantage to deal directly with the less informed ambassadors than through the well informed Jesuits. The change in the attitude of the Chinese ambassadors came about because of this same realization, as both Gerbillon's and Pereira's Diaries testify, and not as a result of the machination of the Jesuits, as the official Russian report alleges. The Russians, noticing the change and not knowing what the position of the Jesuits was, blamed them for the change. The change, however, was brought about by the Chinese ambassadors' realizing that it was to their advantage to listen to Pereira and to recognize the wisdom of K'ang-hsi's choice in appointing Pereira as his personal supervisor. After the successful conclusion of the negotiations the Chinese ambassadors willingly and publicly recognized this, as did the Emperor himself.

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[16] PFISTER, *op. cit.*, pp. 501-517, 667-693, 890-902. PAVLOVSKY, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

[17] PFISTER, *op. cit.*, pp. 382-383.

Thus, one can say that the Jesuits at Nerchinsk played the role of private supervisors in the negotiations to ensure that the intentions of K'ang-hsi be carried out and that they were appointed to this post by a public and official edict.

A more precise evaluation of the role of the Jesuits may be drawn from the following considerations. In the Introduction mention was made of another interesting problem that arises from the Pereira Diary. What role did the Law of Nations play in the conclusion of this treaty ?

The *Jus Gentium* or Law of Nations is mentioned in the Pereira Diary several times. Mention of principles which at that time had become essential elements of the Law of Nations are even more frequent: equality and reciprocity, the need thereof in negotiations and its lack in the Chinese delegates ; the good faith one must have in international transactions and its absence in the Chinese delegates; the concept of just and unjust war, etc. [18] To this can be added the whole manner of procedure during the negotiations and the conclusion of the treaty (meetings, conferences, signing, oath, etc.), even to such minor details as the title Excellency given to the Plenipotentiaries of both countries and the use of Latin as the diplomatic language. Granting that these things had become elements of the Law of Nations, but had they penetrated, and if so, how far, the two contracting countries, viz. Russia and China, and how much of it was known to the Jesuits, intermediaries between the two contracting parties ?

In trying to answer these questions, it is not necessary to trace the development of the *Jus Gentium* throughout Russian and Chinese history. For this the reader is referred to standard works on the history of the Law of Nations, ex. gr., Arthur Nussbaum, *A Concise History of the Law of Nations*, (New York, 1954), [19] and other similar works. The study of the Law of Nations as accepted at the time of the conclusion of the treaty of Nerchinsk is of concern, and so it is necessary to prescind from the controversy with regard to the origin and development of the Law of Nations and restrict investigations to its elements as established and used at that time.

Two important historic events contributed to the establishment and practice of the Law of Nations or international law. The publication of Hugo Grotius' work " On the Law of War and Peace " (1624) and the Peace of Westphalia (1648). A.

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[18] Pereira, *Diary* passim.

[19] Nussbaum, *A Concise History of the Law of Nations*, pp. 3-4, 49-51, 58-60, 65-66, 123.

Nussbaum says : " On the Law of War and Peace made epoch in the history of international law. In fact it initiated the doctrine of modern international law, which we have seen is bound to be secular and indiscriminate. Rightly, therefore, Grotius has been considered as ' founder ' or ' father ' of international law. " " For at least a century the Peace of Westphalia remained the framework of Europe's political organization. Characteristically, important publications on the history of international law have taken the Peace of Westphalia as the starting point. In fact, the Peace has sometimes been represented as the inception of the European law of nations. While this view is unwarranted, the Peace is a landmark in the development of international law. " " The political status of the Western European countries was greatly changed by the Peace. " " Basically the structural pattern of Western Europe remained during this period that drawn by the Peace of Westphalia. " " Just as there is a spiritual nexus between Grotius' work and the Peace of Westphalia, so there is a similar nexus between the Papal condemnation of Grotius' work [in 1626 the treatise was placed on the Index with the mitigating proviso, *donec corrigatur* (until amended) ; it was only in 1899 that this stigma was expunged] and this Peace. Pope Innocent X, by the bull *Zelo domus Dei*, declared the tolerance and other religious clauses, core of the Peace, ' null, void, invalid, inequitable, unjust, condemned, reprobated, frivolous, of no force or effect ' — a nullification extended to oaths taken under the treaty. " " After the Peace of Westphalia his (Grotius') work served, in Rivier's phrase as ' the European Code of international law, ' and its renown was not limited to Europe. " " Mention should finally be made of the sanction added to the Peace. It calls for ' perpetual oblivion and amnesty ' of hostile acts committed in the past, so that all claims based on such acts shall be ' buried ' — phrases repeated later in other treaties. " [20]

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[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 113-117. According to PASTOR, *History of the Popes* (English transl.) XXX, p. 130 " After the evacuation of Germany by the Swedes had begun, as a result of the decree for the execution of the peace treaty published at Nuremberg on June 26th, 1650, the Pope gave orders, on August 20th, for his protest against the peace treaty to be sent to all nuncios so that they may publish the judgement of the Holy See. However, this was not done in the form of

By the last quarter of the Seventeenth Century Russia was familiar with the principles and procedures adopted in the conclusion of the Treaty of Westphalia. While, up until 1822, it may be true that " with regard to the study of international law the situation was particularly unfavorable, Russia had not participated in the religious and philosophical movement in which the law of nations originated. Instead Byzantine traditions prevailed in the Russian views of foreign relations. In the Eighteenth Century and later there was a gradual approximation to Western ideas, accelerated in the closing decades of Tsardom. But, on the whole, learning in the matter of international law was on a low level and was remote from the Russian mind. Grotius' *De Jure Belli et Pacis* was never published in Russia except for extracts printed in the Twentieth Century. Until 1880, Kluber's book was the only systematic treatise on international law available in Russian, and until about the same time Russian writers had produced only minor studies in the field. " [21] However this may be, as far as the study of international law is concerned, the picture is quite different with regard to the practice of international law. " Russia joined the system of permanent embassies under Peter the Great (1682-1727). " Under the same ruler Russia became a leading European power by the Treaty of Nystad (1721) which, as other treaties before it, was concluded on the basis of the Law of Nations. Moreover, during the reign of Peter the Great a manuscript translation of Grotius' work was prepared, apparently for his son Alexis. Consequently Grotius' work and the practices established at Westphalia were known at least to the government.

While Russia, throughout her history, had relations with European nations, and after the Peace of Westphalia these contacts were expanded, the situation with regard to China was quite different. Before the conclusion of the treaty of Nerchinsk, Europeans had visited China. Christianity had

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a solemn Bull as had first been intended, but by a simple Brief ... The Brief retrodated to November 26th, 1648, did not condemn the peace as such, nor all its articles, but only those which injured the Church. " *Ibid.* n. 4 : " The frequently made statement, the most recent instance being MIRBT (Quellen, 202), that Innocent X had protested with a Bull is erroneous ; the document is a Brief dated *Romae... sub annulo piscatoris.* "

[21] NUSSBAUM, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

penetrated it, but no international agreements were concluded with Western nations. " Only the Portuguese succeeded in 1557 in establishing at Macao a settlement which, under a high-degree of self-government, proved to be a great and lasting success. In the eyes of the Chinese the settlement was based merely on their toleration ; and they repeatedly asserted their sovereignty and jurisdiction over Macao. A Chinese-Portuguese treaty was not concluded until the Nineteenth Century. "[22] Chinese history of the imperial period, with regard to international relations with the West, can be divided into three periods : from the beginning to 1689 ; from 1689 to 1842 ; and from 1842 on.

During the first period " China's resistance to contacts with foreign powers took the form of arrogance and humiliating demands ; superiority of Chinese civilization, or rather non-existence of any other, was asserted ; foreign negotiators were required to perform before the Emperor or his representative a definite number of ceremonious prostrations (kowtows) which in connection with the expected gifts or tributes were considered by the Chinese as evidence of Chinese suzerainty. It was only in the Nineteenth Century that the stubborn attitude of the Chinese was broken. " [23] Pereira describes this attitude of the Chinese in the following terms : " From the beginning of the world, China had never received foreigners in its Empire except as tribute-bearers. In their crass ignorance of the world, the Tartars [Manchus who had occupied China forty-six years earlier, i. e. in 1644] with the same pride as the Chinese, considered other nations shepherds like their neighbours. They thought everything was part of the China which they called proudly *Tien hia* [T'ien-hsia], i. e. ' under the heaven ', as if nothing else but it existed. " [24] Consequently, ambassadors or envoys who did not want to conform with Chinese customs were dismissed.

The period beginning from 1842 has been characterized as the " Period of Unequal Treaties. " " Chinese exclusion was first encroached upon by the Sino-English Treaty of Nanking (1842), which opened five Chinese ports to foreign trade and established a status of equality between Chinese and British officials of the same rank. Similar treaties with other powers followed ... " This status of equality, however, was ephemeral. The actions of the Western powers as well as the attitude of the Chinese negated it. " The system of Chinese-European treaties, as it developed during the century, was characterized by marked inequality to the detriment of China, after the model of the Near East ' capitulations. ' The treaties, more or less forcibly imposed upon China, had as their objective the attainment of privileges for foreigners on Chinese territory, without reciprocal concessions to the Chinese. As a result Chinese independence was heavily impaired. " [25] On the other hand the Chinese, while forced to make concessions to the stronger Western powers, still regarded their civilization as superior to all others and refused to acknowledge the Western powers as their equals. It was only " late in the 1870's that the Chinese Government established Legations in London, Washington, and several other capitals in the Occident ... thus accepting diplomatic intercourse on the basis of equality between states. " " It was only reluctantly and after much delay that the foreign envoys in Peking were received in audience by the Emperor. Even then it was by subtle face-saving arrangements which partially soothed the traditional Chinese conviction of the Empire's superiority over all other countries. Not until 1894, after the first defeats in the war with Japan, was an audience held according to protocol which entirely satisfied the ministers of the Western world. " [26]

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[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66, 125, 348, n. 120.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 123.

[24] Pereira, *Diary* 206-207.

These two periods can be characterized by their assimilation to the Near East ' capitulations ' : [27] during the first period whatever China conceded took the form of a unilateral grant or franchise which appealed to the Emperor's feeling of grandeur and generosity based on the superiority of Chinese culture; during the second period it was in the form of unequal treaties forced upon China because of her weakness. Between these two periods is the time during which China concluded two treaties with Russia on the basis of equality and reciprocity. These are the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) and the Treaty of Kiakhta (1727) which both remained in force till around the middle of the Nineteenth Century.[28] This disquisition being confined to the treaty of Nerchinsk, it is not necessary to go into a detailed comparison of these two treaties, but only investigate the reasons for which, in 1689, China gave up her traditional attitude and entered into treaty relation with Russia on the basis of equality and reciprocity as established by the Law of Nations. The diplomatic and military activities leading up to the conclusion of the treaty of Nerchinsk have already been described in the first three chapters. The K'ang-hsi Emperor wanted peace with Russia so that he would have a free hand to deal with the Jün Γar Mongols. Moreover, he wanted a treaty which would bind the Russians as strictly as possible. He was willing to sacrifice the traditional Chinese attitude and superiority, at least for the time being, to obtain this end. The acceptance of the principles and procedures of the Law of Nations, which at that time had already penetrated Russia, seemed to be the most appropriate means toward this end. But how, and how much did the K'ang-hsi Emperor know about the Law of Nations ? For twenty years or more the Jesuit missionaries in Peking had been the intermediaries in the Russo-Chinese diplomatic transactions. Moreover, they were counsellors, advisers, and teachers of the Emperor in the arts and sciences of the West. It is known from their reports that the Emperor was very much interested in the intellectual and technical developments of the Occident. But how much did the Jesuits themselves know about the status of the Law of Nations ? The missionaries in Peking were far removed from Europe and communications were not what they are today. Granting that Grotius' contribution and work was out of their reach for practical use, being on the Index, its principles, however, as used in the Peace of Westphalia and subsequent treaties had most certainly reached them. Granting also that Grotius' contribution to the formulation of modern international law is outstanding, yet he was not the only one in this line. The contributions of Victoria and Suarez are also important. Their works, especially that of Suarez, were known to the Jesuits in China. Some of them had studied at the University of Coimbra where Suarez had been teaching. Moreover, sometime around 1648 Father Martin Martini had started to translate Suarez' work into Chinese. [29]

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[25] NUSSBAUM, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-195.

[26] LATOURETTE, *A History of Modern China*, pp. 74, 81.

[27] For the nature of these capitulations see NUSSBAUM, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

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[28] These two treaties and the relationship they established between the two countries are described by NUSSBAUM (*op. cit.*, pp. 123-4) in the following terms : " Limited agreements, however, were obtained in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth centuries by Russia, whose expansion over Siberia had brought her into close contact, and conflict, with northern Chinese territories. In 1689 a Chinese-Russian agreement was concluded at Nerchinsk (near the Manchurian border), under which the Russo-Chinese border was opened for trade on the basis of reciprocity. Elaborate extradition rules were added ... In 1727 the Treaty of Nerchinsk was replaced, after a bellicose conflict, by the Peace of Kiakhta (south of Lake Baikal), which apart from frontier regulations, followed the lines of the earlier conventions. However, a permanent legation as well as the admission of four priests of the orthodox church was conceded to the Russians, and the exercise of the orthodox faith permitted. The expulsion, ordered a few years earlier of Catholic missionaries from China, gives point to that agreement. In 1733 a Chinese embassy was sent from Peking to Moscow -- a singular event in Asiatic diplomacy and a matter of great wonderment. No similar contacts were established with the Western Powers, but the relations with Russia, too, remained narrowly restricted. On the whole, seclusion persisted during the entire period. " In connection with this passage I would like to make the following remarks : The treaties of Nerchinsk and Kiakhta were fullfledged treaties. The treaty of Kiakhta did not replace the treaty of Nerchinsk but completed it. See LOBANOV-ROSTOVSKY, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-140, 190. PAVLOVSKY, *op. cit.*, p. 25. A. K. WU, *China and the Soviet Union*, pp. 60-61. No Chinese embassy was sent from Peking to Moscow in 1733 but one had been sent in 1729 and another in 1731, not counting Tulisen's embassy to the Turγūd in 1712. See MANCALL, *China's First Mission to Russia, 1729-1731*, in *Papers on China from the East Asia Regional Studies Seminar* (duplicated for private distribution by the East Asia Program of the Committee on Regional Studies, Harvard University) 9 (1955) 75-110. PFISTER, *op. cit.*, p. 507.

Besides these *a priori* reasons, which show the possibility of the influence of the Law of Nations on the negotiations and the conclusion of the Treaty of Nerchinsk, there are also positive indications. The first one : the simple fact that the K'ang-hsi Emperor was willing to send a peace delegation outside the territories of the Empire. In Peking not even such a powerful Emperor as he could have negotiated on even terms with Russia without arousing public opposition. Yet wanting to conclude a pact most binding for the Russians, it had to be concluded according to the Law of Nations, that is to say, on the basis of equality and reciprocity. He was willing to sacrifice the age-old Chinese attitude and procedure. Desiring to do this without offending Chinese public opinion, he sent his delegates outside the Empire where the negotiations would be removed from the eyes of the public. Pereira, in describing the mission of the Portuguese envoy, Manuel Saldanha, to the Chinese capital, says: "However, the truth of the matter is that if other Europeans came, they would not be admitted, I think, unless they subjected themselves to the infamy of vassalage as did the Dutch who, with grave dishonor, as I have heard, went so far as to offer disdainfully a yearly tribute in order to obtain the much desired permission to trade. But, even with this submission they did not get such authorization." And speaking about the advantage the Moscovites had obtained at Nerchinsk, Pereira says: "The Moscovite, however, would never have had this advantage had he come to China, because there they would have obliged him, as they did those who came in the past, either to submit to the Chinese customs or return home without peace; as he did not want to go to the Court of China, he achieved equality and honor through obliging them to leave their own country and to negotiate peace at the pretended borders." [30] In this last passage the words "obliging them" are a bit too strong to fit the historical facts. Russia wanted the peace conference outside Chinese territory and had suggested Selenginsk. Russia, however, still "had thought it possible that China would demand diplomatic conferences on her own territory. To meet this case a new *gramota*, dated the 29th October 1687 was despatched to Golovin ..." [31] At this time China's position was more advantageous than the Russian position and if China insisted that the conference be held on Chinese soil, Russia would have had to consent. K'ang-hsi, however, for reasons of his own accepted the Russian suggestion and selected Selenginsk as the place of the meeting. But even in consenting to meet the Russians outside China, K'ang-hsi wanted to maintain a position which would enable him to bargain from strength. This is evident from the size and strength of the armies accompanying the delegations sent first to Selenginsk (1688) and then to Nerchinsk (1689). Moreover, the concessions made by the K'ang-hsi Emperor with regard to procedure were to be only for this occasion and were not intended as a precedent for the future.

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[29] PFISTER, *op. cit.*, p. 262, n. 13.

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[30] PEREIRA, *Diary* 208-211, 232-233.

[31] CAHEN (W. S. RIDGE), *op. cit.*, p. 11.

Another indication that the K'ang-hsi Emperor wanted everything done according to the Law of Nations is the fact that he sent Pereira and Gerbillon along with his delegates. Pereira himself tells us that he and Gerbillon were not merely interpreters, nor had they been sent along to spy and to report to the Emperor on the actions of the ambassadors. The role of Pereira, as a simple reading of his Diary shows, was to make sure that everything was done in accordance with the principles of the Law of Nations, i. e., to dispel the distrust the Chinese entertained toward the Russians; to supply them with the required "knowledge of the world," which is a condition without which no agreement can be reached on the basis of equality. To enable Pereira to accomplish this, K'ang-hsi had honored him and Gerbillon. The Emperor himself said: "I am treating you with the honor and distinction that I accord to my grandees whom you shall accompany to negotiate important affairs."

K'ang-hsi's desire to comply in every detail with the Law of Nations is also shown by the fact that he ordered his delegates, none of whom was Christian, to take the oath by which the treaty was sworn in accordance with the principles of the Catholic religion. They had a formula prepared for this purpose. The Moscovites objected to this. They were afraid that it might lead to superstition on the part of the Chinese. The Moscovites wanted both parties to take an oath which imposed the strictest possible obligation, and the Chinese, in the end, followed the text of the Moscovites.

In every other detail, viz., writing, signing, sealing and exchanging of the treaty, international practices were scrupulously followed even to the inclusion of the sanction, which since the Peace of Westphalia had been used in treaties. The use of the Latin language in the official copy of the treaty is another indication.

Finally, a word must be said about this important question: Why has such a significant important historic event as the Treaty of Nerchinsk never before received full monograph treatment? The circumstances surrounding its genesis and the procedure followed in the conclusion of this treaty give a hint as to why it has been neglected in Chinese historical literature. The reason why the K'ang-hsi Emperor was willing, by an unprecedented move, to send a delegation outside the confines of the Empire to conclude a treaty based on the

Law of Nations, also explains why he did not want to attract attention to this treaty in China. Any publication of the treaty and the circumstances surrounding its conclusion would have accomplished exactly what the Emperor wanted to avoid, namely, publicity. This might also be the reason why, to such a large and ostentatious delegation as the one of 1689, no Chinese secretaries were attached and why no trace of the text of this treaty is found in any of the Chinese sources of the time. Even the *Shih-lu* includes only the inscription text. K'ang-hsi's concessions were made only for this occasion and were not meant to establish a precedent for a new Chinese attitude toward foreigners. Under Yung-cheng and Chien-lung, literary censorship was tightened rather than relaxed. K'ang-hsi's successors almost down to the end of the Dynasty, clung to the traditional Chinese attitude. After the fall of the Dynasty, Western encroachment on Chinese sovereignty and other burning contemporary questions attracted the attention of Chinese historians. Moreover, for the reasons just stated, modern scholars find it difficult to obtain information concerning this period from Chinese sources.

In the eyes of the Russians, in view of later successes, the Treaty of Nerchinsk was a diplomatic defeat about which the less said the better. By the time this stigma had been erased by the victories of Russian diplomacy in the Nineteenth Century, other contemporary matters occupied Russian historians. Even the most pertinent Russian document concerning this treaty, Golovin's official report, has remained unpublished and was found, in the Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow, by Gaston Cahen in 1912. It still remains unpublished.

Since these lines were first written in 1958 a book has been published in Russia on the Treaty of Nerchinsk. It is the work of Praskovia Tichonovna Yakovleva entitled *Pervii Russko-Kitaiskii Dogovor* 1689 *goda* (The first Russo-Chinese Treaty of the year 1689).[32] It was published under the aegis of the Historical Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and printed by the Publishing House of the same Academy in 1958. After an Introduction (pp. 3-13), in Chapter I, entitled "The Beginnings of Russo-Chinese Relations" (pp. 14-126), Yakovleva deals (in §1, pp. 14-80) with the Russian progress to the shores of the Pacific Ocean and the Tsarist government's policy towards Eastern Siberia. She discusses the population of the Amur basin in the Seventeenth Century (pp. 16-60), describes how the Russians became familiar with the Trans-Baikal and Amur region (pp. 40-51), how they penetrated Dauria (pp. 51-71) and their relations to the Mongol Qans (pp. 71-80). Then (in § 2, pp. 80-126) she outlines the beginning of trade and diplomatic relations between Russia and China and the salient points of these relations: the first Russian embassy to China (pp. 91-111), Russian-Chinese trade in the Seventeenth Century (pp. 112-114) and the conflicts between the Manchu armies and the Russian Cossacks in the Amur basin between 1638 and 1689 (pp. 115-126). In Chapter II, entitled "Preparations and Conclusion of the Treaty of Nerchinsk" (pp. 127-209), the following topics are discussed:

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[32] I am indebted to Dr. Rudolf Loewenthal of the Central Asian Collectanea (Washington, D. C.) for having brought this work to my attention.

1. Preparations for the meeting of the ambassadors, the composition of the delegations, their powers and instructions (§1, pp. 127-162), giving details concerning the Russian delegation (pp. 127-136) and Golovin's activities in the preparation of the meeting (pp. 136-151; the Chinese delegation (pp. 151-155) and its departure from Peking in 1688 (pp. 155-162). 2. The Russo Chinese negotiations at Nerchinsk (§ 2, pp. 162-189), describing the first meeting of the ambassadors on August 12, 1689 (pp. 162-166), the second meeting and the breaking-off of the meetings on account of the question of the escorts (pp. 167-171), the siege of Nerchinsk by the Chinese army (pp. 171-185), and the third meeting of the ambassadors on August 27, 1689 (pp. 185-189). 3. The Treaty of Nerchinsk its interest and historical significance (§ 3, pp. 189-210). Then after a short Conclusion (pp. 210-213), in three Appendices Yakovleva gives the text (in Russian) of the treaty (pp. 214-216), the traveling orders of Golovin (pp. 217-218) and his credentials (pp. 217-220). The book closes with a Bibliography (pp. 221-224), an Index of names (pp. 225-231) and an Index of geographical names (pp. 231-234).

While Yakovleva used unpublished source material from the Russian Archives, (pp. 6-10) this material had already been used by Gaston Cahen and John F. Baddeley and, consequently, adds little that is new to our knowledge. Excepting the three short ones included in the Appendices, she publishes no documents. In her Bibliography of three and a half pages a full page is taken up by the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin ; it containes not a single title in any other language except Russian, although Halde's book and W. Fuchs' article are mentioned in the text. W. Fuchs is described as a Catholic missionary and Thomas Pereira as a Spaniard. Cahen's, Baddeley's and other pertinent works dealing with the Treaty of Nerchinsk are completely neglected. Rather than adding new information to our knowledge, this book represents the official Soviet attitude towards this historic event, with strong " ideological " overtones.

These reasons also explain why historians of other countries have not been attracted by this subject.

Chapter VI

AFTER THE TREATY OF NERCHINSK[1]

The policies of China and Russia toward each other remained as different after the Treaty of Nerchinsk as they had been before. These differences were based on the divergent political theories each followed. The theory which guided Russia was formulated by Peter the Great, who saw only two possibilities for Russia in the Far East: *voyevat ili torgovat,* "wage war or trade." Since his European wars kept him too busy for the former, he chose trade. China, on the other hand, had a completely different conception of her relations with Russia. She wanted neither trade nor war. She simply wanted to pacify the territories over which she claimed suzerainty by isolating them from Russian influence. Her principal aim was to close Mongolia and the Amur region to the Russians and transform these territories into a belt of buffer states under the exclusive control of China. She agreed to trade until such a time as she could accomplish the pacification of these territories.

Chinese policy toward the Mongols. Even before the liberation of Outer Mongolia from Galdan's invasion (1697), to show China's proximity to the Qalqa, who had taken refuge in Inner Mongolia, the K'ang-hsi Emperor, between 1691-1698, made several trips beyond the Great Wall, always with a splendid retinue to impress the Qalqa Princes.[2] Thus the hold of

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[1] For details see Cahen, *Histoire des rélations de la Russie avec la Chine sous Pierre-le-Grand (1689-1730)*, pp. 55-73, 75-113, 153-169, 171-244. *Chia-ch'ing hui-tien shih-li* (Peking 1818) 134, pp. 13-17. *Ch'ing kao-tsung shun-huang-ti shih-lu* (Man-chou-kuo 1937) 743, p. 4 and 1023, pp. 8-9. Dudgeon, *op. cit.*, Halde, *Description* ... IV, pp. 252-422. Hummel, *op. cit.*, I, pp. 9-11, 267, 370 and II, pp. 758-759. Inaba Iwakichi, *Manchu Nattatsu Shi*, pp. 322-343. *Kuang-hsü hui-tien shih-li* (Peking 1899) 167, pp. 6-7. Pavlovsky, *op. cit.* Plattner, *op. cit.* Ravenstein, *op. cit.* Vladimir (Zenone Volpicelli), *op. cit.* A. K. Wu, *China and the Soviet Union.* Ch'eng T'ien-fong, *A History of Sino-Russian Relations.*

[2] For details of these trips see Halde, *op. cit.*, IV, pp. 252-422.

China over Outer Mongolia was strengthened and it officially became a dependency of China. The internal administration of these territories remained in the hands of the Mongols and the Chinese protectorate was merely a superstructure added to the existing system. China's protectorate embraced not so much the territories but the people and the grouping of *ayimaγs*. China sought neither the development of this second-rate pasture land nor the increase of its population through colonization. On the contrary, the Peking government took every measure to hinder colonization. The Code of the Tribunal of Colonial Affairs (containing all regulations adopted since the establishment of the protectorate, first promulgated by K'ang-hsi in 1696, revised in 1789 under Ch'ien-lung and in 1815 by Chia-ching, and the important provisions of which were in force even in the Nineteenth Century), forbade the Chinese to cross the Mongolian border, to cultivate land there, or to marry Mongol women. China wanted a closed strategic buffer state outside her own borders, the less populated the better. Since the shortest caravan routes from Siberia to Peking led through Outer Mongolia, it remained an open country for a while. Gradually, however, measures were taken tending to isolate Mongolia from the outside world. The Qalqa chiefs were forbidden to enter into relations with foreign countries. Frontier control of foreign merchants and couriers was intensified. This control was removed from the Mongols and placed in the hands of Manchu officials at Urga. All these measures, however, had little effect as long as the Russian-Mongolian border was not demarcated. The treaty of Nerchinsk had left this 1,800 kilometer borderline unsettled. Russia was in no haste to establish a fixed boundary which would have been equivalent to the recognition of Chinese sovereignty in Outer Mongolia, since Russia claimed rights of her own deriving from the submission of Altyn Qan in 1634. At the insistence of the K'ang-hsi Emperor, however, Russia had to agree to a settlement. This was accomplished in the Treaty of Kiakhta (1727). Thus, Outer Mongolia was closed to the Russians. Official caravans could still pass through it on their way to Peking, but, in general, Russian trade was limited to the border region, mainly Kiakhta, and the number of official caravans to Peking decreased. During the period between the Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689) and the Treaty of Kiakhta (1727), Russia sent twelve official caravans to Peking. After the

Treaty of Kiakhta she was not able to send more than six, and in 1762 difficulties forced her to give up completely the sending of caravans to China. Henceforth, she was left with nothing but the trade at Kiakhta, which was likewise suspended by China for a total of twenty years during the thirty year period between 1762-1792. During the campaigns against the Jün Γar, which put a heavy burden on Inner and Outer Mongolia, the Qalqa Princes approached Russia on several occasions, especially in 1756, asking for Russian protection. Ch'ien-lung, however, succeeded in suppressing the revolt and in asserting his authority. Thus Outer Mongolia was isolated. The only thing left for the Russians was their " Ecclesiastical Mission " in Peking which, before the Nineteenth Century, had only a scientific significance.[3]

After the pacification of Outer Mongolia, China concentrated all her attention on the Ölöd Mongols. After his invasion of Outer Mongolia in 1688, Galdan returned to Khobdo where trouble with his nephew Tsewang Araptan, son of Senga, started. In 1690 he again invaded Outer Mongolia and in July won a battle over Manchu and Mongol outposts south of Seyelhi Mountains. In 1696 he again invaded Outer Mongolia. This time the Chinese armies were led by K'ang-hsi himself. Galdan was defeated.[4] Galdan died in 1697 and so the first phase of the pacification of the Ölöd Mongols came to an end. Galdan was succeeded by Tsewang Araptan, who soon extended his rule over parts of Siberia, Western Mongolia and Eastern Turkestan. From 1698 on he extended his suzerainty westward to Lake Balkhash. In 1704 he defeated a son of Ayuki and annexed more than 10,000 Turγūd to his hordes. After 1715 he invaded Hami and Tibet, which later, in 1720, he evacuated when K'ang-hsi sent two expeditionary forces to recover it.

In spite of these Chinese successes, things in Mongolia came to a standstill because of court politics in connection with the succession to the throne before and after K'ang-hsi's death in 1722. During that time Tsewang Araptan was expanding west and northward and, hence, came into conflict with the advancing Russians, who were approaching Eastern Turkestan. The Russians were twice defeated, once near Jamuishevsky (1715) and another time near Lake Zaizan (1720). After this Russia abandoned her plan, for the time being, to conquer Turkestan and for thirty years trade flourished between the two countries. Tsewang Araptan died in 1727 and his successor Galdan Tsereng carried on the war against China. Finding that he could not make headway in Mongolia, he agreed to a treaty with China in which the Altai mountains were designated as the boundary between the Jün Γar controlled territories and China. Thus the second phase of the pacification of the Ölöd Mongols came to an end.

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[3] DUDGEON, *op. cit.* PAVLOVSKY, *op. cit.*, 22-23, 32-34.

[4] ARSI *Jap. Sin. 149* ff. 619r-647v there is an interesting description of this war entitled : " De Bello Cam Hi Imperatoris Tartaro-Sinici contra Tartaros Eruthanos. Feliciter confecto 1697. " See also *Jap. Sin. 105* II ff. 319v-355v.

The third and final phase, between 1750 and 1757, when the Jün Γar forces were led by Lama Darja, Davatsi and Amursana, came to an end in 1757 when Ili was invaded by China. Since the eastern Qazaq had accepted Chinese suzerainty, Amursana had to flee to Siberia where he died. The Turγūd, who had migrated to the Caspian Sea and to whom K'ang-hsi had sent Tulisen in 1712-1715, heard of the annihilation of the Jün Γar Mongols and migrated slowly back during the years 1771-1772. Those who survived the journey were alloted pastures southwest of Khobdo.

Thus, Chinese suzerainty extended far into Central Asia; and the border line in the northern part of Sinkiang and west of Outer Mongolia (which had been settled in the treaty of Khiakta in 1727) extended north of Zaisan-nuur, along the lower Irtysh for about a hundred miles. This was the northwestern boundary between Russia and China. The pacified territories were incorporated into the Chinese colonial system under the Ministry of Dependencies.

Chinese policy toward the Amur region. The Manchu Emperors and their Courts, occupied with the pacification of the Qalqa and Ölöd Mongols, did not pay much attention to the Amur region. Wanting to retain these territories as a buffer zone, a policy of exclusion of Chinese immigrants was inaugurated. Manchuria itself was thinly populated; and, in order to prevent the assimilation of Manchus by Chinese, to keep the profits derived from *ginseng* (jen-shen, in Chinese) for the natives, and to protect the imperial hunting grounds, it was kept so. Edicts to this effect were issued in 1740, 1750, 1762, 1776, 1811, and 1847. To make the enforcement of these edicts easier, the Manchu Government of China, following the pattern of the *pien-ch'iang* (which was built by the Ming and extended from the Great Wall across southern Manchuria to the Yalu River), constructed the Willow Palisade to keep the Chinese immigrants out of northern Manchuria and the territories beyond the Amur. Not only were the Chinese forbidden to enter Northern Manchuria, but even the natives themselves were forbidden to go north of Sansin, a city on the upper Sungari. Military posts were established to enforce these regulations. The privilege of trading with the natives on the Amur was restricted to ten merchants who, for this purpose, had to obtain a license from Peking. Thus on the left bank of the river the Chinese population was practically nonexistent. In 1756, General Fu Sen-o, after inspecting the region (the only such inspection undertaken), reported that there were no traces of human activity because the area was too cold for even animals or plants. General I-shan, the military governor of Heilungchiang, reported in 1850 that the Trans-Amur region was a wasteland and that only a handful of Manchu hunters camped on the bank of the Amur between the mouth of the Zeya and the village of Hormoldzin. The virtual absence of Chinese population had also been noticed by western travelers in the Nineteenth Century : Middendorf in 1844, Venault [5] in 1850, Akhte [6] in 1852, and Collins [7] a few years later.

The Russian policy. The scope of Russian policy in her relations with China, immediately following the treaty of Nerchinsk, was to expand trade relations. This was the main purpose of subsequent diplomatic missions by Everard Ysbrand Ides (1692-1695), by Leon Vasilievich Ismailov (1719-1722), by Count Sava Vladislavich Raguzinsky (1725-1727). This was also the purpose of Lorenz Lange's stay (on three occasions) in Peking. Between 1696 and 1721 the Russians succeeded in sending twelve caravans to Peking. However, new difficulties developed in connection with the fixation of the Mongol border and the extradition of fugitive Mongols in Siberia. Just before the death of K'ang-hsi the situation had reached a critical stage. Finally the treaty of Khiakta settled these questions. In spite of the fact that Russia agreed to the conditions and observed the regulations concerning the Mongolian border laid down at Khiakta, as well as those laid down in the treaty of Nerchinsk concerning the Amur region, she could not expand her trade relations. Only a few caravans came to Peking after 1727, then trading was moved to Khiakta. Why did Russia, in spite of all this, adhere to a policy of peace and non-intervention ?

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[5] RAVENSTEIN, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-101, 102.

[6] VLADIMIR, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

[7] COLLINS, *A Voyage down the Amur*, pp. 199 ss.

There were two schools concerning Russian policy in Asia from the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century. The school of " active, " " dynamic " and " expansive " policy represented by L. Lange, G. F. Muller, Miatlev (governor of Siberia), Jacobi (commander at Selenginsk) in the Eighteenth Century ; Nevelskoy and Muriaviev in the Nineteenth Century ; and Korsakov, Korostovets and others in the Twentieth Century. The " conservative " and more cautious school : Count Sava Vladislavich Raguzinsky (negotiator at Khiakta and formulator of the *status quo* policy), Osterman (Minister of foreign affairs), Chancellor Panin and Catharine II in the Eighteenth Century ; Nisselrod and Voronkov in the Nineteenth Century ; and Witte, Sazanov and others in the Twentieth Century. Until the middle of the Nineteenth Century the conservatives prevailed. In the long run this policy proved to further the best interests of Russia.

Russia also profited greatly from the Chinese policy. Russian possessions in Siberia, insufficiently populated and poorly defended, had been saved ; and the important work of colonization could be carried on unhindered. The pacification of Outer Mongolia and Chinese Turkestan tied down both the Chinese and the Mongols, leaving Russia a free hand in her colonizing activity. Moreover, the Chinese military enterprises (the Ili and Turkestan campaigns alone cost about twenty-three million taels) started to tell their tale during the reign of Ch'ien-lung's successor, Chia-ching (1796-1820). The reserve funds became depleted and the revenues diminished. The isolation policy of China and the creation of buffer states along the border also proved advantageous to Russia. By the middle of the Nineteenth Century the entire population of the Amur region numbered less than 11,000 natives, while that of the Ussuri region, less than 2,000 inhabitants.

These factors, together with the disappearance of the influence and the geographical knowledge of the Jesuits, opened the road for Russian encroachment from the Tsarist and the Communist period of Russian history down to the present, when China is a " younger brother " or junior partner of Russia in the Communist block.

The Jesuits after Nerchinsk. As a result of the services they had rendered China at Nerchinsk, the Jesuits obtained the edict of toleration for Christianity (1692) which they had so long desired and worked for. Thus, they had reached their goal as far as China was concerned. But they did not succeed in obtaining from Moscow what they wished in compensation for the services they had rendered to the Russians: they still lacked the overland route. The Jesuit residence in Moscow was closed in October 1689, even before the Russian delegation had returned from Nerchinsk. [8] This eliminated their outpost in the heart of Russia, in which they had put great hopes for realizing their cherished plan of a trans-Siberian route. In Rome and Peking they still continued striving for the same end, both before and after the bad news arrived concerning the closing of their residence in Moscow. In Peking it did not arrive until 1694. [9]

After the repeated failure of the French-Polish Jesuits and of Father Grimaldi to get permission in Moscow to travel overland via Siberia, at Rome headquarters attention once more turned toward Armenia. It was decided that a larger expedition should be prepared and that the journey should be carried out more methodically. No longer would a whole expedition be wrecked through the death or illness of one man. The new plan was: first, that a party of ten or twelve missionaries was to be sent out to Armenia with Father Grimaldi as superior and Father Beauvollier, then in Instambul, as guide; second, the missions there were to be strengthened and the young missionaries were to be educated in the language and customs of the country; third, advance posts were to be established in Samarkand and Bokhara which might possibly push through to China; fourth, every year a fresh party of missionaries was to be formed which was to travel to Armenia through Istambul, Trebizond and Erzerum, relieving the missionaries there and freeing them to continue their journey eastward, where they could use their acquired knowledge of language in the Mohammedan mission in Kansu. In accordance with this plan, in the autumn of 1691 twelve Jesuits entered Istambul with Father Grimaldi as their leader. Beauvollier had been waiting there two years, as his journey had been delayed by the murder of the Count Syri in Persia. Two priests were left behind at Istambul while the others embarked on December 8 for Trebizond and from there went overland to Erzerum, the capital of Turkish Armenia. They arrived on February 6, 1692. Here Father Villote and two other Jesuits welcomed them. From here they went to Isphahan where they changed their original plan. Father Grimaldi realized that he could not reach Peking quickly enough by land. He chose Fathers Schuch, de Bèze and Archambaud to accompany him on the journey to Ormuz and India. The two Frenchmen, de Bèze and Archambaud, upon their arrival in China were to travel westward to establish contact with Beauvollier, who, meanwhile, was to advance eastward with two companions. Father Villote was to reorganize the settlement at Erzerum, recently destroyed by a persecution. Schuch died in Persia and Grimaldi had to continue his journey from Goa to China alone, as the Portuguese authorities refused to let the two Frenchmen proceed. Both of them soon died. Meanwhile, Father Beauvollier had also started his journey from Persia, but failed. In 1694 he and three companions started their return journey to Syria, with the intention of going to Rome for new instructions and supplies. Two of them proceeded to Europe, while Beauvollier and Brevedent waited in Aleppo. The instructions arrived from Rome in September 1695. Brevedent was to go to Egypt while Beauvollier was assigned to Surat on the northwest coast of India, where he stayed till 1699.

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[8] PIERLING, *op. cit.*, IV, pp. 110-123.

[9] ARSI *Jap. Sin. 149* ff. 530-547.

While in Surat, one day a strange visitor came to see Beauvollier, a certain Lawrence van Duyne. He confided to Beauvollier that he was a Flemish Jesuit, Gerard Arnold Rychewaert. He came from Moscow, where he had been sent in 1696 by a secret order of the General to try to travel across Siberia. In spite of his strict incognito, he too was refused by the Kremlin. He had then come to Persia to find the caravan route through Samarkand to Kansu. He had waited for a whole year to carry out his plan, then, at last he had to decide to travel by sea to Goa. On his way there he visited Beauvollier. To conclude his adventure he declared his identity to the Portuguese authorities at Bazaim. They forced him to return northward to Persia. Once again, in 1700, he waited four long months in Isphahan, still hoping to make his way overland to China but failed again. Only then did he return through Armenia and Syria to his native country. Father Beauvollier, after several years in Surat, finally proceeded to China aboard an English ship in November 1699. Thus ended the dramatic struggle of the French Jesuits to find an overland route to China.

Though all this caused great disappointment, it came as no surprise. In Rome, the General and his entourage had been doubtful about the Russian permission, while in Peking the resistance of the Portuguese toward the overland route had rendered its realization questionable. In a letter written on September 6, 1690, Father Anthony Thomas[10] informed the General that there had arrived in Peking a letter from Moscow, from the four Jesuits who were to travel across Siberia, asking for the help of their confrères in Peking. Father Thomas was under the impression that these four Fathers were on their way to Peking, and he and others in Peking wanted to inform the K'ang-hsi Emperor of this and ask for his help. At the insistence of Father Thomas Pereira and other Portuguese Jesuits, however, the Vice-Provincial, Father Dominic Gabiani, ordered them to refrain from doing so. The Vice-Provincial also forbade Father Gerbillon to offer his services to K'ang-hsi for an overland trip to Moscow, even though this trip could lead to the opening of an overland route which would enable the Society to render great services to both Empires. Father Thomas went on to say that, although he had already sent a map and a description of this "via Moscovitica" with Father Grimaldi, since he had acquired new information concerning it, he was sending a more detailed map and more accurate information and would continue to do so. He also stated that the K'ang-hsi Emperor was very much interested in the project and that the only ones who opposed it were the Portuguese. If Father Grimaldi returned via Siberia, he would greatly please the Emperor.[11] Father Grimaldi, however, did not succeed in obtaining permission from Peter the Great for his planned overland trip. Nor did any of the other Jesuits at the time, although they did not give up trying. In another report, sent on September 24, 1696, Father Thomas described the events of 1692: he said that in January of that year Father Gerbillon secretly offered his services to the Emperor for an overland trip.[12] With the death of Father Verbiest in 1688, whom both sides respected and who consequently exercised a controlling influence on both, the conflict between the French and the Portuguese Jesuits in China came into the open. These conflicting interests were of a political nature. The Portuguese Jesuits tried to protect the vested interests of the Portuguese Padroado, while the French Jesuits tried to put into practice the plan approved by Louis XIV himself to find an overland route.

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[10] About A. Thomas see ARSI *Jap. Sin. 105* I ff. 48r-70r. LEFEBVRE, *Thomas (Antoine)*. Contained in *Biog. Nat. de Belgique* XXV, fascl. 1 col. 42-86. PFISTER, *op. cit.*, pp. 403-410.

[11] ARSI, *Jap. Sin. 148* ff. 157-160.

With the arrival of Ysbrand Ides in Peking, the Jesuits there discovered that there was a greater obstacle in the way of the overland route than the Portuguese, namely, Peter the Great, for they had just learned about the closing of their residence in Moscow. Father Thomas expressed his sentiments at this stunning news in the following terms: " how little we must trust the Moscovites in the future, who for our good services repay us with insults. "[13] Though the bad news about the closing of the Jesuit residence in Moscow was confirmed in August 1694 when Father Grimaldi returned to Peking, the hopes of the Jesuits there rose once more with the arrival, in November 1700, of a letter written by the General (in January 1699), informing them of the events of the past few years in Europe. The Jesuits in Europe had been very active during the years between 1689 (expulsion of the Jesuits from Russia) and 1709 (Peter the Great's victory of Poltava over the Swedes). Peter the Great had showed many signs of good will toward the West and the Papacy; the mission of Boris Cheremetev (1698) and Peter the Great's visit to Vienna (later in 1698) made many Western souls hope for a reunion between Rome and Moscow. Should these hopes have materialized, smaller matters, such as the opening of an overland route, would have encountered no difficulties. Alas, these hopes never materialized, and after the victory of Poltava the attitude of Peter the Great changed.

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[12] See n. 9.

[13] *Ibid.*

But in Rome and Peking they were still working toward the same goal. Father Villote, who was still working in Persia, served as an intermediary. Qaimaqit, a Tartar Prince, who had been baptized in exile in Spain, asked Father Villote to help him to return to his native country to take up his rightful position as ruler and there to introduce Christianity. The Prince was traveling under the pseudonym "Don Carlos." But the Persians frustrated his plan, and he returned to Spain.

In Rome it was realized now that the idea of an overland route must be given up once and for all. Moreover, the missionaries who traveled to China by sea at this later date found better conditions on French and English ships. On the other hand, their number rapidly decreased as the doors of China were once more closed to them under K'ang-hsi's successors.

The only ones still to persevere in finding an overland route were the Jesuits at the Imperial Court in Peking. They had a double interest in finding an overland route, for, if the occasion arose, they could always use it to transmit letters. At the beginning of the Eighteenth Century, the missionaries who were engaged in surveying the Empire in preparation for the great Imperial Map traveled far into the interior of Mongolia and Sinkiang. From here it would not have been difficult to explore the line of the Silk Road leading across the Terek Pass to Samarkand and Bokhara. But Russia had also extended her domain southward and jealously guarded her precious secret in this direction. However, in 1721 she was forced, much to her fury, to open her door to a Jesuit. It was the K'ang-hsi Emperor who on the occasion of the Ismailov embassy expressed a clear wish that Father Nicolas Giampriamo [14] should be allowed to accompany the Tsar's envoy to Moscow. K'ang-hsi declared that he had given Father Giampriamo urgent letters for the Pope. This time the Russians could not refuse in order to prevent their embassy from being a failure. So Giampriamo left Peking on March 13, 1721, with the Ismailov embassy. The Tsar kept him waiting as long as he could on the frontiers of the Grand Duchy of Moscow before allowing him to continue his trip. He arrived in Rome in October 1722. He was the only one to obtain this permission.

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[14] Pfister, *op. cit.*, p. 642.

During the Middle Ages, at the time of the " Pax Mongolica ", the Friars and other travelers had made their overland journeys more quickly and safely. At that time there was a regular relay of mail service from the Don to the Yellow River. The Mongols prided themselves that " a young girl could travel alone with a bagful of gold from one end of the Empire to the other without the smallest injury. " With the collapse of the Mongol Empire, the triumph of Islam and the secretive attitude of Russia, the great connecting route between East and West was interrupted. Not until the construction of the Trans-Siberian railway did a few Jesuits (among them the writer of these lines) succeed, though still with great difficulties and in absolute incognito, in reaching China over the trans-Siberian route.

Chapter VII

FATHER THOMAS PEREIRA, THE MANUSCRIPTS OF HIS DIARY, AND GENERAL OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING ITS CONTENTS

Father Thomas Pereira [1]

Thomas Pereira was born in the year 1645 at San Martinho do Valle in the Province of Braga, Portugal. He was the scion of the noble family of the Costa-Pereira. After the customary primary education, he made his secondary studies at the Jesuit College of Braga, after which he entered the Society of Jesus at Coimbra in 1663. In 1666, at the age of twenty one, he left for the Indies. After a short stay in India he came to Macao. In 1672 he was transferred from Macao to Peking where he arrived in 1673 and where he lived and labored for the rest of his days until his death on December 24, 1708.

His rare musical talent was the principal reason for his being called, by the K'ang-hsi Emperor, to the imperial Court at Peking in 1672. He was conducted on this trip, from Macao to Peking, by Mandarins and with great honor. [2] He made his triumphant entry into Peking. From this day until his death in 1708 he did not cease to work for and to promote the interests of the mission by the use of his moral qualities and endowments, as well as his knowledge, technical skill, and rare talents for music. [3] " He was endowed with an exceptional dexterity in the handling of affairs ; with moral virtues and prudence in a more than ordinary degree ; he was humble, zealous and a lover of poverty and obedience, but also of a somewhat harsh character ". This is the way in which the official information, sent from Peking to Rome in 1700 and 1703, describe him. [4] These qualities were appreciated by the K'ang-hsi Emperor as well as by the Superiors of the Order of which he was a member.

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[1] Pfister, *op. cit.*, pp. 381-385. Rodrigues, *Jesuítas Portugueses Astrónomos na China 1583-1805*, pp. 16-20.

[2] Thomas I. Dunin Szpot " Historia Sinarum Imperii ", MS in ARSI *Jap. Sin. 103* ff. 165r-165v, 200r-200v ; *Id.* " Collectanea Historiae Sinensis ", *Jap. Sin. 104* ff. 256r-257v, 301v-302r. In Both works Dunin Szpot draws his account textually from the Litterae Annuae Provinciae Japoniae for 1672. *Jap. Sin. 48* ff. 120-121.

[3] Rodrigues, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

K'ang-hsi, after he had called him to Peking, made Pereira his teacher of music. What most amazed the Emperor was Pereira's ability, while listening to a tune for the first time, to write down the score and play back the tune after a single hearing. It must have been quite a sight, as the contemporary Jesuit reports describe it, to see the great Chinese Emperor K'ang-hsi sitting shoulder to shoulder with the humble Jesuit at the clavicymbalo playing a tune. [5] This desire of K'ang-hsi to learn the art and science of European music was the reason why he took Pereira with him on a hunting trip to Tartary in 1685. [6] In 1688 Pereira accompanied the Chinese peace delegation on its unsuccessuful trip to Selenginsk. In the following year, 1689, he was again attached to the Chinese delegation which went to Nerchinsk where the first Russo-Chinese peace-treaty was concluded. In 1696 Father Pereira once more accompanied the K'ang-hsi Emperor into Tartary. It was Pereira who, in the name of all the Jesuit missionaries in Peking, presented the memorial which, in recognition of his and Father Gerbillon's services at the Nerchinsk negotiations, obtained the famous edict of toleration for Christianity in 1692. And it was again Pereira who, in the name of all the Jesuit missionaries present, thanked the K'ang-hsi Emperor for this singular favor. [7] According to Father Francisco Rodrigues, S. J., the K'ang-hsi Emperor had designated Father Pereira, after Father Ferdinand Verbiest's death in 1688, to succeed the latter as President of the Tribunal of Mathematics, but Pereira declined this honor and, in agreement with the famous Belgian Jesuit and mathematician, Anthony Thomas, recommended Father Philip Grimaldi for this position. Since Father

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[4] *Ibid.*

[5] See n. 2.

[6] See *Diary* 184-185.

[7] RODRIGUES, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

Grimaldi was in Europe at the time, Father Pereira and Father Thomas together held the position, on an interim basis, till Father Grimaldi returned.[8]

His talents were also recognized and appreciated by the Superiors of the Jesuit Order. In 1687 the Visitor of the Japan-China Provinces of the Society of Jesus, Simão Martins, appointed Father Pereira Vice-Visitor for the Peking sector of the Chinese Vice-Province. Father Francisco X. Filippucci, on taking over the Visitorship on January 6, 1688, rescinded this appointment, but Father Filippucci's successor, Francisco Nogueira, renewed the appointment in January 1691.[9] Father Pereira was made Rector of the Jesuit College in Peking sometime between 1688 and 1691.[10] He was also Vice-Provincial of the Chinese Vice-Province of the Society of Jesus from June 29, 1692, to June 29, 1695.

His technical skills and architectural talents were displayed when he rebuilt the church Father Adam Schall had originally constructed in 1650.

Thus his talents, his dexterity in handling affairs, his moral virtues and prudence, his humility and zeal, his poverty and obedience, were put to good use by his own Order as well as by the K'ang-hsi Emperor. The one remaining feature mentioned in the above quoted official information, the harshness of his character, was also displayed on several occasions.

One of these occasions was the arrival of the French Jesuits in China. The events leading up to their coming and the circumstances of their coming have been described in Chapter IV. The Portuguese Jesuits did everything they could to prevent the entrance of these Frenchmen whom they considered intruders, as they had come in defiance of the Padroado. After their arrival, the Portuguese Jesuits tried every means possible to rid the country of them. Father Pereira's special zeal in this matter was recognized when, in 1687, he was made Vice-

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[8] *Ibid.* p. 19.

[9] I owe this information to Father Francis Rouleau, S. J.

[10] The triennial catalogue for 1688 states: " docuit hum. litt. an. 2, creatus magister artium, in missione an. 16 ". ARSI *Jap. Sin. 134* f. 570v. The annual catalogue for 1691 records that Pereira is Vice-Visitor. *Ibid.* f. 375r. The triennial catalogue for the following year, 1692, has this notation: " ... fuit rector coll. Pekinensis, Visitator et Vice-Provincialis. " *Ibid.* f. 376r. Thus he must have been Rector of the Jesuit College of Peking between 1688 and 1691.

Visitor for the Peking sector of the China mission with powers limited to dealing with the French " intruders ". Two other Vice-Visitors were appointed at the same time and for the same purpose : Father Vidal for the South China sector and Father Posateri for Central China. Father Pereira did his best to accomplish the task entrusted to him by his Superior. He did not succeed but not through lack of nationalistic zeal. It is interesting to note that one of his principal opponents in this struggle was the man who was to become his companion during their trip to Nerchinsk in 1689, Francis Gerbillon.[11] This struggle went on unabated for over a decade until the arrival in China of the Papal Legate, Charles Maillard de Tournon, when Portuguese and French Jesuits sank their differences in order to defend their common interests.

The harshness of his character seems again to have come to the fore during the de Tournon Legation for Pereira became the primary target of de Tournon's wrath. The consequences of the de Tournon Legation were, according to Father Rodrigues, the principal cause of Father Pereira's last sickness and death on December 24, 1708. " He saw, " says Father Rodrigues, " the mission for which he had worked for thirty-five years threatened with ruin during the Legation of Cardinal de Tournon ; he saw the fame and good name of the Society of Jesus exposed to danger ; he saw his own honor and virtue degraded as duplicity and rebellion. The Emperor himself attributed the sickness which undermined Pereira's health to the rigors with which Tournon had treated the well-merited and venerated missionary. He gave many tokens of his singular estimation and friendship, heaping on Pereira special honors even after his death, by contributing with royal liberality towards a splendid funeral and by composing in his praise an epitaph worthy, as a contemporary missionary relates, of the person who composed it and of the illustrious Portuguese whose memory it perpetuated ". [12]

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[11] Father Francis Gerbillon, Chinese name Chang Ch'eng, was born at Verdun in France on July 11, 1654. He entered the Noviciate of the Champagne Province of the Society of Jesus at Nancy on October 6, 1670. He arrived in China with the first group of French Jesuits sent by Louis XIV, in July 1687. He was highly esteemed by the K'ang-hsi Emperor who took him or sent him on many trips into Tartary. He died on March 25, 1707, in Peking. For futher details see Pfister, *op. cit.*, pp. 443-451. For Gerbillon's Diary concerning the trip of 1689 see Halde, *Description* ... IV, pp. 163-251 under the title : " Second voyage fait par ordre de l'Empereur en Tartarie par les Pères Gerbillon et Pereyra, missionaries de la Compagnie de Jésus à la Chine l'année 1689 ".

The high point of Pereira's career was, undoubtedly, the role he played, at the Nerchinsk negotiations, in the conclusion of the first Russo-Chinese peace treaty. His participation in these negotiations, however, is most unexpected and most surprising. He was sent on this trip, as seen in one of the foregoing chapters, [13] on the recommendation of Father Ferdinand Verbiest, to render valuable services to the Russians and thus gain their gratitude and confidence, which in turn would induce them to permit his fellow Jesuits to travel across Siberia. This was the end toward which Verbiest had been working for many years in Peking. This was the desire of four successive Generals in Rome ; [14] and this was one of the main purposes for the opening of the Jesuit Residence in Moscow. Yet nothing could have more certainly and more securely defeated this purpose than the sending of Pereira to accomplish it. Even before his trip to Nerchinsk he had been a staunch opponent of the Trans-Siberian route, as were the other Portuguese missionaries. As in the matter of the French Jesuits, who had come to China in defiance of the chartered rights of the Crown of Portugal, the Padroado, so also in this matter can Pereira be considered the spokesman of Portuguese interests. He remained the most out-spoken opponent of the overland route even after the conclusion of the treaty of Nerchinsk. [15] This explains why Pereira, having succeeded in rendering services to the Russians at Nerchinsk and indebting them to the point where Golovin expressed his deepest gratitude both in his own and in the Tsar's name, never even mentioned the question of the overland route. What remains unexplained is the fact that, this being the case, Pereira was chosen for this mission at all. Why did Father Verbiest recommend him ? Was it because Pereira's opposition to the overland route was unknown to him ? Yes, this seems to be the only logical explanation. Yet Pereira's opposition to the coming of the French Jesuits was known to Verbiest and this opposition was based on the same general principles as his opposition to the Trans-Siberian route. Was it that while Verbiest knew of Pereira's opposition, he hoped that the interests of his Order and of the mission would take precedence over those of the Padroado ? If so, then these fondest hopes of Father Verbiest remained unfulfilled. Or is it possible that while at an earlier date, before the controversy concerning the coming and the arrival of the French Jesuits, Verbiest had recommended Pereira for a similar enterprise he did not do so in 1688, for Verbiest, ailing for some time, died early that year (January 28, 1688). It was, in fact, Pereira's long experience at Court, as well as the respect in which the K'ang-hsi emperor held him, that made him the logical candidate for the peace delegation, irrespective of his own intention not to further the interests Verbiest had hoped for. Sufficient evidence is lacking for a final conclusion and judgement. There are, however, some indications that seem to point in this direction. A careful reading of his Diary seems to reveal signs of uneasiness. His constant emphasis on the suspicious nature of the Chinese ambassadors, on the precariousness of the situation, especially when the negotiations reached an impasse. These he registers with more than due persistence and almost scrupulous accuracy, frequently mentioning the fact that his Institute forbade him to mix in purely political matters. It seemed to be an effort on his part to cover up his neglect for asking Golovin's intervention with the Tsar in favor of the overland route. How could one accept these excuses which had little or no bearing on his requesting the overland route, and especially his last excuse that he had to abstain from politics, when the main reason for his being attached to the Chinese delegation by K'ang-hsi was precisely of a political nature ? He himself states that he was not sent only as an interpreter. Moreover, the whole tenor of his Diary is evident proof that he was sent in the capacity of a counsellor and supervisor to see that the intentions of K'ang-hsi were followed and China's interests safeguarded. He is right in saying that he should have endeavored to keep out of politics, that is to say, not to get involved in the first place by being attached to the delegation. It is, however, also true that this regulation of his Institute is not an absolute one ; exceptions can be made when the withdrawal from such affairs is impossible without grave offence to personalities on whose favor the well-being or ruin of religion depends. If he could not refuse to comply with the request of K'ang-hsi that he accompany the Chinese delegation to Nerchinsk and advise its members, could his asking for what his own Superiors might have considered the main reason for waiving the above mentioned regulation of his Institute have made such a difference ? Hardly. Moreover, the Visitor at Macao, Father Francis X. Filippucci, sharply criticized the Pereira-Gerbillon diplomatic action as contrary to the Institute and ordered the Vice-Provincial, Father Dominic Gabiani, to prohibit them from undertaking any further business of this kind.[16]

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[12] RODRIGUES, *op. cit.*, pp. 19-20.

[13] See Chapter IV.

[14] Goswin Nickel, 1652-1664 ; John Paul Oliva, 1664-1681 ; Charles de Noyelle, 1682-1686 ; Thyrsus González, 1687-1705.

[15] ARSI *Jap. Sin. 105 I* ff. 76v-78r, 136r; and *Jap. Sin. 148* ff. 157v-160v.

What adds further to the strangeness of the situation is the fact that Gerbillon was Pereira's companion at Nerchinsk. Gerbillon was to become the spokesman of the French Jesuits, just as Pereira was the spokesman of the Portuguese group. The opposition between these two groups, in 1689, was very pronounced. This opposition seems to have had its repercussions even within the Chinese delegation. It was during this trip to Nerchinsk that Gerbillon befriended Songgotu who afterwards became a kind of " protector " of the interests of the French group, while T'ung Kuo-kang seems to have been Pereira's favorite.

In conclusion : it is well not to forget that Pereira was a Portuguese and a missionary of the Padroado. A conflict arose in him between two loyalties : the loyalty towards the interests of the mission of which he was a member and his Superiors who tried to safeguard these wishes, and the loyalty towards the Crown of Portugal and her vested interests. This will not seem so strange if we keep in mind that a similar conflict existed in the soul of Father Ferdinand Verbiest, who as a Belgian, owed less loyalty to the king of Portugal. Pereira seems to have resolved this conflict by believing that to serve the interests of Portugal was the best way of serving the interests of his Order and of Christianity in China.

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[16] ARSI *Jap. Sin. 164* f. 236.

THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE DIARY OF FATHER PEREIRA

Father Pereira's Diary concerning the Nerchinsk negotiations is dated the 10th of January 1690, some three months after his return from that city. There are two Portuguese copies and one abbreviated Latin version of this Diary extant in the Jesuit Archives in Rome. There exists a third Portuguese copy of the Pereira Diary. It is contained in the Codex *49-V-20* (ff. 400r-432r) of the Collection "Jesuítas na Ásia" in the Ajuda Library in Lisbon. A careful study of this copy shows that it was made either from the original or from a copy of the Pereira Diary. Its contents correspond with the contents of the two Roman copies. It is only in different reading of certain words that it differs from them. Moreover, since it is of a later origin (made around the middle of the 18th century), it did not seem necessary or useful to give a complet listing of these different readings in the critical notes.[17] Besides these, mention must be made of a longer and shorter edited version by the hand of Father Thomas Ignatius Dunin Szpot. The Dunin Szpot versions cannot be considered abbreviated Latin versions but must be called edited versions because they narrate the events in the third person and not, as do the two Portuguese copies and the abbreviated Latin version, in the first person. Moreover, on occasions Dunin Szpot paraphrases the text.

The Portuguese copies of the Manuscript. The first of these two Portuguese copies is found in the Roman Archives of the Society of Jesus and is contained in the Codex inscribed *Jap. Sin. 128,* and entitled "Relationes et Documenta 1686-1802". It runs from f. 5r to f. 19r. The paper and ink (Chinese black) are Chinese and the measurements of the paper are 310×210 mm. The uniform lines are written in a fine, straight, and easily legible handwriting. On the left of each page is an even margin. At the end of this copy on a separate page there is a Latin note in a different hand which reads: " Chinese - 1690. Travel report concerning those things which happened to the Chinese delegates, during their trip and return trip from the frontiers of the Chinese and Moscovite Empires. They were sent there by the Chinese Emperor, in 1689, together with Father Thomas Pereyra and Joachim Bouvet [sic] in order to negotiate a peace treaty between the two Empires with the Moscovite delegates. It also concerns the successful conclusion of the peace treaty due to the work and council of the aforementioned Fathers. It was written by the same Father Thomas Pereyra, and sent to Our Very Reverend Father, on the 10th of January 1690. First copy ".[18] On another separate page there is another note in a different hand which reads: " From the year 1689 to the year 1690. The peace concluded between the Chinese and Moscovite Empires described by Father Thomas Pereyra ".[19]

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[17] For a detailed description and study of the Collection "Jesuítas na Ásia", its origin and contents, we must refer to the articles of BRAGA, *Jesuítas na Ásia,* in *Boletin Eclesiástico da Diocese de Macau,* beginning January 1955; SCHURHAMMER, *Die Schätze der Jesuitenarchive in Makao und Peking,* in *Die katholischen Missionen,* 57 (1929) 224-229; and SCHÜTTE, *Wiederentdeckung des Makao-Archivs,* in *AHSI* 30 (1961) 90-124.

The second Portuguese copy of the Pereira Diary, written by a different hand from the first copy, is found in the Jesuit Archives in Rome in the same Codex *Jap. Sin. 128* ff. 21r-37r. The paper and ink are Chinese like in the first copy and the measurements of the paper are 315 × 215 mm. As in the first copy the lines are written in a fine, straight and easily legible handwriting, although by a different hand, as stated above. There is also an even margin on the left hand side of each page. This second copy is accompanied by three Latin notes on two separate pages of the diary, and has a short note on its title page. These four notes are in three different handwritings, all Rome made. The first of these notes which is in the same handwriting as the first note at the end of the first copy of the Diary, reads : " Chinese - 1690. Travel report concerning those things which happened to the Chinese delegates, during their trip to and return trip from the frontiers of the Chinese and Moscovite Empires. They were sent there by the Chinese Emperor in 1689 together with Father Thomas Pereyra and Joachim Bouvet [sic] in order to negotiate a peace treaty between the two Empires with the Moscovite delegates. It also concerns the successful conclusion of the peace treaty due to the work and the council of the aforementioned Fathers. Written by the same Father Thomas Pereyra, and sent to Our Very Reverend Father General, on the 10th of January 1690. Second copy. There also exists, in the possession of Our Reverend Father General, a Latin copy ". [20] The second note at the end of this second copy of the Diary is on the same page as the first note but in a different handwriting and reads : " Concerning the trip of our Fathers who were sent with the delegates of the Emperor of China to conclude peace with the Moscovites. " [21] On a separate page and in a different handwriting, but in the same handwriting as the second at the end of the first copy, there is a third notation which reads : " The year 1689 : Chinese Legation to the Moscovites and the Peace Treaty concluded between the Empires of China, etc. " [22]. The note on the margin of the title page of this second copy, which is in the same handwriting as the third note to this second copy, reads : " The year 1689 to 1690. No. 2 " [23].

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[18] The original Latin adnotation reads: " Sinensis... 1690. Ephemeris itineraria de his quae in abitu, et reditu ex confinibus utriusque Imperii Sinici et Moscovitici, contigerunt Legatis Sinensibus illo missis anno 1689 ab Imperatore Sinarum una cum Patre Thoma Pereyra, et Joachimo Bouvet [sic] e Societate Jesu, ad tractanda pacis faedera inter utrumque Imperium cum Legatis Moschoviae. Et de felici successu pacis stabilitae opera et consilio praedictorum Patrum. Scripta ab eodem Patre Thoma Pereyra et transmissa ad Reverendum Patrem Nostrum 10 Jan. 1690. Primum exemplar ". The name of Father Joachim Bouvet is an evident mistake of the Archivist. Gerbillon and not Bouvet was Pereira's companion. " Our Reverend Father " is the title of the General of the Society of Jesus who at this time was Thyrsus González, a Spaniard.

[19] The Latin adnotation reads: " Ab anno 1689 ad annum 1690 De pace inita inter Imperium Sinicum et Moscoviticum descripta a P. Thoma Pereyra ".

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[20] This adnotation reads : " Sinensis – 1690. Ephemeris itineraria de his quae in abitu et reditu ex confinibus utriusque Imperii Sinici et Moscovitici contigerunt Legatis Sinensibus illo missis anno 1689 ab Imperatore Sinarum una cum P. Thoma Pereyra et P. Joachimo Bouvet [sic] e Societate Jesu ad tractanda pacis faedera inter utrumque Imperium cum Legatis Moschoviae. Et de felici successu pacis stabilitae opera et consilio praedictorum Patrum. Scripta ab eodem P. Thoma Pereyra, et transmissa ad Reverendum Patrem Nostrum 10 Jan. 1690. Secundum exemplar. Extat etiam apud Reverendum Patrem Nostrum Generalem Exemplar Latine redditum ". The name of Father Bouvet in this note again is an evident mistake of the writer of this adnotation.

[21] In Latin it reads : " De itinere nostrorum Patrum missorum cum Legatis Imperatoris Sinici ad componendam pacem cum Moscovitis ".

[22] It reads : " Anno 1689 : Legatio Sinica ad Moschos et Pax stabilita inter Imperatorem Sinarum, etc. "

[23] " Anno 1689 ad 1690. Num. secundo ".

Neither of these two Portuguese copies is the original autograph of Father Pereira. This fact is ascertained by the comparison of their handwriting with documents undoubtedly written by Father Pereira. This and the fact that the original autograph of the Pereira Diary is not to be found in the Roman Archives of the Society of Jesus or in any other Archive with extensive collections of Jesuit documents, open the way to different hypotheses concerning the genesis of these two copies. The most probable hypothesis is that there was an original Pereira autograph from which the copies were made either in Peking or Macao. That both Portuguese copies were made in China is clear from the fact that both paper and ink (Chinese black) are of Chinese make, while the soiled lines, where the paper was folded, are indicative of long transmission as in similar papers from China to Europe. The notes in Latin at the end of the two copies, obviously made in Rome, are in sharp contrast to the text of the Diary ; the ink is browned (European made), and the handwriting is also different.

According to Father Francis Rouleau the transcripts were probably made at Macao from the original draft of Pereira, as was done for most of the Litterae Annuae and other documents.[24]

Whatever the truth, the original autograph of the Pereira Diary is not extant nor has it been found either in the Jesuit Archives in Rome or in any other major collection of Jesuit documents. The fact that these two copies owe their existence to Pereira, however, is equally certain. The differences between the first and the second copy are of such a nature that only a common source can explain them.

The Latin version of the Manuscript. It is found in the Roman Archives of the Society of Jesus, in the same Codex *Jap. Sin. 128* ff. 45r-62r. The measurements of the paper on which it is written are 270×195 mm. Both paper and ink are of European make. This latin translation, as distinct from the Portuguese copies, is a rough draft with many corrections. It follows the two Portuguese copies substantially. It cannot, however, be called a translation in the strict sense of the word, not even a free translation of the Portuguese copies, as it omits many passages. Whenever I found difficulty in editing and translating the Portuguese texts or an almost unintelligible passage, I tried to find the solution in the Latin copy. My efforts remained without reward as such passages are invariably omitted in this Latin copy. These omissions alone eliminate the possibility of considering this Latin copy Pereira's original autograph. This version was made in Rome probably for the benefit of Father General, as one of the adnotations at the end of the second Portuguese copy seems to indicate: " ... there also exists in the possession of Our Reverend Father General a Latin copy ... ", and for the benefit of others who could not read Portuguese, yet were interested in the main events, as for instance, Father Dunin Szpot, who used this Diary extensively.

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[24] By personal communication.

The copies of Dunin Szpot. The shorter of Dunin Szpot's versions is contained in the same Codex *Jap. Sin. 128* that contains the two Portuguese copies and the above mentioned Latin version. It runs from f. 40r to f. 43r and the measurements of the paper are 270 × 195 mm. It is only a summary recording the highlights of the Pereira Diary, as its title indicates: " Concerning the Chinese Legation to the Moscovites and the treaty concluded between the two Empires, thanks to the diligence and the labors of our Fathers; an excerpt from the Diary of Father Thomas Pereyra. By Father Thomas Ignatius Szpot, Polish confessor in Rome, 1695 ". [25] It narrates the events in the third, not the first person.

The longer of Dunin Szpot's versions is contained in his " Collectanea Historiae Sinensis " still conserved, in manuscript form, in the Roman Archives of the Society of Jesus under *Jap. Sin. 105 I* ff. 160v-165r and 170v-191r. The second section beginning on f. 170v is entitled: " Trip of the Chinese Legates to the city of Nipchu in Moschovite territory. Meetings and transactions of the peace, and the peace concluded between China and Moscovy due to the work of our Fathers ".[26] It is substantially the same as the Latin text in *Jap. Sin. 128* 45r-62r. It narrates the events in the third person and paraphrases certain passages and can consequently not be considered a translation in the strict sense of the word.

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[25] " De Legatione Sinica ad Moschos et Pace stabilita inter utrumque Imperium Sinicum videlicet et Moschoviae, industria et labore Nostrorum Patrum; ex Diario P. Thomae Pereyra excerptum. A. P. Thoma Ignatio Szpot Polono Romae Penitentiario anno 1695 ". T. I. Dunin Szpot was born around 1633 in Podolia; he entered the Lithuanian Province of the Society of Jesus. Among other assignments he was confessor of the Polish language at St. Peter's in Rome. He showed an extraordinary interest in the China mission, and since in Rome he had access to the Jesuit Archives he composed several works still extant in Ms form. See PFISTER, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-64.

Thus the editing and the translating of Father Pereira's Diary has to rest on the two Portuguese copies.

General observations concerning the contents of the Diary

The remarks which can serve as guiding principles for the evaluation of the contents of the Pereira Diary are based on its comparison with Father Gerbillon's Diary, the only other document accessible dealing with the same events.[27] The main difference between the two lies in the different motive which inspired their writing. Gerbillon was one of the group of French Jesuits, sponsored by the French Academy of Sciences and sent to China by Louis XIV as "royal mathematicians". Besides apostolic missionary work, he also did some research work in the field of geography, astronomy and archeology. His report concerning the trip to Nerchinsk, as his other reports,[28] bears the character of the report of an expert to experts with geographical and astronomical details. He usually gives, for instance, the exact geographic location by longitude and latitude of each place they passed. Father Pereira, on the other hand, was, both according to the intentions of K'ang-hsi and his religious Superiors, the leader of the two. It was consequently his duty to report to his Superiors about their activities. Two copies of his report, though it is addressed to the Jesuits of the China mission or to his Jesuit confrères in general, he sent to the General in Rome, and thus it can be considered as his official report. This difference in their purpose of writing explains the differences of emphasis put on different events. Gerbillon who wrote a scientific report, emphasized scientific details. He had to refrain from remarks which could have been considered derogatory by either the Chinese or the Russian side, both extremely sensitive, as his report was written for the general public. If any such remarks should have come to the attention of either party it could not have failed to cause serious trouble, as some of Father Avril's remarks had caused with Peter the Great. Pereira, on the other hand, writing a report to his fellow Jesuits and Superiors, could more freely indulge in revealing some details not flattering to either side since he could count on the discretion of these men. His report was not intended primarily for the general public and remained unpublished until the present.

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[26] " Iter Legatorum Sinensium ad Civitatem Nip-chu Moschicae ditionis. Conventus et Tractatus de Pace, et Pax mostrorum Patrum opera inter Sinas et Moschos stabilita ".

[27] The Official Report of Golovin, although used by Cahen and Yakovleva, has never been published in its entirety and was to me unaccessible.

[28] Haide, *op. cit.*, IV. This volume in the original French edition contains the descriptions of the nine trips Gerbillon made into Tartary.

The difference in the intent which inspired the two writers also explains another difference between their Diaries. In reading Gerbillon's report only, one is inclined to conclude with W. Fuchs that among the two Jesuits Gerbillon played the leading role at Nerchinsk.[29] And in reading only Pereira's Diary, one gets the impression that he was the principal agent of the two, so much so, that one of the Archivists in Rome, after having read it, did not remember who Pereira's companion was and substituted Father Joachim Bouvet in Gerbillon's place. This mutual omission, not excluding a certain amount of fraternal rivalry, is mainly due to their different motive in writing. Louis XIV and the French Academy of Sciences were hardly interested in the contributions of a Portuguese, but were very much interested in the contributions and accomplishments of one of their subjects or members. Gerbillon's only sin, if one can call it such, is that of omission, that is to say, his not mentioning Pereira's efforts in bringing the two parties to their better senses whenever the negotiations reached an impasse: his making the most of the single occasion when he alone went to the Moscovites to induce them to make concessions. In all fairness, however, it must be said that he was frequently absent when Pereira gave one of his exhortations to the Chinese ambassadors. Pereira, on the other hand, did not have to mention Gerbillon's activities in detail for he was under Pereira's command and did not act on his own. Pereira was the leader of the two and had to account only for his own actions. He does mention the instance when Gerbillon visited the Russians alone. Pereira was the one who had to account to K'ang-hsi for what happened ; and it was he who reported to the members of his Order and the Superiors. Consequently, this discrepancy in their reporting cannot be construed as a lack of veracity or an intent to mislead. What they report is true and their reports must be considered as mutually completive and not as mutually destructive. The most important question, in view of the new light Pereira's report sheds on the internal making of the treaty, is whether or not it is truthful in this respect. Considering the nature and the destination of his report, the answer must be yes. The Jesuits in China had ways and means of finding out the truth.

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[29] W. FUCHS, *Der Russisch-Chinesische Vertrag von Nerchinsk vom Jahre 1689*, in *Monumenta Serica* 4 (1939-40) 546-593.

There is, however, one bias running through Pereira's report which, though it does not vitiate its truthfulness, makes him overemphasize certain incidents. This, as we have seen, is his attempt to cover up his own neglects in asking Russian permission for the overland route as a recompense for the services he and Gerbillon had rendered the Russians. This bias, though it puts certain facts and incidents out of proportion, does not destroy his veracity as far as the reporting of the principal facts goes.

Chapter VIII

TEXT OF THE TREATY CONTAINED IN THE DIARY

One more point of interest has to be mentioned and that is the text of the treaty in Latin included in the Pereira Diary. It would go beyond the purpose of this book to give a complete critical disquisition on the different texts of the treaty. Moreover, this has already been done by W. Fuchs in a thorough and learned article. [1] There are, however, some points in which Father Pereira's Diary sheds new light on the problem. For instance W. Fuchs says that his own critical disquisition and investigation of the treaty-texts has the unavoidable disadvantage that it is based only on the already known treaty versions and not on any new documents since no new facts have been discovered on the Chinese side either in the Palace Archives in Peking or anywhere else. [2] Although the Latin text of the treaty as given by Pereira does not represent the copy of the treaty which was written in behalf of the Russian delegation and handed over to the Chinese, it represents new material and helps to clarify some points.

The text of the treaty has been published in many languages: Latin, Russian, Manchu, Chinese, French, Japanese, Mongolian, English, etc., and in many versions. To bring some order to this variety the following considerations may help.

The two Latin copies, the one written in behalf of the Chinese delegation and given to the Russians and the one written by the Russian delegation and handed over to the Chinese, both signed and sealed by the delegates of the two countries, are the two official copies of the treaty. The copy written in Russian by the Russians and given to the Chinese, and the Manchu copy written by the Chinese delegation and given to the Russians (neither signed nor sealed), can be considered the semi-official copies of the treaty. Besides these official and semi-official copies, special mention has to be made of the Chinese version of the text, because the Chinese language played a prominent role in the preliminary stages of the drafting of the treaty. Gerbillon who arrived in China in 1687, i. e. only two years before the conclusion of the treaty, was not yet conversant in either the Manchu or Chinese language. Pereira, who knew Chinese and probably could speak some Manchu, was unable to read a note written by K'ang-hsi in Manchu even at a later date. This makes it plausible to suppose that the Chinese language was used as an intermediary language between the Latin and the Manchu within the Chinese camp. Thus one may, indeed, conclude with W. Fuchs, that the Latin copy, though it is the authoritative copy and, consequently, must be made the starting point of all comparative studies, in its turn rests on either the Manchu or the Chinese version. [3] The Chinese version rather than the Manchu because of the previously listed facts. All the different Chinese versions, however, can be reduced to two prototypes : one is contained in the *Hei-lung-chiang wai-chi* [4] and the other in the *K'ang-hsi shih-lu.* [5] This latter, however, and all versions dependent on it, as a close scrutiny reveals, does not represent the treaty-text but the inscription-text. [6] The sixth paragraph of the treaty contains the following clause : "... this present treaty, with all its articles, shall be engraved in the Chinese, Russian and Latin languages, upon stones, which shall be placed as everlasting monuments on the frontiers of the two Empires." These monuments, with an abbreviated version of the text of the treaty upon them (inscription-text), were erected in 1690. The *Hei-lung-chiang wai-chi* version (and all versions derived from it), on the other hand, which was discovered and published by Hsi-ch'ing, represents the treaty-text. [7]

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[1] W. Fuchs, *op. cit.*

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 550.

On the other hand, the official Latin copy written in behalf of the Chinese delegation and given to the Russians has been found in the Russian Archives and has been published in *Sbornik dogovorov Rossii s Kitaiem.* [8] The official Latin copy written in behalf of the Russian delegation and given to the

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[3] *Ibid.,* p. 554.

[4] *Ibid.,* p. 564.

[5] *Ibid.,* p. 563.

[6] *Ibid.,* pp. 563-564.

[7] For further details see *Ibid.,* pp. 563-566.

[8] The Text is reproduced *Ibid.,* pp. 577-582.

Chinese, however, has not yet been discovered in the Chinese Archives. Thus the comparison of these two official Latin copies is impossible. One cannot say from first hand observation whether or not these two official Latin copies were identical. The situation, however, is not hopeless. We have the testimony of two eyewitnesses in this matter. Both Gerbillon [9] and Pereira assert their substantial identity, emphatically indicating some minor differences. Pereira, for instance, says : " The copy written by the Moscovites is the same [as the one written in behalf of the Chinese] except for the aforementioned circumstances [order of Emperors and signatures] and the last part about the stones to be erected in memory of the peace which was changed by the Moscovites thusly : ' We leave this to the judgement of the Chinese Emperor ' ". [10]

Alas ! The testimony of these two witnesses cannot be confirmed by comparing the official Latin documents, as we have seen. Nor can the official Latin copy written in behalf of the Chinese and given to the Russians be compared with the semi-official Russian copy given to the Chinese (and supposedly identical with the Latin copy) because this has not yet been found, either. Thus, all comparison of the official or semi-official copies written by the respective sides is excluded.

Two possibilities, however, still remain for further exploration as to whether or not the official and semi-official copies of the respective sides are substantially identical : (1) If one could find a draft copy of the official or semi-official version of the Russian side and prove that it is substantially identical with the finished copies ; or (2) establish the fidelity of the two above mentioned witnesses concerning the copies of the treaty.

The first of these two possibilities presents the same difficulty as the comparing of the original official copies, viz. that official copy written on behalf of the Russians and handed to the Chinese has not yet been found. The fidelity of a draft copy can only be established by comparing it with the official end product.

Thus the remaining possibility is to establish the trustworthiness of the witnesses. To establish this, we must prove by extrinsic reasoning that there is no valid reason for doubting the statements of Gerbillon and Pereira that the two official copies were substantially identical. The draft copy of the treaty as written by the Russians and handed to the Chinese must also be substantially identical with the official copy of the treaty as written by the Chinese and given to the Russians and with the official copy written in behalf of the Russians and given to the Chinese.

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[9] HALDE, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 200.

[10] PEREIRA, *Diary* 286-287.

Before going any further, it is necessary to see whether there exists a draft copy of the official or semi-official treaty text written by the Russians and given to the Chinese. What would enable the reader to establish this fact ? According to Pereira, such a draft copy would have the name of the Tsar and his ambassadors before the names of the Chinese Emperor and his ambassadors ; and the passage about the stone monuments would also differ. Indeed, there is a copy which meets these requirements. It is the Russian version of the treaty contained in *Sbornik* (pp. 1-6), the German translation of which is given by MULLER, *Sammlung Russischer Geschichte*, Vol. 2, pp. 434-439. [11]

All that remains to be done now is to establish that the testimony of Gerbillon and Pereira, stating that the two official Latin copies of the treaty were identical, is truthful. This can be established if we can prove : (1) That Gerbillon and Pereira had the required knowledge, i. e. had seen both official copies ; (2) did not gain anything by not telling the truth ; (3) did not conspire to mislead ; (4) told the truth in other statements concerning the treaty.

That they had seen both official final copies of the treaty can be established from the known events and circumstances which preceded the signing of the treaty.

That they had nothing to gain by not telling the truth can be ascertained from a simple study of their purpose in writing their reports.

That they did not conspire to mislead can be established from their relationship to each other. Even though they were members of the same Order and both were missionaries in China, they represented different and conflicting interests. Pereira was Portuguese and a missionary of the Padroado ; Gerbillon, on the other hand, was sent to China by Louis XIV in violation of the Padroado. There was considerable friction

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[11] W. FUCHS, *op. cit.*, pp. 573-591.

Semi-official Manchu text in *Sbornik*	Official Latin text in *Sbornik*	Latin text in Pereira's Diary	French text in Gerbillon's Diary	Russian text in *Sbornik*
Introduction : The Chinese The Russians Date Purpose of meeting	Introduction : The Chinese The Russians Date Purpose of meeting	Introduction : The Chinese The Russians Date Purpose of meeting	Introduction : The Chinese The Russians Date Purpose of meeting	Introduction : The Russians The Chinese Purpose of meeting
1. Gerbici Ud	1. Kerbichi Uddi	1. Kerbetchi Oudi	1. Kerbichi Udi	1. Gorbica Ud
2. Ergune	Ergun	Ergon	Ergone	2. Argun
3. Jaksa	2. Yagsa	2. Yacza	2. Yacsa	3. Albazin
4. Border transgressors	Border transgressors	Border Transgressors	Border Transgressors	4. Border Transgressors
5. Former things be forgotten	3. Former things be forgotten	3. Former things be forgotten	3. Former things be forgotten	
	Future refugees	4. Future refugees	4. Future refugees	
Russians already in China and vice versa can remain	4. Russians already in China and vice versa can remain	Russians already in China and vice versa can remain	5. Russians already in China and Vice versa can remain	
6. Passports for travellers	5. Passports for travellers	5. Passports for travellers	6. Passports for travellers	5. Passports for travellers
7. Future refugees				6. Border transgressors
8. Treaty to be observed Signing of treaty Chinese, Russian and Latin inscription	6. If treaty observed no more trouble Signing of treaty Chinese, Russian and Latin inscription	6. If treaty observed no more trouble Signing of treaty Chinese, Russian and Latin inscription	If treaty observed no more trouble Signing of treaty Tartar, Chinese, Russian and Latin inscription	Monument if Chinese Emperor wants it
Date	Date			Date

between these two groups ever since the French Jesuits arrived in China.[12]

That their other statements concerning the text of the treaty are truthful can be established by investigating these statements. Besides stating that the two official Latin copies were identical (with the minor differences the writers indicate), they both claim that the reproductions they give in their Diaries are substantially the same as the official Latin copies. If this later statement, which can be investigated, is true, there is no reason for doubting their former statement.

But it is precisely in this respect that some difficulty is encountered. According to W. Fuchs, Gerbillon's French version (Pereira's Latin text was unknown to him), from the point of view of textual comparison, is not completely identical with the official Latin version contained in *Sbornik.*[13] Going a step further, after having compared the different versions and translations of the treaty texts, W. Fuchs finds differences between them both as to the order of paragraphs and content.[14] An examination of the outlines of the different versions shows the differences in the order of paragraphs.[15]

Before drawing our own conclusions concerning the differences, the following facts must be pointed out :

Of the five versions given on the foregoing page, four represent the text written in behalf of the Chinese delegation and handed over to the Russians, and only one the text that was written by the Russians and handed over to the Chinese. This can be established from the order in which the names of the respective Emperors and their ambassadors are indicated and also from the clause about the stone monument to be erected on the border.

About the single version representing the text which the Russians wrote and gave to the Chinese one cannot say positively that it is identical with the semi-official Russian copy, because this latter has not yet been found in the Chinese Archives and a comparison is therefore impossible.

The four versions representing the text written in behalf of the Chinese and given to the Russians can be grouped as follows: (a) The official Latin text written by the Chinese and given to the Russians as contained in *Sbornik*; (b) the semi-official Manchu text written by the Chinese and given to the Russians, also contained in *Sbornik*; (c) the others (Pereira's and Gerbillon's) represent different stages of the drafting of the final copy. It is unthinkable that private persons could have had access to the precious official or semi-official copies once they were exchanged.

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[12] Pfister, *op. cit.*, pp. 424, 428. See also Ch. VII.

[13] W. Fuchs, *op. cit.*, p. 553.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 569.

[15] For the complete texts see *Ibid.*, pp. 573-593.

Let us now compare these different versions. The differences between the treaty-text as reproduced by Gerbillon and Pereira are the following: The shortened introduction given by Pereira; the division of the material in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6, and the addition, by Gerbillon, of the Manchu language for the inscription-text. These differences can be explained by the different draft copies each one of them used in reproducing the text. Since Pereira's rendition is closer to the official Latin copy in *Sbornik*, it probably represents a later stage of drafting. The Manchu language for the stone inscriptions is probably an addition of Gerbillon, who wrote his Diary at a later date, when he already knew that the treaty text was to be inscribed on the monuments in that language, although in the official text there was no such provision. Pereira's shortened introduction can be explained from his purpose in writing his Diary. To his fellow Jesuits the enumeration of the two delegations was of little significance.

Let us now compare the versions of Pereira and Gerbillon with the official Latin copy as given in *Sbornik*. For this purpose I shall use Pereira's text because it is in Latin and not in French as is Gerbillon's — translations always have to be allowed a certain amount of discrepancy from the original; moreover the discrepancies between Gerbillon's and Pereira's version can be explained satisfactorily, thus presenting itself as the natural choice. Before comparing the two texts I would like to make the following remarks: (1) The text in the left hand column is the official Latin text from *Sbornik* and the text on the right is Pereira's text; (2) here I shall reproduce only those parts of the texts in which the copy made in behalf of the Russians and the copy made in behalf of the Chinese are allegedly identical; (3) words in italics mark words omitted in the other copy; (4) words with spaced letters mark different readings. Let us now compare the two:

Official Latin text in *Sbornik*	Pereira's text
Anno Cam Hi 28° crocei serpentis dicto 7^{ae} Lunae die 24 prope oppidum Nipchou congregati tum ad coercendam *et reprimendam* insolentiam eorum inferioris notae *venatorum* hominum, qui extra proprios limites, sive venabundi, *sive se mutuo occidentes*, sive depraedantes, sive perturbationes aut tumultus quoscumque commoventes pro suo arbitrio excurrunt, tum ad limites inter utrumque Imperium Sinicum videlicet et Ruthenicum clare ac perspicue *determinandos ac* constituendos, tum denique ad pacem perpetuam stabiliendam aeternumque foedus percutiendum, sequentia puncta *ex* mutuo consensu statuimus ac determinavimus.	Anno Kam Hi 28, crocci serpentis dicti, 7^{a} luna, die 24 prope opidum Nipchu congregati, tum ad coercendam insolentiam illorum inferioris notae hominum, qui extra proprios limites, sive venabundi, sive depraedantes, sive perturbationes, aut tumultus quoscumque commoventes pro suo arbitrio excurrunt, tum ad limites inter utrumque Imperium Sinicum scilicet, et Ruthenicum clare ac praecipue constituendos, tum denique ad pacem perpetuam stabiliendam et aeternum faedus percutiendum sequentia puncta mutuo consensu statuimus ac determinavimus.
1° Rivulus nomine Kerbichi, qui rivo Chorna Tartarice Urum dicto proximus adjacet et fluvium Sagalien Ula influit, limites inter untrumque Imperium constituet. Item a vertice rupis seu montis lapidei, qui est supradicti *rivuli* Kerbichi fontem et originem et per ipsa huius montis cacumina usque ad mare, utriusque imperii ditionem ita dividet, ut omnes terrae et fluvii sive parvi sive magni qui a meridionali huius montis parte in fluvium Sagalien Ula influunt sint sub Imperii Sinici dominio ; omnes terrae vero et omnes rivi qui ex altera montis parte ad Borealem plagam vergunt sub Ruthenici Imperii dominio remaneant	1° Rivulus nomine Kerbichi, qui rivo Chorna tartarice Urum dicto proximus adjacet, et fluvium Sagalien Ula influit, limites inter utrumque imperium constituit. Item a vertice rupis, sive montis lapidei, qui est supradicti Kerbichi fons et origo, et per ipsa huius montis cacumina usque ad mare, utriusque imperii ditionem ita dividet, ut omnes terrae et fluvii sive parvi sive magni, qui a meridionali hujus montis parte influunt in fluvium Sagalien Ula, sint sub Imperii Sinici dominio : omnes omnes vero terrae et omnes rivi qui ex altera parte *ejusdem* montis versus borealem plagam vergunt, sub Imperii Ruthenici dominio ita re-

ita tamen, ut quicunque fluvii *in mare influunt* et quaecumque terrae sunt *intermediae* inter fluvium Udi et seriem montium pro limitibus designatam prointerim indeterminatae relinquantur. De his autem post uniuscuiusque imperii legatorum in proprium regnum reditum rite examinatis et clare cognitis vel per legatos vel per litteras postea determinabitur. Item fluvius nomine Ergon qui etiam supra dictum fluvium Sagalien Ula influit, limites ita constituet, ut omnes terrae quae sunt ex parte meridionali ad Sinicum,quae vero sunt ex parte boreali ad Ruthenicum Imperium pertineant: et omnes aedes quae ex parte dicti fluminis meridionali in faucibus fluvii nomine Meyrelke extructae sunt ad littus boreale transferentur.

2° Arx seu fortalitia in loco nomine Yagsa a Russis extructa funditus eruetur ac destruetur. Omnesque illam incolentes Rutheni Imperii subditi cum omnibus suis cuiuscumque generis rebus in Russi Imperii terras deducentur. Atque extra hos limites determinatos nullam ob causam utriusque *Imperii* venatores transibunt. Quod si unus aut duo inferioris notae homines extra hos statutos limites vel venabundi, vel latrorocinaturi divagabuntur, statim in vincula coniecti ad illarum terrarum constitutos in utroque Imperio Praefectos deducentur,

maneant, ut tamen quicumque fluvii et quaecumque terrae sunt inter fluvium *dictum* Uddi et seriem illam montium pro limitibus designatam,pro interim indeterminatae relinquantur. De his vero post utriusque imperii legatorum reditum in proprium regnum rite examinatis et clare cognitis, vel per legatos vel per literas postea determinabitur. Item fluvius nomine Ergun qui etiam supradictum fluvium Sagalien Ula influit, limites ita constituat, ut omnes terrae meridionales ad Sinicum *Imperium*, quae vero sunt in parte boreali ad Ruthenorum imperium *et dominium* pertineant, et omnia aedificia quae sunt ex parte meridionali dicti fluvii in facibus fluvii nomine Meirelue extructa sunt, ad litus boreale transferantur.

2° Arx seu fortalitia in loco nomine Yagza a Russis extructa funditis eruetur ac destruetur: omnesque illius incolae Ruthenici Imperii subditi cum omnibus suis cujuscumque generis rebus in Russi Imperii terras deducentur, atque extra hos limites determinatos nullam ob causam utriusque venatores transeant. Quod si unus aut duo inferioris notae homines extra hos limites determinatos vel venabundi, vel latrocinandi [causa] divagabuntur, statim in vincula conjecti ad illarum terrarum constitutos in utroque imperio praefectos deducentur, qui cognitam illo-qui cognitam illorum culpam debita poena mulctabunt: Si vero ad decem aut quindecim simul congregati et armis instructi, aut venabuntur, aut alterius Imperii homines occident, aut depraedabuntur de hoc ad uniuscuiusque Imperii Imperatores referetur, omnesque huius criminis rei capitali poena mulctabuntur, nec bellum propter quoscumque particularium hominum excessus suscitabitur, aut sanguinis effusio procurabitur.

3° Quaecumque prius acta sunt, cuiuscumque generis *sint*, aeterna oblivione sopiantur.

Ab eo die quo inter utrumque Imperium haec aeterna pax iurata fuerit, nulli in posterum ex altero Imperio transfugae in alterum Imperium admittentur: sed in vincula coniecti *statim* reducentur.

4° Quicumque vero Rutheni Imperii subditi in Sinico, et quicumque Sinici Imperii in Ruthenico nunc sunt, in eodem statu relinquantur.

5° Propter nunc contractam amicitiam atque aeternum foedus stabilitum cuiuscumque generis homines litteras patentes itineris sui afferentes, licite accedent ad regna utriusque dominii, ibique vendent et ement quaecumque ipsis videbuntur necessaria mutuo commercio.

6° Concilio inter utriusque

rum culpam, debita pena multabunt. Si vero ad decem, aut quindecim simul congregati, et armis extructi aut versabuntur, aut alterius imperii homines occiderint, aut depraedabuntur, de hoc ad uniuscuiusque imperii Imperatores referretur, et omnes hujus criminis rei capitali paena multabuntur. Nec bella propter quoscumque particularium hominum excessus suscitabuntur, aut sanguinis effusio procurabitur.

3° Quaecumque prius acta sunt cuiuscumque generis aeterna oblivione sopiantur.

4° Ab eo die, quo inter utrumque imperium haec aeterna pax jurata fuerit, nulli in posterum ex altero imperio transfugae in alterum imperium recipiantur, sed in vincula conjecti reducentur.

Quicumque vero Ruthenici Imperii subditi in Sinico, et quicumque Sinici Imperii in Ruthenico nunc sunt, in eodem statu relinquantur.

5° Propter nunc contractam amicitiam atque aeternum faedus stabiliendum cuiuscumque generis homines literas patentes itineris sui afferentes licite accedent ad regna utriusque dominii, ibique vendent et ement quaecumque ipsis videbuntur necessaria mutuo commercio.

6° Concilio inter utriusque

Imperii legatos celebrato, et omnibus utiusque regni limitum contentionibus diremptis paceque stabilita, et aeterno amicitiae foedere percusso, si hae omnes determinatae conditiones rite observabuntur, nullus erit amplius perturbationis locus. Ex utraque parte *huius* foederis conditiones scripto mandabuntur, duplexque exemplar huic conforme sigillo munitum sibi invicem tradent magni utriusque Imperii legati.

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The main difference consists in the division of the material in paragraphs 3 and 4. W. Fuchs, who compared Gerbillon's French version with the official Latin copy, thinks that the reason for the discrepancies lies in the fact that the official Latin copy has its basis in another version, viz., the Chinese or Manchu copy. His reasoning, if valid, must also be extended to Pereira's copy. To my mind, however, the reason for the differences must be sought elsewhere. The fact that the official Latin copy was based on a Chinese or Manchu copy does not explain the differences between two Latin copies written by the same person. Pereira himself gives us the clue to the discrepancy between his version and the official Latin copy when he states: " Leaving my companion to translate the chapters of the treaty, without losing any time I ran back to our ambassadors to get them started slowly on their way; this would make the waiting easier for them and still give enough time for the translation to be made. The treaty had to be written three times because one word was translated incorrectly. In this the Moscovites were so scrupulous that the author of an error in a single letter of a document referring to their Grand Duke could be condemned to death. "[16]

Thus, neither final copy of the Latin text was at the disposal of either Gerbillon or Pereira at the time they composed their Diaries. The final copy of the Latin text written by Gerbillon, signed and sealed by both delegations, was not at their disposal either because it was already in Moscow or on its way there. Nor was the final copy written by the Russians and given to the Chinese at their disposal because it is unthinkable that such a precious document would have been accessible to any private person. Thus they both had to use draft copies, or copies they had worked on before the final copy was finished which differed in some details (division of paragraphs and wording) from the final copy. This explains sufficiently the differences indicated by W. Fuchs. From the point of view of textual criticism, Fuchs' statement that the two versions are not identical, is correct. Our concern, however, is primarily with regard to contents ; and there the differences are neither formal nor substantial.

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[16] Pereira, *Diary* 276-277.

The same reasoning explains the differences between the semi-official Manchu copy (in *Sbornik*) and the official Latin copy (also in *Sbornik*), which consists mainly in the division of the paragraphs of the treaty (the semi-official Manchu copy has eight and the official Latin copy six paragraphs). At an earlier stage of the drafting the division of paragraphs was probably different and there had been no time at the last moment to make the Manchu copy correspond completely with the official Latin copy, since there was hardly enough time to finish the official Latin copies which were to be signed and sealed by both sides.

Finally we come to the only version of the treaty which represents the text written by the Russians and given to the Chinese viz., the Russian text in *Sbornik*. The differences between it and the official Latin copy, besides the order of the Emperors and delegates, and the clause about the monuments, are mainly in the distribution of paragraphs, which again can be sufficiently explained by assuming that this Russian copy is a draft copy representing an earlier stage of composition as compared with the official final copy.

By this process, then, all the differences are satisfactorily explained ; and we find the statements of Gerbillon and Pereira that their versions of the treaty are substantially identical with the official Latin copy are true. Consequently, there is no reason to doubt their veracity concerning the identity of the two official Latin copies.

With these facts in mind, the different versions of the treaty as published and used by the different authors can be reduced to the following groups :

OFFICIAL LATIN TEXT :

Written in behalf of the Russian delegation, signed and sealed, by both parties and handed to the Chinese, has not yet been found in the Chinese Archives.

Written in behalf of the Chinese delegation, signed and sealed by both parties and handed over to the Russians, is reproduced :

In Latin (original) : *Sbornik dogovorov Rossii s Kitaiem*, pp. 1-6 ; H. CORDIER, *Histoire des relations de la Chine avec les puissances occidentales*, Vol. I, pp. 81-84 ; VLADIMIR (Zenone VOLPICELLI), *Russia on the Pacific and the Siberian Railway*, pp. 343 ss. ; MIYAZAKI MASAYOSHI, *Kindai Roshi kankei no kenkyū*, in *Kokoryūko chihō no bu* (Ed. South Manchurian Railway Co., Dairen, 1922), pp. 179-182.

In English (translation) : LIU HSÜAN-MIN, *Russo-Chinese Relations up to the Treaty of Nerchinsk*, in *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review* 23 (1940) 423-431.

In Russian (translation) : *Sbornik* ..., pp. 7-10 ; MIYAZAKI MASAYOSHI *op. cit.*, pp. 183-186 ; T. YUZEFOVICH, *Dogovori Rossii s Wostokom* ... pp. 234-236. P. T. YAKOVLEVA, *Pervii Russko-Kitaiskii dogovor 1689 goda*, pp. 214-216.

In Japanese (translation) : MIYAZAKI MASAYOSHI *op. cit.*, pp. 186-188.

SEMI-OFFICIAL TEXT :

Written in Russian by the Russians and given to the Chinese has not yet been found in the Chinese Archives.

Written in Manchu in behalf of the Chinese delegation and given to the Russians is reproduced :

In Manchu (original) : *Sbornik* ... pp.7-10 ; VASSILIEV, *Mancurkaya Chrestomatiya*, pp. 166-170.

In English (translation) : LIU HSÜAN-MIN, *op. cit.*

DRAFT TEXTS :

Representing the Latin text written in behalf of the Chinese delegations :

In Latin : THOMAS PEREIRA, *Diary* 280-287.

French: Gerbillon's text in HALDE, *Description ...* (ed. 1735), Vol. IV, pp. 201-202; (ed. 1736), Vol. IV, pp. 242-244.

In English (following Gerbillon's version): *Treaties, Conventions,* etc., *between China and Foreign States,* Vol. I, pp. 3-7; G. E. P. HERTSLET, *China Treaties* (3d ed.), Vol. I, pp. 437-439; E. G. RAVENSTEIN, *The Russian on the Amur,* pp. 62-63.

Representing the semi-official Russian text written by the Russians:

In Russian: *Sbornik ...*, pp. 231-233; *Polnom sobrani zakonov Rossiiskoi Imperii, s 1649 goda,* Vol. III, pp. 31-32; MIYAZAKI MASAYOSHI, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-192.

In Japanese: MIYAZAKI MASAYOSHI, *op. cit.*, pp. 192-194.

In German: G. F. MULLER, *Sammlung Russischer Geschichte,* Vol. II, pp. 434-439.

In English: *Treaties and Conventions* etc., Vol. I, pp. 3-7. CH'EN FU-KUANG, *Sino-Russian Diplomatic Relations since 1689,* in *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review* 10 (1926) 505-506; LIU HSÜAN-MIN, *op. cit.*, pp. 423-431.

In Dutch: WITSEN, *Noord- en Ost-Tartarie* (2nd ed.).

Representing the semi-official Manchu text written by the Chinese:

In Chinese: HSI-CH'ING, *Hei-lung-chiang wai-chi.* Contained in: *Chung-hua pien-fang yü-ti ts'ung-shu,* Vol. I, pp. 13a-14b. I used the text as reproduced by NAITŌ TORAJIRŌ, *Man-Mō sōshō,* Vol. V.

N. B. Hsi-ch'ing, a great grandson of Ortai (see A. W. HUMMEL, *op. cit.*, pp. 601-602), discovered this Manchu text and translated it into Chinese. The Manchu text itself, found by Hsi-ch'ing, has never been published. For other versions following this see W. FUCHS, *op. cit.*, pp. 566, 571.

INSCRIPTION TEXT (from the stone monuments on the border):

In Chinese. Has following main types:

K'ang-hsi shih-lu (under the 12th month of the 28th year of K'ang-hsi, i. e. Jan. 1690), 143, pp. 16-17. For other copies following this see W. FUCHS, *op. cit.*, p. 567.

WEI YÜAN, *Sheng-wu chi,* chüan 6: *Kuo-ch'ao O-lo-ssu* *meng-ping chi*, p. 4, gives an abridged version. For other copies following this see W. FUCHS, *op. cit.*, p. 566.

HSU YÜAN-WEN, *Han-ching t'ang-chi*, see under *Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien*, 81, 36b-37a. Contains an abridged version. For other versions depending on this see W. FUCHS, *op. cit.*, pp. 566-567.

P'ing-ting lo-ch'a fang-lüeh. Contained in : HO CH'IU-T'AO's *Shuo fang pei-sheng.* For other copies following it see W. FUCHS *op. cit.*, p. 567. *Treaties, Conventions*, etc. ... Vol. I.

In French (translations): KLAPROTH, *Mém. rel. à l'Asie.*

In Manchu: *K'ang-hsi shih-lu*, ch. 143.

In Mongolian: *K'ang-hsi shih-lu*, *ibid.*

CHAPTER IX

OUR EDITION

PORTUGUESE TEXT

In editing the Portuguese text of the Pereira Diary the first copy (primum exemplar) was used as the basic text. It was compared word for word with the second copy (secundum exemplar). The principal differences between the two are listed in the critical notes. In the critical apparatus we have used the following abbreviations : *add.* = added in text ; *before* = before the correction ; *corr. from* = corrected from ; *for* = instead of the word in the text ; *om.* = omitted in text ; *over* = over the line ; *t1*, *t2* = text 1, text 2 ; *underlined.*

Orthography. Between the two texts there exists a considerable diversity in the spelling of words. Nor can it be said that either text taken separately is wholly consistent with itself in this respect. For text 1, which we are here editing, we have with utmost fidelity conserved these orthographic variations (which in no wise alter the meaning of the words or perplex the educated reader). To avoid overburdening the critical notes uselessly, we have omitted the orthographic differences of text 2. By way of specimen, however, it will be helpful to summarize their principal classes at this place :

The interchangeable use of the endings *-aes* and *-ais.* Both of these endings are used in text 1 as well as in text 2, although text 1 uses predominantly the *-ais* ending, as, for instance, in the words *animais*, *quais*, etc., while text 2 uses predominantly the *-aes* ending : *animaes*, *quaes*, etc. There are, however, exceptions. The same is true about the endings *-ão* and *-am.* Both endings are found in both texts, although text 1 uses predominantly the *-ão* ending, as, for example, in words like *relação*, *tão*, *querião*, *estavão*, etc., while text 2 uses predominantly the *-am* ending: *relaçam*, *tam*, *queriam*, *estavam*, etc. This again is true in the majority of cases with instances where text 1 uses the *-am* ending and text 2 the *-ão* ending. A similar case can be made for the endings *-eas* and *-eyas*, as in *cheas* (text 1) and *cheyas* (text 2); *-ei*, *-oi* and *-ey*, *-oy*, as, for instance, in *mandei, falei, aproveitei, derrubei, admirei, foi* (text 1) and *mandey, faley, aproveitey, derrubey, admirey, foy* (text 2).

Another instance is the interchangeability of the various letters: e. g.

s and *z* : *faser, diser, pases, capas, grandesa,* etc. (text 1)
fazer, dizer, pazes, capaz, grandeza, etc. (text 2).
s and *c* : *consequensias, asima, prosissão, paciensia,* etc.
consequencias, acima, procissão, paciencia, etc.
ss and *ç* or *c* : *possos, comessavamos, podessem, assertado*
poços, começavamos, podecem, acertado.
i and *j* : *iá, cuios, seia, igreia, despoiado,* etc. (text 1)
já, cujos, seja, igreja, despojado, etc. (text 2).
i and *e* : *Imperador, inveja, piquenos, visinhas, stratagima,* etc. (text 1)
Emperador, enveja, pequenos, vesinhas, stratagema, etc. (text 2).
o and *u* : *todo, acostumado, meos, agoa, sudoeste,* etc.
tudo, acustumado, meus, agua, sudueste, etc.
m and *n* : *emcorpora, devem-se, em tres, ordem, homem*
encorpora, deven-se, en tres, orden, homen.

The letter *h* is frequently left out, either in the beginning of words, as *avendo - havendo, erege - herege, ombro - hombro*; or in the middle, as *até - athé, saindo - sahindo, concluio - concluhio.* In words derived from the Latin, however, it is sometimes retained: *author - autor, christalina - cristalina, monarcha - monarca,* etc. Then, again, it occurs that the letter *e* at the beginning of a word is omitted by one text, but kept by other: e. g. *scripturas - escripturas, steriles - esteriles.*

The prepositions *per* and *pre* are sometimes interchanged in these two words: *pergunto - pregunto, pretendo - pertendo.*

As regards the doubling of consonants the greatest variety is observable in both texts: e. g. *vassalos - vasallos, excellente - excelente, assima - asima, difficilmente - dificilmente, accomodarão - acomodarão, collocar - colocar,* etc. Similarly also the letter *e* in the two words *fé* and *pé* is often reduplicated: *fee* and *pee.* In this duplication of letters we have likewise followed the same rule as that stated for the above variations, namely, we have everywhere faithfully transcribed the form that we find in text 1.

All these variations and their interchangeable use by the same authors reflect the unsettled nature of Portuguese orthography in the Seventeenth Century. However, to indicate the nature of the two copies, some of the Seventeenth Century forms were retained, especially where their retention did not render more difficult the reading and understanding of the text. A fuller study of these differences must be left to Seventeenth Century specialists in the field of Portuguese language and linguistics.

Punctuation and accents. Punctuation is probably the most confusing aspect of the two Portuguese copies of the Pereira manuscript. There seems to be no clear rule or distinction in the use of the comma, semicolon, colon, and period. They are used almost interchangeably. In editing the Portuguese text radical changes had to be made to make the text readable and more easily understandable. Thus in the matter of punctuation the present day use was the guiding principle. The same is true with regard to the use of the acute accent and the grave accent. Here also the present day use was adopted, as in the use of the tilde. Both the grave and the acute accent are used almost interchangeably, and both the accent and the tilde are used as signs of abbreviation. Likewise and for the same reason, quotation marks were supplied whenever the text required them.

Abbreviations. There are several types of abbreviation in the Pereira manuscript. There are those used at the end of words. For instance, *muito* is abbreviated as *m.*^{to}, *pera* as *p.*^{a}, *acompanhamento* as *acompanham.*^{to}, *finalmente* as *finalm.*^{te}, *companheiro* as *companh.*^{o}, etc. There are also abbreviations of titles : e. g. *Vossas Reverencias* is abbreviated as *V. V. R. R.*, *Padre* as *P.*, *Sancto* as *S.*^{to}, etc.. The two Portuguese texts of the Pereira manuscript are no more consistent in the use of these abbreviations than they are in their orthography and punctuation. To make the text clearer for reading and understanding, we have replaced all such abbreviations with the full form of the words.

Omissions. Omission of letters is sometimes due to the fact that the manuscript is damaged. This is the case on the first page of the first copy of the Pereira manuscript. Obviously, these omissions were corrected. There are also omissions of letters, words, and phrases due either to oversight or haste on the part of the copyists. These missing parts were also supplied.

Another difference between the two texts is that text 2 is more consistent in underlining foreign words than is text 1.

The guiding principle in editing the Portuguese text was to make it easily readable and understandable. A fuller listing of the differences between the two texts will be found in the critical notes at the end of each page of the text.

The English Translation

Not being an expert in Seventeenth Century Portuguese language and literature, I am in no position to discuss the Pereira manuscript in respect to rhetoric, beyond the general statement that Father Pereira's style is heavy and artificial. Though it is true that his primary intention was not to produce a piece of literature but a factual report, he nevertheless made an attempt at literary form, as his many classical and biblical quotations and allusions betray ; these, in most instances, do not seem to serve any other purpose than to give proof of his classical training and erudition. In translating such a semi-literary piece one has to try to avoid making it even more pedantic, as translations seldom improve on the original, and yet show the reader what and how the writer conveys what he has to say. The right solution to this dilemma seemed to be a translation that was somewhat free but at the same time substantially faithful to the original.

THE ORIGINAL PORTUGUESE TEXT AND THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF FATHER PEREIRA'S DIARY

SUMMARY

1. Father Thomas Pereira and Father Francis Gerbillon are ordered by the Emperor of China to accompany the Chinese delegation and to assist the delegates in the conclusion of a treaty with Russia. 2. Special favors accorded to the two Jesuits by K'ang-hsi. Trip of the Chinese delegation through the Gobi and Mongolia. 3. Composition of the first delegation. Interruption of this trip because of the war between the Ölöd and the Qalqa Mongols. 4. Departure of the Chinese delegation for Nipchu. Meeting with some Mongol chiefs. 5. Lake Dal, Mount Pecha, and the deserted Pagoda. Meeting with another Mongol chief and a Lama. 6. A chief of the Qalqa Mongols. 7. The method of hunting yellow goats and wild mules. 8. The river Kerülen and the country of the mosquitoes. 9. The Porchi river and the difficulties encountered in its crossing. 10. Rhubarb and otters. The rivers Suctei and Tuihen. 11. The river Pori and the river Umdu. 12. Envoys sent by the governor of Nipchu visit the Chinese camp. The incident created by the 90 Chinese boats that had ascended the Amur and arrived at Nipchu. 13. The arrival of the Chinese delegation at Nipchu. The Amur river, the forests that surround it and the fur-bearing animals that populate these forests. 14. The river Nipchu (Nercha) and the city of Nipchu (Nerchinsk) which derives its name from the river. 15. Historical events that preceded the meeting of the Chinese and Russian delegations. The mission of Baikov and the embassy of Spathar. 16. Manuel de Saldanha ambassador of Portugal to Peking. The first and the second siege of Albazin by the Chinese troops and the arrival of a Russian representative in Peking. 17. Raising of the siege of Albazin and the beginning of the negotiations leading to the treaty of Nerchinsk. Departure of the Chinese delegation to Selenginsk. Return of the Chinese delegation before it had reached Selenginsk on account of the attack of the Ölöd Mongols against the Qalqa. Arrival of a new Russian envoy in Peking. 18. Activities of this Russian envoy in Peking. 19. K'ang-hsi selects Nipchu as the site of the peace negotiations. Departure of the Chinese delegation for Nipchu. 20. Comings and goings between the two delegations from the first to the seventeenth of August. The Chinese suspect the Russians. 21. Letter of the Chinese delegates urging the Russian ambassador to hurry his arrival. The Russian ambassador, in his turn, expresses his astonishment that, for the sake of concluding

peace, the Chinese came with such a large army and that they set up their camp so close to the city. The Chinese justify their action. The Russians demand the withdrawal of some Chinese boats that were too close to the city. Arrival of the Russian ambassador. Representatives of the Chinese and Russian camps exchange visits. 22. Agreement concerning the dispositions of soldiers during the meetings. Distrust of the Chinese and their unwillingness to act according to this agreement. The two Jesuits visit the Moscovite camp seeking a new agreement. The new concessions made by the Russians do not satisfy the Chinese. 23. Pereira convinces the Chinese ambassadors. 24. Golovin's tent and its furniture. 25. The tent of the Chinese delegation and its furnishings. 26. The two delegations as they approach the meeting place. 27. The two delegations enter the tents set up as the meeting place. 28. The first meeting and the first difficulties raised by the Chinese. These difficulties are solved by Pereira. 29. Splendor of the Moscovite ambassador. First Chinese proposal rejected by the Russians and Golovin's counter-proposals. Adjournment of the first meeting. 30. The second meeting of the delegations again ending in an impasse. The distrust of the Chinese reaches such proportions that the danger of war is imminent. Uneasiness of the Chinese ambassadors for having made this hasty decision without consulting Pereira. 31. The Chinese ambassadors persist in distrusting the Russians until Pereira succeeds in dispelling their suspicions. 32. The negotiations are saved from ruin for the second time. Exchange of visits between the two camps : Pereira and Gerbillon visit the Russian camp on behalf of the Chinese delegation and the Latin interpreter of Golovin visits the Chinese camp. The border to be established between the two Empires is the subject of these discussions. 33. The Chinese proposals that Yagza (Albazin) be the border is rejected by the Russians. It is the Russian's turn to be intransigent. 34. The reason for this Russian intransigence and the counter-measures adopted by the Chinese. Pereira alone does not give up hope for a satisfactory solution. 35. The Russians ask for a new meeting. 36. Pereira's advice helps the Chinese ambassadors to resolve the dilemma they faced. 37. The Chinese delegation crosses the Amur. The Russians still delay in making their proposals. 38. The Latin interpreter of the Russian delegation finally brings the new proposals. The Chinese ambassadors explain their reasons for having crossed the river. The Russians request that the two Jesuits be sent to their camp. 39. The Chinese ambassadors are unwilling to let both Jesuits go and finally Gerbillon goes alone. 40. Pereira tries to convince the Chinese that they must trust the Russians. His wager with Songgotu. 41. Gerbillon returns bringing the summary of the Russian proposals that should serve as the conditions of the peace. 42. Some Qalqa having rebelled against their Russian overlords want to surrender to the Chinese but Pereira advises against accepting their surrender. 43. The Latin interpreter of the Russians brings new proposals concerning the protocol to be observed in future diplomatic relations between the two countries. New difficulties arise from the Chinese proposal that the Noz mountain be the boundry between the two Empires. 44. The letter of protest sent by the Russians to the Chinese. 45. At Pereira's advice the two Jesuits are sent to the Russian camp. They urge the Russians to make new concessions but without result. 46. Between the third and the seventh of September new Russian proposals and Chinese counter-proposals are made. 47. Events of the seventh of September preceding the signing of the treaty. Last hesitations of the Russians. 48. The Jesuits and especially Pereira urge the Russian ambassador to make up his mind. 49. Pereira urges the Chinese ambassadors to be patient a little longer. 50. Final arrangements for the signing of the treaty. 51. A final difficulty of the Chinese and its solution. Reading of the copies of the treaty and the signing. 52. Sealing and oath-taking. 53. Text of the treaty. 54. Differences between the texts of the treaty as written by the Russians and by the Chinese. Celebration following the signing of the treaty. 55. Golovin urges the Chinese to stay for a few days. Golovin's presents to the Chinese. 56. Last visit of the Jesuits to the Russian camp. Presents of the Chinese to Golovin. 57. Golovin's generosity in freeing some prisoners. 58. The Chinese delegation starts on its return trip. 59. The Chinese ambassadors praise the Jesuits for their work. 60. Trip from the Umdu river to the Emperor's hunting lodge in the Pecha mountain. 61. The Jesuits pay the Emperor a visit here and after his return to Peking they again pay him a visit. 62. Pereira's speech in the presence of all the Peking Jesuits. 63. Conclusion.

Relação diaria da viagem dos embaixadores da China Tumque Cam[1] e Somgo tu[2], athé à povoação de Nip chu[3] e successo das pazes entre o Imperio Sinico e Moscovitico escrita pella testemunha individual dos mesmos embaixadores abaixo assinada,[4] no anno de 1689 com todas as circunstancias e miudesas que podem os curiosos apetecer.[5]

Já o anno passado por cartas particulares dei noticias sufficientes à Vossas Reverencias[6] em como o Emperador desejando ter efficaz sucesso em seu deseio, me determinou por companheiro

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[1] Tum que cam, i. e., T'ung Kuo-kang, a general, was the eldest son of T'ung t'u-lai of the famous T'ung family of Liaotung who in 1619 had allied themselves with the Manchus. The Hsiao-k'ang Chang Empress, a secondary consort of the Shun-chih Emperor, was a daughter of T'ung T'u-lai and the sister of T'ung Kuo-kang. She became the mother of the K'ang-hsi Emperor. Thus in the Jesuit reports T'ung Kuo-kang is referred to as *chiu-chiu* i. e., " maternal uncle ". The K'ang-hsi Emperor also referred to him by this term. T'ung Kuo-kang died on September 3, 1690 in the battle of Ulan-butung as a commander of the artillery corps in the operations against Galdan. He was killed by a musket of the enemy. See Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* II pp. 794-795 and I p. 327. See also ARSI *Jap. Sin. 103* ff. 172r-172v ; *Jap. Sin. 104* f. 243r.

[2] Som go tu, i. e., Songgotu who was the third son of Soni and for that reason was also called Sosan as, for instance, in the Jesuit reports. He was a member of the Manchu Plain Yellow Banner. His grandfather, Šose, had joined the forces of Nurhaxi. The Hsiao-ch'eng Jen Empress, the mother of the second son of the K'ang-hsi Emperor, Yin-jeng by name and one time Heir Apparent, was the daughter of Songgotu's eldest brother, Gabula and consequently Songgotu's niece. Thus in the Jesuit reports Songgotu is called the uncle of the Heir Apparent. Songgotu helped the young K'ang-hsi Emperor to oust Oboi (one of the four regents during K'ang-hsi's minority) and his faction after K'ang-hsi took over control from the regents in August, 1667. Songgotu after having held different offices, in 1688 was appointed one of the chief negotiators of the treaty with the Russians. After 1689 he played a part in the campaigns against Galdan (1690, 1695, 1696). He retired in 1701 on the plea of advanced age and died probably in 1703. See Hummel, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 663-669 and I, p. 328. ARSI *Jap. Sin. 104* ff. 203r, 243r.

[3] Nipchu, i. e., Ni-p'u-ch'u in Chinese, Nerchinsk in Russian. The

A daily report of the trip of the Chinese ambassadors, T'ung Kuo-kang,[1] and Songgotu,[2] to the city of Nipchu [3] and of the conclusion of the peace treaty between the Chinese and the Moscovite Empires signed individually by the ambassadors [4] in the year 1689, and given below with all the circumstances and details which interested persons may want to know.[5]

1. Last year I informed Your Reverences[6], in certain letters, how the Emperor had artfully assigned me in a public edict to accompany his ambassadors. His feelings were made known in a

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town got its name from the river of a similar name (Ni-p'u-ch'u in Chinese and Nerche in Russian). W. Fuchs, *Der Jesuiten-Atlas der Kanghsi-Zeit* pp. 172-173 and 270 gives the name of the river Nibcu Bira and its geographical location as W 1°-½°, N 52°-52½°, and the name of the town as Nibcu haton and its geographical location as W ½°-0°, N 51½°-52°. According to the *P'ing-ting lo-ch'a fang-lüeh* (included in Ho ch'iu-t'ao's *Shou-fang pei-sheng* presented to the throne in 1860, edited in 1881), pp. 27-28, the Chinese delegation of 1688 which was sent to conclude a treaty with the Russians in a memorial claimed that " Ni-p'u-ch'u was originally the pasture land of our Muu Mingγan tribe ... Ni-p'u-ch'u and all the rivers and rivulets flowing into the Amur are ours and should not be abandoned to the Russians ". The Russian *ostrog* of Nerchinsk, from which the town developed, was founded between 1654-1658 by Peter Beketov and Afanasei Pashkov. Under the *Voevodes* Larion Tolbuzin and Daniel Archinsky, Nerchinsk was the center from which the invasion and penetration of the Amur region was directed. See Kerner, *The Urge to the Sea*, p. 82. Baddeley, *Russia, Mongolia, China.* II, pp. 273, 428. Ravenstein, *The Russians on the Amur*, pp. 3-44. A description of the town and its surroundings is given by Pereira in his *Diary.* See also Baddeley, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 276-428.

[4] For the names see Note 240.

[5] For the latin text of the treaty as given by Pereira see *Diary.* For further details relative to the latin text as well as the text in other languages see W. Fuchs, *Der Russisch-Chinesische Vertrag von Nertchinsk vom Jahre 1689*, in *Monumenta Serica* 4 (1939-40), 546-593, and Liu hsüan-min, *Russo Chinese Relations up to the Treaty of Nerchinsk*, in *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review* 23 (1940) 391-440.

[6] This report was written to his Jesuit confrères as is clear from his addressing it to *Vossas Reverencias*, or Your Reverences.

de seus embaixadores por publico edicto, publicando seu sentimento com hum despacho que deu por escrito que immediatamente me foi entregue, o qual já enviei o anno passado, e aqui aponto com substancia por ser de grandes consequencias e honra de nossa Companhia. " Tenho visto (dis o Emperador) que os homens europeos de que me sirvo são fieis, dignos de credito e em quem me posso estribar, pello que vá comvosco Siu ge xim [7] (que hé o meu nome em China) aos Moscovitas " [8]: em que dá huma induvitavel testemunha da fidelidade (que ainda que a minha pessoa indignamente) abrange gloriosamente a todos os europeos contra as antigas calunnias da maliciosa enveja de seus vassalos. [9] Publicado este despacho, mandou o mesmo Emperador hum mancebo de seu serviço muito affeiçoado a santa ley, por cuia via passarão e passão nossas cousas ao Emperador, de alcunha Chao, [10] o mandou, digo, a nossa casa avisando-me que seria bom levar comigo hum companheiro, o qual logo se determinou como de melhores forças entre os mais o Padre Francisco Gerbillon. [11] Sahio ainda o Emperador com outros despachos honrosos, que já como muito publicos e sabidos os não repito. [12] Demais se dignou dar-me seu proprio vestido, cuja cassaca era de pelles de muito preço, que vendo-a todos vestida sabião logo a forma digna de seu feitio. Ao companheiro fes faser huma nova tambem de sufficiente estima. [13]

Com estas e outras muitas honras não menos publicas que sabidas, entre as quaes não quero deixar por unica o entregar-nos a seu tio, [14] irmão de sua mãy, hum dos embaixadores, pera que a sua mesa e assento nos tratasse com a honra que eu nunca mereci sem differença alguma de sua pessoa, o que porem não bastou

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9 pesso *t1* || 13 da santa *t2* || 14 Chao *underlined*

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[7] Siu ge xim, i. e., Hsü Jih-sheng was the Chinese name of Father Thomas Pereira. See PFISTER, *op. cit.*, pp. 381-386.

[8] This edict was issued on the 13th day of the 3rd moon of the 27th year of K'ang-hsi (April 14, 1688) to the *Li-fan-yüan* or Court of Colonial Affairs. The text of this edict is not contained in the *Tung-hua-lu* nor in any other of the better known collections of Ch'ing documents. Father HUANG PO-LU, *Cheng-chiao feng-pao* (Public praise of the True Religion. A Collection of public documents, acts and edicts of the Chinese Emperors between 1635-1829) 94a8-94a10 gives this edict in Chinese, but does not indicate his source. Furthermore, in the Introduction of his work Father Huang states that some of the documents which he reproduces are retranslated documents by him from foreign languages into Chinese. The dating of the present document would indicate that it is one of these retranslated documents, as the date on the official Chinese documents is usually given with the cycle character. Be this as it may, there can hardly be any doubt about the authenticity of the edict as Father

written dispatch, a copy of which was given to me immediately, and which I sent to you last year. Here, I wish only to note its substance because of the great consequences and honor for our Society. " Having seen ", says the Emperor, " that the Europeans whom I employ are loyal and trustworthy and people on whom I can rely, Hsü Jih-sheng[7] (which is my name in Chinese) shall go with you to the Moscovites ".[8] Thus he gave indubitable testimony (in such laudatory terms as I personally do not deserve) of the loyalty of all Europeans, counteracting the old calumnies and malicious invectives of his subjects.[9] After publishing this dispatch, the Emperor sent me his attendant, Chao,[10] who has been very friendly toward Christianity and through whom we have managed our affairs with the Emperor. He sent this man, as I say, to our house to notify me that I could take a companion. I chose Father Francis Gerbillon[11] as the most able. The Emperor issued other notices praising us which, however, I shall not repeat here as they are already published and well known.[12] Besides all this, he gave me his own dress, the gown of which was made of very precious furs, and was cut in so elegant a style that people immediately recognized the dignity of the person clothed in it. The Emperor had another valuable one made for my companion.[13]

2. These and other honors he lavished on us. As they have been made public, I want to mention only one : he recommended us to his uncle,[14] the brother of his mother, and one of his ambassadors, that we be treated at his table and in his residence with the honor due to the Emperor's own person. This was respect which

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Huang must have had a source independent of the Pereira Diary (unknown to him) yet as far as the relevant passage goes they are identical.

[9] Refers to the persecutions which the Jesuits had suffered since their arrival in China. For a list of these persecutions see " Table Alphabétique " under " Persécutions " in PFISTER, *op. cit.*, pp. 1073-74.

[10] Chao, i. e., Chao Ch'ang, a member of the *shih-wei* or " Imperial bodyguard ". See HUANG PO-LU, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-86.

[11] For Gerbillon's biography see PFISTER, *op. cit.*, pp. 443-451.

[12] For some of these notices see HUANG PO-LU, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-95.

[13] PFISTER, *op. cit.*, p. 382, basing his statement on Father Joseph François Marie Anne de MOYRAC DE MAILLA, *Histoire de la Chine* (Tom. XI, p. 111) says : " Les deux missionnaires, à cette occasion, reçurent de K'ang-hsi, entre autres présents, une longue robe du plus beau brocat, ornée de dragons, mais sans broderies, parce que cette distinction est reservée à l'empereur et aux princes du sang. Il leur donna aussi des robes courtes de martre à boutons d'or, doublées de satin, qui venaient de sa propre garde-robe ".

[14] This refers to T'ung Kuo-kang. See note 1.

pera livrar do muito padecer, assim pellas circunstancias das terras desertas e inaquosas, em que vivemos quatro e mais mezes padecendo incriveis molestias, sedes e fomes. Estas não por falta da materia, que sobeiava, mas p[ella] de condimento, sendo esta gente toda acustumada a comer quasi tudo cru e muitos cru puramente (o que vi muitas ves[es di]ante de meos olhos) servindo a nossos estomagos de antidoto a abstinensia; aquellas por serem terras des[er]tas, quasi tudo areyas, sem moradores, mais que acaso de trinta e 30 e mais legoas huma ou mais tendas de pastores que comboyando seus carneiros, vacas e cavallos, de cujo leite sem exceição se sustentão, sem nenhum modo de cultura de tantas terras e muito pouco de pessoas, vivendo mais entre seus pastoforios grosseiramente, sem saberem nome ao pão e muito menos ao arrôs; sendo nós obrigados cada dia a abrir possos de agoa salobra, a que fasião os pobres camellos, carneiros e cavallos tanta festa, que vendo que depois de alojados comessavamos a cavar na terra, corrião logo todos pello habito, esperando que aparecesse a agoa pera satisfaser a sua bestial sede, que ainda que salobra e de mao cheiro (por causa do muito salitre de que estão cheyos estes esteriles desertos), a tragavão com incrivel ambição, sendo necessario de abrir cada dia tantos poços, quantos erão necessarios pera satisfaser à sede de mais de vinte mil dos sobreditos animais que levavamos ou muito mais.[15]

Corrião seis mil e mais homens, de que constava todo o acompanhamento, a mesma fortuna, sendo obrigados pella canicola a beber agoa cosida e fervente, por sendo crua e fria, ser o perigo da saude evidente. Donde veyo que, tendo eu o nome de bom bebedor de agua, fui obrigado a rigurosa abstinencia della entre tantas calmas pera se me não dar em culpa o sobredito. Com tudo se daquella causa escapei, não evitei a oposta, originando-se-me por falta de agua e abundancia da cruesa de seus comeres huma penuria no estomago de calor e abundancia de cruesa, que fui desinchando, voltando a casa quasi tisico só com a pelle sobre os ossos, de que [5v] com o tempo melhorei ainda que muito devagar. Finalmente, pera diser em hum muitas, em muitos meses que andamos nestes desertos não vimos hum pao de lenha nem arvore pera queimar; servia-nos de perfume cotidiano aos comeres que cosiamos o cheiro do excremento de cavallo, do qual usavamos em lugar de lennha, podendo com pura verdade affirmar o que daqui claro se

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7 antidato *t1* || 15 e *om. t1* || 19 de muito *t2* || 21 o abrir *t2* || 28 porque *t2* || 30 arrigurosa *t1* || 32 aposta *t1 and t2* || 33 comores *t1*

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[15] For a more complete description of these territories see Halde, *Description ... de la Chine et de la Tartarie Chinoise*, IV, pp. 3-419.

I never deserved. Such consideration, however, was not enough to save us from much suffering, from the effects, for instance, of the wasted and parched lands in which we lived for more than four months, enduring incredible hardship, hunger and thirst. We suffered so not because of lack of foodstuffs, which we had in excess, but because of the lack of seasoning, for these people are accustomed to eating everything either almost uncooked or entirely raw, as I saw many times with my own eyes — a practice which for our stomachs served merely to prevent starvation. These regions are wastelands, almost completely covered with sand and without inhabitants. For thirty or more leagues at a time we saw only a few tents of shepherds tending their sheep, horses and cows, from whose milk they draw their poor subsistence. The country is without any type of agriculture, and has hardly any degree of civilization. The few people live on their grazing lands without knowing even the name of bread, much less that of rice. Everyday we were obliged to dig wells of water that, because of the strong saltpeter with which these sterile deserts are full, is brackish and of a bad smell. But the poor camels, sheep, and horses used to enjoy it. As soon as these animals saw, after we encamped, that we were starting to dig, they ran instinctively, hoping that the water would appear so that they could quench their thirst. So voraciously did they drink that it was necessary to open many wells every day to satisfy the twenty thousand or more beasts that had accompanied us.[15]

3. Our company of six thousand men shared the same lot and, on account of the severe heat, were obliged to drink boiled hot water, since the raw cold water was not healthful. Thus I, who have the name of a great water drinker, was obliged to observe a strict abstinence in spite of the heat so as not to expose myself to danger. Although I avoided one hazard, I did not escape the opposite danger, as the lack of water and the abundance of uncooked foods gave me stomach trouble. I lost so much weight that when I returned home I looked a skin-and-bones tubercular, and though I got better it took quite a while. In all the months during which we traveled in these deserts, we did not see a stick of wood or a tree to burn. The perfume which prevailed during our meals was the smell of burning horse manure, which we were forced to use because we needed something combustible to preserve life. The consequences of this are such that I do not want to

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These pages contain " Observations géographiques sur la Tartarie, tirées des Mémoires envoyées par les missionnaires qui en ont dressé la Carte " ; " Observations historiques sur la grande Tartarie, tirées des Mémoires du Père Gerbillon " ; and " Voyages en Tartarie du Père Gerbillon ".

infere e eu me não atrevo a escrever, sendo aquelle unico remedio de nossas vidas. Nosso mayor regalo era misturar farinha seca em agoa pura, e assim pera sentir o cheiro que os charcos lhe communicavão e a bebiamos como excellente, sendo de tudo suave e unica medicina a solida paciencia, e a quem esta faltava se achava levar comsigo hum intoleravel inimigo não se podendo de si mesmo suavemente alienar da mayor pena. Tendo já quasi chegado poucos dias antes da povoação de Selenga,[16] aonde com o embaixador Moscovita se devião faser as pases, eis que nos veyo nova como o Elut fasia guerra ao Hal ha,[17] por cuias terras fasiamos nosso caminho, a que eu ouvi chamar sine rubore emperador[18] (parecendo-me a mim indigno ainda o nome de pastores). Pello que com mais acellerado conselho que prudente resolução, se voltarão nossos embaixadores, o que dahi a poucos dias, por falta de noticia verdadeira, lhe confirmou o Emperador, chegando a esta corte depois de tantos gastos feitos, perdas de vidas e saude sem abrir as portas a que com tantos trabalhos tinhamos batido, pagando-nos a pena de sua inexperta resolução, se hé que não foi outro o fim e causa della, cujo juizo deixo aos leitores. Em chegando ao Emperador, logo deu despacho que no seguinte anno fariamos a mesma viagem e recreação, etc., ainda que por outras terras, em tudo porem semelhantes, só pella abundancia das chuvas não sentimos tanto a secura, encontrando muitos charcos pellos desertos que

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1 remdio *t1* || 4 e *om. t2* || 6 *before* intoreravel || 10 Elut *underlined* | Hal ha *underlined*

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[16] Selenga, i. e., Se-leng-o in Chinese and Selenginsk in Russian. The Russian *ostrog* of Selenginsk from which this town by the same name developed was founded in 1665 on the river Selenga. See Kerner, *op. cit.*, p. 82. Baddeley, *op. cit.*, I, p. xcvi. The name of this river is given by W. Fuchs, *Der Jesuiten-Atlas* ... p. 176, nn. 1135, 1136 ; p. 274, n. 113 ; p. 276, n. 151 as Selengge bira (with two variants, see *ibid.*). For more details see Baddeley, *op. cit.*, I, pp. xcv ; II, pp. 84 n., 129, 231, 237, 244-5, 246, 266-7, 270-1 etc.

[17] About this war see Halde, *Description* ..., pp. 46-50, 40-41. It refers to the Ölöd invasion of the territories of the Qalqa Mongols.

[18] The title of this chief was *Qan* (Han in Chinese), the highest title among the Mongol chieftains, held by the descendants of the Qans of the four ayimaγ (Ai-ma-ko in Chinese) or princely apanages into which Činggis Qan divided his Empire. See H. S. Brunnert and V. V. Hagelstrom, *Present Day Political Organization of China*, p. 445, n. 873 ; p. 442, n. 870a. In the contemporary Jesuit reports this title is translated as King or Emperor. About the Qalqa territory, around this time, Father Gerbillon says : " The Country from East to West extends from Mount *Altai* to the Province of *Solon* ; and from North to South, from the fiftieth and fifty-first Degree, to the South extremity of the great desert called *Chamo* [Sha-mo or Gobi], which was also accounted to belong to them ... ". At this time the

describe them in detail. Our greatest luxury was the mixture of dry flour with water, which, in spite of the smell of stagnant water, we found to be excellent. Our patience was the only sweetening medicine, and those who were impatient took along with them an intolerable enemy and only increased their own sufferings. Just a few days before our arrival at Selenginsk, [16] where we were to negotiate peace with the Moscovite ambassador, we received news that the Ölöd had attacked the Qalqa [17] in whose territories we were traveling and whose chief, I have heard, is shamelessly called Emperor. [18] It seemed to me, however, that he was even unworthy of the name of shepherd. After a hasty, rather than prudent consultation, our ambassadors turned back. A few days later, our Emperor, who had no reliable information, approved this decision. We arrived again at this court after such great expenses, as loss of life and health, without having opened the door on which we had knocked with such great effort. We paid the penalty for the ambassadors' incompetent decision; there was nobody else to be blamed for our failure, as the reader himself may judge. The Emperor gave orders on our arrival that next year we were to be fortunate enough to enjoy the same recreational trip, though through different yet similar territories. The only difference in the second trip was the result of abundant rainfalls. In place of the previous complete aridity we would find many muddy swamps throughout

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Qalqa territories were divided into three ayimaγ. "The eldest of these three *Han* [Qan] was named *Tchasaktou* [Jasaγtu or Cha-sa-k'o-tu in Chinese]; he possess'd the Country that lies immediately east of Mount *Altai* ... they extend to the river *Selengué* [Se-leng-o in Chinese], *Orhon* [O-le-chun in Chinese] and *Toula* [Tu-la in Chinese]. The second of these *Han* [Qan], called *Touchektou* [Tüsiyetü or T'u-hsieh-t'u in Chinese], was most powerful of all the *Kalka* [Qalqa] Princes; his Country extended along the three last mentioned rivers as far as Mount *Kentey* [K'en-te in Chinese] whence the River *Toula*, as also that of *Kerlon* derives its source. The Third, called *Tchetching han* [Sečen Qan or Ch'e-ch'en Han in Chinese] resides toward the source of the River *Kerlon* [Ku-lu-lun in Chinese] along the banks of which his people extended themselves to its fall into the Lake *Dalai* [Ta-la] in Chinese] or *Coulon*, and also beyond to the frontiers of the Province of *Solon* [So-lun in Chinese]". This English text from the English edition of HALDE, *The General History of China* (ed. 1736) IV, pp. 164-166. The Qalqa Qan in whose territory they were traveling was the Sečen Qan. Pereira's protest against the Sečen Qan being called Emperor is understandable if one remembers that by this time little was left of the former Mongol glory. For the identification of the geographical names in this note I used W. FUCHS, *Der Jesuiten-Atlas* ...

From here on, to distinguish HALDE's work in French from its English translation, the French will be referred to as *Description* ... and the English translation as *The General History of China*.

bastavão pera não morrerem de sede huns e outros ; achamos porem na volta alguns já secos. Deixo o mais daquella igualmente inutil como trabalhosa jornada pera gastar melhor o tempo em escrever desta o que julgar ser de algum uso a noticiosa curiosidade.[19]

Aos 13 de Junho 689, dia felicissimo do prodigioso Santo Antonio,[20] sahimos desta corte com muito mayor numero de gente e muito mais de cavallos, carneiros, bois e camellos (porque todo o sustento de sinco mezes era necessario levar em comboi comnosco juntamente), andando até os 26 varios rumos, que cotejados huns e outros se resolvem quasi ao norte com pouca inclinação ao leste.[21] Neste dia chegamos a hum lugar entre humildes montes, que constavão de areya, entre os quaes havia algum plaino em que habitava hum cabeça de alguns poucos pavilhões ou tentorios ; ao qual cabeça e outros semelhantes chamão os Tartaros Tai Kie,[22] hoc est parentes do sangue real, que no reynado dos Tartaros occidentais[23] que antigamente dominarão a China 60 e mais[24] annos forão

2 aquella *tl* || 10 26 *underlined* || 14 huma *tl* || 17 60 *underlined*

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[19] About this first interrupted trip three contemporary accounts are extant : " The Travels of Father Gerbillon, a Jesuit and French Missionary in China, into Tartary. The First Travel in the Year 1688 ", contained in HALDE, *The General History of China*, IV, pp. 214-358. The other two accounts are in Chinese : CHANG P'ENG-KO, *Feng-shih O-lu-ssu hsing-ch'eng-lu* ; and CH'IEN LIANG-TSE, *Ch'u-sai chi-lüeh*. Ch'ien was added to the 1688 peace delegation as private secretary to Songgotu and his Diary is contained in the *Chao-tai ts'ung-shu*. Chang P'eng-ko, together with Ch'en Shih-an, was added to the staff of the Embassy as a Chinese secretary on the recommendation of Maci, one of the delegates in 1688 and President of the Censorate or *Tu-yu-shih*. Chang was at the time secretary of the Transmission Office. His Diary is contained in the *I-hai chi-ch'en ts'ung-shu*. In some other Collections his Diary appears under the title *Feng-shih O-lo-ssu jih-chi* with variations in the text. See HUMMEL, *op. cit.*, I, p. 49 ; II, p. 667. For the two Chinese Diaries I used NAITŌ TORAJIRŌ, *Man-Mō sōsho* II. Pereira's statements about the difficulties of this trip are confirmed by these other Diaries. There is only one thing in which these other writers disagree with him, namely in his calling the decision of the ambassadors to turn back an " incompetent decision ". The other writers seem to have been happy. For summaries of this trip see PAVLOVSKY, *Chinese-Russian Relations*, pp. 16-18 ; HUMMEL *op. cit.*, II, p. 665.

[20] Reference is made here to the feast of St. Anthony of Padua whose feast, in the Roman Martyrology, is indicated on the 13th of June. For Pereira, who was Portuguese, this day had a special significance, since the saint was also Portuguese.

[21] According to Father Gerbillon the route followed by the embassy between June 13 and June 26 was as follows : From Peking through

the deserts which were to save us from dying of thirst, although by the time we made our return trip some of the swamps had already dried up. The rest of that first trip, which was as useless as it was difficult, I will omit in order to spend my time more profitably in the writing of the second trip.[19]

4. On June 13, 1689, on the feast of the wonderous Saint Anthony,[20] we left the Court with an even greater number of men and with many more horses, sheep, oxen, and camels than the year before because we had to take with us all the provisions for five months in the caravan. Until the 26th we traveled in a northern direction, bearing slightly toward the east.[21] On this day we reached a place on a plain in the low sandy hills where there lived a chieftain of a small settlement of tents. The Tartars call him and other similar chieftains taiyiji,[22] that is to say, a man of royal blood. These Western Tartars[23] who previously reigned over China for more than sixty years[24] were sent to these deserts for the safety of the Empire. To these exiles many others were added, includ-

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Mi yun hien [Mi-yün hsien] on the 14th, through Ku pe keou [Ku-pei-kou] on the 15th, hrought Nganiskiatun [An-chiang-tun] on the 16th, along the course of the river Lan [Luan-ho] from the 17th till the 20th, until they reached the little river Courkie [Kurkire bira or K'u-ehr-ch'i-lo ho in Chinese] reached on the 20th. They followed the Courkie and on the 22nd reached the rivulet Iskiar [Ijar or I-cha-ehr in Chinese] and camped at a place called Tourghen Iskiar [T'u-ehr-hen I-cha-ehr in Chinese]. From here traveling north-northwest they reached, on the 24th, a place called Oustoukoure [Ustu kure of U-su-tu k'u-le in Chinese], and then on the 26th they arrived at the place which Pereira describes. See HALDE, *Description ...*, IV, pp. 163-166. The tentative identification of these places was made with the help of W. FUCHS, *Der Jesuiten-Atlas ...* Map. 7. See also the two Chinese Diaries described in Note 19.

[22] Tay Kie i. e., taiyiji [t'ai-chi in Chinese], Prince or hereditary noble of the 7th and lowest rank divided into four classes or *teng*. See H. S. BRUNNERT and V. V. HAGELSTROM, *op. cit.*, p. 445, n. 873.

[23] The Western Tartars here refer to the Mongols as distinct from the Manchus, who in the Jesuit accounts are called Eastern Tartars. Ex. gr. " The Empire of China, besides the Fifteen Provinces that compose it, and of which we have treated in the first Part of this Work, contains also all the countries beyond the Great Wall subject to the *Mantcheoux Tartars*, whose ancient country is properly *Eastern Tartary* ". HALDE, *The General History of China*, IV, p. 86. See also HALDE, *Description ...*, IV, p. 1. " The second nation of *Tartary*, which was ever the largest and most numerous, is that of the *Mongous*, whom the *Chinese* sometimes call *Si ta tse* [Hsi ta-tzu] or *Western Tartars*, and sometimes in derision *Tsao ta tse* [Ch'ou ta-tzu] or *Stinking Tartars* because of the ill scent which usually attends them. This nation comprehends the Kalmucs [Qalmuq], or Eluths [Ölöd], the

divididos por aquelles desertos por politica de sua segurança ; aos quais forão depois faser muitos companhia e o mesmo Emperador despoiado do imperio pellos Chinas do reynado passado Mim,[25] a quem de grandes obrigou a fortuna depois e a necessidade com a incultura ao genero de vida de que assima falei, em que me não dilato por serem já cousas nas historias muito tritas. São já aqui as terras tam altas a respeĭto do orisonte de Pe Kim,[26] e tam delgados os ares, que achamos huma fonte entre outras com a agoa encaramelada na mesma fonte, do que se não deve duvidar pois alem de outros me aproveitei eu do caramelo por então pera beber nos calores da canicola que, se de noite se não sentião, pello meyo dia abrasavão. Achão-se nestes lugares outras muitas fontes semelhantes.

Aos vinte sete chegamos a huma fermosa lagoa por nome Tual[27] que fica pouco mais de dous dias de caminho ao noroeste do celebre monte Pe cha,[28] aonde vai ordinariamente o Emperador à caça de veyados pello outono e verão, como já escrevi em outra occasião em huma relação que mandei da viagem que em sua companhia fis à dita caça por occasião do apetite que elle tinha e ainda tem de aprender a arte e ciencia de nossa musica.[29] Tem esta lagoa[30] 16 legoas em circuito ; hé oblonga do sudoeste ao nordeste. Hé incrivel a quantidade que tem de peixe, como cardume de sardinhas ; em poucos lanços de rede (que do Emperador levamos pera semelhantes occasiões, com duas barquinhas pera qualquer sucesso casual) tomamos tanto peixe quanto bastou pera todo o exercito, de modo que por piedade não quiserão lançar mais rede por lhe não sofrer o coração o faser pesca inutil, não os podendo comer, nem conservar. Em cada redada se via ferver o peixe como formigas no formigueiro, não se podendo puxar a terra prae multitudine piscium.[31] Mas sendo todos obrigados (capitaneando-os os mesmos [6r] embaixadores) a entrar dentro descalçando-se com muita festa cada hum a faser presa no peixe dentro na agua sem receyo de errar o lanço, porque metendo as mãos na agoa forçosamente erão obrigadas a faser presa na multidão que occupava mais lugar do que ficava vasio. Finalmente digo sinceramente que quem o não vio se deve forçar a crer pera faser con-

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3 Mim *underlined* || 15 Taal *t2* || 16 Pe cha *underlined* || 16-7 *for* Emperador *t1* embaixador || 17 já *om. t1* || 18 em *over*

Kalkas [Qalqa] and those who are simply called Mongous [Mongol] ... " See Halde, *The General History ...*, IV, p. 150.

[24] Refers to the Yüan Dynasty (1260-1367).

[25] Mim i. e., Ming Dynasty (1368-1644).

[26] Pe Kim i. e., Peking.

[27] Lake Tual or Taal i. e., Dal omo (W. Fuchs, *Der Jesuiten-Atlas ...* p. 147, n. 344 and p. 280, n. 90 or also Ta-ehr-o-mo in Chinese). Father Gerbillon says that they camped near a pond called Tahan nor i. e.,

ing the former Tartar Emperor and the grandees who were deposed and expelled from China by the Late Ming Dynasty.[25] They were forced, because of their lack of training and circumstances, to take up the type of life of which I have spoken. But I do not want to digress on these things which have already been treated in historical works. Compared with the altitude of Peking[26] these territories are high, and the air is so cold that in some of the springs, of which there are several in the neighborhood, we found water that was frozen. You can be certain that I, more than anyone else, took advantage of the ice ; I used it as drinking water in the great heat which, although subsiding during the night, at noon is scorching.

5. On the 27th we came to a beautiful lake called Dal.[27] It is a little more than two days travel from here of the famous Pecha[28] mountain where the Emperor goes deerhunting, usually in autumns and in spring. But I have already reported this when I was writing about the hunting trip on which I accompanied the Emperor because he wanted to learn the art and science of our music.[29] The circumference of Lake Dal[30] is sixteen leagues, and it lies southwest to northeast. It contains such an incredible quantity of fish that it looks like a school of sardines. We threw out our nets (which we had received for just such occasions from the Emperor, who likewise provided two small boats for any eventuality) only a few times and the fish we caught were sufficient for the entire group. Out of sportsmanship our people did not want to fish more, since we could not have eaten the fish nor have conserved them for later use. In each netful the fish were teeming like ants in an anthill, and it was impossible to pull the nets ashore because of the great weight.[31] Since the ambassadors had set the example, everyone was obliged to go into the water. Each took off his shoes and fished in the water without any danger of failure. Because of the abundance of fish, all anyone had to do to catch some was to put his hand into the water. In all sincerity, I must say that it is difficult for somebody who has not seen it to believe or even to conceive of such an experience. Four rivers flow

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Dahan omo and from there went to see Taal Lake which contained a great quantity of fish. See Halde, *Description ...*, IV, p. 167.

[28] Pecha mountain. Father Gerbillon tells us that the river Courkir (see note 21) has its source in this mountain. Halde, *Description...* IV, p. 165. This refers to *Ch'ang pei shan.*

[29] See Pfister, *op. cit.*, p. 382.

[30] For Gerbillon's description of Lake Taal see also Halde, *Description ...* IV, pp. 167-168.

[31] " Prae multitudine piscium " is a biblical allusion referring to the Gospel according to St. John 21, 6 (Vulgata).

ceito desta verdade. A agoa hé salobra a não muito doce ; entrão nella quatro riachos,[32] e sem vasão, donde se duvida ter com o mar interior communicação. Affirmão que tem maré: eu a não experimentey, pello que deixando aos lentes o discurso pertendo narrar somente o que vi. Não muito longe desta lagoa achamos ruinas de hum pagode, que tinha sido fundado há 400 annos no reinado sobredito dos Tartaros occidentais por hum mandarim do tribunal interior do palacio,[33] cuja memoria em hum fermoso padrão de marmor branco se acha ainda bem esculpida em sinicos karateres. Havia varios tomos de suas escripturas diante do idolo, mas já tudo aruinado, dos quais trouxemos alguns em letras que parecem ser do Tubet, e o mesmo idolo como indigno derrubei e trouxemos em memoria pera Pekim.[34] Não havia já memoria de sacrificolos (os quaes se não acomodão senão aonde podem ter bem com que satisfaser a gulosina que com o tempo lhes faltou), mas só servia de ninho a andorinhas e outras aves que nelle se queriam agasalhar.

Deste lugar fomos caminhando a varios rumos alguns dias acomodando as jornadas à necessidade da agoa e pasto dos animais, a que eramos obrigados por estes desertos, aonde os charcos são fontes christalinas, a pouca e seca erva prados deliciosos, e o excremento dos animais medium sine quo não tinhamos que comer, como acima fica referido. Aos 9 de Julho passamos os limites ou arrayas, dentro das quais vivem alguns Tartaros que apparent rari nantes, de que assima falei, sogeitos a este Imperio e Reynado,[35] que se

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1 solobra *t1* | então *t1* || 2 don se *t1* || 6 há *add. t2* já || 16 elle *t1*

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[32] Two of these four rivers are the Gunggur bira or Kun-ku-ehr ho in Chinese and the Kuiton bira or K'uei-t'un ho in Chinese. The remaining two are not given. W. Fuchs, *Der Jesuiten-Atlas* ..., p. 154, n. 535 ; p. 168, n. 919 and also Map. 7.

[33] According to Gerbillon, the inscription on the marble block said that a *Hio sse* (hsüeh shih) of the Tribunal of the *Colao* (the Hio sse were immediately after the Colao) had erected this Pagoda during the reign of the Mongous. See Halde, *Descriptions* ..., IV, p. 167. The reign of the Mongous (Mongols), or as Pereira says Western Tartars, refers to the Yüan Dynasty. See Notes 23, 24. This official whose name is not given seems to have been a *Nei-ko hsüeh-shih* or subchancellor of the Grand Secretariate. The Grand Secretaries, *Ta-hsüeh-shih*, were familiarly designated as *Ko-lao* or Elders of the Secretariate, rendered *Colao* in the Jesuit reports. See Brunnert-Hagelstrom, *op. cit.*, p. 44, nn. 132, 133. Hence this official is called a *Hio sse* of the Tribunal of *Colao* by Gerbillon, while Pereira, translating the title, calls him a mandarin of the Tribunal of the Interior Palace. But the *Nei-ko* was organized during the Ming Dynasty. How, then, could this man have been a sub-chancellor of the *Nei-ko* ? Both Jesuits seem to give not his actual title but its Ming equivalent.

into Lake Dal,[32] and it is also possible that there is an underground connection with the sea. The water is brackish, and it is said to have tides. But I have not experienced the tides, and therefore am leaving that question up to the discretion of the reader. I tell only what I have seen. Not far from this lake we came upon the ruins of a Pagoda which was built four hundred years ago during the reign of the Western Tartars by a Mandarin of the Tribunal of the Interior Palace. This man's memory is still preserved in Chinese characters well-graven on a beautiful white marble block.[33] There were several tomes of his writing, already very much damaged, in front of the idol. We selected from them some which seemingly were in the language of Tibet and, having destroyed the unworthy idol,[34] took the tomes with us to Peking as a memento. The ministers of the idol prefer to stay in places where they can satisfy their gluttony, but as time went by, they were unable to do so here. Now even their memory is lost and the Pagoda served only as a nest for swallows and other birds looking for shelter.

6. From this place we traveled for a few days in various directions, as we were forced to arrange our journey in accordance with water available. Here even the muddy swamps seemed to be crystal springs, the little dried grass seemed like pleasant meadows; and the dung of the beasts was a commodity without which we could not eat. On the 9th of July we passed the frontier within which there live those Tartars who are subjects of the Empire of China,[35] of whom I have already spoken. They raise horses,

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[34] Religious zeal prevailed over archeological interest.

[35] From Lake Taal on it becomes difficult to trace the exact route they followed, since most of the place names are not indicated on the Jesuit maps. On the 8th, according to Gerbillon, they had already passed the limits of that part of Tartary which is subject to the Emperor of China but does not yet belong to the Qalqa; it was a kind of no-man's land between the two Empires. On the 9th they camped near a little place called Tchono (?) which is already in Qalqa territory. To understand this passage one must keep in mind the Jesuit concept of Tartary at this time. " Under ... Grand Tartary I comprehend all that part of our Continent which lies between the Eastern Ocean to the north of *Japan*, the *Frozen Sea*, *Moscovy*, the *Caspian Sea*, *Persia*, *Mogol*, the Kingdom of *Corea*. " See HALDE, *The General History ...*, IV, p. 142. HALDE, *Description ...*, IV, p. 33. In this Grand Tartary contemporary Jesuit reports distinguish loosely four nations: The Manchu " whose ancient country is properly *Eastern Tartary* " (HALDE, *The General History ...*, IV, p. 86; *Description ...*, IV, p. 35); " the Western Tartars " whose " Nation comprehends the *Kalmucs* [Qalmuq], or Eluths [Ölöd], the *Kalkas* [Qalqa] and those simply called Mongous [Mongols of Inner Mongolia] " (HALDE, *The General History ...*, IV, p. 150; *Description ...*, IV, pp. 37-38); " the third nation of Tartary is that of the *Mahometan Tartars* ... from West

occupão em pastar e criar cavallos, que trasem cada anno a esta corte ao Imperador e alguns pera vender,[36] sem o que sentiria este Reynado falta acustumado em tudo ao andar a cavallo e nada à cadeira tão apetecida dos Chinas. Aqui encontramos outro Tai Kie,[37] homem já de idade e com alguma grosseira pompa, já dos não sogeitos a este Imperio, mas ao Halha, de que assima falei, o qual trasia seu sacrificolo a que chamão Lama,[38] e lhe tem todos estas gentes agrestes incrivel veneração, os quaes todas as veses que comem, aquelles lhes dão primeiro huma certa benção de mesa e consentimento com muita gravidade exterior sem o que não comerão, mostrando-nos com isto o quam natural hé ao homem a tal acção. Neste lugar deixamos cavallos cançados e camellos pera que, refeitos de forças com o descanço, nos podessem servir na volta, deixando tambem alguma gente pera que tivesse cuidado de tudo como convinha.

Aos 13[39] se espalhou o exercito em forma de meya lua dando caça aquelles desertos de caminho, e no fim, fechando-se o cerco, se acharão muitas hoam yam,[40] hoc est ovelhas ou cabras amarellas, porque a voz yam em China hé univoca a estes duas especias de animais, que são tão ligeiros que por mais velozes que sejão os cavallos e escolhidos as não podem alcançar, tanto que ainda que com tres pés, tendo o 4º perdido na demanda (como eu vi muitas veses) seguem as mais na carreira com o mesmo atrevimento e fortuna, perdendo poucas a vida por esta falta, mas só cedendo às frechas que algum tanto mais ligeiras as alcanção na carreira. Morrerão de muitas poucas que se cercarão em hum cerco

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4 apetecidas *t1* || 8 agrostes *t1*

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to East they extend from *Persia* and the *Caspian Sea* to the country of the Eluths [Ölöd], and on the south almost to China ... " (HALDE, *The General History* ..., IV, p. 179 ; *Description* ..., IV, p. 53) ; " the fourth Nation of Tartary is that which is under the domination of the *Moscovites* ". (HALDE, *The General History* ..., IV, p. 181 ; *Description* ..., IV, p. 54). Another principle of distinction between the Tartars which must be taken into consideration to understand the Jesuit reports, as the foregoing lines show, is, whether they depended on China or Russia or whether they were independent. In the territories dependent on China we must again distinguish between the territories immediately subject to the Emperor of China, who sends governors and officials there in the same manner as in the other Provinces of the Empire ; and between those territories which are governed by their own princes who are sovereign in their territories though they hold of the Emperor of China (HALDE, *The General History* ..., IV, p. 88 ; *Description* .., IV, p. 2). Applying this principle to the first three nations of Grand Tartary, the fourth one can be discounted here, we find that the first nation or Eastern Tartary was immediately subject to China and was divided into three Provinces (Manchuria or the Three Eastern Provin-

some of which are brought to the Imperial Court as tribute and some of which are sold.[36] Without these horses the kingdom of China would be in great need, as the people are all accustomed to ride on horses and not in the sedan chair which the Chinese covet so much. Here we met another taiyiji,[37] a man of advanced age and surrounded by coarse pomp, who was not a subject of this Empire but of Qalqa, which I have mentioned before. He was accompanied by his minister of idols, called Lama.[38] These rural people hold the Lamas in such great veneration that they would not eat before having had grace said by one of them. Grace is said with much gravity, showing how natural such an action is in human beings. In this place we left behind the tired horses and camels so that with a rest they might regain their strength and be of service to us on our return trip. And we also left behind a sufficient number of people to take care of them.

7. On the 13th[39] we lined up in a semi-circle formation in order to hunt in the desert as we traveled. When we finally closed the circle there were many huang yang,[40] that is to say yellow sheep or goats, as the word *yang* in Chinese is the same for these two species of animals. They are so fast that even specially picked horses, no matter how swift they may be, are unable to overtake them. Even if one has lost a leg in the chase, as I have seen many times, it follows the others with the same daring and only occasionally loses its life on account of this defect, and even then only if hit by a lucky arrow. From the many which we had encircled in a diameter larger than a league only a few were killed; it

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ces). The second nation in 1689 shows a gradation of dependence or independence: the "Mongous" (or Mongols of Inner Mongolia) had already accepted Chinese sovereignity, that is the sovereignity of the Emperor of China, and were organized into forty-nine Banners under their own Princes (except the Čaqar who were under direct dependence) (Halde, *The General History...*, IV, p. 191-196; *Description...*, IV, pp. 160-163); the Qalqa after their defeat by the Ölöd under Galdan, had accepted Chinese protection but were not yet organized into Banners. The Ölöd and the Mohamedan Tartars were still independent. Thus the Chinese peace delegation, having passed through the territories of the Mongol tribes of Inner Mongolia, had entered the territories of the Sečen Qan of the Qalqa. See also list of Mongol tribes in Appendix.

[36] For details of this horse trade and the price of horses see Halde, *Description ...*, IV, p. 47.

[37] See Note 22.

[38] Lama. See Appendix of Chinese terms.

[39] None of the places through which they passed between the 9th and the 13th are indicated on the Jesuit Map. They covered some 129 Chinese *li*. See Halde, *Description ...*, IV, pp. 171-173.

[40] Hoam yan i. e., *huang-yang*.

que de diametro occupava mais que huma legoa, e de outro modo hé impossivel o apanharem-se, porque, em vendo cousa viva, correm tanto até perderem de vista o que virão. Achão-se bandos de muitos centos e milhares que eu vi em muitas occasiões ; os filhinhos em nacendo seguem as mais de modo, como se o fim de seu nacer fosse só pera correr. Neste cerco se acharão tambem varias mulas do matto,[41] em tudo semelhantes as steriles que entre nos se cavalgão, grandesa do corpo, cabeça, orelhas, pescoço, pernas, cascos e tudo o mais ; a cauda, cabellos e coma, e outras partes, que pera admiração da natureza observey, e ainda o mesmo excremento, só não ouvi a suavidade da voz e garganta. Huma nacida do mesmo anno só se matou porque as grandes (se as ovelhas amarellas nacerão pera correr parece nacerão estas pera voar) se não podem alcançar, nem ainda ver de perto. A cor em todas hé a mesma, não branca, nem preta, mas entre estas duas como de cinza. Na circunferencia da cauda tem todas huma malha sobre branca todas do mesmo modo. Criando-se manças (o que difficilmente se alcança) se não deixão cavalgar de nenhum modo. Hé cousa verdadeiramente digna de admiração na natureza. Os Tartaros comem sua carne e eu a provei tambem, a qual hé muito grosseira e só [6v] acomodada e seus dentes. Aos 14 se apanhou outra pequena viva, que manca de huma perna, sendo o dia dantes frechada nella, não podia correr tanto que os cavallos a não pudessem alcançar ; e nesta viva admirei mais devagar a fecundidade da naturesa, observando tudo o assima dito estando ella em pé.

Aos 16 de Julho chegamos, continuando a mesma derrota quasi sempre ao norte, até o rio Kerolon,[42] que fica já em altura de 48 graos e alguns minutos[43] no lugar aonde o passamos. Corre do oeste pera leste pella mayor parte. Hé abundantissimo de variedade de peixe e excelente, que parece lhe communica huma fermosa lagoa[44] de quazi 60 legoas de circuito na qual entra em distancia deste lugar mais ao leste hum dia de caminho. Corre brando e suave, nenhuma arvore porem cria em suas ribeiras : correndo a mesma parece maldição de todas estas planicias, entre as quais via dividit invia[45] largas campinas, mas como já disse esteriles e incultas. Junto deste rio nos alojamos e pescamos quantidade de bom peixe. Não hé capas de mais que de pequenos barquinhos

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5 as mais *om. t2* || 9 cabello *t2* || 19 de *om. t1* || 22 huma *om. t1* || 23 frechanda *t1* || 37-8 pescamos bom e quantitade de peixe *t1*

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[41] The wild mules, we are told in another Jesuit report, are called by this name " because that is the meaning of the Chinese name Ye lo tse [Yeh-lo-tzu] ". While Pereira finds a great deal of similarity between the wild mule and its tame counterpart, this report finds them very different. HALDE, *Description* ..., IV, p. 28.

[42] River Kerülen i. e., Ku-lu-lun in Chinese.

is impossible to capture them, since, as soon as they see a living thing, they run until it is out of sight. They live in herds of thousands, as I have seen on many occasions. The young ones, imitating from the moment of their birth, run as if it were the only purpose they have in life. In our circle there were also some wild mules [41] similar to our own mules. They were the same in the size of their bodies, head, ears, neck, legs, skull as well as in the tail, the hair and mane, all of which I observed in admiration. Even their excrement was similar. The only difference was that the voice of the wild mule was harsher. A young mule, less than a year old, was the only one killed, since the older ones cannot be overtaken or even approached to be observed from close range. If the yellow sheep are born to run, these creatures seem born to fly. They all have the same color, which is neither white nor black but between the two — ash or cinder. Around the tail they all have a spot of white. Even when born in captivity, which is not easily accomplished, they are impossible to saddle. Nature is truly admirable. The Tartars eat wild mule meat; I tried it but it is too tough for any but their teeth. On the 14th we picked up another young mule, which the day before had been hit in the leg by an arrow and, not being able to run fast enough was overtaken by the horses. I admired the richness of nature with more leisure, as this one was still on its feet and I observed everything as I have described before.

8. On the 16th of July, continuing our trip in the same northward direction, we reached the river Kerülen. [42] We crossed this river at the location forty-eight degrees and some minutes north. [43] It runs for the major part from west to east, flowing quietly and smoothly. There are no trees on its banks, however, as all these sterile and uncultivated plains seem to be under the same curse in which "paths divide the pathless spaces" [45] of open country. The river contains many excellent fish which seem to come from a beautiful lake [44] about sixty leagues in circumference approximately a day's travel downstream and east from here. Camping along the river, we caught a large number of fine fish. The river is navigable in small boats, such as the two we brought with us, the

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[43] The point of crossing was somewhere between long. 112-116 degrees.

[44] The name of this lake, according to Gerbillon, was Coulon nor. i. e., Kulun omo (W. Fuchs, *Der Jesuiten-Atlas* ..., p. 117) i. e., K'u-lun-o-mo in Chinese. According to Gerbillon, the Moscovites call it Lake Dalai. See Halde, *Description* ..., IV, p. 175. See also Note 18.

[45] "Via dividit invia" is a literary allusion to Virgil's *Aen.* 3,383.

que creyo ab orbe condito[46] nunca teve, mais que os dous que comnosco levamos de que assima falei. Continua sua corrente depois da lagoa sobredita já com outro apelido de Kerolon em Ergon,[47] que depois nas condições das pases encontraremos na entrada[48] que fas no grande rio Negro, de que tambem depois se falará, que em Tartaro se chama Sagalien Ula,[49] que hé o mesmo que Rio Preto. Em passando este rio se continuão as mesmas campinas e charnecas incultas sem se poder achar huma só arvore, athé que iá perto do Rio Negro se encontrão continuos e deliciosos bosques de que depois falaremos. Em todas as terras circunvisinhas a este rio, alguns dias continuados são tantos os mosquitos, que passão, parece, a fé humana, fasendo aos animais guerra cruel e aos homens atormentando de modo, que forão (os que podião) obrigados a faser de huma seda rara como veos volantes humas cassacas com viseiras ou capuchos, que cobrião o cabeça como rede, e assim caminhavão como empapelados dentro de suas sayas de malha contra aquella praga ; sendo os mais obrigados ao assougue daquellas molestas bestiolas, que aonde chegão logo tudo com sua tromba penetrão, o que eu vi muitas veses nos pobres cavallos coalhados delles e de sangue, que lhes fasião sair tam facilmente a seu pesar. Hum dos embaixadores se compadeceo de nós e nos fes tambem faser nossas viseiras pera nos armarmos contra esta cruel guerra, que nos não servia de pouco exercicio de paciencia e merecimento a quem o sofria como convinha. De modo que se podia chamar este o reyno dos mosquitos.

Aos 21 de Julho,[50] estando ainda distantes do fim de nossa derrota 7 ou oito dias de caminho, mandarão os embayxadores novas aos Moscovitas de sua visinhança por alguns Tartaros com pouca gente ; e aos vinte dous chegou em nosso alcance hum correyo que nos trouxe cartas de Pe Kim. No dia seguiente chegamos a outro rio chamado Porchi,[51] aonde se recrearão os olhos com a vista de alguns poucos salgueiros e agrestes, que quanto mais desejosos aquelles pella penuria de arvores em todo este caminho, nos parecião bosques deliciosos. Corre este rio do leste pera oeste em terra plaina e alagadissa de ambas as bandas. Não hé muito caudaloso, mas arrebatado. Pode-sse passar a vao em alguns lugares com os

1 tive *t1,* viu *t2* || 28 *for* aos *t1* dos || 29 chegou *om. t1*

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[46] " Ab orbe condito " is an allusion to the Roman calendar " ab urbe condita ".

[47] Ergon i. e., Ergune bira or O-le-ku-na ho in Chinese (W. FUCHS, *Der Jesuiten-Atlas* ..., pp. 103, n. 267 ; 255, n. 55) is the Argun River.

[48] See *Diary* 232-233.

[49] Sagalien Ula i. e., Sahaliyan ula in Manchu, Hei-lung-chiang in Chinese and Amur in Russian. The Chinese name translated means the Black Dragon River from which by abbreviation Pereira calls it

likes of which I have never seen.[46] After leaving the lake of which I spoke, the Kerülen River continues its course under the name of Argun.[47] This Argun, at the point of its entrance into the Black River, we shall find mentioned in the peace treaty.[48] About the Black River, which in the language of the Tartars is called Sagalien ula,[49] we shall have occasion to talk later. Until we came to the Black River, we found plains and uncultivated treeless wastelands. In the Black River region, however, there were continuous and enchanting forests. For several days in all these neighboring territories there were so many mosquitoes that their number seemed to be beyond belief. The mosquitoes waged a cruel war against the animals, and many a time I saw poor horses covered with them and with the blood which the mosquitoes drew very easily. They tormented us to such a degree that those who were able, were forced to make thin silk gowns with visors or hoods which covered the head like a net, and traveled in these as in knitted armor against the plague. One of the ambassadors taking pity on us had two hoods made to give us protection. Others had to endure these molesting little beasts which penetrated everywhere with their stingers. This was a good exercise of patience and an opportunity to gain merit for those who endured it properly. As a result of this experience, I would say that this region could very well be called the kingdom of mosquitoes.

9. On the twenty first of July,[50] only seven or eight days travel away from our destination, our ambassadors, through some Tartars, informed the Moscovites about our arrival; and on the twenty second a messenger with letters from Peking overtook us. On the following day we reached another river called Porchi[51] where we enjoyed the sight of a few willows and shrubs which, on account of the scarcity of trees during all this trip, looked like beautiful forests. The river Porchi flows from east to west through a terrain which is level and damp on both sides; though it does not carry a great amount of water it is precipitous. When the river is not flooded it can be crossed at some spots with horses. At the time

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Rio Negro or *Rio Preto* i. e., Black River. See HALDE, *Description ...*, IV, p. 35. W. FUCHS, *Der Jesuiten-Atlas ...*, p. 175, n. 1117.

[50] From the day they crossed the Kerülen till the 21st, while passing through this "kingdom of mosquitoes", they traveled about 300 *li* in a north-northeasterly direction. HALDE, *Description ...*, IV, pp. 174-177.

[51] Porchi, or according to Gerbillon Portchi i. e., Borji bira or Po-la-huo-chi ho in Chinese. W. FUCHS, *Der Jesuiten-Atlas ...*, pp. 142, n. 180; 270, n. 73; and Map. 5.

cavallos, não tendo enchente. Porem quando a elle chegamos inundava todas as terras circumvisinhas com a enchente das chuvas (que forão em todo o caminho muitas) pello que tivemos aquelle dia muita difficuldade. Alguns poucos em chegar à madre, atollando os cavallos, ficando os cavalleiros como aquelles que na lama aplaude o adagio, sem se poderem bolir. Os outros se alojarão longe em hum alto aparelhando-se pera a passagem no dia seguinte. Tinha crecido a agoa em altura mais que de hum homen. Buscamos neste dia lugar conveniente a passagem, mas não achamos por ser toda a borda do rio lodo e tudo alagadissa. Pello que nos voltamos atras deixando alguns ventureiros que, depois de muito tempo nadando sem vestidos sobre os cavallos, demarcarão alguns lugares de menos perigo pera a passagem no dia seguinte, aindaque neste mesmo tiverão alguns melhor sucesso e fortuna passando logo a nado por hum lugar de menos fundo que encontrarão. No dia seguinte se acomodarão alguns lugares lançando ramos cortados dos salgueiros sobre o lodo junto da beira do rio pera os cavallos e mais multidão de animais se não atolarem na entrada, o que em todo se não pode evitar morrendo muitos afogados na empresa, perdidos muitos mantimentos, danadas muitas fasendas e vestidos, sendo obrigados alguns mais graves da modestia (mas nem todos tomarão a mesma resolução) a nadar sobre os cavallos molhando os vestidos por se não resolverem a despi-llos. A gente inferior tinha por menor perda molhar o vestido que herdarão de seus pays, do que defender a modestia [7r] a custa dos que lhe tinhão custado muito. Nós com os embayxadores passamos o rio nas barquinhas. Não evitamos porem os lodos, em que atollavão até os joelhos os cavallos, ficando muitos nelles encaixados sem delles se poderem arrancar. Morrerão muitos animais nesta passagem [52] em que se gastou todo o dia e parte do seguinte. Morrerão tãobem varias pessoas afogadas que, não sabendo nadar nem governar o cavallo que nadando os passava, cahirão no rio perecendo miseravelmente a vista de nossos olhos, saindo da morte temporal e principiando a eterna juntamente com grande dor minha que o não podia remediar. Nos dias seguintes passamos muitas terras alagadissas, cheas de huns virgultos, a que entre nos chamamos vimes, em muita quantidade.

Aos 24, caminhando entre estes alagadissos em que já não sentiamos a penuria de agoa mas abundancia, achamos muita cantidade de ruibarbo naquelles desertos, os quais estavam tambem cheos de muitas lontras, [53] cujas pelles usão os Halha e mais Tar-

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[52] For this crossing see also Gerbillon's description in HALDE, *Description ...*, IV, p. 177.

[53] In the " Geographical Observations on Tartary extracted from Memoires sent by the Missionaries who drew up the Map " we read :

we reached it, however, it had flooded all the surrounding area due to the excessive rains which were frequent throughout our trip. We had many difficulties that day. Some upon reaching the river, sank so deeply into the mud with their horses that they were unable to stir, just as in the proverb; others encamped at an elevated place some distance away intending to cross the river, which was here over a man's head, on the next day. We searched for a place to cross over but were unable to find one as the whole bank was muddy and flooded. And so we turned back, leaving behind only a few adventurers who, after swimming around naked on their horses for awhile, located a few less dangerous places where we could cross on the following day, though some were even so fortunate as to find that they could swim across at once. On the following day a passage of willow branches was prepared on top of the mud near the river so that the horses and other animals would not sink, but this calamity could not be entirely avoided. Many beasts died in the enterprise, quantities of supplies were lost, and a great amount of property and clothing was damaged, the latter because some of the higher personalities resolved modestly (not all were so determined) to swim across on horseback while wearing their clothes. The simple people undressed and swam across. We together with the ambassadors, crossed the river in the small boats. The horses sunk into the mud up to their knees and many of them were stuck irretrievably in it. Besides the animals that perished in the crossing, many persons who could not swim or manage the horses on which they were crossing fell into the river and drowned miserably before our eyes, thus passing through temporal death to enter into the eternal, without my being able to help. This caused me great pain. The crossing [52] consumed one entire day and part of the next. During the succeeding few days we passed through territories thickly covered with bushes.

10. On the 24th, traveling through floodlands where our problem was no longer the absence of water but its abundance, we found great quantities of rhubarb. There were otters [53] here too, the fur of which the Qalqa and other Tartars use for clothing,

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"The Kalka [Qalqa] have but few Sables and are only rich in the skins of Squirrels, Foxes and a little Animal as small as an Ermine called *Tael pi* ... These Animals are a kind of land rat and very common in certain parts belonging to the *Kalkas*; they live underground

taros em seus vestidos e barretes. Não se via em todas aquellas campinas mais que continua serie de tocas destes animais, dos quais matarão alguns desejosos mais da carne, que disem ser excellente, que de suas pelles em tal tempo. Neste dia encontramos alguns Halha, [54] dos quais, como de naturesa perfidos, nos fiamos pouco de suas noticias que ao principio lhes pedimos. Porem animando-os com algumas dadivas, os grangeamos pera que nos dirigissem por bom caminho, o que fiserão aquelle dia até chegarmos a hum riacho por nome Suctei [55] a cuja borda nos alojamos. Aqui comessamos a ver montes cheyos de bosques a que os olhos de todos os desejosos fiserão muito aplauso. No dia seguinte nos deixarão os Halha que, como inimigos declarados dos Moscovitas [56] se não atrevião ir mais adiante. Corre este riacho do leste pera oeste como o outro por nome Tui hen, [57] que passamos o dia seguinte, e entramos em bosques espessos de fermosissimos alimos, pinhos e outras arvores tão direitas e viçosas, que podião faser enveja aos mais ordenados bosques que entre nós se cultivão.

Aos 26 passamos outro mayor riacho chamado Pori, [58] na qual passagem se não morrerão animais nem ouve perigo de vidas, foi insano o trabalho que deu a todos pellas beiras serem todas alagadissas, sendo necessario pera que não atolassem os animais, faser o caminho sobre camas grossas de ervas fabricadas, que pera isso se cortarão, pera assim, como quem anda com huma jangada sobre

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2 seria *t1* | *before* tochas || 5 da naturesa *t1* || 15 *for* entramos *t1* encontramos

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where they make a Range of as many little Holes as there are males in their company ". The way in which these animals live and are hunted is also described. See HALDE, *The General History ...*, IV, pp. 138-139. This description fits the animals called *tarbagha* by the Mongols. *Tarbagha* means *marmotte* (marmotta alpina, dipus gerboa). See J. E. KOWALEWSKI, *Dictionnaire mongol-russe-français*, Tome troisième, p. 1679 a-b. They seem to be allied to the American prairie dogs (Cynomys ludovocianus). Pereira's description is generic and not precise calling them otters.

[54] About the Qalqa encountered on this day Gerbillon relates that they were brought before the ambassadors by one of the Chinese officers and that they had staged a raid on Moscovite territory. See HALDE *Description ...*, IV, p. 178. This raid of the Qalqa on Moscovite territory fits into the pattern of the time (described in Ch. 3 above). During the years preceding 1688, when the Chinese delegates were supposed to meet the Russians at Selenginsk, China had defeated the Russians on the Amur and had succeeded in reaching an agreement with the Qalqa, and they in turn supplied with Chinese arms, were raiding Russian territory and even attacked Golovin himself. Thus, on their way to Selenginsk, the Chinese delegates expected to find Golovin in an embarrassing situation. But something unforeseen hap-

especially hats. Nothing else can be seen on these plains other than endless series of otter holes. At this time, our people killed otters more for their meat, which is supposed to be delicious, than for their fur. On this same day we met some Qalqa, [54] who by nature are untrustworthy, so that we did not rely on the news which they gave us when we inquired. We enticed them with some gifts, however, to lead us to a good road, which they did. Arriving at the river Suctei, [55] we camped on the bank. From here on we began to see mountains covered with forests, a sight to delight our eyes. On the next day the Qalqa, who are bitter enemies of the Moscovites, [56] left us as they did not dare to go farther. The Suctei River, like the Tuihen [57] which we passed the following day, flows from east to west. Soon we entered into dense forests of pines and other trees which are so tall and straight that they are not inferior to the best and most cultivated forests of Europe.

11. On the 26th we crossed another big river called Pori [58] without danger or loss of life, but the effort this crossing caused us all on account of the flood waters proved a tremendous strain. In order to prevent the animals from sinking into the mud we had to cut grass and throw it down in crude layers ; thus we walked on the mud as people walk on fishing rafts in the water. On this

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pened. Galdan invaded and defeated the Qalqa, who fled southward into Inner Mongolia and northward into the Trans-Baikal region of Siberia. These latter ones, unaware of the negotiations to be opened at Nerchinsk, again attacked the Russian delegate Golovin, who had arrived at Selenginsk. This was their spontaneous answer to many years of ruthless, hostile acts by the Russians against the Mongols and local Siberian tribes such as the Buriyad with whom the Qalqa were tied by bonds of racial affinity, culture and religion. Golovin succeeded in defeating them and in forcing them to submit (March 1689). Their raids on Russian territory continued, however. CAHEN, *Histoire des relations de la Russie avec la Chine sous Pierre-le-Grand (1689-1730)*, pp. 42-45. PAVLOVSKY, *op. cit.*, p. 16. SABIR, *Le Fleuve Amur.*, p. 18.

[55] The little river Suctei, which according to Gerbillon was called Sunde and flows into the Sagalien ula, is not indicated on the Jesuit Map.

[56] See Note 54.

[57] The Tui hen river called, by Gerbillon, Tourghe i. e., Turge bira or T'u-li-ko ho and also T'u-ehr-ko ho in Chinese. See W. FUCHS, *Der Jesuiten-Atlas* ... pp. 185, n. 1367 ; 270, n. 75 and Map. 5.

[58] The river Pori, the name of which is not given by Gerbillon, according to both Pereira and Gerbillon flows into the Um du or as Gerbillon calls it, Ouentou (see note 59). HADLE, *Description* ..., IV, p. 179.

a agoa, assim nos sobre o lodo. Fomos este dia seguindo este riacho navegando sobre o lodo, ficando semeado o caminho de camellos e cavallos e mais animais, que grudados nos atoleiros, se não podião delles desencaixar, athé o rio Um du,[59] em que aquelle desemboca. Mas neste não achamos melhor agasalhado. Estava tambem com muitas agoas das muitas chuvas daquelles dias. Hé navegavel de pequenos barcos se os ouvesse e precipitado na corrente. Aqui, depois de escaparem dos outros, naufragarão muitos animais e não poucos homens se afogarão diante de nossos olhos por não poderem vencer a corrente precipitada das inchentes. Muitas carregas se molharão e não poucas se perderão. Foi tal esta viva tragedia que me fes vir as lagrimas aos olhos com muita lastima da devida compaixão. O mesmo tio do Emperador, pera animar os outros, se lançou a nado e assim passou o rio; nós, seguindo a antiga posse, appellamos às barquinhas de que assima falei. Gastou-se todo o dia e o seguinte nesta passagem com muita perda de tudo. Corre este rio quasi do leste ao oeste, como os mais que passamos depois do Kerolon, e deste lugar se inclina com huma volta ao norte, com a qual sem menos de meya jornada desemboca no Rio Negro que iá assima toquei e ao diante tratarey. No dia seguinte voltou hum dos homens que dantes fora mandado com a nova aos Moscovitas,[60] e aos 28 os companheiros que com elle tinhão ido.

Aos 29 andamos entre continuos bosques e em tudo semelhantes, sobre inexplicaveis atolleiros, e alojando-nos este dia em hum pouco descuberto, chegarão dez Moscovitas que o seu governador[61] mandava a preguntar da saude a nossos embaixadores. Tratarão-os com benevolencia e urbanidade, do que os Moscovitas mostrarão terem satisfação. No tempo dantes, em que chegarão aos Moscovitas os enviados de nossos embaixadores, tinhão tambem chegado, sobindo o Rio Negro, 90 barcas nossas com mil soldados de guarnição e comboiando mantimentos pera tudo o que o tempo pedisse e circunstancias do sucesso. Levavão estas barcas 40 peças [7v] de artelharia divididas, conforme a capacidade de cada huma, cavalgadas nas proas de algumas.[62] E chegando muito perto da povoação dos Moscovitas, lhes mandou preguntar o governador

4 Um du *underlined* || 15 appallamos *tl* || 28 uerbanidade *tl*

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[59] The river Umdu or Ouentou (according to Gerbillon) is the Undu bira or Wen-tou in Chinese. W. Fuchs, *Der Jesuiten-Atlas ...*, p. 270, n. 78 and Map 5. The Russian name is Unda.

[60] This man was of the people who had been sent to the Moscovites on July 21 (see above). According to Gerbillon this man reported that he and his companions had arrived in Nipchu on the 25th and that on the next day they were well received by the Governor of that

day we traveled along the Pori River stumbling through the mud and leaving our way sown with camels, horses and other animals which inextricably were glued into the mud. Then we came to its confluence with the river Umdu,[59] flowing in an almost east-west direction as all the other rivers which we crossed since we left the Kerülen. But even here we did not have better luck; in this river, too, the water was high from the heavy rains during those days. It would have been navigable in small boats if we had had them, but the current was strong. Here many animals perished and some persons, too, drowned in front of our eyes as they were unable to overcome the fast current of the flood waters. A great part of our supplies were dampened and another part was lost. The tragedy of lives lost was of such proportions that it brought tears of compassion to my eyes. The uncle of the Emperor, in order to animate the others, jumped into the river and swam across it. We, following our former practice, called upon the services of the boats which I have already mentioned. This day and the following one we spent in the crossing with great loss of all sorts. From here going north less than a half day's journey, the Umdu flows into the Black River, which I have already mentioned and of which I shall speak later. On the following day, one of the persons whom we had sent to the Moscovites[60] returned, and on the 28th the others who had gone with him came back.

12. On the 29th we traveled through continuous forests between swamps left by the flood, and on this same day we camped at a little opening. Ten Moscovites, sent by their Governor[61] to inquire about the health of our ambassadors, were treated with benevolence and courtesy which seemed to please them. A short time before our own ambassadors' messengers had reached the Moscovites, our ninety boats arrived, having ascended the Black River with a crew of one thousand soldiers and a convoy of supplies that time and future success required. These boats brought forty pieces of artillery which were divided according to the capacity of the boats and were mounted on the prows.[62] When the boats came very close to the town of the Moscovites the Governor asked them where and for what purpose they were going. The

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city (Ivan Vlasov). He also reported that the Russian Plenipotentiary (Feodor Alexeevich Golovin) had not yet arrived, but that Ma lao-yeh (Mala) who was *Hu-chün t'ung ling* or "captain general" of the *Hu-chün-ying* or "guard division" (BRUNNERT-HAGELSTROM, *op. cit.*, pp. 327-328, n. 734) had arrived under Nipchu from Aigun with troops and provisions. HALDE, *Description ...*, IV, p. 180. See also Note 4.

[61] See Note 60 and 240. See also the entry in Gerbillon's Diary on this day in HALDE, *Description ...*, IV, p. 181.

[62] For the military and naval preparations that enabled the K'ang-hsi Emperor to send such a strong fleet see Ch. 3 above.

destes, a que fim ou pera onde caminhavão. Respondeu-se-lhe com ignorancia do mundo e natural presunção, que hião aonde querião. Calou-se prudentemente o governador e, recebendo bem a cortesia do antecedente aviso que nossos embaixadores lhe mandarão de sua chegada, os aplaudiu como grandes que obravão como tais, estranhando-lhes por seus enviados o pouco modo da reposta e rusticidade dos das barcas, [63] ao que logo derão os embaixadores sufficiente satisfação, disendo que o que lhes responderão os governadores das barcas se não devia ouvir, pois o negocio das pazes em nada lhes pertencia. Aqui paramos hum dia mandando muita soldadesca diante a consertar os atoleiros que entre aquelles bosques são incriveis. Aos 30 andamos entre espessos bosques e continuas sinco legoas quasi sempre sem ver o sol, e sahindo delles encontramos algumas casas à desfilada, dos Moscovitas, fabricadas de madeira a seu modo, e junto de algumas dellas huma capellinha tambem de pao, algum tanto com mais fabrica e asseyo, e com huma cruz em cima. Teria de largo esta capela duas braças e de comprido dobrado, fundada sobre colunas de pao, com o pavimento 3 ou 4 covados em alto por causa da muita lama e sitio daquelles mattos. [64] Cultivão os Moscovitas alguns lugares juntos daquelles bosques, semeando fermoso senteyo e outras novidades ; trigo porem não semeão, parece o não permite o clima.

Aos 31 chegamos a povoação Nip chu, antes do meyo dia, vindo muitos mandarins das barcas ao encontro a preguntar da saude aos embayxadores. [65] Fica Nip chu no angulo que fas a entrada do rio Nip chu [66] (qui nomen de nomine dedit à fortalesa) [67] no grande Rio Negro que corre do oeste pera o leste com inclinação ao norte. Hé iá aqui de muitas agoas, capas de grandes pataxos e caravellas. Corre com muita violencia. A cor da agoa barrenta, sendo a de Nip chu christalina, cuja diversidade conserva cada hum por muito tempo depois de se unirem entre si. Hé abundante de muito e variedade de peixe excellente, [68] mas

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4 antecende *t1* || 6 de reposta *t1* || 12-3 continuos *t1* || 19 couvados *t2* || 27 lesta *t1* || 29 patexos *t1* | caravellas *corr. from* caramellos | com *om. t1*

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[63] According to Gerbillon, the Moscovites through their interpreter, who was an Ölöd, wanted to know where the Chinese delegation intended to camp. HALDE, *Description* ..., IV, p. 181.

[64] According to Gerbillon, the name of this Moscovite settlement was Ayergon after a little river by the same name. He also states that the place seemed deserted and that they were told that the inhabitants had all gone to Nipchu when they heard about the imminent arrival of the Chinese delegation. HALDE, *Description* ..., IV, p. 182.

[65] According to Gerbillon, besides Mala (see Note 60) the reception committee which came to greet them consisted of the *Tsian kun* (Chiang-chün) or general of the imperial troops at Aigun (Ai-hun in Chinese) and all the territories north of the Amur, who at this time

soldiers answered him very undiplomatically and with their usual presumption that they would do as they pleased. The Governor prudently ignored this and, receiving the courteous message which our ambassadors sent him about their arrival, praised the ambassadors as great men who acted graciously, and he informed them of the impoliteness and rudeness of the men on the boats.[63] Our ambassadors answered that he should not pay attention to the comments of those on the boats as the negotiations of the peace did not involve them. Here we stopped for a day and sent a great number of soldiers in advance to locate the swamps of which there is an incredible number in these forests. On the 30th we traveled through thick forests for five leagues hardly even seeing the sun. When we came out into the open, we saw a line of houses belonging to the Moscovites, made of wood in their own style. Near them was a little chapel, also of wood, but made with a little more distinction and care. This chapel was two cubits wide and four cubits long, erected on four wooden columns and surmounted by a cross. Its floor was elevated three or four inches on account of the muddy location.[64] The Moscovites had some cultivated spots near the forests where they grew winter wheat and other novelties ; they had no wheat as the climate does apparently not permit it.

13. On the 31st we arrived at the city of Nipchu where we were met by many Mandarins from our boats who came to inquire about the well-being of the ambassadors.[65] Nipchu is in the angle formed by the river Nipchu[66] (whence the fortress has its name)[67] as it flows into the Black River. The Black River flows from west to east with a little inclination toward north. Because the river is much deeper here, it is navigable by bigger boats. Its waters run with great violence and are clay-colored, while those of the Nipchu River are crystal clear. This difference in color can be observed for quite a distance after their union. In this place

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was none other than Sabsu, and some other mandarins. Arriving finally at Nipchu they found the soldiers and supplies sent from Hei-lung-chiang and Aigun already there. The number of soldiers who had arrived by boat was around 1500 and their (arrogant) behavior had surprised the Moscovite Governor (Vlasov). He was consequently very pleased with the (orderly) behavior of those who had come by land. The Chinese ambassadors ordered those who had arrived by boat to retreat from the place where they had camped. HALDE, *Description* ..., IV, p. 186.

[66] See Note 3.

[67] " nomen de nimine " a literary allusion to Virgil's *Aen.* 3, 18.

[68] Among these fish there is a great quantity of sturgeons and another kind that is not found in Europe which is about the length and shape of a little tuna. HALDE, *Description* ..., IV, p. 11.

difficultoso na pesca por sua corrente furiosa. Entre os muitos e bons peixes, cria muita cantidade semelhante a nossos salmõis, se os não são, e outros grandes monstruos. Tem aqui de largura quasi hum quarto de legoa, mas muito fundo. Vai entrar no mar oriental em distancia deste lugar pouco mais ou menos 700 legoas, conforme disem os Tartaros que tem noticia delle. Entrão nelle varios rios e caudalosos, donde vem que quando no mar desemboca tem 6 e mais legoas de largura, e emcorpora em si algumas ilhas em alguns lugares. Hé quasi lisongeado e cortejado daquelles aprasiveis bosques que o acompanhão cheos de muita caça de animais : veyados, [69] gasellas, javaliz e huma laya de lebres da grandesa de nossos caens ordinarios, as quaes pello verão tem a cor das nossas e pello inverno ficam brancas como neve, que eu tive em minhas mãos. Da disposição de seu corpo se julga facilmente não serem muito ligeiras, por mais grosseiras e grandes. Há outra laya de animais a que os Tartaros chamão Kam dar gan [70] semelhantes aos veyados. Sua cor mais sobre castanha que cinsenta. Sua armação semelhante à dos veyados, mas com o tronco e ramos espalmados e não redondos, em que differem dos veyados. Sobre as duas espaldas, junto ao principio do pescoço, crião hum polmão de carne de grandesa de hum mellão, em tudo semelhante aos que vemos que crião os bois na India e na Ilha de S. Lourenço. Tem muito uso este animal com os Tartaros na carne, pelle, e armação. De todo este rio e outros muitos que nelle entrão, com terras immensas, se tem apoderado o Imperio Moscovitico em poucos annos[71] com incrivel lucro de suas pelles, [72] a que o mimo das nossas Portuguesas chamou regallo e os Moscovitas zebilina, [73] que são huns animais da grandesa de nossos gatos. Tem o pello muito mimoso e preto, os melhores ; outros, de menos estima, com cor mais morta sobre castanha, e esta ainda mais ou menos superior, a cuja cor, seguindo a estima, acompanha a valia. Há muitas raposas pretas e brancas e amarellas, e outros muitos animais de preço, de cujas pelles se aproveitão muito os Moscovitas e vem vender a esta corte [74] com grande lucro. Achão tambem no mar oriental os Moscovitas no caramello grandes peixes, de cuios dentes fasem lucrosa veniaga. São estes dentes quasi hum covado e meyo de comprido, grossos como hum braço ordinario de hum homem, soli-

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1 furiosa corrente *t2* || 8 e (*bis*) *om. t2* || 11 gavaliz *t1*, gevaliz *t2* || 20 principo *t1* || 22 em Ilha *t1* || 33 se *om. t1*

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[69] About the deer and deer hunting see HALDE, *Description ...*, IV, pp. 29-30.

[70] Kam dar gan or according to another Jesuit report " the *Han ta han* resembles very much an Elk ... ; we have seen some of them when killed that outweighed the fattest ox ". See HALDE, *The General History ...*, IV, p. 135. In Mongolian the name of this animal is *gan-*

the river is about a fourth of a league wide but very deep; it has some islands and finally enters into the East Sea at about seven hundred leagues distance, according to the knowledge of the Tartars. Several other rivers carrying a great quantity of water enter into it so that at its delta it is more than six leagues wide. The river is rich in a great variety of excellent fish, [68] but the furious current makes the fishing difficult. Among the many large and tasty fish there are some which are similar to our salmon. The pleasant forests which surround it and emphasize its beauty are full of game: deer, [69] gazelle, goats and a kind of rabbit, that I have held in my hands. It is as big as our ordinary dog, with a color in summer similar to that of our rabbit and in winter it has a snow white color. Judging from the shape of the body, the rabbits are not very light but rather big and fat. There is another species of animal which the Tartars call Kamdargan, [70] similar to the deer; its color is closer to chestnut than gray and its antlers are similar to those of the deer but with the beam and branches flat. On their shoulders near the neck they have a growth of flesh as big as a melon, similar to the ones found on the oxen in India and the Island of St. Lawrence. Their meat, skin and antlers are all of great use to the Tartars. The Black River and many others which flow into it, and the immense surrounding territories have been occupied by the Moscovite Empire during the last few years. [71] The Moscovites derive incredible profit from this area through the furs [72] of which the most precious, from an animal the size of a cat, is called by our Portuguese women "regallo" and by the Moscovites "zebelina." [73] The fur is very delicate and that of the better ones black in color; the color of those of lesser value is chestnut, the value being greater or smaller according to the estimation in which these colors are held. There are many black, white and yellow fox and other valuable animals from which the Moscovites profit greatly by selling the furs to the Court of China.[74] They have also found a kind of a great fish in the ice of the Eastern Sea which they likewise trade with immense profit. The teeth of these fish are a meter long, as thick as an arm, solid, pure white in color and very similar to the jaspis. They are bought

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dayai. See Kowalewski, *op. cit.*, Tome deuxième, p. 724 b.

[71] For the exploration and occupation of the Amur basin by the Russians see Chapters 1 and 3 of Historical Background.

[72] For the role furs played in the Russian occupation of Siberia see Chap. 1 above.

[73] For the importance of sable see Chap. 1 above.

[74] For a complete list of fur bearing animals which played a role in the Siberian fur trade see Chapter 1 above and J. Klein, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-32.

dos por dentro e alvos em summo grao, que asemelhão o jaspe e os comprão os Tartaros nesta corte a muito preço pera fasem algumas cousas curiosas ao torno. [75] [8r]

O rio Nip chu corre pera o sul e entra no Rio Negro da parte do norte. [76] Fica a povoação em lugar plaino, em altura de polo do norte 51 graos e quasi meyo, unida de hum lado aquelle rio que lhe fica ao oeste ou poente (como disem) e a povoação ao nacente ou leste distante algumas carreiras de cavallo do Rio Negro. Está em plaino e arriscada a enchentes dos mesmos rios, de modo que acontece de ordinario (o que nós experimentamos) não se poder entrar na povoação sem vadeyar as agoas com que as singem as enchentes. Da outra banda do rio de Nip chu ao poente ficão altos montes [77] que facilmente dominão a dita povoação, a qual se não pode sustentar contra nação europea sem fortificar os ditos montes que a dominão. Em hum delles, acomodado ao fim, vimos de longe duas altas traves levantadas sem nenhuma outra cousa ; e, preguntando aos Tartaros de que servião aquellas traves levantadas, me responderão que quando os Moscovitas adoravão idolo hião alli bater cabeça, do que eu então me ry não podendo dar sahida a tal explicação. Eis que dahi a pouco tempo, provando o Padre meu companheiro hum oculo de longa mira, levanta a voz disendo que erão duas fermosas crusez, cujos braços não divisavamos por ficarem em linha direita e não transversa a respeito do sitio em que estavamos alojados. Donde inferimos ser o seu calvario e as duas crusez, huma mayor de nosso Redemptor e a inferior por discurso iulgamos seria do bom ladrão. Da banda do leste ou nacente, em distancia de mais de meya legoa, ficão outros montes mais humildes, em que os Moscovitas semeão suas cearas, os quais de pouco a pouco se vão degenerando pera o norte em largas campinas muito capases de tudo. Nestas crião cavallos, bois e carneiros em quantidade os Moscovitas e os Halha seus tributarios. Cultivão tambem varias layas de nossos bredos e ortalissa, entre o que não devem ter o peior lugar os bons repolhos, que em abundancia crião. dos quais mandarão de presente a nossos embaixadores. Fruitas nem europeas nem estrangeiras nenhumas vi, ou seia pellas não cultivarem ou por não as dar a terra. Alojamos junto do Rio Negro em hum plaino da parte do sul, aonde logo mandou o governador da terra preguntar aos nossos da saude.

Pera tratar porem com miudesa o sucesso e conteudo nelle, será conveniente o traser à noticia algumas cousas passadas pera mayor claresa do que dissermos. Nos primeiros annos que os Tar-

2 fazerem *t2* || 4 e *om. t1* || 18 respondeu *t1* || 19 m ry *t1* || 29 degerando *t1* || 33 repollos *t1*

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[75] This refers to the walrus also mentioned in Spathar's report. Baddeley, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 239-240, 308.

at a very high price by the Tartars of the Imperial Court who use them for making curiosities.[75]

14. The town of Nipchu is on a plain about fifty-one and a half degrees north.[76] On the west it touches the shores of the river Nipchu and on the east it is only a little distance from the Black River, so that being on level ground it is endangered by floods and usually impossible to enter (as we experienced) without wading through the flood waters. On the other bank of the Nipchu River, in a westerly direction, there are high mountains.[77] These mountains so dominate the city of Nipchu that, without fortifications on these mountains the city could not be defended against a European aggressor. On one of these mountains we saw two upright and unadorned wooden beams. When we asked the Tartars what purpose these beams served, they answered that when the Moscovites adored their idols, they went there to strike their heads on the ground. I smiled at the explanation at the time, as I could not believe it. But a little later my companion, who looked through field glasses, said that they were two beautiful crosses, the crossbeams of which we could not see as they were in a straight line with our vision. We concluded, therefore, that this place was their Calvary and that the taller of the two crosses was that of Our Lord and the smaller one was that of the good thief. On the eastern bank of the river, about half a league away, there are other mountains but not as high as the former. On these the Moscovites plant grains. Northwardly these mountains become lower and lower until they are plains useful for all kinds of purposes. On these plains the Moscovites and their vassals, the Qalqa, raise horses, cattle and sheep in great quantity. They also cultivate different kinds of vegetables. Not least in importance is a very good cabbage, which is grown in great abundance and of which some was sent to our ambassadors. I did not see any fruit, European or foreign, either because they do not cultivate it or because the ground is not good for this purpose. We camped on the plain just south of the Black River and very soon the Governor of these territories sent some people to inquire about the well-being of our ambassadors.[78]

15. In order to treat the succession of events in detail and to make clear what we are going to say, it will be necessary to review a few things of the past. In the first years of the Tartar

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[76] Halde, *Description* ..., IV, pp. 56-57.

[77] These might be the foothills of the Yablonoi Range.

[78] This courtesy delegation is not mentioned by Gerbillon.

taros senhoriarão este imperio da China, de que estão em posse já há 46 annos, [79] mandarão os Moscovitas, que já então se avisinhavão à Tartaria, [80] seu embaixador ao novo imperador a tratar como igual condições de pases. [81] Porem como os Tartaros, então ainda rudes, se governavão em todo pellos custumes chinas, que ab orbe condito nunca receberão em seu imperio estrangeiros athé então, senão como tributarios, influirão nos Tartaros a mesma soberba, julgando as naçoens estrangeiras como as suas vesinhas de pastores, por ignorancia crassa que tem do mundo, estimando todo elle incluido dentro da sua China, cuja soberba lhe dá por nome Tien hiá, [82] hoc est debaixo do ceo, como se debaixo deste nada mais se incluira. Pello que foi remandado o dito embaixador não querendo elle ceder nada, [83] disendo com galantaria aos chinas: " O vosso imperio hé grande, mas o nosso não hé pequeno ". [84] Passados alguns annos forão conquistando mais ao oriente pellas terras assima ditas, até que chegarão muito vesinhos as terras a que este imperador tartaro china manda cada anno seus caçadores, [85] atracando algumas veses alguns homens com os outros com perda de huma e outra banda de alguma gente, sem nenhuma das partes querer ceder nem a outra retroceder. Depois de alguns annos, estando eu já nesta corte, haverá já circiter 13 annos, [86] mandou outro embaixador o Moscovita a tratar das pases que desejava. [87] Não foi mal recebido por cauza da concorrencia da rebelião do U san quei, [88] regulo feito pellos Tartaros, o qual tendo-os com bom intento introdusido na China, foi depois obrigado a reconhecê-los por senhores (cuja historia hé já muito trita e antiga), depois por ser delles mal contente se rebelara e actualmente occupava já meyo imperio. Comtudo como perseverou este embaixador em conservar suas pertenções de igualdade, não se acomodando aos costumes dos

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7 *before* sorberba

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[79] 1644 is the official beginning of the Manchu or Ch'ing Dynasty in China.

[80] See Note 71.

[81] This was the diplomatic mission of Theodore Isakovich Baikov (1653-58). For details see Chapter 3 above.

[82] Tien hia i. e., *t'ien hsia.*

[83] Baikov did not comply with the Chinese court etiquette, since he was instructed that ... " ... he is not to surrender the Tsar's letter not merely to the Chinese voevodas, but even to the ministers ... ; he is not to bow down either to the Palace itself or to any threshold ... at the audience he is by ho means to kiss the Bogdikan's [name of the Chinese Emperor used by the Russians at this time] foot ... ". Baddeley, *op. cit.*, II, p. 134.

[84] There is no trace of such a statement by Baikov in any of the sources that contain his *statenie spisok* or official report.

domination in China, forty-six years ago, [79] the Moscovites, who at that time were already coming closer and closer to Tartary, [80] had sent an ambassador to the Tartar Emperor to negotiate peace on equal terms. [81] The Tartars, however, were then still very uncultured and completely under the influence of Chinese customs. From the beginning of the world, China had never received foreigners in its Empire except as tribute bearers. In their crass ignorance of the world, the Tartars, with the same pride as the Chinese, considered other nations shepherds like their own neighbors. They thought everything was part of the China which they called proudly T'ien hsia, [82] that is to say " all under heaven ", as if nothing else but it existed. Consequently the Moscovite ambassador, who did not want to compromise, [83] was sent back for saying bravely to the Chinese : " Your Empire is great but ours is not small either ".[84] After a few years, the Moscovites progressed eastward, conquering the aforementioned territories, until they came to those territories to which the Chinese Emperor yearly sends his hunters. [85] One side attacked the other with loss of men on both sides, neither party willing to give in. Some years later when I was already in this Court, about thirteen years ago, [86] the Moscovites sent another ambassador to negotiate for the peace they desired. [87] This ambassador was well received on account of the rebellion of Wu San-kuei [88] whom the Tartars had previously elevated to high honors for helping them to occupy China. Wu San-kuei, later having to recognize their sovereignty, (the history of which is already old and well known) became discontented, rebelled and occupied what, at that time, amounted to half the Empire. The Moscovite ambassador, however, persisted in maintaining pretensions of equality and was unwilling to accomodate himself to the customs of the

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[85] Some important events had taken place between 1656 (Baikov's mission) and 1676 (Spathar's embassy). Onufrei Stepanov's forces had been annihilated by the Manchus in the spring of 1658 and the Russians had abandoned the Lower Amur for a while. By 1665, however, they had consolidated Nerchinsk and founded Albazin, thus reestablishing themselves on the Lower Amur. To this came in 1666-7 the Ghantimur affair and the ensuing controversy which led to the mission of Milovanov. That the territories in question were considered as under Chinese sovereignty can be seen from K'ang-hsi's letter of 1670 given to Milovanov for transmission. For full details see Chapters 1 and 3 above.

[86] Pereira arrived in Peking in January, 1673.

[87] This Russian ambassador was Nicolai Gavrilovich Spathar (1675-1676 was the date of his embassy). For full details see Chapter 3 above.

[88] U san quei i. e., Wu San-kuei. HUMMEL, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 877-880.

chinas [89] inexpertos, foi tambem mal despachado, mas não deixou pouco abatidos os chinas de suas presunções, que se admirarão da audacia com que intrepido lhes respondia. Era homem resoluto ficando sempre em pé na igualdade que pertendia, mas [8v] manqueiou na mercancia, [90] em que mostrava ser igualmente douto, que em letras humanas, philosophia e controversias em que como erege estava bem versado, não querendo admitir disputa nem ouvir falar de religião catholica. [91]

Não ensinou tambem pouco neste ponto aos Chinas o embaixador de Portugal Manoel de Saldanha, [92] contra o qual dando os chinas mandarins da provincia de Cantão memorial acusando-o que não queria assinar-se vassallo em seus papeis, [93] respondendo o Emperador levado da fama que delle ouvia que viesse à corte e que nella seria perguntado e daria resão de si. Porem vindo a esta corte dissimularão e julgarão (iá mais noticiosos) por bem o não lhe faserem a tal pergunta. Deixou este senhor hum tal nome nesta corte que o mesmo Emperador e outros grandes (que eu ouvi muitas veses, sendo-lhe difficultosa a pronuncia de lingoas estrangeiras) se lembrão ainda de Manoel de Saldanha, o que a enveja aleivosa e tirana da verdade quis morder, disendo se acomodou aos custumes chinas. [94] Hé verdade que se agora viera cá outro europeo, bem creyo não seria admitido sem se sogeitar à infamia de vassallo, como com deshonra manifesta o fiserão os Holandeses, não se desdignando de offerecer tributo annual se lhe concedessem o comercio que tanto anellão, [95] o que eu ouvi, mas nem com esta

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15 perguntando *t1* || 23 infami *t1* || 25 desindignando *t1*

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[89] After his arrival in Peking on May 15, 1676, Spathar refused to surrender his credentials to the officials of the *Li-fan-yüan* and refused to kotow during his audience. So these regulations were waived. When, however, he refused to receive the Emperor's presents for the Tsar on his knees, K'ang-hsi, on August 29, declared in an edict that he would not answer the Tsar's letter because Spather had been disobedient.

[90] Although Spathar's preliminary report to the *Li-fan-yüan* contained points concerning trade and commerce, and though in his entourage there were traders, his rank as *poslannik* transcended that of the former Russian emissaries who were mostly commercial agents. This might be the explanation of Pereira's statement that "he did not bring merchandise".

[91] Spathar's caution about not wanting to enter into religious disputes might have been caused by the fact that he needed the assistance of Verbiest and the other Jesuits and did not want to antagonize them.

[92] This was the embassy dispatched to Peking by D. João Nunes da Cunha, new viceroy of the Indies, in 1667. Saldanha was accredited,

Chinese [89] inexperienced in such affairs, he too was sent back, although not without weakening the presumptiousness of the Chinese who admired his audacity in answering them fearlessly. He was a most resolute man who always considered himself their equal. Although he was well versed in trading he did not bring merchandise. [90] He was also well acquainted with letters, and for a heretic, was well conversant in philosophy and controversy. He did not, however, want to enter into any discussion of the Catholic religion or even hear its name mentioned. [91]

16. The ambassador of Portugal, Manuel de Saldanha, [92] also contributed in instructing the Chinese concerning this point. The Chinese Mandarins of the city of Canton had memoralized the Emperor accusing Saldanha of refusing, in his papers, to recognize his vassalage. [93] The Emperor moved by Saldanha's fame, answered with an invitation calling Saldanha to the Court where he should be questioned and account for himself. By the time he arrived in Peking, however, the Chinese were better informed : they considered it wiser to pretend ignorance of the matter and not to ask questions. This ambassador left such a reputation in the Court that the Emperor and other grandees (as I frequently heard though it is difficult for them to pronounce foreign names) extolled Saldanha whom certain people attempt to discredit with untrue and perfidious calumny by saying that he accomodated himself to the Chinese customs. [94] However, the truth of the matter is that if other Europeans came, they would not be admitted, I think, unless they subjected themselves to the infamy of vassalage as did the

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though, as " royal ambassador ", to negotiate better trade relations and to obtain freedom for the propagation of Christianity. See Pfister, *op. cit.*, pp. 506-507, 376-377. Boxer and J. M. Braga, *Breve Relação da Jornada que fez à Corte de Pekim o Senhor Manoel de Saldanha 1667-1670, scrita pelo Padre Francisco Pimentel S. J., e Documentos Contemporâneos* (Macao, 1942). Petech, *Some Remarks on the Portuguese Embassies to China in the K'ang-hsi Period*, in *T'oung Pao* 44 (Leiden 1956) 227-244.

[93] The *Tung-hua-lu* states that Saldanha came to pay tribute which would be equivalent to recognizing his vassalage. Pfister, *op. cit.*, p. 377.

[94] Pfister, *op. cit.*, following Montalto, *Historic Macao* (2nd ed. p. 121) says : " Déjà, pendant la route, on avait obtenu qu'il n'y eût pas sur son étendard l'inscription d'usage ; payer le tribut ou chin-kung' ". However this may be, the *Tung-hua-lu* states that he came to pay tribute.

[95] Spathar says : " ... the Dutch, seeing what profits were made by the Portuguese, sent their ambassadors three times to Peking by sea, to the end that trade might be established between them and the Chinese. " Baddeley, *op. cit.*, II, p. 223. These three Dutch embassies were those of " Pierre de Goyer et Jacques de Keyser, envoyée

sumissão o alcançarão como querião.[96] Pello discurso dos annos sobreditos fabricarão os Moscovitas huma povoação murada de grossas traves, a que chamarão Albazim,[97] dirivando este nome do senhor ou mayor pastor daquella terra sogeito a este imperio por nome Albajú. Os Tartaros porem lhe chamão Yagzá.[98] Pello que este Imperador se resolveo haverá 4 ou sinco annos a mandar exercito e citiando os Oruses os obrigou a largar o que violentamente conservarão.[99] Mostrou porem o Imperador sua natural brandura e piedade ordenando que a nenhum se fisesse mal, mas os mandassem com todo o bom tratamento, mas avisando-os que não tornassem mais;[100] o que elles porem, data fide, não observarão, mas voltarão passados sinco ou 6 meses e, achando tudo desemparado dos Tartaros (que não querem povoar aquellas terras mas só pera caçar as senhorião), se apoderarão outra vez de sua fortificação,[101] a qual logo o Imperador com novo exercito mandou sitiar,[102] e estando já em summa angustia, chegou aqui com muita pressa hum enviado a esta corte, em que pedia cessão de armas até chegar seu embayxador plenipotenciario que iá estava de caminho.[103]

Logo o Emperador, com sua acustumada brandura e clemencia, mandou despacho pera que logo o sitio da praça se resolvesse, com

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1 do annos *t1* || 5 Yagzá *underlined* || 24 com *om. t1*

à l'empereur Choen-tche [Shun-chih] par la Compagnie hollandaise" in 1655; of "J. V. Campen et C. Nobel, envoyée à Choen-tche [Shun-chih] par la Compagnie hollandaise des Indes" in 1661; of "Pierre van Hoorn, envoyée à Choen-tche [Shun-chih] par la Compagnie des Indes" in 1664. Pfister *op. cit.*, pp. 505, n. 1. The van Hoorn embassy could not have been sent to the Shun-chih Emperor in 1664 since he had died in 1661, unless when it was dispatched the Dutch did not yet know of his death. The next Dutch embassy came around 1670. About the following one we read in a letter of Father Verbiest to the Jesuit General de Noyelle written on September 21, 1686: "Hoc anno 1686 sub initium mensis augusti legatus hollandicus ex Societate mercatorum Indica, cuius caput in nova Batavia moratur, Pekinum pervenit et multa eaque pretiosa munera obtulit. Imperator singulari benevolentia et honore illum excepit, et nobis tamquam interpretibus usus est; et ipsi Hollandi multa gratitudinis signa hanc ob rem nobis monstrarunt. Domum stabilem in hoc regno mercaturae exercendae omnibus viribus conati sunt impetrare, sed frustra." See Josson-Willaert, *Correspondance ...*, pp. 528-529.

[96] For the reasons for their failure see Baddeley, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 155-159, 223. Bosmans, *op. cit.*, pp. 203-204, 209.

Dutch who, as I have heard, with grave dishonor did so. They went so far as to offer disdainfully a yearly tribute in order to obtain the much desired permission to trade.[95] But even with this submission, they did not get such authorization.[96]. During these years the Moscovites built a town which they surrounded with a wall and which they called Albazin,[97] deriving the name from one of their subjects in these territories, a chief of nomads called Albajum. The Tartars, however, call it Yagza.[98] For this reason the present Emperor, some four or five years ago, decided to send an army to lay siege to the Russians to force them to abandon what they had usurped.[99] Even in this, the Emperor showed merciful mildness in ordering that no one should be harmed and that the people should be sent away with the best of treatment and advised never to return.[100] The Moscovites did not observe these terms in spite of having given their word. After five or six months they returned and finding the place deserted by the Tartars (who did not want to settle or use the place for any purpose other than for hunting) occupied their fortification again.[101] The Emperor sent another army to lay siege to Albazin,[102] so that the people sent a messenger in all haste to this Court asking for an armistice until their ambassador plenipotentiary, who was already on his way, would arrive.[103]

17. The Emperor, with his usual benevolence, sent orders to put an end to the siege on the condition that, until their ambas-

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[97] For the foundation of Albazin see Chapter 1 above.

[98] Yagza or Ya-ku-sa in Chinese and Albazin in Russian.

[99] For full details for the events preceding these military preparations and for the military preparations see Chapter 1 and 3 above. After the failure of the Spathar embassy, the suppression of the *San-fan* rebellion and the completion of the military preparations the K'ang-hsi Emperor still hoped that the dispute might be settled without an all-out war. The systematic raids of the Chinese against the Russian settlements had caused the disappearance of every vestige of Russian occupation on the Lower Amur and its tributaries by 1683. Only Albazin, fortified and well stocked with provisions, remained. In 1683 K'ang-hsi sent an edict to Albazin by two Russian prisoners. Since he received no answer he gave the order to start the campaign. The Chinese forces appeared under Albazin on June 13, 1685.

[100] This is clear from the edict sent to Albazin and also from the instructions of K'ang-hsi to his ministers on September 4, 1686 concerning the letter which he sent through the Dutch embassy to the Tsar. See Chapters 1 and 3 above and LIU HSÜAN-MIN, *op. cit.*, pp. 410-411.

[101] LIU HSÜAN-MIN, *op. cit.*, p. 402.

[102] For this second siege of Albazin which started in July, 1686 see Chapter 3 above.

[103] Here Pereira simplifies the successive events. For details see Chapter 3 above.

condição que, emquanto o embaixador não chegasse, se não semeariam as terras pellos Moscovitas, dando-lhes aliunde plena liberdade.[104] Havia poucos dias antes que este Imperador tinha enviado algumas vias de cartas por via de Europa,[105] só a fim de saber se o grande Duque sabia, que seus vassallos obravão de tal modo por estas terras, declarando-lhe que o não os ter totalmente derrotados era só por crer que elle o não sabia, mas seus vassallos entereçados, o que elle devia impedir pera não dar occasião a tantas mortes que disto se seguião etc. Passado hum anno e meyo, eis que chega a esta corte hum enviado do embaixador moscovita,[106] dando nova em como tinha chegado à povoação de Selenga, que dista da de Nipchu 15 dias de mao caminho, quasi ao poente, e convidava a coloquio a nossos embaixadores.[108] Logo se tratou do negocio com fervor,[109] mas o resfriou e totalmente abateu o que iá disse da guerra entre o Hal ha e Elut,[110] acoçando este aquelle de tal modo, que com o medo com que fugião, deixavão semeados os desertos de seus cavallos cançados, camellos e mais animais, e ainda a mesma gente doente e velha desemparada, como eu vi. Erat ergo videre miseriam[111] roubando estes e voltando aquelles habentes ea. Avisamos por huma carta do caminho ao embaixador moscovita de nossa volta e impossibilidade em tais circunstancias de ir avante por estas guerras,[112] o que elle, com sua reposta mostrou (mas prudentemente) estranhar a nossos embaixadores;[113] o que se verteo com toda a fidelidade e juntamente recato conveniente, que convinha. Este anno pello inverno (por serem as terras encarameladas e os atolleiros mais capazes de caminho) mandou o embaixador moscovita seu enviado a esta corte pera que se

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2 aliunde *underlined* || 6 que os não o ter *t2* || 15 Hal ha *underlined* | *for* Elut *t2* Lut || 16 mede *t1* | deixando *t1* || 24-5 recato conveniente *om. t2* || 25 conviha *t1*

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[104] K'ang-hsi ordered the besieging Chinese forces to loosen the cordon around Albazin by moving back three *versts* — the siege being completely raised only after the arrival of the Russian plenipotentiary. See Chapter 3 above.

[105] This was the letter K'ang-hsi gave the Dutch embassy for transmission to Moscow. Grimaldi also took copies of this letter for transmission to Moscow. Bosmans, *Le problème ...*, pp. 207-213.

[106] Here the succession of events must be completed. Venyukov and Favorov had arrived in Peking on October 31, 1686, and remained there until the 14th of November. They at once informed Golovin of their arrival and sent word that the Emperor of China was willing to raise the blockade of Albazin. Golovin received their letter on February 18, 1687; and they themselves passed him on March 14, 1687, on their way back to Moscow. They brought back with them two letters from Peking: one in Mongolian, a simple acknowledgement of the receipt of the messages they had brought; and the other in Latin dated November 21, 1686, enumerating all the complaints the

sador arrived, they were not to cultivate the lands, but left them free in other matters.[104] A few days earlier the Emperor had sent, via Europe, several copies of a letter[105] to find out whether the Grand Duke knew what his subjects in these parts were doing. He further declared that only the conviction that the Grand Duke did not know of these events had saved his subjects from complete destruction. He informed the Grand Duke to advise these people not to be cause of so many deaths. A year and a half had passed when a messenger sent by the Moscovite ambassador[106] came to this Court to notify the Chinese that the ambassador had already arrived in the town of Selenginsk,[107] which is about fifteen days traveling distance from Nipchu in a westerly direction, and to invite our ambassadors for peace talks.[108] At first this matter was taken up with great fervor,[109] but enthusiasm was dissipated by the war between the Qalqa and the Ölöd, as I have mentioned before.[110] The Ölöd attacked the Qalqa so fiercely that the latter fled in great terror, leaving the deserts strewn with the bodies of tired horses, camels, and other animals, and even humans who were old or sick. It was a pitiful sight.[111] In a letter written during our trip we notified the Moscovite ambassador about our turning back, since it was impossible to continue on account of the war.[112] His prudent answer which we translated faithfully, seemed to show surprise at the action of our ambassadors.[113]. This past winter, as the ground was frozen and the swampy places not so bad for traveling, the Moscovite ambassador sent a messenger to this Court to have a new place assigned for the peace talks.[114] The Emperor picked Nipchu, and the messenger returned with great profits from the

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Chinese had against the Russians. For the text of this letter see BADDELEY, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 425-427. Meanwhile Golovin had left Moscow on January 26, 1686 with his instructions. He sent Korovin as his advance agent to Peking who arrived there on March 14, 1688, and remained there until April 17. See Chapter 3 above.

[107] Selenga i. e., Selenginsk. See Note 16.

[108] The letter Korovin brought back from Peking, from the K'ang-hsi Emperor dated April 27, 1688 fixed the town of Selenginsk as the place of the conference. This was the very place the Russians had suggested. CAHEN, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

[109] The Chinese delegation left Peking on May 30, 1688.

[110] See *Diary* 180-181.

[111] For further details see Gerbillon's description of this first trip in HALDE, *Description ...*, IV, pp. 87-162.

[112] For this letter see HALDE, *ibid.*, pp. 120-122.

[113] For the details of the happenings between the 22nd of July (when the Chinese delegates sent their letter to Golovin) and the 8th of September (when Golovin's answer arrived) and for the contents of Golovin's letter see HALDE, *ibid.*, pp. 123-136.

asinasse outro lugar pera se tratar de pases,[114] apontando logo o Imperador o de Nip chu, despachando o enviado com incrivel lucro e ganho das pelles que trouxera pera vender.[115] Pedio este enviado ao Emperador o vir ver esta igreia, a qual licença lhe concedeo o Emperador, mandando-me primeiro avisar (o que fes tambem com o do anno passado) pera que o tratasse bem, como se fes, mostrando-lhe todas as curiosidades desta caza e offrecendo-lhe alguma collação, de que ficou em tudo satisfeito e notavelmente obrigado. [9r]

Quis em sinal de agradecimento offerecer algumas pelles e dinheiro com muita efficacia, o que com outra igual e mais poderosa se regeitou ; o que vendo elle appellou pera a igreia, disendo o offerecia a Deos, a que o lingoa ignorante, que era rude moscovita, explicava a modo tartaro por idolo. O que ouvindo eu, respondi que nós não conheciamos tal fasenda. Ainda que em lingoa china, vendo o enviado o modo de falar com a reposta que dei, logo alcançado disse pera evitar toda a anfibologia : " Eu offereço a JESU ". E dando-lhe eu as graças respondi que Jesus lhe agradecia seu bom coração, porem que não tinha necessidade de suas pelles pera vestir, acabando em jovial rizo a reposta.[116] Logo fui a dar conta ao Imperador de tudo, do que mostrou ficar muito satisfeito : o que vendo, tomando do contentamento occasião (que com tanta cautela devemos viver aqui, aonde nos estimam com elles da mesma ley), perguntei se suposto elle nos dar presente e offerecer de suas cousas, ainda que nós as não tinhamos aceitado, conforme a cortesia, parece deviamos corresponder com alguma cousa. Considerou o Emperador e respondeo que sim, porque com isto nenhum mal se segue, antes bem (dis o Emperador) fasendo este homem amigo pera quando lá chegares. O que ouvindo eu, dei hum passo mais adiante perguntando se convinha tãobem ir eu visitá-lo, suposto elle vir a nossa caza. Considerou o Imperador e resolveo que não, disendo : " Eu vos mando e trato com muita honra e estimo como a meus grandes em cuja companhia vos mando a tratar tanto negocio. Pello que tenho medo que indo vós a visitá-llo, vos olhe com outros olhos do que eu, e vendo a facilidade com que vos mostrais benevolo, degenere nelle em menos estima vossa, o que eu não quero. Pello que não convem que o vades visitar, mas (se quereis) mandai em vosso lugar algum de vossos companheiros a visitá-llo " ;[117] o que se guardou à risca. Com

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14 idolo *underlined* || 17 a *om. t1* | *before* anfibogolia || 21 a *om. t1* || 22 do *om. t1* || 25 de *om. t1* || 35 otros *t1* || 38 vasitar *t1*

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[114] This messenger was Ivan Loginov who arrived in Peking on May 23, 1689, and stayed until June 7. He was accompanied by 70 persons. The letter of Golovin which he brought was addressed to the Emperor's ministers, asking that a new place be designated for

sales of the furs which he had brought with him.[115] This man had asked the Emperor's permission to come to see our church. The Emperor consented to this request and notified me of it as he had done in the case of the messenger who came a year ago, asking that he be well treated and offered some refreshment. All this seemed to please the messenger.

18. He insisted in offering furs and money as a sign of his gratitude. We, however, rejected the gifts. Seeing our refusal, he appealed to the church and said that he was offering it to God, but his interpreter, being an uneducated Moscovite, used for " God " the Tartar word for idol. Hearing this, I answered that such a thing was unknown to us and, although I spoke in Chinese, when the messenger saw the respect with which I spoke about God, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, he said, " I offer it to Jesus ". I thanked him and said that Jesus was grateful for his good will but that he did not need his furs for dress. And so our conversation ended with a jovial laugh.[116] I informed the Emperor immediately of what had happened and he seemed pleased. Taking advantage of his contentment (we must use great caution as the Chinese think that we follow the same law as the Moscovites), I suggested to the Emperor that, since the Moscovites offered us presents, it seemed that, although we refused them, courtesy obliged us to offer something too. Thinking this over the Emperor agreed, as our gesture could have only good effects ; it could make this man our friend in the future when we go to the Moscovites. On hearing this I dared to take a further step and asked whether it was convenient for me to visit him, since he had come to our house. The Emperor thought this over and said, " No, I am treating you with the honor and distinction that I accord my grandees whom you shall accompany to negotiate important affairs. I am afraid that if you go and visit him he may misunderstand your kindness and his estimation for you may diminish ; I do not want this. For this reason it is not wise that you pay him a visit but, if you wish, you can send one of your companions to visit him ".[117] The Emperor's plan avoided any risk. Such is the caution with which we have to proceed here, and in this present affair even

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the negotiations. Cahen, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-45 ; Halde, *Description ...*, IV, p. 160.

[115] *Ibid.*

[116] For further details of Loginov's visit see Halde, *Description ...*, IV, p. 161.

[117] Fathers Joachim Bouvet and Joseph Soares paid the Moscovite

esta cautela se procede aqui e muito mais ainda neste e em todos os negocios, e como cuidão ou cuidarão outros acomodando a materia alhea a sua forma. Falei nisto com tanta miudesa a falarei adiante pera que apareça em tudo esta verdade que direi sem enfeite nem figura.

Despachado de volta este enviado com reposta que não continha outra cousa que assignar o lugar de conferencias pera se tratar de pases.[118] Partido elle, passados 2 ou 3 dias[119] partirão os embayxadores com o sequito e derrota[120] que assima descrevi. Neste estado e antecedencias estava o negocio quando chegamos a Nip chu no ultimo dia de Julho, felicissimo pera nós consagrado a Santo Ignacio nosso pay e fundador,[121] que com muita resão nos devia pronosticar fausto agouro.

Ao 1º de Agosto mandou o governador quinze carneiros em seu nome e dez bois em nome do seu gram Duque a nossos embaixadores de presente,[122] e aos dous chegou hum mancebo de parte do embaixador (que por então não tinha ainda chegado, mas estava muito perto) a preguntar aos nossos da saude e juntamente intimando-lhes que pera tratar de pazes se devião com igual numero de gente congregar,[123] com o que não deu pouco aos ignorantes do mundo que enteder. Mandarão os nossos gente sua a faser as mesmas mostras de urbanidade preguntando-lhe pella saude e rogando-lhe viesse depressa pois não permitião os tempos e os futuros frios dilação, porque (como verdes em semelhante negocio entre elles nunca praticado) trasião ou levavão só des dias de termo pera sua conslusão. Respondeo elle sempre com juizo e cortesia que vinha como o tempo o permitia.[124] Passarão em idas e vindas até os 17 do corrente.[125] Neste entremeyo mandou o governador da

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6 Despachando *t1* || 8 de *om. t1* || 23 uerbanidade *t1* || 24 permitão *t1* || 28 *before* vinbas

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the return visit. Halde, *Description ...*, IV, p. 162 ; Pfister, *op. cit.*, pp. 399-402, 433-439.

[118] Cahen, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-45 ; Halde, *Description ...*, IV, p. 160.

[119] It was actually six days after the departure of Loginov that the Chinese delegation departed for Nerchinsk on June 13. See *Diary* 182-183.

[120] About the number of the retinue see Liu hsüan-min, *op. cit.*, p. 416 ; Ch'en fu-kuang, *op. cit.*, p. 500.

[121] The feast of Saint Ignatius of Loyola, founder of the Society of Jesus, of which Gerbillon and Pereira were members, is celebrated by the Catholic Church on July 31.

[122] Gerbillon tells us that on this day the Chinese ambassadors wrote a letter to the Moscovite ambassador which Pereira and he translated into Latin, in which they expressed their surprise in not finding him at Nipchu as yet. They also informed him that they had refrained from

greater care is required than in all others. We have to take these precautions and others will have to take them too, adapting such diverse matter to its forms. I wrote and shall write in great detail in order that the unadorned truth of what I am going to say shall be evident.

19. This envoy, in his turn, was sent back with an answer that contained nothing else but the designation of the place for the peace conference,[118] and two or three days[119] after his departure, our embassy also left with retinue[120] and with the outcome as described before. This was the situation and these were the antecedents of the affair we found upon our arrival on the last day of July, the day consecrated to our Father and Founder, St. Ignatius.[121] We took it, with good reason, to be a sign of a happy conclusion to our business.

20. On the first day of August, the Governor of Nipchu sent fifteen sheep in his own name and two cows in the name of his Grand Duke as a present to our ambassadors.[122] On the second, there arrived a young man sent by the Moscovite ambassador, who had not yet arrived but was very near, who inquired about the health of our ambassadors and to hint at the same time that in the peace negotiations both parties should be represented by the same number of people.[123] This was too subtle a suggestion for people inexperienced in international affairs. Our ambassadors also sent people to tender the same respects, to ask for the health of the ambassador and to urge him to hurry up as the time of the coming of the cold weather did not permit any delay. Inexperienced in matters which are not customary to the Chinese, they calculated only ten days to the conclusion of the treaty. He answered, as always, with good judgment and courtesy that he would

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crossing the river so as not to arouse suspicion, but that if he did not arrive promptly they would be forced to do so in order to find better forage. Halde, *Description* ... IV, pp. 184-185.

[123] Gerbillon says that the Russian emissary asked some other embarassing questions, too. He wanted to know (1) whether the Chinese delegation had come to make war, since they had brought along such a great number of soldiers ; he also complained about the behavior of those who had come by boat ; (2) why his last envoy to Peking (Ivan Loginov) had not yet returned though he had left Peking before the Chinese delegation. Halde, *Description* ..., IV, p. 183.

[124] This answer of Golovin reached the Chinese ambassadors on the 10th. Halde, *Description* ..., IV, p. 187.

[125] The highlights of events till the 17th were as follows : On the 7th Golovin sent a messenger to inform the Chinese that he would be delayed for 9 more days. He again inquired about the delay of his agent Loginov who had not yet returned. Two mandarins were dispatched to greet Golovin. On the 10th the answer to the inquiries

terra varios presentes a nossos embaixadores :[126] vacas de leite e hortalissa diversa, e bons repolhos. E como alheyos os nossos da fé que se deve ao direito das gentes, forão tais que duvidarão se naquillo lhes mandaria peçonha, não me declarando com a boca, mas vendo-o eu por obra ; pello que peguei de hum rabão e pedindo algum sal o comessei a comer como se fosse tenro pepino, o que elles vendo disse hum inadvertido o que com astucia tinhão obrado : " Não há engano ", e me fes logo companhia. Mandou por outra vez algumas empadas, cousa grossa e quantitativa e algumas cousinhas doces. Logo nos mandarão convidar e, chegando nós, alcancey logo o fim de sua abstinencia ; e começando logo a provar pera os ensinar, e com o exemplo lhe dar a entender se deve dar fee humana, conforme o direito da natureza, e não com temeraria ignorancia duvidar, e provando com liberdade christam (que a elles lhes parecia arremessado atrevimento), sahio logo hum delles com o que tinha no coração, disendo : " Padre Fulano entre elles [9v] não custumão dar peçonha ? " lançando com esta a que tinhão em seu peito. Logo provarão muito contentes de se verem tratados com fidelidade e sem engano. Estes forão nossos companheiros em tanto negocio e tantos meses de viagem, o que devem considerar os ouvintes, assim pera ver com quem lidamos, gente chea de sospeitas e falta de conhecimento do mundo, como pera ver o quanto Deos assistio em negocio de tanta expectação.

Nestes dias, vendo os nossos tardavão muito, lhe escreverão huma carta em que o convidavão a apressar-se com sua chegada, pellas causas sobreditas,[127] cuja reposta foi sincera, estranhando-os como tinhão trasida tanta gente vindo tratar de pazes, e como se tinhão chegado tam visinhos à povoação contra o direito das gentes. Pello que se devião retirar mais longe e largar aquelle lugar omninamente.[128] Foi a reposta viva e não por carta, e forçosamente

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2 hortalisse *t1* || 6 e comessei *t1* || 11 logo *om. t2* || 15 arremessando *t1* || 22 gen cheas *t1*

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of the 1st arrived by another messenger. Golovin apologized for his delay and promised to arrive earlier than he had expected. He asked the Chinese to retreat from the place where they had set up their camp as it was too close to the fortress. This request displeased the Chinese ambassadors. On the 12th three other mandarins were sent to the Moscovite. The Governor of Nipchu, Vlasov, sent some presents. On the 15th the Governor informed the Chinese that Golovin would arrive within a few days. On the 16th the three mandarins, sent on the 12th, returned very pleased with the reception they had received. The only thing Golovin asked was that the Chinese retreat a little farther from the fortress. But the mandarins had told him

come as fast as circumstances permitted.[124] The days until the 17th of the current month were passed in comings and goings.[125] During this time the Governor of these territories sent presents to our ambassadors:[126] milk cows, different kinds of vegetables, and a cabbage of good quality. As they were unaware of the trust due in international law, our ambassadors were afraid that these things were poisoned, a suspicion they did not declare in so many words but which their conduct betrayed. I took a piece of radish and asked for some salt and started to eat it as if it were a delicious cucumber; when they saw this, one of them disclosing their fear said, "There is no deception", and joined me. On another occasion the Governor sent some coarse meat in great quantity and sweet cookies. The ambassadors immediately invited us and as soon as I arrived I understood the reason why they had not eaten. I started at once to taste these things in order to instruct them and to make them understand by my example that one must have faith in the natural goodness of men and not doubt it foolishly. When I tasted the things without fear, an action which to them appeared foolishly daring, one of them expressed his thought, "Father, do they never poison people?" Such were our companions in these important matters, as the reader must remember in order to understand what we were up against for many months. On the one hand, we were burdened with a people full of suspicions and lacking in knowledge of the external world, while on the other hand God assisted us much in this affair of great promise.

21. During these days it seemed to our leaders that the Moscovite ambassador was too slow in coming, and they wrote him a letter asking him to hurry because of the reasons mentioned before.[127] To this letter he sent a forthright answer. He expressed his astonishment that for the negotiation of a peace treaty they had come with so great a number of people, and he said that, having come closer to the town than was in accord with the law

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that there was no other appropriate place to camp, and that if upon his arrival he could find such a place elsewhere they would comply with his request. He also complained about the ignorance of his Mongol interpreter and proposed that in the future the Latin language be used. (A subtle hint that the Jesuits be sent to him). Some Moscovite deputies came to repay the visit of the mandarins. They inquired about the number of people that were to participate in the negotiations. This inquiry was made in such a way that the Chinese were offended and resolved to ask Golovin not to send similar persons again. HALDE, *Description ...*, IV, pp. 187-188.

[126] This took place on the 12th. See Note 125.

[127] See Note 125.

[128] See Note 125.

como em terra alhea, muito urbana e branda, mandando alguns homens a visitá-llo ao caminho e diser-lhe que a necessidade os obrigara a alojar-se neste lugar, pois pellos lugares circunvesinhos não havia pasto pera os animais, nem lugar conveniente pera o alojamento, da qual verdade, se sua excellencia duvidava, mandasse gente sua a apontar-lhe lugar sufficiente e que logo se mudarião. Ouvindo o Moscovita esta urbanidade mandou diser apressaria sua chegada pera em tudo dar gosto no que pudesse a suas excellencias e ajuda.[129] Aos 17 mandou diser que alguns barcos que ficavão junto por onde havia de passar sua gente se devião retirar e sem isso não virião. Pello que forão obrigados a retirar os barcos aquelle dia em que tinhão algumas bombardas cavalgadas, de cuja salva nam tinha o Moscovita ambição, ou se não quis someter (que parece o mais provavel) debaixo de seu arbitrio, passando debaixo de suas bocas. Logo no dia seguiente pella manhã mandou diser que já chegara, e neste dia começarão a entrar varias jangadas, em que aquelles sofredores do trabalho por falta de barcos fasem suas viagens.[130] A verdade hé, que o embaixador moscovita havia dias que por terra tinha chegado, o que nós conhecemos claramente pellas trombetas e charamelas e outros indicios que os nossos não alcançavão.[131] Porem quis cunctando restituere,[132] ou abater a ignorancia da presunção. Neste mesmo dia se mandarão de huma e outra parte vizitar, e aos 19 o mesmo, resolvendo-se tudo em boas palavras de huma e outra parte. Mostrarão os nossos embaixadores muitas veses desejo que lhes mandassem o lingoa que sabia falar latim, por se verem embaraçados e confusos com as outras rudes e incultas. Porem o Moscovita nunca respondeo a isto. O certo hé que elle desejava de nós o mesmo, mas os nossos embaixadores se não atrevião a fase-llo por não levarmos o officio nem nome de lingoa.[133] Pello que se consumirão muitos dias em confusão e sem fructo, indo e vindo os lingoas com sua gente só pera tratar do modo em como se devião de ajuntar.

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4 o *om. t1* || 21 alçançavão *t1* || 27 a isto *om. t2*

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[129] See Note 125.

[130] The names of these boats used by the Russians were : *doshchanik, strugi, lodii* and *kochi.* KERNER, *op. cit.*, pp. 165, 167, 171 ; BADDELEY, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 246, n. 4, 48, n. 1, 23 ; RAVENSTEIN, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

[131] Gerbillon says that the Moscovite Plenipotentiary notified the

of nations, it was absolutely necessary that they retreat a little.[128] To this they answered not by letter but viva voce, and in a very polite tone, as fitted their being on foreign soil, that necessity had obliged them to stay at that place, as in the surrounding territories there was neither pasture for the animals nor a convenient place where they could stay. If he doubted this, he could send emissaries who could appoint a place more suitable and then they would move at once. Having this answer, the Moscovite ambassador said that he would hasten his arrival and give satisfaction and assistance to their Excellencies in everything possible.[129] On the 17th the Moscovite ambassador sent messengers to tell our ambassadors that some of our boats which were near the place where he had to cross must withdraw. On that day, therefore, these boats, on which there were some mounted guns, had to be pulled away either because the Moscovite did not wish to hear their salvoes or, which is more probable, because he did not want to recognize their power as he walked by the guns. Then on the next day he let it be known that he would arrive soon. On the same day some fishing rafts, on which these hard-working and much-suffering people travel, started to arrive.[130] The fact of the matter is that the Moscovite ambassador had already arrived by the overland route several days before, as we knew from the blowing of trumpets and flutes and from other signs which our ambassadors did not understand.[131] He wanted to assert his authority by delaying,[132] or perhaps it was to affront their presumptious ignorance. On this same day and also on the 19th both sides sent emissaries, but this resulted in nothing but fine words. Our ambassadors had frequently expressed their desire that the Moscovite send them his Latin interpreter because they were embarrassed and confused by the rude and uncivilized people who had been sent. The Moscovite, however, never obliged. He himself most certainly desired the same from our ambassadors, but they did not dare to oblige either, as we were not invested with the office or title of interpreter.[133] Thus many days were wasted in the confused comings and goings of interpreters and their companions who tried to settle the means and ways of the future meeting.

Chinese ambassadors that the conference could not be started for two or three more days as his entourage had not yet arrived. Some mandarins were sent to repay this visit. HALDE, *Description* ..., IV, p. 188.

[132] A literary allusion to " unus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem publicam ". Ennius quoted by CICERO, *De Off.* 1, 24, 84; from the *Annals of Ennius* (Fragm. 313 Vallens), who applied the verse to Q. Fabius Cunctator. VIRGIL appropriates the verse, *Aen.* 6, 846.

[133] See Note 125.

Aos 21 consentindo huma e outra parte depois de muita controversia, se resolveo que assistirião de cada banda 300 soldados [134] e nas barcas (que devião estar no meyo do rio na mesma distancia em que a sua povoação ficava do lugar em que se farião as conferencias) estarião 500 soldados e não mais. Aos 22, não sabendo eu de nada do passado, por ser tudo feito de quem da sua nenhuma experiencia confiava demasiado (e eu me querer lançar de fora emquanto as circunstancias o permitião), não sei com que fundamento, que eu não atribuo a outro, mais que o não saber que cousa hé o mundo fora da China, se excitou desconfiança e receyos em nossos embaixadores [135] ou por confusão e rusticidade do lingoa de que usarão, e se não guardarão da nossa parte as condiçoens determinadas o dia dantes sobre o modo e numero de soldados, chegando as nossas barcas a terra e sahindo nella toda a soldadesca. Logo reclamarão os Moscovitas e romperão o concerto. Pello que ensinados os nossos já as suas custas (que nós deixamos correr pera ser mais limpa nossa demanda) nos mandarão convidar e recorrendo a nós que fossemos persuadir aos Moscovitas que condecendessem com sua resolução. Fomos e, recebendo-nos o embaixador com cortesia (a quem eu tinha escrito huma carta de Pekim por seu enviado, [136] dispondo-o ao que depois o Senhor mostrou aprovar tudo pera gloria sua, vista a inclinação deste Emperador, de cuja vontade expressamente me constava), lhe persuadimos a que em tudo condecendesse a nossos embaixadores : a saber, que chegassem as barcas a terra e dellas sahisse a soldadesca, mas que não discorresse à vontade de cada hum. [137] Voltei eu e meu companheiro com a reposta. Com tudo não sei que tem a desconfiança, ou que sospeita tinha entrado em [10r] nossos embaixadores (se não foi medo), que de nenhum modo, estando já tudo aparelhado e concedido, não querião passar o rio, salvo levando comsigo muito mais gente ; [138] o que o Moscovita, vendo-os que vacilavão e se mostravão inconstantes e sospeitosos, não queria conceder, declarando que tinha já suas sospeitas, vendo os nossos duvi-

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32 querião *t2*

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[134] Gerbillon says that it was on the 20th that it was agreed upon that the conferences were to open on the 22nd, and also the manner in which the meetings were to be held. The two Jesuits tried to convince the Chinese ambassadors, who for the first time participated in such a conference, that the difficulties created by the Moscovite were due to the fact that the Chinese delegation had come with such a large number of people and soldiers. The Jesuits also tried to assure the Chinese ambassadors that all the arrangements were in harmony with the " Law of Nations ". HALDE, *Description* ..., IV, pp. 188-189.

[135] This distrust of the Chinese ambassadors, Gerbillon tells us, was caused by the general of the imperial troops in Eastern Tartary, who

22. On the 21st, after a long controversy, both parties agreed that each should be accompanied by three hundred soldiers.[134] Also in the boats, which would have to stay in the river at the same distance from the meeting place as was the town, there should be not more than five hundred soldiers. Without my knowledge, on the 22nd, our ambassadors, becoming distrustful and afraid,[135] did not observe the conditions laid down the day before regarding the disposition and number of soldiers. All the soldiers disembarked when the boats reached the banks of the river. I did not want to get involved in the affair unless it were unavoidable. Apparently the whole thing was arranged by ignorant people who had too much confidence in their own ability. They acted, for some unknown reason, possibly it was the fact that they did not know the world outside China, or they might have been deceived through the confusion and rusticity of the interpreters whom they had used. The Moscovite protested and broke the agreement. Our ambassadors realized the price they had to pay for their action (which we let go at that as the Chinese demands were fairer) and called us to go to urge the Moscovite to agree to the resolution they reached. So we went and the Moscovite received us with courtesy. It was he to whom I had written a letter from Peking through his envoy,[136] disposing him for things which he later agreed to. It must be said to his credit the envoy knew the inclination of this Emperor whose express will was known to me. We now persuaded him to agree in every detail to the proposals of our ambassadors, namely, that the boats would go to the shore and that the soldiers would disembark although they were to be confined to one place.[137] We returned with his answer. I do not know what kind of distrust or suspicion had taken hold of our ambassadors unless it was fear. They did not want, under any circumstances, to cross the river unless they could take many more people with them, even though everything had been already settled and agreed upon.[138] The Moscovite, seeing them hesitant and

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had frequently been deceived by the Moscovites. Halde, *Description...* IV, p. 190. This refers to Sabsu who, since 1683 was Military Governor of Heilunchiang and as such had frequent dealings with the Russians. See Note 64 and 240.

[136] This envoy probably was Korovin who had come to Peking in 1688. Loginov, Golovin's envoy of 1689, had not yet returned since only three days earlier Golovin had no news about him. See Note 125. This letter of Pereira has not been found yet.

[137] According to Gerbillon, the reason which convinced Golovin to consent was that they (the two Jesuits) pointed out to him how inexperienced the Chinese were in similar matters. Halde, *Description ...*, IV, p. 190.

[138] See Note 135.

dar de sua fee que se deve a todas as gentes, das quais os Chinas se lanção fora. Pello que disião os nossos querendo-se alimpar, que os Moscovitas os queriam enganar e não as pazes, e por isto os não deixavão levar soldados à vontade: no que eu respondia, fasendo-me surgião destas chagas, que o Moscovita se devia crer, e o não admitir mais soldadesca, era somente ponto de honra e não estratagema.[139]

De nenhum modo se resolvião a passar o rio nossos embaixadores, em cuja conquista, sem fruito, consumi forças e tempo, cortando-me o coração romper-se hum tal negocio por não saberem do mundo, vendo principalmente a todos os mandarins presentes que com assenos me animavam a persuadir a nossos embaixadores à passagem. Nada, ainda que gritando, pude concluir (porque parece julgavão de outros conforme, o que a propria conciencia os fasia reos), só com a seguinte resolução, dizendo:[140] " Senhores, hé mister saber que os Moscovitas são homens de rezão e não feras do mato: não são perfidos, que com capa de buscar paz, nos queirão faser injuria. Seria ao mundo todo afronta manifesta, e a ignorantes de rizo, faser tantos gastos, tantos empenhos e tantos trabalhos, e o que mais hé, a nosso Emperador muito estranho o depois de tudo isto voltarmos sem abrir as portas a que batemos e sem ver o rosto ao Moscovita, estando em sua caza, e bem creyo seria disso pouco contente e satisfeito. O que considerando, eu me offereço a colocar a boca de hum mosquete dos Moscovitas sobre minhas costas por todo o tempo das conferencias em penhor de todo o risco; e avendo alguma perfida aleivozia de sua banda, sem duvida serei eu o primeiro e mais arriscado e morrendo algum devo eu ser o mais exposto ". A esta resolução ficarão todos calados, intentique ora tenentes,[141] sem dar resposta. Eis que o tio do Imperador,[142] como prudente e com juizo arresoou deste modo: " Siu ge xim[143] (que hé o meu nome em China) hé homen a quem conhece tanto nosso Emperador, que se dignou por despacho publico a declarar que era homem fiel e digno de credito,[144] estimando-o como a tal há tantos annos de experiencia. Hé homem publico e conhecido, já de idade e não menino, falla com tanta segurança e resolução: não convem, dandolhe nosso Emperador tanto cre-

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24 voltamos *t2* || 32 erat tenentes *t1* || 33 arresou *t1* || 39 *before* rosolução

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[139] See Note 134.

[140] This speech and others to follow, and the circumstances in which they were delivered, bear out Pereira's statement that he and Gerbillon " were not invested with the office or title of interpreter ",

detecting signs of inconsistency and suspicion, did not want to accede to their wish. He said that he was beginning to have his own suspicions when they denied him the confidence one must have in other people. Our ambassadors, therefore, trying to justify themselves, said that the Moscovites' intention to cheat them and not conclude peace was the reason why they did not allow the Chinese to take as many soldiers as they wanted. Making myself surgeon to these diseases, I answered that they should have confidence in the Moscovites and that the dispute about the number of soldiers was a question of honor and not a plot.[139]

23. Nevertheless they refused to carry out the resolution to cross the river, although I exerted much energy and wasted much time. I was heartbroken, seeing this important business being ruined because of their ignorance in the ways of this world, and especially as I saw all the Mandarins present encouraging me with signs to persuade our ambassadors to agree. Everything, however, even my yelling at them, was unsuccessful. They seemingly thought that others were guilty of the same thing of which their own consciences accused them. I finally said,[140] " Sirs, you must realize that the Moscovites are human beings endowed with reason and are not wild beasts ; they are not so perfidious as under the pretext of peace to wish to harm us. It would be an insult to the whole world and make us the laughing stock of the world if, after all the expenses, pledges, and hardships, we returned not having opened the door on which we have knocked and not having met the Moscovites face to face after being in their home. What is more, all this would seem strange to the Emperor and would not, I think, please him in the slightest. Taking all this into consideration, I offer to have the barrel of a Moscovite gun stuck into my ribs for the duration of the conference as a security against all risk, since if they have some evil design undoubtedly I, being the most exposed will be the first to die ". They listened to this proposal in silence.[141] Finally the uncle of the Emperor,[142] a man of prudence and common sense, answered in the following words : " Hsü Jih-sheng[143] (which is my name in Chinese) is a man well-known to our Emperor who in a public dispatch deigned to declare him a loyal man deserving of confidence,[144] and he appraised him as such after many years of experience. He is a public figure and well-known, of advanced age and not a child, and he speaks with

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but that their status transcended that of interpreters.

[141] Refers to VERGIL'S *Aen.* 2, 1 : " conticuere omnes, intentique ora tenebant ".

[142] T'ung Kuo-kang. See Note 1.

[143] Siu ge xim i. e., Hsü Jih-sheng. See Note 7.

[144] See at the beginning of *Diary* 176-177.

dito, nós negar-lho : eu irey só com elle passar o rio ". Vendo os mais a tal resolução calificada com a resão, se levantarão todos e fomos passar o rio, admirando toda a gente e os mesmos embaixadores (que depois o confessarão) nossa efficacia e resolução, e fidelidade em negocio de tanto porte a seu Emperador, vendo metido a caminho o que todos já iulgavão o perdera, e pôr em pee o que já vião arruinado.

Tinha mandado o Moscovita a perguntar a nossos embaixadores se querião que elle aparelhasse lugar commum de conferencias, ou cada parte o seo. Responderão estes, me inscio, et illis muito mais do mundo, que tinhão seu tentorio, e que sua excellecia aparelhasse o seu. Pello que compoz elle o seu do modo seguinte. Havia huma grande e bem ornada tenda com pinturas, oblonga de norte pera o sul,[145] dentro da qual estava todo o pavimento estrado de fermosas alcatifas ; na cabeça correspondente ao sul e banda nossa tinha atravessada huma meza que a tomava quasi toda, em sima da qual havia huma fermosa escrevaninha dourada a modo europeo ; havia mais hum relogio de rodas que media o tempo, que em propor e responder se consumia, e dous fermosos e grandes vazos de prata de obra de relevo, e servindo ao embaixador hum com agoa fresca e azeda, ou idromel, que bebia a cada passo. Sobre a meza tinhão na tenda dependurada huma fermosa cruz engastada em muita pedraria com muita reverencia e respeito. Da parte do poente tinha levantada outra tenda mas pequena, bem pintada, que julgamos ser pera o que o tempo desse de sy.[146] Havia huma cadeira fermosa de damasco amarello com sua pregaria, ou de ouro ou dourada, destinada ao embaixador ; outra somenos vermelha e mais baixa, em que se assentava o governador[147] daquellas terras, e hum banco cuberto de alcatifa, em que se assentava outro homem, que conforme o que vimos, julgamos ser official dos ritos.[148] Nen-

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4 rosolução *t1* || 17 todas *t1 and t2* || 19 relogo *t1* || 21 e *om. t2* || 22 com *om. t1* || 26 disse *t1 and t2*

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[145] For the description of the tent see Halde, *Description ...*, IV, p. 190.

[146] Pereira never explains the purpose of this tent. It probably served as a waiting place for the respective delegations awaiting the arrival of the other.

[147] Ivan Vlasov whose full name and title in the text of the official Latin version of the treaty is given as : " dapifero ac locitenente Jelatomski, Joanne Eustachieviez Wlasoph " (W. Fuchs, *Der Russisch-Chinesiche Vertrag ...*, p. 577) ; in the German translation of the treaty text by Muller (*Sammlung Russ. Geschichte*, II, pp. 434-439) : " der Stolnik und Statthalter von Jelatma Ivan Ostafiewitch Wlassow " (W. Fuchs, *op. cit.*, p. 586) : in the English translation : " Ivan Astaffjevitch Vlassoff, Minister of the Household and Governor-General of

such soundness and resolution that we cannot deny him the confidence which the Emperor has in him. Therefore, I alone shall cross the river with him." When the others saw this reasonable attitude they all got up; we went to cross the river and everyone, even the ambassadors themselves as they confessed later, admired our effective determination and our loyalty to the Emperor in such an important affair. They saw underway again what they thought blocked before, and raised upright what they had seen in ruins.

24. The Moscovite had sent to inquire of our ambassadors if they wanted him to prepare a common meeting place, or if each party should prepare its own. They answered without my advice in a way which for them showed great knowledge of the world: they had their tent and His Excellency should prepare his. The Moscovite then erected in a north-south direction a large and well-ordered oblong tent[145] with pictures and a floor covered with beautiful carpets. At its head, which was the southern side and towards us, he had a large desk, occupying almost the whole area, on top of which was a beautiful gilded writing table in European style. Besides this there was a clock, which kept the time of the proposals and answers, and also two fine, large, silver vessels decorated with reliefs. From them the ambassador was served either with a sour drink of vinegar and cold water or honeyed water, which he took frequently. Above the table, hanging from the tent, there was a beautiful cross decorated with precious stones which the Moscovites held in great reverence and respect. To the west there was another smaller, well-painted tent which I think served the purpose of which I shall speak in due course.[146] There was an excellent chair of yellow damask for the ambassador with nails either of gold or gilded. One in ordinary bright red and smaller, on which the Governor[147] of those parts was sitting, and a bench covered with carpets on which another man, whom we thought

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Elatomsk" (*Treaties and Conventions*..., I, p. 3-7); in the Russian version (in *Sbornik*): "Stolnik i Namstnik Elatomskoi, Ivan Ostafevich Vlasov" (W. Fuchs, *op. cit.*, p. 592). For the ethymology and translation of these titles see Cahen, *op. cit.*, p. 36, n. 1. Vlasov at this time was *Voevode* of Nerchinsk, which post he retained till February, 1690, when Golovin, in accordance with his powers, appointed Theodore Isaevich Skrypitsyn, a colonel of his regiment, to take Vlasov's place as *Voevode* of Nerchinsk. A son of Vlasov, Peter Ivanovich, was appointed to the Sava Vladislavich embassy to China in 1725. Cahen, *op. cit.*, pp. 78, n. 1, 198, n. 5.

[148] The name and title of this man as given in the Latin text of the treaty (*Sbornik*..., p. 1-6) is: "Cancellario Simeon Cornitski" (W. Fuchs, *op. cit.*, p. 577); in the German translation by Muller (*Sammlung Russ. Geschichte*, II, pp. 434-439): "der Diak Semon Kornitzkoi" (W. Fuchs, *op. cit.*, p. 586); in the English translation: "Semen Kornitsky,

hum outro assento houve, mas todo o mais acompanhamento (havendo muitos) e honrados officiais de [10v] guerra, capitães e coroneis, estavão em pé, sem mais nenhum se atrever a assentar em sua presença, donde se collige era o embaixador homen de muita authoridade, consideração e nome, que se assinava assim : Odolnicius Locitenens Brancensis Theodorus Alexius Oviez Golovin.[149]

Mandarão os nossos embaixadores suas tendas a modo tartaro de cor preta, bem feita mas modesta, e a colocarão junto à sua, ficando a meza como comua, mas dominada de seu senhor, e da parte do oriente colocarão outra mais pequena pera os mesmos effeitos que os Moscovitas a sua ao poente.[150] Sahirão nossos embaixadores desta corte como se fossem elles sós no mundo (o que não posso deixar de dizer pera não faltar à verdade de sincera relação, e não referir conceitos apaixonados), sahirão com o acompanhamento e soldadesca assima referida, e com muita resão gloriabantur in multitudine sua. Porque bem creyo que a nenhum outro monarcha do mundo seria possivel comboyar hum exercito de cavallaria tal, 40 dias de caminho por hum deserto (ainda que gastamos 49, levando todo o necessario e mantimentos em camellos e carruagem), e 90 barcas capazes de artelharia, que levavão por agoa com mil soldados e mais de 2000 de serviço, que à vista de Nip chu não deixarão de dar aos Moscovitas em que cuidar.[151] No aparato porem erão suas tendas grosseiro e inexperto. Levavão algumas toscas esteiras com que em lugar daquellas fermosas alcatifas cobrião o pavimento de suas modestas tendas. Em sabendo que o Moscovita tinha cadeiras fermosas, não tendo elles mais que seus coxins pera no chão se assentarem a seu modo, fiserão toda a noite trabalhar os carpinteros, fabricando grosseiros bancos como o tempo deu lugar, sobre os quaes escassamente se podião colocar os seus coxins. Aparelhavão suas lanças de guarda, que erão 16 em tudo. Sabendo porem as muitas com que sahia o Moscovita,

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1 asseto *t1* || 3 a *om. t1* || 10 como *om. t1* || 13 só *t1* || 15 o *over* || 16 e *om. t1* || 18 combayar *t1* || 21 arthelheria *t2* || 22 2000 *underlined*

Deacon of the Orthodox Church " (*Treaties and Conventions* ..., I, p. 3-7) ; in the Russian version (in *Sbornik* ...) : " Dyak Semen Kornitskoi " (W. Fuchs, *op. cit.*, p. 592). Cahen calls him " le diacre d'Ieniseisk, Simeon Kornitskoi ". Cahen, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

[149] Odolnicius Locitenens Brancensis Theodorus Alexius Oviez Golovin. Golovin's title in the Russian text of the Treaty is : " Blichneo Okolnichei i Namstnik Brianskoi, Theodor Alexevich Golovin " (W. Fuchs, *op. cit.*, p. 592). In German Muller (*op. cit.*) renders it " Der Blischnei Ocolnitchei und Statthalter von Brjansk Fedor Alexeevitch Golovin ". The *Oviez* in the Latin text, as in Pereira, is a result of trying to latinize the name Alexeevich, which in the process is being

to be an official of rites, sat.[148] There was no other seat; the rest of the company consisting of many honorable officials of war, captains and colonels, remained on their feet and no one dared to sit in the presence of the ambassador. From this fact we gathered that he was a man of great authority, respect and rank. He signed his name as follows: Odolnicius Locitenens Brancensis Theodorus Alexius Oviez Golovin.[149]

25. Our ambassadors sent their own Tartar-styled black tents, well but more modestly made, to be put up next to the Russian ambassador's in such a way that the desk served both parties but was dominated by its owner. To the east of this tent they put a smaller one for the same purpose as the Moscovites had put one to the west.[150] Our ambassadors departed from the Court in Peking as if they were alone in the world (which I cannot fail to repeat in order to be truthful and sincere in my report and not to omit their conceit) with an army as described above. They gloried justly in their great number, for I sincerely believe that for no other monarch would it have been possible to send such a mounted army on a forty day trip through the desert (although it took us forty-nine days, taking all necessary things and supplies with us on camels and ox-carts), with ninety boats all to transport artillery, with one thousand soldiers and with two thousand servants who, when they appeared at Nipchu, caused the Moscovites no end of concern.[151] The style of their tents, however, was common and unelaborate; they had some coarse grass mats instead of carpets with which they covered the floor of their modest tents. Knowing that the Moscovite had beautiful chairs and that they had nothing on which they sat on the floor according to their custom, they ordered the carpenters to work all night in order to fabricate such rough benches as time permitted and on which there was hardly enough room to place their cushions. They had sixteen lances for the guards, but knowing that the Moscovites had

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separated into two words "Alexius" and "Oviez". The date of Golovin's birth is unknown. He was the son of the *Voevode* of Tobolsk, Alexei Petrovich Golovin, who was partisan of Peter the Great. His appointment as *Voevode* of Tobolsk by the Prince Golitsin, who during Peter's minority wielded great power as head of the *Posolski Prikaz* (1682-1689), was probably due to the fact that Golitsin wanted to strengthen his own position by giving appointments to Peter's partisans to draw them away from him. Our Golovin already a *stolnik*, was made *okolnich* and *namyestnik* or Governor-general of Briansk. CAHEN, *op. cit.*, p. 35, n. 4. For Golovin's activities after Nerchinsk see *ibid.*, p. 52.

[150] See Note 146.

[151] See Note 120.

arcabuzes e outras diversas armas ao modo antigo romano, iulgarão mais assertado ir à modesta deixando suas 16.

Passamos o rio na forma sobredita, vestidos todos os mandarins, que erão cantidade, com seus vestidos nuciais, de dragões e outros animais, insignias do officio de cada hum, que parecia com o fundo de ouro, aos olhos muito lustroso, mas era de pouco preço. Os mais soldados de damasco e outra seda semelhante à vontade. Passado o rio cavalgarão todos nos cavallos que a nado tinhão passado dante-mão. Havia 4 fermosas sellas em tudo, a saber, a minha que o Emperador me deu, toda bordada de ouro de muito custo, e a de meu companheiro, e as dos dous embaixadores Tum que Kam,[152] tio do Emperador, e Som go tu,[153] tio do Principe herdeiro. As mais erão muito ordinarias ao modo china, mas sufficientes. Antes que sahisse o Moscovita, sahirão primeiro duas companhias de soldados com muita pompa, vestidos todos os soldados de vermelho, com seus capitaens e officiais por sua ordem, como em procissão a passo lento precedendo-os varios choros de charamellas bem armonicas e 4 fermosas trombetas bem temperadas, que de quando em quando se união em boa consonancia e graciosa com as mesmas charamellas e com aplauso. Seguião tambem tambores a cavallo e por sua ordem se despunhão aquellas armas e insignias dos Romanos de que assima falei. Depois de tudo se seguia o embaixador com seu acompanhamento de cavallo que não era muito mas bastante. Acompanhavão-no os dous assima ditos a cavallo aos lados. Sua sella muito pequena, só como pera correr a gineta capaz de pouco ornato, mas a gualdrapa de fermosa tella de prata de Milão que a modo europeo cobria lustrosamente todo o corpo do cavallo pella parte superior.

Chegando já de huma e outra parte perto dos tentorios, pararão todos, continuando elles com suas trombetas e charamellas e nós às surdas. Tomarão resolução de se apeigarem, que igualmente se fez com presteza de huma e outra das partes no mesmo ponto. Entrarão em suas tendas huns e outros e ficando da parte dos Moscovitas todos em pé, salvos os 3 assima ditos.[154] Quiserão os nossos imitar esta grandesa, obrigando a todos os mandarins ficassem em pé por todo o tempo, havendo mais de 100 e graves, dando só a 4 superioris momenti hum banquinho, no que todos por sua honra facilmente consentirão. Eu e meu companheiro ficamos assentados entre huns e outros embaixadores.[155] Vestia o Mosco-

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2 16 *underlined* || 15 primeiro *om. t1* || 16-7 os soldados *om. t2* || 22 tombores *t1* || 26 dito *t1 and t2* || 32 apeyarem *t2* || 33 outra parte *t2* || 38 superiores *t1*

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[152] See Note 1.

[153] See Note 2.

[154] Golovin, Vlasov and Kornotskoy, see Notes 149, 148, 147.

many more as well as arquebuses and other arms in the ancient Roman style, they thought it better to leave their sixteen lances behind.

26. We crossed the river in the manner mentioned before. All the Mandarins, who were in great number, dressed in their best attire decorated with dragons and other animals, the insignia of their respective offices, which on the golden background made a great impression on the eyes but were not of any great value. The rest of the soldiers were dressed in damask or other similar material. After crossing the river we all rode on horses which had swum across the river before us. There were four beautiful saddles : mine, which the Emperor had given to me and which, decorated with gold, was of great value ; my companion's ; and those of the two ambassadors, T'ung Kuo-Kang,[152] uncle of the Emperor, and Songgatu,[153] uncle of the heir apparent. The others were very ordinary in Chinese style but good enough. Before the Moscovite left his lodging, there came out two companies of soldiers with great pomp and with their captains and officers in order marching slowly as if in a procession, preceded by some bands of well-harmonized flutes and four trumpets which from time to time united their tunes with those of flutes with much applause. They were followed by some drums mounted on horses, after which came in order those arms and insignia in Roman style of which I spoke before. Then came the ambassador on horseback with a suite which though not excessive was quite adequate. He was flanked by two persons on horseback. His saddle was very small, similar to those used in racing and not large enough to be decorated. The blanket which covered the whole upper part of the back of the horse was the color of Milano silver and in European style.

27. As they approached the tents both parties stopped ; their flutes and trumpets continued to play, but we were in silence. It had been decided that both parties would descend simultaneously from their horses and this was readily done. Both parties entered the tents. All the Moscovites, except the three[154] which we mentioned before, remained standing. Our ambassadors wanted to imitate this impression of grandeur and consequently obliged all the Mandarins, more than one hundred and some of them in high office, to stand during the whole time ; only the four most important ones received a bench. In order to honor their ambassadors they all consented to this. My companion and myself were seated

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[155] This again confirms Pereira's statement that he and Gerbillon were not mere interpreters. If that was the only position they held they would hardly have been treated with such honor on this occasion.

vita soberanamente de suas pelles preciozas cubertas de damasco, mudando cada dia o vestido do mesmo preço, e os barretes (porque não usão chapeos), que cuido valerião com a pedraria que continha cada hum mais de 1000 cruzados. De sua ilharga direita ficava hum mancebo [11r] junto delle com hum bastão ou cetro de prata dourada (ao que parecia) todo engastado com muita pedraria de muita valia. Assentado em sua cadeira, a enchia bem materialiter com a grossura, e formaliter com sua experteza e desafogo com que falava. Era homem bem entendido, agudo e experimentado em negocios. Sabia latim, mas sempre usou de lingoa,[156] que era o mesmo mestre que lho ensinara. Estava senhor de sy, sem perturbação. Finalmente homen digno desta função. Entre os nossos não faltarão homens agudos e prudentes, mas todos manqueiavão na experiencia do mundo, fora da sua China. Nem o Moscovita teria tais partidos e ventagens se viesse dentro da China, porque o obrigarião (como os passados) aos custumes chinas ou voltar-se sem as pazes, que alcançou com igual honra, obrigando-os a exire de terra sua, tratando as pazes nos limites que se pertendião, não querendo vir a esta corte.[157]

Assentados todos, como fica dito, se comessou a tratar o negocio começando (conforme os Chinas tinhão insinuado em suas cartas dos annos passados[158] (no que se entrava em longa disputa[159]

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4 sua *om. t1* || 14 no experiencia *t1* || 16 ao custumes *t1*

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[156] His name according to the official Russian report of the embassy was Andrei Belobotski or Andre Belobotskii (Cahen, *op. cit.*, p. vii-ix). Cahen also gives the name Andre Aristofor Bialobotskii (*ibid.*, p. 37, n. 2). His own signature is Andrey Bialobochi (*ibidem*). Other variant readings of this name are : Andrei Bielobotsky (Pavlovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 125) ; Andrew Belobotski (Liu Hsüan-min, *op. cit.*, p. 436). He was a "gentilhomme polonais, traducteur de latin" (Cahen, *op. cit.*, p. 37, n. 2). Gerbillon says : "les Moscovites exposerent leur commission par la bouche d'un de leur gentihommes de l'Ambassade, qui étoit Polonois de Nation, et qui avoit étudié en Philosophie et en Théologie à Cracovie ; il s'exploquoit aisément et assez clairement en Latin". Halde, *Description ...*, IV, p. 191. Pereira, as we shall see later on, thought that he was a Roman Catholic.

[157] Golovin's mission, as we have seen before, was occasioned by the arrival in Moscow of two letters of K'ang-hsi to the Tsar, probably sent via Albazin together with K'ang-hsi's edict to the garrison of Albazin (Cahen, *op. cit.*, pp. 33-35 ; Liu Hsüan-min, *op. cit.*, p. 411, nn. 99, 103). These letters arrived in Moscow in November 1685.

between the two delegations.[155] The Moscovite was dressed in an array of magnificent furs covered with damask which he changed everyday to another equally impressive one. He also changed caps (as they do not use hats), the price of one of which, together with its precious stones, I think was more than one thousand cruzados. At his right, close to him, there was a young man holding a baton of great value which was of gilded silver at least, ornamented with many precious stones. Seated, he filled the chair materialiter with his bulk and filled it formaliter with the air of experience and directness with which he spoke. He was an intelligent man, acute and experienced in negotiations, and though he knew Latin he always used the interpreter[156] who had been his teacher of this language. Master of himself without ostentatious show, he was all in all worthy of this function. Among our group there were some intelligent and prudent men, but all were lacking in experience of the world outside China. The Moscovite, however, would never have had this advantageous position had he come to China, because there they would have obliged him, as they did those who came in the past, either to submit to the Chinese customs or return home without peace. Since he did not want to go to the Court of China, he achieved equality in honor through obliging them to leave their own country and to negotiate peace at the pretended borders.[157]

28. When they were all seated, in the manner related before, the negotiations started on the matters which the Chinese had noted in their letters of the years past.[158] There began long use-

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Golovin received his first instructions at the beginning of 1686 (Cahen, *ibid.*, pp. 36, n. 3, 37, III-IV). Even before the return to Moscow of Venyukov and Favorov who had been sent to Peking to announce Golovin's mission and of the letters they brought from K'ang-hsi (July 1687), the Russian Court had decided upon further concession and had sent new instructions to Golovin. Not content with all this, the Russian Court, at the end of the year 1687, after the return of Venyukov and Favorov, thinking it possible that the Chinese Emperor might insist that the forthcoming diplomatic conferences be held in China, sent still a new set of instructions to Golovin in order to meet this possible eventuality. Moreover, Golovin was ordered to send to Peking the bearer of these newest instructions, Ivan Loginov, with letters reproducing the arrangements set forth in these latest instructions. When these instructions reached Golovin in July, 1688, he had already, in February of that year, sent Korovin to Peking. Korovin arrived in the Chinese capital in March 1688 and left Peking in April, bringing with him a letter from K'ang-hsi fixing Selenginsk as the place of the conference. The Chinese delegation left for Selenginsk on May 30, 1688, but on July 22 was forced to turn back, informing Golovin to this effect by a letter which reached him on the 1 or 2 of August.

e inutil perda de tempo), o que vendo eu e considerando conforme a obrigação que o Emperador impusera em semelhantes circunstancias e iulgando ser acertado,[160] como a experiencia mostrou), disse a nossos embaixadores : “ Senhores, o tratar de agravos passados creyo não serve de outra cousa que debalde gastar o tempo, porque nem elles nem nós cederemos às injurias, nem nenhum quererá reconhecer a culpa. Se elles nos matarão gente, hé certo que emquanto a matavão lhes não amarrarão as mãos ; sem duvida os nossos se defendião, o que não fiserão sine sanguinis effusione, mas matando os que podião. Se nos roubarão, hé certo que os nossos não olhavão entretanto pera elles, nem lhes perdoarão o furto, e o mesmo digo do mais. Elles dizem de nós o mesmo que lhes imputamos, e mais ainda, e sahirão mais com algumas de que dificilmente nos livraremos com infinito processo. O que suposto, parece seria mais acertado o virar ou dobrar aqui a folha e tratar em solido da divizão de terras e firmar a paz, que hé o que se espera : doutro modo nem nós, nem elles (tendo gastado longa disputa) quererão ficar debaixo ” .[161] Logo pareceo a todos bem, e o mesmo Moscovita folgou muito, depondo tudo o passado e comessando pella divisão de terras e mais negocio de mayor consideração.

De quando em quando pegava o Moscovita (essentado em sua cadeira) em seus fermosos vazos de prata bebendo agoa com muita soberania. Os nossos assentados no seu branco banco beberão chá em suas porçolanas de pao, como fasem a cada passo, mas charoadas huma vez : pondo porem os olhos naquelles fermosos vazos

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7 elle *t1 and t2* || 18 a tdos *t1*

Thereupon, in January, 1689, Golovin sent Ivan Loginov to Peking, in accordance with the instructions Loginov had brought him from Moscow. Loginov arrived in Peking in May. Far from showing himself disinclined to diplomatic conferences, K'ang-hsi designated Nerchinsk. (Cahen, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-47). Consequently, Pereira's statement that the Chinese were forced to leave their own country is not quite correct. In spite of the willingness of the Russians to negotiate in Peking or elsewhere in China, K'ang-hsi chose Nerchinsk as the place of the conference. His reasons for this we have seen later on.

[158] That there had been some letters sent by the Chinese to Moscow before Spathar's mission in 1675 is clear from the fact that among the twelve points presented by him to the *Li-fan-yüan* the first one was : “ That all letters formerly written by the Chinese in their own language to the Russian Court be translated. That a definite language be agreed upon, to be used both for letters and references in the future. ” (Liu Hsüan-min, *op. cit.*, p. 407). Some of the letters referred to by Spathar might have been the ones which Daniel Archinsky, *Voevode* of Nerchinsk, received in 1670 from the military Governor of Ninguta, complaining about the encroachment of the cossacks and

less disputations.[159] I considered the obligation the Emperor had imposed on me in similar circumstances and judged it proper according to past experiences to interrupt[160]. I said to our ambassadors, "Sirs, to bring up the offenses of the past, in my opinion, does not serve any purpose. It wastes time because neither they nor we are willing to admit these injuries and neither side will want to recognize its responsibility. When they killed our people, our hands were not tied; doubtless our people defended themselves, not without bloodshed, killing whom they could. If they robbed us, our people certainly did not watch them do it without retaliating, nor did they pardon them the theft. And the same is true about other things. They say all this about us and even more, and they might come forth with some facts from which we could not extricate ourselves without great difficulties and endless arguments. Supposing such, it seems to me that it would be better to turn over a new page and to negotiate seriously the division of the land and the peace treaty which we want, for neither we nor they, having wasted much time in disputation, would want to recognize defeat."[161] That seemed agreeable to all and the Moscovite himself decided to let bygones be bygones and to begin with the division of land and with other more important affairs.

29. Now and again from his high seat the Moscovite ambassador reached out to one of those silver vessels from which he sipped water with an imperial flourish. But our ambassadors, ensconced on bare benches, followed their wont in continually drinking "cha" out of wooden cups which were ornamented with but a thin coat

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demanding the surrender of Ghantimur. This led to the mission of Milovanov. (Liu Hsüan-min, *op. cit.*, pp. 405-407). Milovanov brought back anothar letter written by K'ang-hsi. The arrival of this letter in Moscow led to Spathar's mission. Even after the failure of the Spathar embassy, the Chinese continued sending letters. In 1683, K'ang-hsi sent an edict to the garrison of Albazin. (See Note 157). In 1686, while the second Chinese campaign was in full operation on the Amur, K'ang-hsi sent another letter to the Russian Court through the Dutch embassy and through Father Grimaldi (See Note 105). Other letters were sent by the Chinese Emperor on the occasion of Venyukov's and Favorov's visit (See Note 106). All these letters contained China's grievances and complaints about Russian encroachment on Chinese territories on the Amur and the Ghantimur affair.

[159] It is implied that the long and useless disputations ensued in connection with the grievances.

[160] What these obligations or instructions were we do not know. Pereira never reveals them in detail, probably because they were of a secret nature. However, this again seems to confirm the assumption that the position of Gerbillon and Pereira exceeded that of simple interpreters.

[161] See Note 159.

de prata, a sombra destes lhe deu o ar a porçolanas tal que as tolheo, obrigando-as a perpetuo recolhimento, e assombradas de tal ar, temerão ser maior o perigo em seus senhores aparecendo, que a rigurosa abstinencia dos Tartaros que não podem passar hum quarto sem beberiarem de seu leite. Não foi o fausto daquelles pequeno quebranto nestes, que sahirão desta corte como a mandar e não disputar. Em primeiro ponto pedião nossos embaixadores aos Moscovitas a mesma povoação de Nip chu por limites, deixando-lhes somente a povoação livre.[162] Com muita galantaria respondeo o Moscovita: "Agradeço vos muito a mercê e vos dou graças por me deixardes aqui dormir esta noite",[163] cuja ironia encheo de bile e de não menor vergonha a nossos embaixadores, o que elles por então souberão mas não totalmente dissimular.[164] Isto, e outras cousas odiozas lhe deixei dizer pellos lingoas, disendo que em nomes de terras e cousas em que poderia haver perigo ou equivocação de nomes as fiserem diser pellos lingoas das terras mais peritos, que eu pera isso não era necessario ainda que presente a tudo. Desta ironia se queixarão comigo depois nossos embaixadores, disendo zombara delles o Moscovita, a que eu respondi o que convinha e entendia. Gastou-se muito tempo este dia sem

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1 a porçolanas *corr. from* temerão || 2 tolhou *t1* || 5 beberejarem *t2* || 11 deixares *t1 and t2* || 16 as *om. t1*

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[162] There is a slight discrepancy between the report of Pereira and Gerbillon in the description of the events on the 22nd and 23rd. After describing the visit he and Pereira paid the Moscovite, Gerbillon goes on to describe the first meeting. According to him the Moscovites explained their commission and purpose through their Latin interpreter and asked the Chinese ambassadors to do the same and to proceed and make their first proposal. The Chinese refused and urged the Moscovites to make their proposal first. The Moscovites then asked the Chinese ambassadors about their credentials and were willing to produce their own. The Chinese refused this, too, saying that they would take his word. The Moscovites then, leaving aside former grievances and quarrels, proposed the Amur river as the boundary between the two empires. The Chinese refused to accept this proposal because, they said, there were many territories beyond the Amur which belonged to China, especially the forests which abounded in fur-bearing animals ; they proposed (beyond what they hoped to obtain) the Selenga as the line of demarcation because, they claimed, ever since the Mongol Dynasty (Yüan) had ruled China, the population of these territories paid tribute to China. The Moscovites refused this proposal in their turn and since it was getting late the meeting adjourned. According to Gerbillon, the alternate Chinese proposal with Nipchu as the boundary was made on the 23rd. Halde, *Description* ..., IV, pp. 189-192.

[163] To understand the situation, it will be helpful to see the instructions both delegations had received from their respective sovereigns. Golovin's first instructions, drafted at the beginning of 1686, fixed the

of paint. These cups were seized with embarrassed fright, as it were, when they looked upon the other beautiful silver utensils and began to fear that the precariousness of their owners' position would increase when it became apparent that the abstemious Tartars could not pass a quarter of an hour without their milk. The good fortune of the Russian caused our ambassadors, who had come not to dispute, but to rule, great irritation. At first our ambassadors proposed the town of Nipchu as the border line, leaving the town itself to the Moscovites.[162] The Moscovite answered with much gallantry: "I am very grateful to you, and I thank you very much for letting me sleep here tonight."[163] The irony of this statement irritated our ambassadors and caused them to feel ashamed, although they at the moment managed, at least partially, to disguise it.[164] This and other odious things he said to them through the interpreters. He also asked them, in discussing the names of places and things in which there might be a danger of equivocation, to use native interpreters of those territories who were more expert, and he said that it was not necessary to use me although I was present during all this. Our ambassadors complained to me about his irony and said that the Moscovite

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frontier at the Amur, either at its affluents on the left bank, the Bystra and the Zeya, or at Albazin (CAHEN, *op. cit.*, pp. 9, 36, n. 3, 37, III-V). In the second set of instructions, issued in June 1687 and received by Golovin in September, he was authorized to cede Albazin. The third set of instructions, issued in October 1687 and received by Golovin in July 1688, did not contain new territorial concessions (CAHEN, *op. cit.*, 37-47). The Chinese instructions are contained in a Memorial presented to K'ang-hsi by the Chinese delegates before their departure from Peking in May 1688, which was sanctioned by the Emperor and partially reads: "Nipchu [Nerchinsk], Yagza [Albazin] and all the rivers and rivulets flowing into the Amur being ours, it is our opinion that none should be abandoned to the Russians. Ghantimur and other deserters must be extradited. If the Russians will acceed to these points, we shall in return give up their deserters, expatriate the prisoners, draw the boundary and enter into commercial relations; otherwise, we shall return and make no peace with them at all" (LIU HSÜAN-MIN, *op. cit.*, pp. 313-314). On the eve of the departure of the second mission in June 1689, K'ang-hsi issued the following instructions: "If you insist on keeping Nipchu [Nerchinsk] and not give it up to the Russians, then their missions and merchants will find no sheltering place. At the opening of the conference, you should still try to retain Nipchu. But if they beg for that city, you may draw the boundary along the Argun River." See *P'ing-ting lo-ch'a fang-lüeh* contained in *Chung-hua pien-fang yü-ti ts'ung-shu*, pp. 28-29.

[164] The irritation of the Chinese ambassadors on accout of the ironical answer of the Moscovite is also recorded by Gerbillon. HALDE, *Description ...*, IV, p. 192.

nenhum querer ceder, propondo cada hum dificuldades e respondendo outros com astucia, sem abrir caminho a melhor concerto, antes os Moscovitas demandarão restituição de alguma artelharia e outras cousas, que parecia paradoxo aos Tartaros a demanda. Pello que o Moscovita vendo não se tomava resolução, sagazmente acabou as conferencias daquelle dia, convidando com melhor conselho ao segundo. [11v]

Aos 23 se ajuntarão com o mesmo sequito e aparato, porem nada se concluio por nenhuma das partes querer ceder das terras a que cada hum disia tinha direito.[165] Pello que os Tartaros resolverão, como inexpertos de semelhantes negocios, a voltar à corte sem nenhuma conclusão,[166] sem eu saber a tal resolução. Bem creyo que a natural altivez assombrada daquelles vazos de prata, cadeira amarella e mais asseyo que não esperava, lhe não consentia pôr os olhos em tanto lustre que dantes iulgava grosseiro, inventando não querer paz o Moscovita, mas era stratagima e engano pera assim os trazer com a dilação a seu intento. A noite e dia seguinte choveo continuamente, comtudo veyo o lingua latino do Moscovita[167] que nada concluio, antes o despedirão os nossos secamente, o que eu muito estranhei mas não pude impedir. A noite seguinte iá desconfiados das pazes, mandarão os nossos embaixadores aviso a povoação de Yag za ou Albazim que se houvessem com os Moscovitas como inimigos porque não havia esperança de paz.[168] De tudo eu não sabia nada, porque, como alheyo de meu Instituto, me retirava o que podia e os deixava, salvo quando chamado forçosamente me não podia sem grave perigo retirar. Esta hé a segunda vez que arruinarão o negocio com a guerra já em effeito declarada.[169] Todavia depois de mandar o sobredito aviso, lhe remordeo a conciencia por me não terem comunicado, temendo que o Imperador o estranhasse.[170] Pello que constando-me[171] o sucedido, o estranhei eu como devia, assim pella charidade pedir

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15 sem — resolução *om. t2* || 16 assombrava *t1* || 21 langua *t1*

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[165] According to Gerbillon the proposal that Nipchu be the line of demarcation was made by the Chinese delegates on this day. See Note 162.

[166] Gerbillon tells us that the Chinese delegates went so far as to have their tents taken down as if they did not want to meet the Moscovites again. HALDE, *Description* ..., IV, p. 192.

[167] This refers to Andrei Bialobotsky.

[168] This treatment as enemies was to consist in cutting down the grain the Russians had planted around Albazin. HALDE, *Descrip-*

made fun of them, to which I answered what seemed to me wise and in accord with my understanding of the situation. On this day much time was wasted, as neither side wanted to cede. Each party proposed difficulties and the other gave evasive answers without opening a path to better understanding; the Moscovites demanded the restitution of some artillery and of other things, which seemed out of place to the Tartars. The Moscovite realizing that no agreement could be reached, concluded the conference of that day, prudently inviting our ambassadors to the meeting of the next day.

30. On the 23rd they met with the same following and pomp, but again nothing was concluded as neither party wanted to give up anything from the territories to which they both claimed a right.[165] The Tartars, therefore, without experience in similar matters, resolved to return to the Court without concluding anything.[166] Of this I knew nothing. I think that their innate haughtiness and surprise at those silver vessels, yellow chair, and other things which they had not expected made it painful for them to see the Moscovite, whom before they thought to be barbaric, in such lustre. This caused them to contend that the Moscovite did not want peace, but that all this was a scheme designed to obtain what he wanted by delaying things. In spite of the fact that during the night and the next day it rained continuously, the Latin interpreter of the Moscovites came.[167] He did not accomplish anything and was dismissed rather curtly, which caused me great surprise. However, I could not prevent this. The following night our ambassadors, who had lost their hope for peace, sent word to their troops at Yagza [Albazin] to treat the Russians as enemies because there was no hope for peace.[168] All this was unknown to me because, as these matters were alien to my Institute, I kept aloof and left them on their own except when I was forced to participate. This was the second time that the negotiations were interrupted and war practically declared.[169] The consciences of the ambassadors bothered them for not having told me in advance

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tion ..., IV, p. 195.

[169] The first time the negotiations had been in jeopardy was on the 21st. See text of the *Diary* 225-227.

[170] This again seems to confirm the assumption that Pereira was present in a more important, though unofficial, capacity than that of interpreter. See also notes 155 and 160.

[171] Gerbillon mentions another matter in which the Chinese ambassadors had failed to consult the Jesuits. On the 24th, he reports, the Chinese ambassadors had proposed to abandon Selenginsk and Nipchu without consulting them, though Pereira and he knew about this proposal.

o impedir podendo mortes, como parece constar de certo que não era aquella a vontade do Emperador, e tambem ver claro que o Moscovita desejava tambem a paz e não se enganava, mas dilatava o que podia pera assim ter seu intento (modo de obrar em semelhantes negocios ordinario) que os Tartaros e Chinas nunca experimentarão.

Instarão nossos embaixadores disendo o seguinte : " Os Moscovitas não são como vós, que sois sinceros e verdadeiros ; elles não, nem vós vos deixeis delles enganar. Disem hoje huma cousa e pella manhã a não guardão. Nos temos delles muita experiencia ; vós nenhuma : sabemos que são mentirosos ". Dito isto (pera o que parece tinhão algum fundamento de gente baixa)[172], julgando eu era este mao conceito, total ruina do bom sucesso que esperava, julguei tambem faser meu arresoado em sua deffença e bem comum, do que espero se não mostrarão ingratos os Moscovitas à Companhia de Jesus, e tenho confiança que o Gram Duque não ignorará este justo reconhecimento. Disse pois assim : " Senhores, não convem parvis componere magnos.[173] Nem devemos confundir cousas grandes com as pequenas, e muito menos pessoas. O conceito que Vossas Excellencias tem dos Moscovitas hé só do que virão obrar a gente baixa,[174] cujo alvo de ordinario hé a mentira : athé agora não houve semelhante occasião de os tratar e conhecer. O mesmo podemos diser de nossos Chinas, aonde há mentirosos sem numero, nem medida, mas nem por isso se segue o dizer que se não deve dar credito a nenhum china, mas devem-se considerar as pessoas. O dizer tambem que os Moscovitas bebem muito vinho, há muitos nossos Chinas que o comem, e nesta boa parte lhe não querem dar as mãos, dos quais se achão cada dia estirados nas ruas de Pe Kim a cada passo, e ainda a cavallo se encontrão muitos à borlantina, sobre o que há muito que dizer. Porem se não deve concluir que não há homens sobrios na China desta fasenda, aonde se achão muitos que o não bebem. O mesmo digo do mais, pello que se não deve negar a fee a semelhantes pessoas, ainda que nos inferiores haja nota, ou perfidia no povo rude : alem de que era necessario ouvir o que elles a isto responderião, e não só fiar no que ouvimos aos nossos ". Tinha o tio do Emperador,[175]

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3 se *om. t1* || 20 tendo *t2* || 22 *before* parvius || 38 perfida *t1*

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[172] This passage seems to substantiate Pavlovsky's distinction, which, according to him, the Russians proposed and the Chinese believed, between irregular and unruly elements on the Amur called *lo-ch'a*, and *O-le-ssu* regular subjects of the Tsar. PAVLOVSKY, *op. cit.*,

about the above mentioned order, as they were afraid that the Emperor would be displeased.[170] Consequently, knowing what had happened,[171] I pretended astonishment, as I had to, in order to beg them in charity to prevent so many deaths, both because there seemed to be no doubt that this was not the intention of the Emperor and because it was clear to me that the Moscovite desired the peace and was not planning treason but only trying to gain what he wanted by a policy of delay (an ordinary way of acting in similar circumstances). The Tartars and Chinese had never negotiated in this manner before.

31. Our ambassadors, however, persisted saying, " The Moscovites are not like you, sincere and reliable; do not let them deceive you. Today they say one thing but tomorrow they do not keep their word. We have had much experience with them and you have had none ; we know that they are liars ". Hearing this and knowing that it was a misconception (though seemingly they had some foundation for it in so far as it pertained to the people of the lower classes)[172] and that it would lead to the total ruin of the expected success, I decided to rise to the defense of the Moscovites and of the common interest, for which I hope the Moscovites will show their gratitude towards the Society of Jesus and for which also the Grand Duke will not deny us due acknowledgement. Therefore I spoke as follows: " Sirs, it is not right to make mountains out of mole hills. You must not confuse small things with important ones[173] and much less mean people with great. The concept which your Excellencies have of the Moscovite is founded on the basis of dealings with people of the lower class[174] whose aim usually is deception. Until now, you did not have an opportunity to negotiate with and know the Moscovites. What you said of them could also be said about the Chinese among whom there are liars without number ; from which fact, however, it does not follow that one must deny credit to all Chinese ; on the contrary one must consider individuals. Again, you say that the Moscovites drink much wine ; are there not many Chinese who drink it, and who in this respect are nowise inferior to them ? Many of them can daily be found walking and on horseback in the streets of Peking — a topic on which much more could be said. Yet, in spite of all this, one must not conclude that there are no sober people among the Chinese, for indeed there are many who do not drink at all. And the same could be said about other things, so

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pp. 134-136.

[173] A literary allusion to *Eclogues* 1, 23: " sic parvis componere magna solebam ".

[174] See Note 172.

[175] T'ung Kuo-kang See Note 1.

como sincero, avizado aos mais consultores da embaixada o seguinte, e com successo : " Sabei, senhores, que estes Padres são homens incorruptos que não temem a ninguem. Sabei que fulano[176] não lisongea a ninguem, assim como falla comnosco, com a mesma resolução falla com o Emperador, o qual o estima por edicto publico,[177] solido e verdadeiro. Sem duvida o Emperador lhe perguntará tudo meudamente, e sabei que dirá a verdade sem respeito a ninguem. Pello que não devemos desprezar o que elle dis e a experiencia nos ensina em outras couzas e occasiões não ter errado ". Isto mesmo me disse depois elle mesmo varias vezes, com o que fez ir os outros mais atentos e não tão arrebatados.

Pello que affirmando eu que tinha ainda grandes esperanças da paz se concluir, lhes persuadi não desanimassem, mas mandassem no alcance do correyo de avizo que se voltasse, o que logo fiserão na mesma noite [12r] mas debalde porque o não puderão alcançar, donde se seguirão não poucos danos. E esta hé a segunda vez que, perdido o negocio,[178] se tornou a restaurar com ajuda de Deos e admiração de todos, que não podião entender o ver-me tão seguro do sucesso. Voltando nós todos a nossas tendas muito de noite da sobredita consulta, me convida à sua o tio do Emperador,[179] cheyo de malenconia e, lastimado, me contou o que passava, e a resão de suas desconfianças ! (Divina Providencia que lhe fes ver com seus olhos o erro que tinhão dado por se governar a seu modo), pedindo que fossemos a exhortar o Moscovita e saber delle claramente seu intento : porque eu me retirava os dias dantes, julgando se podia, o que aquelles dias se tratava, fazer sem mym (lembrando-me de meu Instituto que me impede semelhantes negocios, quantum fieri potest) socedeo que a ignorancia do lingoa deu occasião ao sobredito.[180] Aos 25, dia de Assumpção da Virgem Senhora Nossa (por ser o seu anno conforme o antigo calendario, 10 dias depois do nosso) fui com meu companheiro a exhortá-lo.[181] Tratou-nos muito suave e cortezmente, fasendo entrar nossos ca-

11 atento *t1 and t2* || 19 de paz *t1* || 35 *for* Assumpção *t2* A, *but he left its place vacant* || 37 10 *underlined* || 38 Tratamos *t1*

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[176] Siu ge xim i. e., Hsü Jih-sheng, Pereira's Chinese name.

[177] See the beginning of *Diary* 176-177.

[178] See Note 169.

[179] T'ung Kuo-kang See Note 1.

[180] About this misunderstanding Gerbillon gives some details. He

that one must not refuse confidence in these people, even though there is malice in the inferiors or perfidy in the common people. You should listen to what the Moscovites have to say to this question and not blindly believe what others say about them." The uncle of the Emperor,[175] a sincere man, gave the following advice with some success to the other councillors of the embassy: "Sirs, you know that these Fathers are incorrupt people who are not afraid of anybody. You know that Hsü Jih-sheng[176] does not flatter anyone but speaks with the same resolution to the Emperor as he speaks to us, and you know that the Emperor honored him in public, with a weighty and true edict.[177] The Emperor will undoubtedly interrogate him minutely about everything, and you realize that he will tell the truth regardless of what others may think. We should, therefore, take his advice into consideration, for experience has taught us in other instances that this is right." He repeated the same thing to me later on several occasions, and with such words he convinced the others not to proceed too hastily.

32. Thus asserting that there was still great hope of concluding a peace, I convinced them not to despair but to recall the courier. They sent for him that same night, but in vain as it was impossible to overtake him. The failure caused no small damage. This was, nonetheless, the second instance in which the situation which had seemed to be lost[178] was saved with the help of God, to the admiration of all who did not understand how I could be so sure of success. As we returned very late at night from this conference to our tents, the uncle of the Emperor[179] invited me to his tent and, filled with melancholy and sadness, told me everything that had passed, including the reason of his defiance. (Divine providence had made him realize the error which they had committed by following their own way.) He suggested that we go to the Moscovite and find out his intentions. It seems that because, during the past days, I had kept aloof, being reminded by my Institute to keep out of similar things as far as possible, they thought that the things which were discussed should be arranged without me; and it turned out that the ignorance of the interpreter whom they had employed was the cause of all our troubles.[180] On the 25th, the feast of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin (since the Moscovites follow the old calendar which is

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states that Pereira and he knew that the Chinese ambassadors had made direct proposals to the Russians through the Mongol interpreters and without consulting them. The reasons for this were: (1) the Chinese ambassadors were distrustful of the two Jesuits because Golovin had treated them so cordially, and (2) they (the Chinese ambassadors) could not understand Latin (while Golovin could) and did not know what went on between the Jesuits and the Moscovites. HALDE, *Description ...*, IV, p. 192.

vallos em sua presença, na qual descavalgamos. Ouvio tudo e respondeo que mandaria gente sua com a reposta, consultando primeiro as conveniencias que lhe apontamos.[182] Hé incrivel o como nossos embaixadores reviviscerão com esta nova, olhando-nos com muy diversos olhos, correndo depois tudo por nossa conta, sem quererem de nenhum modo que mais nos lançassemos de fora, a que tudo o Senhor lançou e˜ benção. Aos 26 mandou o lingua latino com suas duvidas, trasendo o mapa[183] das terras e inteirando-se do intento de nossos embaixadores. Logo fomos nós com as repostas,[184] e tornou elle com outras, sendo nós obrigados em todas estas idas e vindas a passar aquelle grande rio com igual perigo e não pouco enfadamento. Voltamos nós com as novas duvidas e propoz as suas o Moscovita, huma dellas que não entrarião de nenhum modo nestas pazes os Halgas seus atreiçoados inimigos,[185] como já disse assima.[186]

Aos 27 fomos com a ultima resolução (resfriando já o calor a nossos embaixadores de conferencias em presença o frio daquella

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1 *before* descavlgamos || 12 Voltamo *t1*

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[181] Gerbillon tells us that before he and Pereira went to see the Russian ambassador, a Moscovite messenger came and asked the Chinese that, in the event they did not want to continue with the conferences, they should give him a letter declaring what had been done up to this point. He said that he would be willing to do the same for them. The Chinese ambassadors, however, declined, since they themselves had made the same proposal on the preceding day and because they wanted the Russians to do it first. To this Golovin proposed one more meeting which, if it should turn out to be without results, they should mutually give each other these letters. The Chinese declined the proposal of a new conference. (HALDE, *Description ...*, IV, pp. 192-193). It is to be noted that Baikov and Spathar had asked for similar letters. Baikov not being able to obtain one from the Chinese, asked the Dutch embassy, then present in Peking, for a letter attesting to his presence in China. BADDELEY, *op. cit.*, II, p. 156. Spathar asked K'ang-hsi for such a letter, saying that without it he would not dare to return, and when refused, got one from Father Verbiest. BOSMANS, *Le problème ...*, pp. 196-203. BADDELEY, *op. cit.*, p. 404.

[182] According to Gerbillon, K'ang-hsi had given instructions according to which the surrender of Albazin was a condition without which no agreement could be reached. HALDE, *Description ...*, IV, p. 193.

[183] This map was probably a copy of Spathar's map or at least

ten days behind ours), I went with my companion to exhort the Moscovite.[181] He treated us very nicely and courteously and even went out to greet us as we were yet on horseback and ready to dismount. He listened to what we had to say, and then said that he would send somebody with his answer when he had studied our proposals.[182] It is incredible how our ambassadors were revived upon hearing this news; they listened to us with different ears and gave us credit for everything, and under no circumstances did they want to leave us out of the negotiations which the Lord had blessed so evidently. On the 26th, the Moscovite sent his Latin interpreter to convey certain of his doubts. He brought a map[183] of those territories and inquired about the intentions of our ambassadors. After a while we went with our answer.[184] Then he came again, and thus we were obliged with all these comings and goings to cross that big river with much danger and fatigue. We went back with our reservations and the Moscovite proposed his own, one of which was that the Qalqas, the bitter enemies of the Moscovites[185] as I mentioned before, should not enter into the peace treaty.[186]

33. On the 27th, we went with what were our last proposals regarding the division of the territories.[187] The zeal of our ambas-

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based upon it, of which a copy was obtained by Avril in Moscow just around the time when Golovin was nominated ambassador plenipotentiary. BADDELEY, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 214-215.

[184] Gerbillon says that the boundary line proposed by the Chinese was, in the north, the chain of mountains (Outer Kingan) which runs from the source of the Gorbitsa (Kerbichi) eastward to the sea; and in the west, the Gorbitsa and the Ergone (Argun). Furthermore, the Russians were to refrain from advancing into the territories of the Qalqa whom the Chinese claimed to be subjects of China. HALDE, *Description* ..., IV, pp. 193-194.

[185] CAHEN, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

[186] The Russians objected, according to Gerbillon, to the inclusion of the Qalqa into the clauses of the treaty, saying that the Qalqa could not be considered subjects of China while their country was occupied by the Ölöd. The Qalqa were enemies of the Russians and the Russians wanted to settle this account without interference from the Chinese. After the Jesuits returned to the Chinese camp, the Chinese ambassadors agreed to let the Qalqa question go unsettled for the time being, as they had no instructions concerning it, but insisted that when peace is reestablished between the Qalqa and the Ölöd it should be settled. When the Jesuits brought this answer to the Moscovites, they raised another difficulty, namely they were unwilling to give up all the territories beyond the Argun, pointing out that at first the Chinese ambassadors had only asked for Yaksa [Albazin]. Without having this question settled first, the Moscovites were unwilling to give a positive answer. HALDE, *Description* ..., IV, p. 194.

sombra que assima já insinuei)[187] sobre a devizão de terras.[188] Nesta occasião responderão os Moscovitas o que não devião ; não concedendo, nem só o entregar Yag za, ou Albazim. Com resão legitima me queixei, disendo-lhes que ao principio lhe tinha bem declarado que Yag za, como primeiro fundamento de tudo, se devia restituir,[189] e que se não tinhão esta intenção, era escusado ir adiante e tratar de outros pontos. Pello que não devião ir adiante em discursos e conferencias : e não estando este fundamento, nos tinhão enganado, que supondo isto como sem controversia dever-se entregar Yag za, se passou a outros negocios com fiel sinceridade. Demais, que o Emperador da China não duvidava desta entrega, pois tendo-a tomada por força de armas muitas vezes,[190] desejoso da paz por resão e não por armas lha deixara outra vez em boa fee, nem duvidava seria seu o que ad tempus emprestara. E que redicula cousa seria, o que tinha tomado duas vezes e deixado em boa fee, tê-llo agora por mercê e entregá-llo a disputa. E o nunca disto se falar, foi por se não meter em controversia o que sabia era seu. Frios os Moscovitas com estas resões e verdades conhecidas, responderão : " Nihil conceditur, quia multum petitis ". Nem o entereçado governador me perdoou em alguma occasião, disendo : " Vos agitis pro domo vestra ", sendo que depois apalpou o fasiamos tambem pro sua, pois o reconheceu e confessou. Aqui me mostrei eu e meu companheiro algum tanto encrespado, estranhando a reposta como convinha, da qual elles (como abaixo veremos) se arrependerão. Com os olhos cheos de lagrimas me apartei dos Moscovitas, disendo-lhes que mandassem por outro a reposta, porque eu não tinha rosto pera declará-lla, porque sabia seria causa de total ruina de muitos bens, e que depois inutili paenitencia se arrependerião de tão apressada resolução.

A causa da reposta tão resoluta e seca (como depois soubemos por via certa e digna de fé sincera) foi o governador destas terras,[191] moscovita, homem filho da fortuna e intereceiro em summo, o qual, e outros particulares, vendo que se lhe tirava o destrito de seu interece e diminuya o dominio que elle dizia lhe pertencia, persuadirão ao embaixador que nada concedesse e que lançasse

13 de paz *tl* || 20 perdou *tl* || 41 concedasse *tl*

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[187] For further details see HALDE, *Description ...*, IV, pp. 194-195.
[188] See Note 185, 186.

sadors to negotiate was already waning in the presence of the reservations which I just mentioned.[188] On this occasion the Moscovites said something which they should not have said. They now did not want to agree to the giving up of Yagza or Albazin. I complained with good reason and said that from the beginning I had made it clear that Yagza, as the basis of everything, must be restored[189] and if they did not intend to agree it was useless to proceed to other points. I said that they should not have proceeded to other discourses and conferences if this fundamental item were not acceptable and that they had misled us. The reason we had proceeded in sincerity to other subjects was based on the supposition that they were willing to give up Yagza without any controversy. I told them, moreover, that the Emperor of China had no doubts that they would give it up, as he had occupied it several times with arms.[190] But because he wanted to reach a peaceful settlement through reason and not through arms, he had each time evacuated it in good faith, not doubting that what he had lent to them for the time being would ultimately be restored to him. It would be ridiculous to obtain by barter or to make the subject of disputation something which the Emperor had already occupied on two occasions and given up in good faith. The reason why he never spoke about this was that he did not wish to argue about a thing which was already his. The Moscovite remained cold in spite of these reasons and obvious facts and said, " We concede nothing, because you ask too much ". Nor did the Governor miss this occasion to complain, saying to me, " You act in your own interest. " Later, however, he realized that it was also in his interest, because he recognized and confessed it. On this occasion my companion and I acted somewhat forcefully to show them that we were naturally offended by their answer, of which they indeed repented, as we shall see later. I left the Moscovites with tears in my eyes and told them to send their answer by somebody else, because I was ashamed to announce it, knowing that it would be the cause of the complete ruin of so many good things and that they themselves later would repent this hasty answer when it was too late.

34. The reason for this resolute and short answer, as later we found out from a truthful and reliable source, was that the Governor[191] of these territories, a Moscovite and extremely selfish adventurer, together with others, who saw that his district was being taken away and the dominion which he claimed being diminished, persuaded the ambassador not to concede anything, but to fish

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[189] See Note 182.

[190] See Note 99, 102.

[191] Ivan Vlasov. See Note 60, 147, 240.

barro à parede como se dis, a ver se pegava. Mostrou este governador em minha presença o duvidar de mym e meu [12v] companheiro, do que com modestia nos queixamos, demostrando-lhe ad oculum o quanto o tinhamos servido e a seu Duque, do que o embaixador não duvidava e elle depois, da necessidade obrigado, reconheceo a verdade e nos deo publica satisfação. Sabendo os nossos embaixadores esta (que não julgavão fingida) resolução, comessarão logo a dispor tudo à passagem do rio com todo o exercito (porque já da nossa parte não havia pasto pera os animais),[192] vendo-se no arrayal hum continuo moto de cavallaria pera de noite passar o rio que os Moscovitas ignoravão, julgando ser a revolta só apresto pera nossa volta a Pe Kim, sendo a intenção de nossos embaixadores esperar a deliberação do Emperador pera faser guerra ou não.[193] Tinhão os Moscovitas suas sentinellas, que vendo a revolução do arrayal, não duvidarão nossa partida. Indo o tio do Emperador[194] muito malenconico a dormir, me falou muito triste (a quem eu consolei) e lhe disse esperava ainda que os Moscovitas mandarião ainda gente sua a buscar-nos e não quererião voltar debalde, e pera diser isto tinha fundamento, acrecentando que este negocio era grande e apressada resolução nada concluiria, mas a paciencia tudo alcançaria, e que sua excellencia se resolvesse à paciencia, porque importava mais voltar com a paz concluida, do que o não padecermos algum frio iá vesinho,[195] pello que se devia considerar o principal; e que eu, como menos provido de vestidos, era o que mais padeceria, mas nem por isso desejava partirme sem a paz pera evitar o frio. Respondeo elle: " Levemos a paz comnosco ainda que esperemos aqui hum mez ". Respondi eu que esperava ainda que os Moscovitas mandarião aquella noite gente sua.

Com esta disposição, já muito tarde nos fomos a descançar. Eis que escassamente tinha pegado no sono, quando comessa o tio do Imperador[196] a gritar por mim, disendo (porque lhe tinhão dado a nova): " Vem o Moscovita, vem o Moscovita! " Com grande

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13 o deliberação *t1 and t2* || 15 resolução *t1* || 18 queirão *t2* || 39 Vem o Moscovita *t2 only once*

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[192] According to Gerbillon, the crossing of the river by the Chinese was done with the purpose of deploying their troops in such a manner that they would blockade Nipchu; they also sent troops to blockade Yaksa. Halde, *Description ...*, IV, pp. 194-195. According to Pereira

around a little, as they say, to see whether he could catch anything. This Governor in my presence showed himself doubtful of me and my companion, an attitude which we in all modesty complained of, telling him to his face the services we had rendered him and his Grand Duke. The ambassador had no doubt about this, and, the evidence being so convincing that later on even the Governor had to recognise it, he gave us public satisfaction. When our ambassadors heard this resolution not to concede (which they did not understand as pretence), they made preparations to cross the river with the whole army, because on our side there was no pasture left for the animals.[192] In our camp there was a continuous movement of the cavalry which was getting ready to cross the river that night. The Moscovites, being unaware of our purpose, thought that all this turmoil was due to the fact that we were getting ready to return to Peking, though in fact our ambassadors intended to wait here for the decision of the Emperor as to whether to start a war.[193] When the Moscovite sentinels saw the commotion in our camp, they had no doubt about our departure. The uncle of the Emperor[194] was in a very melancholy mood before he retired and spoke to me most sadly. I comforted him by saying that I still hoped that the Moscovites would send people to look for us as they did not want to return empty handed, and I told him that I had good reason for saying this. I added that this was an important affair which could not be brought to an end with a hasty resolution; but with perseverance everything would be accomplished. His Excellency should be patient because it was more important to go home with the peace treaty concluded than to avoid suffering a little from the cold weather which was approaching;[195] also that one should always keep his eyes on the principal things, and that I, less provided with clothes and more likely to suffer, was not at all desirous of returning home without the peace being concluded, simply in order to avoid the cold. He said, "We are not going home without the peace even if we have to wait for a whole month." And I replied that I hoped that the Moscovites would send somebody that same night.

35. This was our state of mind when we went to rest very late that night. I hardly had dropped off to sleep when the uncle of the Emperor,[196] having been the one to receive the news, started to call me in a loud voice, "The Moscovites are coming." We

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this decision had been taken on the 24th.

[193] This seems to confirm Gerbillon's statement as to why they had crossed the river. See Note 190.

[194] T'ung Kuo-kang. See Note 1.

[195] See *Diary* 216-217.

[196] T'ung Kuo-kang. See Note 1.

[197] Andrei Bielobotsky. See Note 156.

alvoroço nos levantamos, e indo ao lugar comum da consulta, disse o lingua em latim [197] que seu embaixador pedia 3ª conferencia conforme (dizia elle) o jus gentium, porque a primeira hé pera saudações, 2ª pera proposições, e a 3ª se deu pera conclusões. [198] Responderão nossos embaixadores que esperarião até pella manhã nova reposta sua e alguma outra melhor resolução. Quanto pude eu e meu companheiro exortamos ao Moscovita a vir em melhores condições, dando-lhes alguns indicios de conveniencia e insinuando-lhe alguma noticia de consideração de muita consequencia pera elles se resolverem, em que os nossos embaixadores consentião e desejavão elles soubessem. Pello que lhe disse que a reposta devia ser a mesma noite, porque pella manhã seria já tarde. Bem entendeu elle o bom conselho. Pello que vendo as circunstancias se despedio, disendo : “ Reverendissimi Patres adeste nobis ”. Eu tudo banhado em alegria, huma por ver minhas esperanças bem fundadas, outra por ver falava com hum catholico romano, que athé então se não tinha declarado (que sendo sismatico nos não daria tanta honra), [199] lhe respondi : “ Nos sine dubio quidquid in bonum publicum in nobis erit, scito faciemus ; sed et vos prudenter agite et vobis prospicite : bene considerate quid agitis ”. Voltando elle, fiserão logo consulta se, suposto isto, convinha ou não passar o rio, o que já estava determinado na mesma noite. Todos disserão pella penuria dos pastos e conveniencia redicula que julgavão de muito porte, a saber, pera recolher alguns Halha que rebellados dos Moscovitas se rendião aos nossos, de cuja ajuda necessitavão pera passar o rio pera cá a nossa banda. [200]

Com tudo ainda que estavão com a tal resolução, como tinhão suas consultas experimentando claramente alguns erros, me perguntarão se suposto eu ter esperanças, que me parecia, se convinha passar ou não o rio. Respondi eu que era religioso e que meu Instituto e profissão me prohibia o tratar cousas semelhantes, e que o Emperador me não mandara a este fim, e bem sabia que eu era religioso, profissão alheya a tais conselhos (porque o passar o rio era arriscado por muitas circunstancias, o que suas excellencias o não ignoravão). Pello que o Emperador me mandara só a tratar pazes, que com passar o rio se não alcançavão. [201] Pello

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1 levatamos *t1* || 3 u jus *t1* || 6 reslução *t1* || 14 adest *t1* || 30 tinha *t1* || 38 ignorão *t2* || 39 alcanção *t2*

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[198] According to Gerbillon, the Moscovite sent his interpreter to renew negotiations under the pretext of a protest. The interpreter insinuated that his master was willing to cede Yaksa, but because too much had been asked of him he had taken the attitude of offering

got up in great excitement, and when we arrived at the place of consultation, their Latin interpreter[197] said that his ambassador asked for a third conference in accordance, as he put it, with the Law of Nations, according to which the first conference is for the purpose of salutations, the second for propositions and the third for conclusions.[198] Our ambassadors said that they would wait until morning to hear a more acceptable resolution. I and my companion exhorted the Moscovites as much as we could to return with better conditions, hinting at a few convenient things and insinuating some items to be considered, which were of great importance, so that they may come up with resolutions which our ambassadors wanted and to which they might consent. I told the messenger that the answer must be given that same night because the next morning would already be too late. He understood the situation very well and, realizing what the circumstances were, he took his leave saying, " Most Reverend Fathers, assist us. " I was overcome with joy, first in seeing how well founded my hopes were, and second because he spoke as a Roman Catholic, for until then he had not declared himself and if he were a schismatic he would not have honored us in such a way.[199] I answered him, " We most certainly shall do for the common good whatever we can, but you too should act prudently; look out yourselves, and consider well what you do. " When he left, we held a consultation to decide if, in view of this, it were wise to cross the river as it had been decided earlier that night. The ambassadors had said it was necessary because of the lack of pasture and because of the ridiculous plan, which they considered important, of receiving some Qalqa who had rebelled against the Moscovites and surrendered to us and who needed our help to cross to our bank of the river.[200]

36. They had already reached a decision, but, since they had previously made mistakes in their consultations, they asked me in view of my experience whether I thought it were sensible to cross the river. I said that I was a religious, that my Institute and profession prohibited me from considering such matters, that the Emperor had not sent me for this purpose for he knew very well that I was a religious, a profession alien to such counsels, and that the Emperor had sent me only to negotiate peace which had nothing to do with crossing the river. (The crossing of the river was very dangerous for many reasons of which their Excellencies were

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nothing. HALDE, *Descripiion* ..., IV, p. 195.

[199] This again refers to Andrei Bielobotsky.

[200] HALDE, *Description* ..., IV, p. 197.

[201] The principal reason being that the crossing of the river might be construed by the Moscovites as a hostile act and would consequently prejudice further negotiations.

que não podia eu nem pro nem contra dar meu parecer: que suas excellencias tinhão sua direcção do Emperador com a qual se devião conformar. Dura lhes pareceo a reposta, pello que instarão fortemente pera que dissesse meu parecer, confessando que não sabião o que convinha. Bem o podia eu impedir, mas considerando que hum e outro parecer era igualmente arriscado e não conforme meu Instituto, lhes tornava sempre a declarar o mesmo.[202] Tres ou mais quartos de hora gastarão nesta conquista sem effeito. Vendo eu finalmente que erão homens tais, que convinha dar-lhes alguma satisfação, e entendendo de certo que seu intento não era outro, senão o medo que tinhão de mao sucesso, e que crião depois, com fundamento, que o Emperador me perguntaria tudo (como de facto [13r] perguntou e com tal honra como adiante veremos), e supondo de certo que eu diria a verdade, se querião pôr em seguro metendo-me da sua parte. Pello que não podendo eu escapar, ou de os offender (o que não convinha de nenhum modo), ou de consentir em passar o rio com o exercito (no que eu me não devia meter, nem podia aconselhar) me ajudou Deos, qui praesto adest suis, com meu companheiro lhes dei satis a entender e assegurei que não tinha tambem vindo em sua companhia pera inquirir de outros, nem dar conta de açoens alheyas.[203] Com esta reposta se contentarão e me deixarão.

Pello que seguindo a beira do rio pera baixo quasi tres legoas costeyando, acharão en tres asperos montes hum acomodado pera sahir em terra da outra banda alguma soldadesca. Ficarão os embaixadores com os mais esperando pella reposta do Moscovita athé pella manhã, a qual tardando muito e aparecendo já nossa soldadesca sobre os montes, armada, que dominão a povoação, se resolverão os embaixadores a os seguir, dizendo que já não podião encobrir sua passagem, e que já sua reposta a não podia impedir.[204] Pello que partimos com toda a gente seguindo o mesmo caminho pello rio abaixo. Morrerão nesta passagem algumas pessoas e animais, lucro ordinario em semelhante mercancia. A causa da tardança da reposta dos Moscovitas não foi outra, que a desunião de

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1 pro *underlined* || 3 lhe *t1* || 7 lhe *t1* || 9 dar-lhe *t1* || 19 companheiro *om. t2* || 31 passaguem *t1*

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[202] The dilemma facing Pereira was that on the one hand the Chinese ambassadors had already decided to cross the river (as we have seen above) and his forcefully preventing them to do so might have made them suspicious that he was favoring the Moscovite cause (for such suspicions see Note 180). On the other hand, he did not want to endorse their decision and thus assume the responsibility for the crossing with its possible consequences. See Note 201.

[203] This again points toward the assumption that Pereira was not

not unaware).[201] I could not declare myself either for or against, I said, and added that their Excellencies had received their instructions from the Emperor and that they should act according to those. This answer seemed too harsh to them and they insisted strongly that I give them my opinion and confessed that they did not know what was the wise thing to do. I could easily have prevented the crossing, but both opinions were equally dangerous and not in conformity with my Institute, and so I repeated the same answer several times.[202] Three quarters of an hour or more were wasted in this argument. In the end I saw that they were people to whom it was necessary to give satisfaction. I realized that their concern was simply the fear that their efforts might be unsuccessful and that they believed with reason, that their Emperor would ask me everything — as he really did with great honor, as we shall see later. Since they knew for certain that I would tell him the truth, they wanted to play safe by winning me over to their side. As I could not escape from either offending them, which I had to avoid by all means, or from consenting to their crossing the river with the whole army, God, who is always at hand to help, came to my rescue, and I made it sufficiently clear to them that I had not come with them in order to spy or to report their actions.[203] With this answer they were content and let me go.

37. Descending along the river about three leagues, keeping close to the bank, they found three rugged mountains, one of which seemed a suitable spot for disembarking some of our soldiers. The ambassadors and the rest of their suite stayed behind until morning, waiting for the answer of the Moscovites, and because this did not arrive and our soldiers, armed, had already made their appearance on the mountains which dominate the town, our ambassadors resolved to follow them, saying that the crossing could not be kept a secret and that the answer of the Moscovites could not prevent it any longer.[204] Therefore we took the same route descending along the river. Some persons and beasts perished during this crossing, which is the usual loss in similar transactions. The reason

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only an interpreter. See Note 155, 170.

[204] According to the entry on the 28th in Gerbillon's Diary, the Moscovite deputies came back on this day saying that their master was willing to accept the Argun as the border line but wanting to retain their habitations on the east bank. They also asked that the two Jesuits be sent over to the Russian camp. This request, however, was refused. The Chinese ambassadors promised to wait for one hour and if the Russian answer was not forthcoming within that time, they would cross the river. Since after two hours the answer had not come, they started the crossing. HALDE, *Description* ..., IV, p. 196.

pareceres entre si, e em persuadir a seu embaixador, como acima toquei, que se negasse tudo a ver com que os nossos sahião: engano certo com naçõis que se não conhecem. Pello que vendo-se o embaixador moscovita naquellas circunstancias, a que nunca chegaria sua prudencia, se como plenipotenciario por si mesmo nesta occasião se governara, e não ouvisse o governador[205] intereçado e a turba de pareceres empenhados, cuja confusão foi aquella noite (como depois soubemos) qual à de Babilonia. Vendo-se o embaixador dos seus mesmos enganado, sahio com o que devia sahir dantes, tomando todo o negocio sobre si como plenipotenciario, estranhando ao governador[206] o ser causa da antecedente resolução mostrando-lhe o erro cometido.

Pello que mandando o lingua com novas proposições e achando-nos já partidos, voltou depressa e nos foi ao encontro, chegando nós já, como assima disse, pella parte do oriente sobre os montes de fronte de Nip chu em distancia de mais de meya legoa. Vendo eu que vinha, cheyo de alegria, por ver me não tinha enganado e pello bom fim que esperava, correndo por montes agrestes a cavallo, o fui a encontrar com tanto alvoroço que julgo que este me deu o atrevimento e forças pera aquellas não acustumadas carreiras. Logo lhe perguntei o fim, trasendo-o pella mão diante de nossos embaixadores, a quem não foi menos grata que não esperada sua vinda. Trasia em comissão a perguntar aos nossos algumas cousas, cujo fim alcançando eu logo, iulguei ser só o não querer mostrar ter medo. Com rosto enteiro preguntou, pera que fim tinhão passado o rio? Logo avisei a nossos embaixadores que, se não querião danar de novo o negocio, devião responder com prudencia e cautela. Pello que responderão que tinhão passado o rio só a fim de não terem já pastos da outra banda e buscá-llos pera os cavallos e mais animais. Instou elle: "Se pera este fim foi vossa passagem, pera que vestidos de peitos de armas?" Responderão que era seu custume e honra que se devia a suas pessoas e não outro mao intento. "Se hé assim, pera que tomastes os altos dos montes", replicou o Moscovita, "com vossos esquadrões?" Responderão que, como não conhecião a terra, mandarão dantes soldadesca a segurar-lhe o campo dantes pera se alojarem: porque, como erão montes agrestes, se não devião fiar da terra inficionada de Hal ga. Com o que satisfeito o Moscovita, pedio que me mandassem lá com meu companheiro a aclarar algumas condições.[207] Estando nossos embaixadores desconfiados de si mesmos, não se atreverão a dar fee aos outros, de que sentião faltos, desconfiando com a ignorancia de semelhantes negocios do Moscovita, julgando que

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16 Vindo *t1* || 36 dantes *om. t2* || 41 dar *add. t1* a

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[205] Ivan Vlasov. See Note 60, 147, 240.

for the delay of the Moscovite answer was a difference of opinions among them and the fact that they had persuaded their ambassador, as I mentioned before, to deny everything to see what we would do — a great mistake when negotiating with a nation one does not know. The Moscovite ambassador, realizing the situation which his prudence would have avoided had he on this occasion acted as plenipotentiary and not listened to the Governor [205] and to many prejudiced opinions, realized that he was misled by his own people. He decided to do now what he should have done before : taking the whole thing in his own hands as plenipotentiary, he reprehended the Governor [206] for being the cause of the earlier resolution and showed him the error he had made.

38. He sent his interpreter with new proposals, who, when he saw that we had left, turned around and met us on the eastern side of the mountain in front of Nipchu and about a half a league away. When I saw him I rejoiced because I realized that my expectations were justified and also because of the success which I anticipated. I started to race toward him on those rough mountain trails with a great excitement that seemed to give me courage and strength needed for this unaccustomed speed. I asked him about everything all at one time, and taking him by the hand I led him before our ambassadors to whom his coming was the more pleasing as it was unexpected. He was commissioned to ask various things of us, the purpose of which, as I understood right away, was to hide their fear. With a straight face he asked for what purpose they had crossed the river. I at once advised our ambassadors that if they did not want to put the whole thing in jeopardy again they must answer with prudent caution. They answered that the only reason for their crossing the river was that on the other side there was no more pasture and they were here in search of some fodder for their horses and other animals. He insisted asking, " If that is the reason, then why are you in armor ? " They said that it was their custom and a mark of personal dignity, indicating no hostile intention. " If that is so, then why did you occupy the high places in the mountains with your squadrons ? " asked the Moscovite. Our ambassadors answered that since they did not know the terrain and since they could not feel safe in a rugged mountain territory infested by the Qalqa, they had sent soldiers in advance to secure a camp where they could stay. The Moscovite was satisfied with this and asked that I and my companion be sent back with him to clarify certain conditions. [207] Our ambassadors, distrustful themselves, did not

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[206] See Note 205.

[207] HALDE, *Description ...*, IV, pp. 196-197.

tendo passado o rio daquelle modo (do que se conhecião reos) se quererião faser seus imitadores os Moscovitas. E foi esta a 3ª vez que se vio tudo perdido sem esperança com sua inexperta desconfiança.[208]

Gastei em os persuadir quasi ou mais de huma hora, trasendo resões forçosas a este fim, a saber, que se em lhe conceder o que pedião havia risco, que os Moscovitas muito mais desconfiarião de suas excellencias do que de facto de suas excellencias experimentavão. Donde se resolveria tudo em [13v] desconfianças sem se tratar do mais importante. Declararão nossos embaixadores com a 2ª reposta seus receyos, disendo (o que me não causou pouco rizo): " Nós nos não atrevemos a mandar-vos lá aos Oruzes, porque tememos vos deixem lá presos em refens e, não vos querendo restituir, nos obrigarão a condições que não queremos, ou a darmos estreita conta a nosso Imperador de vossas pessoas ".[209] Com não menos rizo que dor do coração respondi eu que não havia o tal perigo. Que se fisessem isto os Moscovitas, bastaria pera os não conhecer o mundo todo por homens humanos e cultos, mas por barbaros e indignos de comercio humano, presionando aleivosamente a quem os desejava servir e ao commum, que por seu bem e em boa fee e amisade se lhe entregava nas mãos. Estas e outras muitas resões, que deixo por occorrerem a todos, trouxe a nossos embaixadores, sem elles lançar o medo da desconfiança. De modo que reparando o mesmo Moscovita que ouvia tudo, ainda que não entendia, disse: " Parece que ainda duvidão de mandar a Vossas Padernidades ", ao que respondi de modo que não fisesse aos nossos embaixadores tão inexpertos do mundo. Pello que fui continuando meu discurso, sem ver esperança de concluir cousa alguma. Não deixei de me agastar (quanto bastou pera todos o conhecerem) por ver danar o negocio que estava já a bom caminho. Finalmente depois de todos cançados de ouvir, e eu não menos de gritar, me occorreo outro meyo termo, e disse: " Suposto Vossas Excellencias se não resolverem a tanto, ao menos vá hum de nós. " Logo contentou o alvitre ao tio do Emperador e disse: " Está bem, mas qual de vós irá? " Respondi eu que qualquer era o mesmo, que isso deixava à disposição de suas excellencias. Disse elle: " Suposto isso, vá o Padre vosso companheiro, como mais moço. Vós estais diante do Emperador há muitos annos: sois homem publico. O Emperador me entregou vossa pessoa por publico edicto: eu devo dar conta de vós.[210] O Padre companheiro está a vós entre-

2 Esta foy *t2* || 9 podião *t1* || 14 Nós não nos *t2* || 16 obrigão *t1* || 32 em bom *t2* || 37 Eu respondi *t2*

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[208] For the first and the second time see Note 169.

dare to believe the Moscovites in matters in which they themselves had been at fault. Distrusting the Moscovites on account of their own ignorance and feeling guilty about the way they had crossed the river, they imagined the Moscovite would act as they themselves had done. This was the third time that everything seemed hopelessly lost as a result of their foolish distrust.[208]

39. I wasted the better part of an hour in trying to convince our ambassadors that there could be no risk in agreeing to what the Moscovites asked, arguing that the Moscovites, judging from what they had experienced, had much more reason to be distrustful of their Excellencies. If we continued to carry on this way, arguing about whether or not to trust each other, we would never get down to any more important business. Our ambassadors revealed their fear in their second answer, which caused me to laugh very much : "We do not dare to send you to the Russians because we are afraid that they will keep you as hostages and will not let you return, thereby forcing us either to accept conditions which we do not want or embarrassing us by having to account for you to the Emperor."[209] With not less laughter than pain in my heart, I answered that there was no such danger, for, if the Moscovites did that, it would be sufficient reason for the whole world to deny them the recognition due humane and cultured people and to brand as barbarians, unworthy of human treatment, those who would fraudulently imprison people desiring to serve them and the common good and who in good faith and friendship delivered themselves into their hands. I brought forth these and many other reasons which I do not want to repeat here as everybody can conjecture what they were, but I was unable to overcome their fear and distrust. Even the Moscovite who had heard everything that was said, although he did not understand it, observed, "It seems that they even hesitate to send Your Paternities." I said that he should not pay too much attention to our ambassadors so inexpert in wordly affairs. I continued my discourse without hope of success. I became irritated, to such a point that they all noticed it, when I saw that possible negotiation was again put in jeopardy. When they were all tired of listening to me and I of yelling, I thought of a compromise and said, "Suppose your Excellencies agree that at least one of us shall go." The uncle of the Emperor was content with this suggestion and said, "All right, but which one of you shall go?" I said that either one of us would do, and we would leave the decision to their Excellencies. He said, "The Father, your companion, who is younger should

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[209] See Note 203.

[210] See at the beginning of the *Diary* 176-177.

gue : vós que não tendes medo dos Moscovitas, que o deixeis em refens, dareis em qualquer cazo conta delle, e eu de vós ao Emperador ".

Com aplauso de todos os desconfiados se ouvio esta resolução, satis digna de muito rizo. Não hé aliunde crivel o contentamento de todos os presentes, que admirarão minha constancia, fasendo rosto a todos e com sucesso, vendo a 3ª vez metido a caminho o que vião já desgarrado,[211] dando-me depois os parabens não merecidos. Indo o Padre meu companheiro com alguma instrução sobre o negocio, estavão todos esperando intentique ora tenentes[212] com os olhos se voltava, disse eu : " Senhores, não convem negar a fee que se deve a todas as gentes. Se as pazes se concluirem, como espero, devemos conclui-llas finalmente debaixo de sua fee. Sem duvida virá hum dia em que sejamos obrigados a os crer ; senão, quando ajustadas as condições, se fiser o juramento, a quem creremos ? Quando elles as assinarem com suas firmas e nomes, que credito lhe daremos ? Quando puserem o sello valerão com elle ou sem elle ? Só fiados em sua fee, creremos ser verdadeiro seu sinete, logo lhe devemos dar credito agora e não ir tanto avante que se lance tudo a perder, por negar a fee que se deve a qualquer barbaro, no qual numero não devem entrar os Moscovitas.[213] Finalmente se o diabo se quisesse vestir de homem pera mentir e enganar, o não faria com tanta aleivosia como nós delles queremos sospeitar ". Não tinhão que responder. Emquanto que não voltava meu companheiro com a reposta, hum de nossos embaixadores Somgo tu,[214] tio do principe herdeiro, que sempre se mostrava o mais desconfiado, usque in finem perseveravit, chamando-me me disse que fisessemos huma aposta, a saber, se as pases se concluirião ou não, concluindo-se pagaria elle hum bom cavallo e não se concluindo perderia eu hum relogio de rodas. Respondi eu logo que o não tinha ; cortou elle a escuza e disse que quando o tivesse. Disse eu que o cavallo devia ser bom, que parecesse cousa digna de tal empenho e pessoa, e que não dissessem depois os ouvintes

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1 *before* deixeiis || 18 dia *corr. from* hia || 32-3 concluiria *t2* || 34 Eu respondi *t2*

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[211] See Note 208.

[212] Literary allusion to Vergil's *Aen.* 2, 1 : " conticuere omnes, intentique ora tenebant ".

[213] What a strange paradox of opinions concerning the Russians! Pereira, a Portuguese Jesuit missionary acting in behalf of the Emperor of China, defends, before the Chinese delegation, the Russians

go, for you have been with the Emperor for many years; you are a public figure. Your person was recommended to me by the Emperor in public edict, so I am responsible for you.[210] The responsibility for your companion, however, lies with you, and you, who are not afraid that the Moscovites will keep you as hostages, will have to account for him to the Emperor, whatever way things turn out, just as I for you."

40. All the distrustful people applauded this absurd decision; it was incredible that they should be satisfied with it. At any rate those present admired my constancy in opposing them successfully as they saw for the third time the whole business,[211] which they had thought already in ruins, put back on its feet. They congratulated me in a manner which I did not deserve. When my companion had gone with that instruction necessary for the business, all waited and watched to see[212] if he would return. I then said, "Sirs, it is not fitting to withhold the trust which is due to all nations. If the peace treaty is concluded, as I hope it will be, we will have to conclude it with reliance in their faith. The day will come undoubtedly when we shall be obliged to trust them; if not, when all the conditions are agreed upon and the oath is being taken, on what shall we rely? When they subscribe their names to the documents, what credit shall we attach to it? When they affix their seals to the treaty, shall it be valid with or without them? Only by trusting them can we believe that their agreement is authentic; and we may not jeopardize everything by denying them the confidence due even to a barbarian, which is a category that does not include the Moscovites.[213] Indeed, if the devil himself in human disguise would try to lie and mislead us, he could not do it with such perfidy as we suspect from the Moscovites." To this they had nothing to answer. While we waited for my companion to return with news, one of our ambassadors, Songgotu,[214] uncle of the heir apparent and one who persevered in his distrust until the end, called me and proposed a bet on the conclusion of the peace treaty. If the treaty were concluded, he would give me a good horse; and, if not, I would give him a clock. I said that I did not have a clock, but he cut me short saying that I could pay when I had one. I suggested that

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as a civilized nation, while a former Russian ambassador to China, Spathar, praises the Chinese. Father George David, reporting from Moscow to his General, Thyrsus González, about an interview with Spather in 1689 writes: "Ce monsieur [Spathar] croit la paix prochaine. Elle serait déjà conclue, si les Moscovites étaient aussi civilisés que les Chinois, dont il fait le plus grand éloge". BOSMANS, *Le problème ...*, p. 220.

[214] Som go tu i. e., Songgotu, see Note 2.

(que erão mais de cento) que sua excellencia me enganara. Respondeo elle com comum aplauso da aposta, que sim, e acrecentou disendo que folgava de perder; continuey eu disendo: e eu folgo de ganhar, não falta mais que o cavallo.

Voltando o Padre meu companheiro com a reposta, já em summa resumidas as condições, lhe dei hum abraço muito apertado, e depois ouvimos tudo o que dizia, ficando já nossos embaixadores sem saberem que diser. E com esta occasião disse eu pera lhes dar alguma (ainda que não necessaria) [14r] satisfação de meu agastamento antecedente: " Senhores, eu quem sou? Sou hum homem estrangeiro: se diser que honrado, nada val a testemunha, e só está nos ouvintes o crê-llo. Se disser sou homem baixo, sei que Vossas Excellencias não querem assim, pois me tratão com tanta honra. Logo não me devo fiar de nada pera gritar, como fiz, e enfadar-me com quem e a quem devo tanto e toda a honra que tenho, pois seria cousa fora de todo o bom juizo contra stimulum calcitrare[215] e faser rosto a quem mo dá. Quero diser que supposto eu gritar tanto, sendo tão desigual a condição e partido, sem duvida há huma resão violenta que me obriga a fasê-llo diante de Vossas Excellencias, o que se prova claro, porque, tendo eu tantos annos tratado a Vossas Excellencias, nunca a tanto me atrevi. Donde se segue que o forçar-me a rezão e a necessidade a fasê-llo, de que Vossas Excellencias virão e vem já effeitos evidentes, que se eu não gritasse algumas veses já tudo estaria arruinado ". O que elles e todos confessarão, disendo que com mais rezão devião faser elles aquella palinodia, do que eu pois tinhão passado os limites; e mostrarão depois totalmente em praxe a emenda, dando em tudo o credito que se devia, e não fasendo nem querendo consentir que nenhuma cousa se tratasse sem primeiro me chamarem e a meu companheiro.

Voltando todos alegres pera o arrayal, que fica longe tres legoas de Nip chu, encontramos alguns Hal ha que, rebellados dos Moscovitas, se vinhão sogeitar[216] e entregar aos nossos em grande numero, e chegarião a 6 ou 7 mil pessoas. Tiverão logo sua consulta se convinha recebê-llos. Não faltarão nella ambiciosos inexpertos, que levados da babugem do interece, desejavão recolhê-llos e ajudá-llos. Perguntarão-me meu paracer. Respondi com o devido recato e cautella, concluindo que o Emperador me não mandara buscar Hal ha, mas a faser pazes; e que levando estas daria ao Emperador contentamento, indo sem ellas e com muitos Hal has, nada o contentaria. Pello que o dar-lhes ajuda contra os Moscovitas hé ruina

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1 *before* engara || 13 *for* se *t2* sey || 14 *for* Se *t2* Sey || 25 do que *t1*

the horse be a good one, worthy of such a pledge and person, so that the people who heard the wager (who were more than a hundred) could not say that his Excellency cheated me. He agreed. Everyone applauded, and then he added that he would gladly lose. I said that I was glad to win and that the only thing missing was the horse.

41. When my companion returned with the answer, which was a summary of the conditions, I embraced him affectionately and then, with our ambassadors silent, we listened to what he had to say. On this occasion I gave them really unnecessary explanation of my former irritation : " Sirs, who am I ? I am a foreigner. If I say that I am honored, my testimony is invalid, as agreement depends on the listeners. If I say that I am a person of low condition, I know that your Excellencies who treat me with great honor will not believe it. Consequently, I had no reason to shout as I did and to get angry with you to whom I owe all the honor I have ; it would be a foolish thing to kick against the goad.[215] What I want to say is that if I yelled so much in spite of our different positions, I must have had a good reason, and this is clearly proven by the fact that in all the years I have known you I never dared to speak so before. In my judgment these circumstances made it necessary. Your Excellencies have seen, and will see again, that had I not spoken up on occasions, our negotiations would be in ruins. " To this they agreed and said that they had more reason than I to apologize. They really did show their improvement by being more trusting and by refusing to negotiate on anything without first consulting me and my companion.

42. As we were all happily returning to our camp, which was about three leagues distant from Nipchu, we met a great number of Qalqa, at least six or seven thousand, who had rebelled against the Moscovites and now came to surrender themselves to us.[216] There were some amongst our inexperienced and ambitious people who were carried away with their own interest and who wanted to receive and help these people. They asked for my opinion. I answered respectfully and cautiously that the Emperor had not sent me to look for Qalqa but to conclude a peace treaty, and if I returned with the treaty he would be content, but if I went back with Qalqa instead of the treaty he would not be at all

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[215] Biblical allusion referring to the *Acts of the Apostles* 26, 14.

[216] HALDE, *Description* ..., IV, p. 197.

certa das pases.[217] Ouvindo isto os despedirão com boas palavras, o que ajudou muito depois ao bom sucesso das pazes. Foi o que remeixeo estes Hal has hum Lama,[218] da qual gente já falei, que são seus sacerdotes a quem em summo venerão; sendo immundissimos formal e materialmente, se estimão entre estes pastores os mais limpos, cuja material limpesa consiste em traser huma bolça em que conservão huma porçolana de pao, por não beberem por alhea (porque comer em porçolana nenhuma especia disto tem estes barbaros, mas só beber seu leite, como já disse, e a carne crua) sua potagem, lançando a lingoa fora como cão e com ella lamber com grande diligencia a porçolana, a qual diligencia feita a recolhem na sua bolça, cujo cheiro hé tam asqueroso que faria doer a cabeça a qualquer nosso aldeão, donde se vê a limpesa daquelles que estimam estes por mais limpos. Não fallo mais desta gente, porque já anda em livros nossos impressa e expressa sua vida e costumes, como se pode ver no Padre Alegambe, que refere na vida do Padre Andrade de nossa Companhia na relação que o dito Padre Andrade fes de sua viagem ao Tubet,[219] e outros livros, a que me remetto. Sua limpesa formal hé tal, que me impede aqui a modestia, que a elles lhe falta, o descrevê-lla.[220]

Aos 29 veyo o lingoa latino com muitas proposições, que ao futuro se devião guardar em assento de igualdade: ao que responderão nossos embaixadores que não tinhão orden pera incluir isso nas pases.[221] Bem creyo que os Moscovitas insistirião nisto se a rebelião sobredita dos Hal has lhe não apressasse sua resolução,[222] pera que limpo este negocio, entendessem só com elles com mais segurança e ventagem, e sem duvida de nossa ajuda. Porem declararão os Moscovitas que, se algum negocio se tratasse com seu Duque com desigualdade, seria tudo recebido como convinha, e por isso os desenganavão e avisavão pera que não sucedesse depois faser-se alguma afronta por esta causa a seu Emperador. Aos 30 se escreverão as condições e contratos da paz de huma e outra parte, não guardando os Tartaros o que tinhão dito o dia dantes. Aos 31 os levamos, e no 1º de Septembro puserão os Moscovitas

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2 ajudo *t1* || 13 limpasa *t1* || 16 o Padre *t1*

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[217] *Ibid.*, p. 194.

[218] See Note 38.

[219] *Novo Descobrimento do gram Cathayo, ou Reinos de Tibet, pello Padre Antonio de Andrade da Companhia de Iesu, Portuguez, no Anno de 1624* (Lisboa 1626). SOMMERVOGEL, *Bibliothèque* ..., I, 329.

[220] For more details about the veneration of the Mongols toward the lamas and the Dalai Lama see SCHALL, *Historica Relatio* ... (éd. de P.BORNET) in the series *Lettres et Mémoires d'Adam Schall, S. J.*

happy. Moreover, to help the Qalqa against the Moscovites would be certain ruin of the peace.[217] Hearing this they sent the Qalqa away with nice promises. These circumstances later contributed considerably toward the success of the peace. These Qalqa were led by a Lama.[218] Lamas are priests whom the Qalqa surround with great veneration and of whom I have already spoken. Although in dress and in habit the dirtiest people yet, the Lamas deem themselves the cleanest among these shepherds. For cleanliness sake, they carry a wooden cup in a bag and never drink their milk except from this cup. They like raw meat but are not generally accustomed to eat out of their cups and only drink from them. They lap liquids like dogs, putting their tongues into the cup, and when they have finished drinking they put the cup back into its bag. Their smell is so repugnant that it would even cause our villagers to get a headache; hence, one can form an idea about the cleanliness of those who consider the Lamas clean. But I do not want to speak more about them because their life and customs have already been described in books, such as Father Alegambe's life of Father Andrade of our Society, who encountered them in a trip to Tibet.[219] Their bodily cleanliness is such that modesty, which they lack, prevents me from describing it.[220]

43. On the 29th the Latin interpreter came with many propositions having to do with courtesies of rank on both sides, which were to be observed in the future. To this our ambassadors answered that they had no instructions concerning the inclusion of these matters in the peace treaty.[221] I believe, however, that the Moscovites would have pressed this resolution had the rebellion of the Qalqa not put them under pressure.[222] Even so, they hoped that after clearing up the affair with the Qalqa they could reach a settlement with us in the matter of protocol which would be to their advantage. They did not doubt that we would ultimately come to terms. For the interim, however, the Moscovites declared that whenever their Duke was not treated as an equal they themselves would react in kind, so that if the Chinese did not want to see their Emperor slighted they had better take care. On the

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(éd. par le P. H. Bernard, S. J.), pp. 220-221.

[221] The Moscovite proposals according to Gerbillon were: (1) that in all future letters the titles of their Grand Duke be given in full or in an abbreviated form; and that he be treated as equal to the Chinese Emperor; (2) that the future Russian ambassadors be treated with honor, and without humiliations; that they be permitted to submit their credentials to the Emperor, and be given freedom in the place where they stay and also at Court; (3) that commerce between the two countries be free and without restrictions. Halde, *Descriptions ...*, IV, pp. 197-198.

[222] Halde, *Description ...*, IV, pp. 194, 197.

suas dificuldades. Entre as quaes foi o principal sobre o monte Noz,[223] que está ao norte 75 graos (que tanto se estendem estas terras ao polo). [14v] Aos 2 de Septembro resolverão os Moscovitas em como não podião vir na condição de conceder athé o monte Noz,[224] escrevendo a nossos embaixadores hum protesto sincero, prudente, não humilde nem soberbo, mas cheyo de valerosas resões e efficacia nervosa e valerosa candura, cheya de magestade e christandade, — utinam catholica! — e não astuta humildade nem fingimento de grandesa, que julgo aqui escrever, pera que se veja na fonte o que digo. Mandou o Moscovita este protesto já quasi por ver os Tartaros afferrados em nada cederem do monte Noz, desconfiado algum tanto já da paz. E por esta reção em huma noite e dia fortificou sua povoação a todo o sucesso sufficientemente, a respeito de soldadesca e modo de pelejar destas gentes, o que quasi acabado mandou a seguinte protestação :

" Transactis diebus, celebrato inter nos Sacrae Tzareae Majestatis magnos ac plenipotentes legatos, atque inter vos magnos ac plenipotentes legatos, concilio de limitibus utrique parti ponendis, exponebant nobis ablegati vestri in praesentia nostra velle vos habere limites inter utrumque imperium, fluvium Gorbieza et Argum. A fluvio Gorbiesa per lapidem usque ad ipsum mare, ex quo lapide profluunt fluvii in Amur. Similiter ne in fundo Albazim usque ad ipsum Gorbiesa inhabitationes ullae utraque ex parte habeantur. Nos itaque Sacrae Tzareae Majestatis magni et plenipotentes legati, quamvis hanc limitum determinationem non sine magnis ex parte Sacrae Majestatis detrimentis, atque supra nobis datum mandatum fieri prospexerimus, attamen desideratam in vobis habentes pacem ad utrumque inter imperium aeternum

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3 rosolverão *t1* || 26 *for* utrumque *t2* virumque || 27 A fluviis *t2*

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[223] Noz mountain, Noszi, in Gerbillon, is the Tschuktchoi [Jugjur] Noss which is the continuation of the Stanovoi range, also known as the northeastern range of the Outer Kingan chain. According to Gerbillon, the Moscovites sent people to inquire which of the two chains of mountains, the northern or the southern was to be the border. These mountains are called " Nosze ". The Chinese ambassadors said that it was to be the northern chain. Between these two ranges there is a plain (the Ud River valley) where the best sables are hunted and good fishes caught. The Russian deputies said that they did not think their Plenipotentiary would agree to this. HALDE, *Description* ..., IV,

30th the conditions of peace were put into writing by both parties. The Tartars took no notice of what had been said the day before. On the 31st we delivered our terms, and on the 1st of September the Moscovites revealed their difficulties, the most important of which concerned the mountain Noz[223] which is 75° north and extends from here to the Pole. On the 2nd of September the Moscovites declared that they could not concede the territories to the Noz mountains.[224] The written protest given to our ambassadors was sincere, prudent, and neither humble nor haughty. In the strong, candid note there were valid reasons for their objection; it was full of majesty and Christianity — alas not Catholic — and there was no false humility nor illusion of grandeur. I think it would be best to reproduce the letter here so that the reader may see in its source what I am saying. The Moscovite sent this note because he was under the impression that the Tartars insisted adamantly on the Noz mountains, and because he gave up hope of succeeding with the peace. Consequently, in one day and one night he fortified his town rather adequately, considering his military personnel and their method of operation, and when these preparations were almost finished he sent the following note of protest:

44. " During the past days, in those transactions between us, the great and plenipotentiary Legates of His Holy Majesty the Tsar, and you, the plenipotentiary ambassadors concerning the frontiers on both sides, your envoys explained to us that you wanted as the border line between the two Empires the rivers Gorbitza and Argun, and from the river Gorbitza to the sea along the mountains from which flow several rivers into the Amur. You also desired that the territory between Albazin and the Gorbitza be left without inhabitants from either side. We, therefore, the great and plenipotentiary Legates of His Holy Majesty the Tsar, consented to this proposal in spite of the fact that we considered this detri-

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p. 198. See also Map.

[224] According to Gerbillon, the events of the 2nd were as follows: At first the Moscovites did not send anybody and this embarrassed the Chinese and inspired them with fear that by having asked too much they had endangered the future of the negotiations. They called a conference of consultation during which the two Jesuits told them that in their opinion the Moscovites would not consent to what they had asked. The Chinese ambassadors wanted to send the two Jesuits over to the Russian camp with the proposal that the territories between the two mountain ranges in question i. e., the Ud river valley, be divided between the two Empires. The Chinese still claimed that these territories had belonged to their Empire. Before the two Jesuits had started for the Russian camp, some Russian deputies came with a protest written in Latin. HALDE, *Description ...*, IV, pp. 198-199.

faedus stabilire volentes, vestro in his quoque desiderio consentiebamus. Nunc vero in scripto pactorum conditionumque faederis a vobis deprompto transmissoque ad nos, denunciatis limites fore a fluvio Gorbiesa per lapidem qui apellatur Noz, qui lapis Noz utraque ex parte multa loca et fluvios cum hominibus Sacrae Majestatis subditis continet, et dividendo ex utraque sui parte planiora loca, sub uno jungit imperium Sacrae Tzareae Majestatis. Ad haec itaque nos vobis magnis legatis ipsissimam genuinam veritatem declaramus, non habere nos de his limitibus determinandis a vobis propositis ullum mandatum a Dominis nostris clementissimis Sacra Tzarea Majestate, nec hoc audemus intentare, sed etsi (quod procul a nobis) ad id cogeremur, hoc faedus invitum numquam fieret stabile ac constans. Cum autem in literis ad S. Tzaream Majestatem Dominos nostros clementissimos ab Imperatore vestro sua Bohdihan[225] (esta hé huma palavra dos Tartaros occidentais, que significa santo, do que me admiro dos Moscovitas, que não a entendendo usão della, chamando com este titulo ao Emperador da China, do que eu os não avisey por ser fora do que me pertencia, pello gravissimo perigo que daqui se podia originar, como está claro a qualquer bom juizo. Eu sempre verti assim mesmo Bohdihan e não em tartaro oriental, nem em china, disendo que o sentido do Moscovita não era o de santo, pois não lhe faltava no latim a palavra sanctus pera se explicar querendo, e não usar de palavra estrangeira : pello que eu não podia verter do latim o que o não era, que com os Moscovitas se houvessem e os fisessem explicar, a que os Tartaros se não quiserão arriscar, mas a tomarão a seu modo)[226] celsitudine pluries scriptum sit ut ad statuendam pacem ac constitutionem limitum, ac inquisitionem super excessus subditorum utriusque partis ad Amur fluvium comorantium ; praecipue tamen in et circa Albasin degentium intentato bello, parcendoque sanguini effundendo in utramque partem pacificae legatorum personae e regnis suis exeant haecque omnia determinent. Idcirco propter literas vestras ad mutuum pacis vinculum conspirantes, absque bellico tumultu deputati ad haec advenimus nos S. Tzareae Majestatis magni ac plenipotentes legati desiderioque desideravimus pacificam compositionem, cuius rei vos ipsos testes appellamus. Nunc vero causam in nobis non intentatae pacis supponitis, id quod vos neque in colloquiis vestris nobiscum, neque per ablegatos vestros nobis insinuatis, scilicet, ut hic lapis Noz limes sit inter nos et vos, dicitisque quod si positioni horum limitum non aquiescamus, bello-

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1-2 consentiebamus *om. t2* || 3 fere *t2* || 4 qui (*bis*) *om. t1* || 7 Tzareae *om. t2* || 10 prepositis *t2* || 10-1 Sacrae Tzareae *t1 and t2* || 13 S. *over* || 13-4 Majestatim *t1 and t2* || 27 celcitudine *t1 and t2* || 34 *tumultum t1 and t2* || 36 appalamus *t1*

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[225] In the Russian text of the treaty this term occurs again and the Chinese text renders it *Ta-sheng-huang-ti* (The Great and Sacred or Holy Emperor). W. Fuchs, *Der Russisch-Chinesische Vertrag ...,*

mental to the interests of His Holy Majesty and as overstepping our instructions. We consented because we thought that you desired peace and everlasting friendship between our two Empires. But now in the writing of the pacts and in the conditions of the treaty drafted by you and transmitted to us, you declare that the limits will be from the river Gorbitza through the mountain which is called Noz. This mountain commands on both sides many regions, rivers, and many subjects of His Holy Majesty. In dividing the plains on each side it unites into one the Empire of His Holy Majesty. Therefore we declare to you plenipotentiary ambassadors the honest truth, which is that with respect to these frontiers which you propose we have no instruction whatsoever from our Lords, their most clement Majesties the Tsars, and that we do not dare to consent to this. Even if we would be forced to do so (far be this from you), the peace thus concluded as forced on us could never be stable and permanent. Since, however, in letters to His Holy Majesty the Tsar written by your Emperor, His Highness the Bodihan [225] (This is a western Tartar word meaning sacred. I was astonished that the Moscovites who did not understand its meaning used it as a title for the Emperor of China, for I had certainly not advised them, as it was outside my jurisdiction, due to the grave danger which could have resulted from such action. Therefore I left it as Bodihan and did not translate it into eastern Tartar or Chinese. I said that the sense intended by the Moscovite could not have been that of sacred because he could have used the Latin word sanctus instead of a foreign word; and I could not Latinize it into something which it did not mean, and besides the Moscovites could have explained it if they wanted to. But by then the Tartars did not dare to ask and simply understood it in their own way), [226] said that in order to conclude peace and to establish the border line we should inquire into the excesses of the subjects of both Empires who live near the Amur River. Most of all we should investigate the disturbance around Albazin; both parties should send out peaceful missions to decide all this without shedding blood. In view of these letters, therefore, which promised a peaceful settlement, we, the great and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Holy Majesty the Tsar, came without any animosity; we were filled with the desire to reach a peaceful settlement to which you are our witnesses. Now, however, you seem to doubt our peaceful intentions and propose something which you had never

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pp. 592-595.

[226] It is interesting to note the scrupulous care of Pereira in this matter, yet who did not (together with other Jesuits) hesitate to attribute the honorific title "holy" or "sacred" to the schismatic Russian Tsar.

rum vi vos acturos. Quare nos S. Tzareae Majestatis magni ac plenipotentes legati reiterato genuinam veritatem vobis declaramus, nos non habere a S. Tzareae Majestatis mente mandatum, neque posse nos hos limites vobis concedere. Quod si non satisfiat vobis haec nostra declaratio, id feliciori tempori decernendum relinquimus, de quo utrisque Imperatoribus [15r] S. Tzareae Majestatis et suae Bohdigan celsitudine statuere placebit, sive per legatos, sive per ablegantes, quibus tradita ad id potestate absque tumultu et interruptione pacis et faederis haec componantur per illos. Nos vero bono communi intendentes propter leves (siquid forte sub hoc breve tempus) lites inter venatores accidant, faedus dirumpere ac determinationi limitum operam nostram subtrahere non est conveniens. Quodsi vos magni legati (quod de personis vestris non auguror) posposita pace, bellum injustum sublevetis, praetendentes ac simulantes vobis causas aliquas, scilicet, quod emissi sitis ad praescindendas omnes rationes rixarum, ac postremo tandem stabiliendos limites in quibus causis nos quoque sat superque adlaboravimus. Protestamur contra vos coram caeli et terrae gubernatore Deo et Duce supremo exercituum cui non est differentia in magnis aut parvis vincere, et apud quem remotissima proxima simulque sunt quod immunes simus ab inceptione belli hujus, neque desideramus sanguinis effusionem in irritum, neque vos provocamus. Contra autem insurgentes adversus nos, Dei auxilio et justitia nostra freti nos deffendemus quantum in nobis virium est et erit. Appellamusque contra iniqua agentes testem, vindicemque Deum ipsum, in quo spes nostras ponimus, hic percutiet dispergetque iniquas machinationes atque struentes mala contra volentes et quaerentes bona. Processum voluntatis vestrae cupimus scripto vestro nobis nuntiari, reponimusque vos excelsissimi exercituum Regis regum Dei manibus, salutamusque ut non falsos amicos nostros."

Ouvindo nossos embaixadores este protesto, que logo lhes expliquei ad literam, acrecentando de mim que aquelle papel era huma lança cruel, com que se queria o Moscovita mostrar innocente de tudo o que sucedesse neste encontro diante de seu Gram Duque. E que ouvindo nosso Emperador da China sua versão genuina, sem duvida se agastaria muito se as pases se não concluissem por culpa nossa, e não por falta de vontade ou engano dos Moscovitas que suas excellencias presumião. Pello que convinha de novo com toda a diligencia pôr o ombro ao negocio sinceramente. O que ouvindo elles, lhes não deu pouco em que cuidar, e logo nos pedirão que fossemos lá a exortá-llos. Jurou muitas veses o Moscovita que tinha chegado ao que podião e tinha ainda passado seus poderes. Continuey eu mais pedindo que por pouca cousa não arriscasse

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2 *between* legati *and* vobis *some words have been covered over with a pasted slip, on which are hade* reiterato genuinam veritatem | genuiam *t1* || 5 declaratis *t1* || 17

intimated to us, either in your letter or through your envoys, namely, that the Noz mountain should be our border, and you say that if we do not agree to this you shall act forcibly with war. Therefore we, the great and plenipotentiary ambassadors of His Majesty the Tsar, again declare in all truth that we have no instructions in this matter and cannot agree to those limits. If this our declaration does not satisfy you, we leave the matter of peace to be decided and settled in the future at a time which will please both His Holy Majesty the Tsar and His Highness the Bodihan, either through Legates or envoys with full power to negotiate without interference. For us, however, who work for the common good it would be wrong to disrupt peace and diminish our efforts in the task of delimiting a border line because of some small rivalries (if there should have arisen some in this short interval). But if you great ambassadors put peace in second place (which I do not suppose of you), you may begin an unjust war on the assumption that your mission to eliminate grounds for quarrels and to establish boundaries is sufficient justification. In these negotiations, we too have worked hard and more than enough. I do not care whether I have the upper hand in small things or in great things ; all I am concerned with is that we shall not be responsible for the starting of a war. We do not desire bloodshed and do not deliberately provoke you. If, nevertheless, you rise up against us, we, confiding in the help of God and in the justice of our cause, shall defend ourselves to the limit of our energies. We shall call as our witness and vindicator against the wrongdoers, God Himself, Who is our hope. He will strike and destroy the inimical plots and punish whosoever would wrong those who want to seek good. We are desirous of learning in writing your intentions and recommend you into the hands of the Highest King of Kings, God, and we greet you as our true friends."

45. Our ambassadors listened to this protest, which I read literally. I added my own opinion that this uncompromising paper was a device by which the Moscovite tried to prove himself innocent before his Grand Duke of whatever was to happen. Should our Emperor of China hear the original version of this protest, I said, he would most certainly be irritated if, on account of our fault and not because of the lack of good faith on the part of the Moscovites, as their Excellencies our ambassadors imagined, the peace were not concluded. Consequently, it was wise to try to negotiate sincerely once more with all diligence. When our ambassadors heard this they were not a little preoccupied, and they asked us to go to the Moscovites to advise them. The Moscovite swore again and again that he went as far as he could, even further. I

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for sat *t1* at || 18-9 Protestamur - exercituum *om. t2* || 25 con iniqua *t1* || 27 querentes *t1 and t2* || 42 muitas veses *om. t2*

hum negocio de tanto preço, e que, se podia conceder mais alguma cousa, que acabasse com huma palavra. Respondeo elle : " Eu sou christão e vós o sois. Tendes-me ouvido jurar em vossa presença muitas veses e deveis suppor que como sou christão, não juro falso. Iá tenho vergonha de falar comvosco mais neste ponto ". O que ouvindo nós, não duvidando já ser a ultima resolução, nos voltamos aos nossos, caminhando por incultos montes e cada dia, idas e vindas, com chuvas e de noite seis legoas de mao caminho e peyor cavallo. Chegando tratei logo de faser capases a nossos embaixadores, de ser esta a ultima resolução, perguntando-lhes de mais se sabião as terras que pedião ; advertindo eu que na siencia manquejavão, ajuntando logo que o destrito que pedião de sul a norte era perto de 800 legoas (o que tinhamos computado pellos graos).[227] Ouvindo elles, olharão pera huns e pera os outros e, não pouco perturbados de verem o negocio a 4ª vez por sua culpa arruinado,[228] nos pedirão logo que fisessemos como tinhão dantes determinado, cheyos não de pouca confusão de sua pouca noticia e menos conhecimento do mundo.

Aos 3 de Septembro fomos com a ultima resolução da paz, não fasendo nem obrando já elles cousa alguma sem o consentimento de quem tantas veses os ensinara e redusira a caminho, nem consentindo este se escusasse disso sem grave risco. Moverão ainda suas difficuldades os Moscovitas sobre algumas circunstancias que depois todas se compuserão.[229] Não hé crivel a alegria com que todos aquelles montes cheyos de soldadesca por onde passavamos nos aplaudião como anjos da paz e não homens, não tendo medo nem se envergonhando de nos darem todo o merecimento de todo o bom successo. Aos 4 tornamos com as mesmas condições mais modificadas e voltando nos mandou o Moscovita gente sua a propor algumas suas;[230] e neste dia nos mandarão algum mimo de suas pelles, com huma carta de muita honra e reconhecimento dos muitos trabalhos que neste negocio tinhamos tomado pello bem comum, que elle reconhecia como particular. Já se olhavão huns aos outros com outros olhos, e a nós (quod etsi pudeat ad Dei gloriam dictum sit) como [15v] a anjos desta paz, amon-

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3 *for* vossa *t1* nossa || 12 pedia *t1 and t2* || 30 enverganhando *t1*

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[227] The territories in question were not only the Ud River valley (though it was the most valuable part) but also the coastal plains 800 Portuguese leagues long extending as far north as the 75th degree latitude.

[228] For the first, second and third times when the negotiations had been in jeopardy, see Notes 169, 208.

insisted, urging him not to put into jeopardy such important business for such insignificant reasons, and if he could concede something more to do so in one word. He answered, " I am a Christian, as you are ; you have heard me state my position under oath many times and you must believe that as a Christian I do not commit perjury. I am ashamed to speak to you about this matter any more. " When we heard this, we were convinced that it was the last resolution and we returned to camp. In doing so, we crossed exposed mountains. In every going or coming, whether in rain or at night, we had to travel six leagues on a bad road and on bad horses. When we arrived, I informed our ambassadors that this was his final resolve. Moreover, I asked them whether they knew the territories which they wanted to obtain, and when I noticed that they had no knowledge of these territories, I told them that they amounted to approximately eight hundred leagues (which we had computed by degrees).[227] Hearing this, they looked at each other and were very much perturbed because through their fault the negotiations were jeopardized for the fourth time.[228] They asked us to conclude the matter as had been decided before and were much confused because of their little knowledge of the affairs of the world.

46. On the 3rd of September we went to the Moscovites with the last proposals. Our ambassadors no longer dared to do anything not in accord with their previous agreements with the Moscovites — a policy which we had several times urged upon them and deviations from which we had rectified. They had showed themselves reluctant to give the Moscovites any pretext for breaking the agreements without grave risks. The Moscovites still had difficulties with some of the terms which, however, were finally agreed upon.[229] Our soldiers who filled those hills through which we passed applauded us joyfully as if we were angels af peace. They were not afraid nor ashamed to give us the entire credit for the success. On the 4th we went again to the Moscovite with the terms a little modified, and upon our return he sent some of his men to propose some conditions of his own.[230] On the same day, the Moscovite sent us a present of skins with a letter of praise and recognition of our special efforts for the common good in connection with this affair. By now both parties viewed each other

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[229] According to Gerbillon, it was agreed upon that the territories in question (Ud River valley etc.) should remain undecided until a later time. HALDE, *Description* ..., IV, p. 200.

[230] The main point of this proposal concerned Albazin. The Russians wanted it to be put in the treaty that it shall never be rebuilt. The Chinese refused to consent although they had no intention of rebuilding it. HALDE, *ibid.*

toando-nos comum aplauso mais ainda do que convinha. Aos 5 voltamos com as mesmas condições ainda mais moderadas,[231] andando todos estes dias em roda viva lidando com huns e outros semelhantes em suas cousas, e de noite sem dormir, das quais passei quatro a fio sem descançar o necessario, nem meu companheiro, vertendo de noite o que de dia se concluya. Aos 6 veyo o lingoa latino[232] (que sempre se achava presente) com as condições ainda mudadas[233] (que aqui não particulariso por serem só accidentes), e fomos nós logo com a conclusão e determinação de tudo, e que no dia seguinte, 7 de Setembro, se jurarião as pazes com commua e universal alegria de huma e outra das partes desejada e tantas veses desesperada.

Finalmente amanheceo aos 7, ou (pera melhor diser) não anoiteceo aos 6, estando toda a noite em huma incrivel alegria com lumes e alinternas no arrayal. Fui eu dantes com meu companheiro a determinar algumas miudesas e com a forma do juramento dada pellos nossos embaixadores,[234] a que o Moscovita (ainda que lho asseguramos) se não quis acomodar, por ter medo haveria nelle alguma superstição. Pello que cada huma das partes o fes como julgou obrigava mais, seguindo nossos embaixadores o teor em tudo dos Moscovitas. Quando chegamos à povoação de Nip chu estavão ainda indeterminados os Moscovitas de como se devião firmar os sinetes nos capitulos das pazes, e com estas duvidas, a que se não resolvião, forão gastando todo o dia. Porque os Tartaros querião se assinassem ambos em ambos os exemplares, a saber, hum que escreverião os Moscovitas por sua mão, o qual nos entregarião, e outro que nós escreveriamos e lhe entregariamos com os sigillos de hum e outro imperio. Aos Moscovitas lhes parecia esta duplex diligencia escusada, não sei por que seus intentos. Gastei muito tempo persuadindo a pressa sem nada concluir. Fui-me hum pouco enfadando e estranhando como sendo o dia dantes determinado se nam acabavão de resolver.[235] Demais, que estavão já vindos nossos embaixadores e esperando sobre os montes, que elle via com seus olhos, com a cabeça ao sol e esperando a chuva (que já come-

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1 apluso *tl* || 31 lhe *tl*

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[231] Gerbillon says that the Moscovites wanted a few words changed in the draft they showed him this day. HALDE, *ibid.*

[232] Andrei Bielobotsky. See Note 156.

[233] Gerbillon says that on the 6th he and Bielobotsky finished the

with different eyes; and me and my companion (though I am ashamed, I shall say it so that God be glorified) they considered as angels of peace. Both sides congratulated us more than we deserved. On the 5th we returned to the Moscovites with the terms again modified.[231] All these days we worked incessantly without sleeping at night negotiating with both parties. Both I and my companion passed four nights in a row without getting our needed rest, for we translated at night what was concluded during the day. On the 6th, the Latin interpreter,[232] who was always present, came with the conditions still more modified,[233] which I shall not enumerate in detail as they were only incidental. We brought the Moscovites the final settlement which was the basis for the treaty so much desired and so frequently despaired of, that it would be sworn with equal joy by both sides on the 7th of September.

47. Finally, the morning of the 7th dawned, or perhaps it is better to say night had not fallen on the 6th, as the whole night was spent in merrymaking with lights and lanterns burning in the camp. Before this, I and my companion went to settle a few minute details. We carried with us the oath our ambassadors were to take,[234] which the Moscovite, despite our reassurance, did not want to accept because he was afraid that it might contain some superstitions. He wanted both parties to swear an oath which imposed strict obligations, and our ambassadors, in the end, followed the text of the Moscovites. When we arrived in the town of Nipchu, the Moscovites were as yet undecided as to how the treaty should be signed. Because of these doubts which they could not resolve, the whole day was wasted. The Tartars wanted both copies signed by both parties, that is to say both parties would sign the copy which the Moscovite would write in his own hand and deliver to us, as well as the copy which we had written to give to them. To the Moscovites this double signature seemed superfluous, for what reason I do not know. I wasted much time trying unsuccessfully to convince them. I was a little irritated and astonished that they were unable to settle this question, since it had been decided on the day before.[235] Our ambassadors, moreover, had already come and were waiting on the hills, as the Mos-

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final draft and agreed on the manner in which the treaty was to be signed, sealed and sworn. HALDE, *ibid.*

[234] According to Gerbillon, the Chinese ambassadors had been ordered by K'ang-hsi to take the oath according to a formula based on the Catholic religion. They had their formula ready. The Moscovites, however, objected to this. HALDE, *ibid.*, p. 203.

[235] See Note 233.

çava) com pouco decoro e respeito a suas pessoas. Logo ouvindo isto o embaixador moscovita com toda a pressa e cortesia (no que sempre se mostrou como prudente advertido) mandou levar huma fermosa tenda a nossos embaixadores contra as injurias do tempo, servindo esta acção de brando oleo à ferida, que elles impacientes ainda renovarião de sospeitas de engano.

Fui eu apressando e meu companheiro quanto pude, porem como ao embaixador resoluto, que queria as pases como bem comum contra os intereçados particulares,[236] lhe punhão estes (como vemos em semelhantes casos cada dia) impedimentos, dos quais se devia elle primeiro em solido desembaraçar, passava já de meyo dia e duas horas depois, sem, desd'a manhã, lidando com elles, os resolver a tomar final resolução. Pello que me increspei quanto convinha, disendo era zombar aquillo de nossos embaixadores e ensinuava o que elles sospeitavão dos Moscovitas. E levantando-me disse que não tinha mais que esperar, porque se em o dia inteiro nada tinha concluido, não o poderia com mais hum quarto de hora alcançar. Estava o embaixador em consulta com os seus (que em semelhantes occasiões de discordias não servem mais que de embaraço e impedimento, devendo tomar em tais casos a rezolução a quem pertence e não deixar-se perder o tempo em dilações) algum distante de nós. Ouvindo elle a tal resolução de minha ida (que eu não tomaria se com solidos fundamentos não estivesse seguro que elle mandaria em meu alcance), e por outra parte julguei devia dar alguma satisfação a nossos embaixadores (que cheyos de sospeitas, que se de mim mesmo não desconfiavão, lançarião sobre mim credulo toda a culpa da dilação). Mandou logo correndo o lingoa latina[237] a toda a pressa a reter-me. Foi cousa galante o medo que tinhão alguns Tartaros inexpertos que me acompanhavão que com minha desconfiança o negocio se danasse, pedindo-me que me não fosse, nem enfadasse, não advertindo quantas veses elles o danarão, e era o mesmo que o tinha posto a caminho. Outros mais agudos, considerando o passado e vendo o presente, me aplaudião a resolução, antidoto presensial às moras do Moscovita; e muito mais triunfarão quando, ainda sem acabar a dita resolução, vião tão depressa della tam bom effeito. Sucedeo que, no mesmo tempo que eu me mostrei enfadado, chegava hum mancebo enviado de nossos embaixadores, que estavão longe sobre os montes quasi huma legoa afastados esperando, os quais impacientes

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16 reslução *t1* || 20 o *om. t1* || 38 triufarão *t1*

covite could see with his own eyes. The ambassadors were looking up and expecting the rain which, in defiance of their persons, was even then beginning. When the Moscocovite ambassador was made aware of this, in a great hurry and with that courtesy in which he always proved himself well versed, he sent a beautiful tent to our ambassadors to protect them against the inclement weather. He intended this action as a soothing ointment for the wound which their impatience might have reopened through fear of being deceived.

48. My companion and I reminded him that he was the ambassador who had wanted peace even when men with particular interests opposed it,[236] that he himself (as is frequently the case in such situations) had brought up those difficulties which now he had to resolve, and that it was already the hour past noon. Since I had argued with him since morning and had not persuaded him to take the final steps, I showed as much irritation as was fitting and said that this joking with our ambassadors could only confirm their suspicions concerning the Moscovites. I arose and said that there was no use waiting any longer, because if, during the entire day, they had reached no conclusion there was no hope that in another fifteen minutes they would accomplish anything. The ambassador was in consultation with his own people at a little distance. On similar occasions, such consultations serve rather as an embarassment and impediment, since it is fitting that the one who is in charge should resolve the problems and not let time be wasted. When he heard my decision, which I would not have taken if I had not been sure that he would stop me, he sent the Latin interpreter[237] at once to stop me. By my action I also wanted to give some satisfaction to our ambassadors who were full of suspicions, for even though they did not distrust me they would at least make me responsible for the delay. Some of the less experienced Manchus with me demonstrated their fear that my despondent attitude might damage the negotiations; they asked me not to leave or get angry, forgetting how many times they had jeopardized the negotiations and that it was I who had to straighten out the difficulties. More acute observers among the Tartars, aware of past and present maneuvers approved my resolution as an appropriate antitode to the delay of the Moscovites, and they felt much more triumphant when they saw the results which were achieved even without my executing the threat. It so happened that just when I had shown my irritation to the Moscovite, there arrived a messenger from our ambassadors who had been waiting a long time on the hills only

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[236] Ivan Vlasov.

[237] Andrei Aristofor Bielobotsky.

de tanta mora me mandavão já chamar, ficando ali meu companheiro por entretanto, pera saber a causa [16r] desta detença.

Tomando eu disto occasião (porque me tinhão os Moscovitas já pedido me não voltasse), disse : " Vedes em como nossos embaixadores me mandão chamar impacientes ? Não cuideis que hé a colera inconsiderada, mas reparai que o devo faser assim ". Fui logo correndo até chegar a nossos embaixadores, aonde cheguei quasi sem folgo ainda que a cavallo, junto dos quais estava já hum Moscovita mandado ao mesmo fim.[238] Logo me fes hum delles assentar em seu mesmo assento diante do mesmo Moscovita, no que reparou com rezão da grande honra que eu nem merecia nem esperava. Comecei a abrandá-llos com as resões que me occorrião acomodadas a este fim, disendo que, supposto suas excellencias tinhão tido tantos dias de paciensia, a coroassem com esse dia, no qual infalivelmente se concluirião e jurarião as pases. Deixando-os com esta esperança, voltei assim mesmo correndo aquella legoa, chegando ao Moscovita com a mesma falta de folgo, aonde estive primeiro hum pouco descançando pera poder dearticular algumas palavras, que continuei apressando-os a acabar. Finalmente estando já quasi tudo concluido, me resolvi a dar outra carreira semelhante às sobreditas, fasendo-me verdadeiramente neste dia o que não sou, medico de duas paixões, impaciente huma e a outra ad nauseam usque vagarosa, entretendo aquella com a paciencia e estimulando esta com o necessario enfadamento. Pello que deixando a meu companheiro com elles tresladando os capitulos da paz pera não perder o tempo, fui correndo a nossos embaixadores pera os faser partir e ir caminhando devagar pera assim lhe não parecer dura a espera, e pera que indo devagar dar tempo ao treslado sobredito, o qual tres veses se tresladou por erro só de huma letra, em que os Moscovitas são tão escrupulosos que havendo huma só letra emendada em papel que trate de seu Gram Duque hé condenado à morte seu author.

Fui correndo, como já disse, e chegando a nossos embaixadores os alegrei com tal resolução tanto, que em ponto se alevantarão logo e a cavallo forão caminhando com todo o acompanhamento ; e advertindo-os eu que fossem devagar pello fim que assima fica dito, me pus eu logo na carreira pera ir diante aos Moscovitas dar a nova e acabar o treslado das condições da paz de que assima falei. Iá acima tambem tratei dos assentos de cada hum e da muita diversidade, não violenta mas voluntaria de huns e outros. Conhecendo os animos feridos com a propria escolha de nossos embaixadores sobre isto, tinha já pedido ao embaixador moscovita que pera em tudo aparecer uniformidade, se contentasse naquelle

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16 e jurarião *om. t2* || 21-2 semelhantes *t1* || 24 nauscam *t1* || 37 eu *om. t2*

a league away and who had become impatient with the long waiting. He carried an order for me to return without my companion so that they could find out the cause of this delay.

49. As the Moscovite had already asked me to stay, I seized this opportunity and said, " See how impatiently our ambassadors are calling me. Do not be concerned, however, about my anger, for I shall be careful and do what I have to do. " With great haste I returned by horse to our ambassadors, and arriving breathless I found there a certain Moscovite who had come for the same purpose.[238] One of our ambassadors made me sit down in his own chair in front of the Moscovite ; this was an honor that I neither deserved nor expected. I started to calm them with reasons which seemed appropriate to this end and said to them that since they had been patient for so many days they should crown their endurance with tolerance this day too on which certainly the peace treaty would be concluded. Leaving them with this hope, I ran that one league road again, but had to rest for a while to catch my breath before I reached the Moscovites, so that I would be able to speak a few words. When the whole business was almost concluded, I returned once more to our ambassadors, making myself what I am really not, the doctor of two patients, one impatient, and the other sickeningly slow, treating the former with patience and stimulating the other with necessary ire. Leaving my companion to translate the chapters of the treaty, without losing any time I ran back to our ambassadors to get them started slowly on their way ; this would make the waiting easier for them and still give enough time for the translation to be made. The translation had to be written three times because one word was translated incorrectly. In this the Moscovites were so scrupulous that the author of an error in a single letter of a document referring to their Grand Duke could be condemned to death.

50. Our ambassadors were so joyful that a settlement had been reached that they got on their horses at once and started on their way with all their followers. I told them to go slowly and then hastened back, both to prepare the Moscovite for their arrival and to finish the translation of the conditions of the peace treaty. I also talked to the Moscovite about the great difference in the seats of the Moscovites and the Chinese which had been voluntarily agreed upon. I knew that our ambassadors had wounded their own pride by their choice and, therefore, I asked the Moscovite for the sake of uniformity in everything to be content on that day to sit on a bench and to prepare a common place

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[238] To ask the Chinese ambassadors to be patient a little longer.

dia com assentar-se em banco, e que aparelhasse por si o lugar comum do juramento que os nossos embaixadores não levarião seus assentos. Logo se ria do erro alheo, disendo que tinha perguntado isso no primeiro dia de conferencias e que nossos embaixadores tinhão dito que cada hum fisesse sua tenda, comtudo que com muito gosto faria o que eu lhe pedia. Pello que fes huma commua tenda com seus assentos à roda cubertos de fermosas alcatifas e huma meza no meyo tambem cuberta de outra. Pedi-lhe mais que como os Chinas erão naturalmente escrupulosos na corthesia, que lhes seria muito aceito que quando chegavão nossos embaixadores, os sahisse a encontrar fora da tenda convidando-os primeiro a entrar, no que elle veyo suavemente com muito aplauso e successo. Entrando dentro da tenda (que seria já pellas 6 horas da tarde) se assentarão somente os embaixadores, nós e mais sinco mandarins superioris dignitatis, ficando os mais mandarins, ainda de grande nota (como assima já disse) todos em pé pera faser a mesma corte a nossos embaixadores que os Moscovitas ao seu.

Assentados deste modo, se tratou ainda huma difficuldade pera os Chinas não pequena, a saber, querião estes traser comsigo o papel em latim feito em seu nome, o qual nomeavão este Emperador em primeiro lugar e em 2º o Gram Duque, assinado com o sigillo de hum e outro imperio, e que os Moscovitas levassem o seu com as mesmas circunstancias, a saber, com o seu Duque em primeiro lugar escrito e o Emperador da China em 2º, pera assim não serem obrigados a traserem à China hum papel com o nome de outro em primeiro lugar e não o seu. Houve grande debate sobre isto, não consentindo o Moscovita, o qual nenhum caso disso fasia como experimentado em negocios semelhantes, sabendo bem que seu Duque não devia estranhar vendo que os Chinas nomeavão em primeiro lugar a seu Emperador. Depois de longa [16v] disputa e resões de conveniencias, occorreo a hum hum bom pensamento, disendo: "Que nos estamos matando? Na nossa China ninguem mete em controversia ser o nosso primeiro, pello que indo o nosso tambem ao seu reyno em primeiro lugar escrito aparece ainda mayor honra de nosso Emperador, e ainda que no papel que elles fasem e nós levamos va o seu no primeiro lugar, na nossa China quem não sabe que o nosso hé o mayor?" Com aplauso foi recibido o discurso e o conceito; o que determinado se leo hum dos papeis em publico e alta voz, cotejando-se o outro no mesmo tempo; o que acabado se leo o cotejado assim mesmo em alta voz, cotejando-se o outro no mesmo tempo por diversos rivisores. Em visto não discreparem entre si, se firmarão com os nomes dos embaixadores de huma e outra parte, assinando-se cada hum dos embaixadores em primeiro lugar conforme os Emperadores, a saber,

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3 *for* ria *t2* rio || 13 6 *underlined* || 14 e *om. t2* || 15 superioris - mandarins

for the signing of the treaty. I said that our ambassadors would not bring their own benches. He smiled when he heard this strange proposal and said that he had asked our ambassadors about that very matter at the first conference, and there they had said that each party should bring its own tent, but he nonetheless would gladly accede to my request. He put up a common tent with the seats arranged in a circle with a table in the middle, both covered with beautiful rugs. I suggested that since the Chinese were scrupulous about etiquette, it would please them very much if upon their arrival he would meet them outside the tent and invite them in. He did this very nicely and with much approval. It was already around six in the evening when they entered the tent. Only the ambassadors, we and the five more important Mandarins sat; the others, even some important among them, remained standing to form a court around our ambassadors as did the Moscovites around their ambassador.

51. When all were arranged in this manner, another difficulty came up, which for the Chinese was not a trifling one. They wanted, in fact, to take back with them the Latin copy of the peace treaty which was made on their behalf and in which the name of the Chinese Emperor was in first place and that of the Grand Duke in second place; they desired further that this be signed by both parties. Thus they would not have to take back to China a document in which the name of someone else's Emperor stood in first place. The Moscovites too were to take back a copy with the name of their Grand Duke first and that of the Chinese Emperor second. A great debate began about this. The Moscovite objected that it was not the proper procedure, and he said that everyone realized that their Grand Duke would not think it strange if the Chinese put their Emperor in first place. After a long dispute and many arguments, some one had a clever idea, "Why are we fighting?" he said. "In China no one disputes the fact that our Emperor is first, and if in a document which goes to the Moscovite Empire he also is in first place it is a greater honor; and even though in the document which they make out for us he is in second place, at home in China no one will doubt that our Emperor is greater." This suggestion was received with approval. After this one of the copies was read aloud and the other one checked at the same time. When this was finished the other copy was read aloud and the former was checked by different reviewers. Since there was no discrepancy between them they were signed by the ambassadors of both parties in the same order of procedure in each copy in which the names of the Em-

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om. t2 || 19 Chias *t1* | a sabar *t1* || 44 *before* Emberadores

no que escreverão os nossos se assinarão em primeiro lugar os nossos, e em 2º os Moscovitas; e no que escreverão os Moscovitas se assinarão elles em primeiro lugar e os nossos em segundo.[239]

Depois de serem assinados os embaixadores, se firmarão com os mesmos sigillos e com a mesma a ordem sobredita. No mesmo tempo mandou o Moscovita vir fermosos pratos de doces, mas grosseiros, entre o que veyo hum pão de asucar da Ilha da Madeira alvissimo, que como cousa nunca vista causou admiração e levou o mayor aplauso, furtando cada hum o que podia pera mostrar aos amigos que ficavão com a multidão mais afastados ou ainda no arrayal. Trouxerão tambem vinho de uvas e do seu, reprehendendo este todos por forte. Sellados os papeis, como assima disse, se levantarão todos e, cada hum com o seu papel na mão, fes o Moscovita seu juramento e na mesma forma o fiserão os nossos embaixadores, usando já de vellas acezas de cera por ser já noite fechada. Forão os capitulos das pazes os seguintes:

Missi ab Imperatore Sinarum ad determinandos limites legati, una cum missis ab Imperatore Russorum legatis[240]

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1 se assinarão *corr. from* e em || 13 reprehedendo *tl*

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[239] About the signing see also HALDE, *op. cit.*, pp. 202-203.

[240] The names and titles of the signatories can best be collected from the introductory part of the treaty itself:

Latin text in *Sbornik* as reproduced by W. FUCHS	Gerbillon's French translation in HALDE	Chinese in *Hei-lung-chiang wai-chi* (See list of Chinese terms)
Som Go Tu, Praetorianorum militum praefectus interioris palatii Palatinus, etc.	Song Ho Tou, Capitaine des Officers de la Garde du Corps, Conseiller d'Etat & Grand du Palais	Songgotu
Tum Quem Cam, interioris palatii palatinus, primi ordinis comes, Imperialis vexilli dominus, imperatoris avunculus, etc.	Tong que kang, Grand du Palais, Cong du premier ordre, Seigneur d'un des Etendarts de l' Empire, & Oncle de l'Empereur	T'ung Kuo-kang
Lam Tan, unius etiam vexilli dominus	Lang tan, Seigneur d'un des Etendarts de l'Empire	Langtan

perors appeared ; that is, in the copy which our ambassadors had made out they signed first and the Moscovites wrote in second place, and in the copy which the Moscovites had made out they signed first and our ambassadors wrote in second place. [239]

52. After the treaty was signed, the seals of the respective ambassadors were attached in the same order. At the same time the Moscovites ordered beautiful plates full of sweets — a little coarse — to be brought in. Among them was a white loaf of sugar from the Island of Madeira which was something our ambassadors had never seen before and which caused the greatest admiration. Each one (of the Chinese) stole what he could to show to his friends who were with the multitude at a little distance or in the camp. The Moscovites also had wine made of grapes and of grain, which, however, our ambassadors did not like as it was too strong. After the papers were signed all stood up and each ambassador took his own copy in hand. The Moscovite took the oath and our ambassadors did the same. Lighted wax candles were used as night had already fallen. The chapters of the peace were the following.

53. The ambassadors sent by the Emperor of China to establish the border together with the ambassadors sent by the Russian Emperor. [240] Being assembled near the town of Nipchu, in the

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Pam Tarcha, item unius vexilli dominus	Lang tartcha, Seigneur d'un des Etendarts de l'Empire	Bandarša
Sap so, circa Sagalien Ula aliasque terras generalis exercituum praefectus	Sapso, Général des Camps & Armées de l'Empereur sur le fleuve Saghalien oula & Gouverneur Général des Pays circonvoisins	Sabsu
Ma La, unius vexilli praefectus	Ma la, Grand Enseigne d'un Etendart de l'Empire	Mala
Wen Ta, exterorum tribunalis alter praeses et caeteri una cum missis ...	Wenta, Second Président du Tribunal des Affaires étrangeres & autres ...	Unda
Magnis ac plenipotentibus suae Tzareae Majestatis Legatis Proximo Okolnitio ac locitenente Branski Theodoro Alexievicz Golovin	... les Grands Ambassadeurs Plénipotentiaires, Theodore Alexienoviez Golovin Okolniz, & Lieutenant de Branki	Feodor Alexeevich Golovin

Anno Kam Hi 28, crocci serpentis dicti (nome do anno corrente no Kalendario), 7ª luna, die 24,[241] prope opidum Nip chu congregati, tum ad coercendam insolentiam illorum inferioris notae hominum qui extra proprios limites, sive venabundi, sive depraedantes, sive perturbationes, aut tumultus quoscumque commoventes pro suo arbitrio excurrunt, tum ad limites inter utrumque Imperium Sinicum scilicet, et Ruthenicum clare ac praecipue constituendos, tum denique ad pacem perpetuam stabiliendam et aeternum faedus percutiendum, sequentia puncta mutuo consensu statuimus ac determinavimus.

1° Rivulus nomine Kerbichi,[242] qui rivo Chorna[243] tartarice Urum[244] dicto proximus adjacet et in fluvium Sagalien Ula influit, limites inter utrumque imperium constituit. Item a vertice rupis, sive montis lapidei,[245] qui est supradicti Kerbichi fons et origo, et per ipsa huius montis cacumina usque ad mare, utriusque imperii ditionem ita dividet, ut omnes terrae et fluvii sive parvi sive magni, qui a meridionali hujus montis parte influunt in fluvium Sagalien Ula, sint sub Imperii Sinici dominio : omnes vero terrae et omnes rivi qui ex altera parte ejusdem montis versus borealem plagam vergunt sub Imperii Ruthenici dominio ita remaneant, ut tamen quicumque fluvii et quaecumque terrae sunt inter fluvium dictum Uddi[246] et seriem illam montium pro limitibus designatam, pro interim indeterminatae relinquantur. De his vero post utriusque imperii legatorum reditum in proprium regnum rite examinatis et clare cognitis, vel per legatos vel per literas postea determinabitur. Item fluvius nomine Ergun qui etiam supradictum fluvium Sagalien Ula influit, limites ita constituat, ut omnes terrae meridionales ad Sinicum Imperium, quae vero sunt in parte boreali ad Ruthenorum Imperium et dominium pertineant, et omnia aedificia quae sunt ex parte meridionali dicti fluvii, in faucibus fluvii nomine Mei relue[247] extructa sunt, ad litus boreale transferantur.

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20 remaneat *t1 and t2* || 27-8 *before* merionales

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dapifero ac locitenente Jelatomski, Joanne Eustachievicz Wlasoph	& ses Compagnons	Ivan Ostafievich Vlasov
Cancellario Simeone Cornitski		Simeon Kornitskoy

[241] Crocei serpentis i. e., *chi ssu*, September 7, 1689.

[242] Kerbichi, written Gerbici in the Manchu text, Kerbitchi in Gerbillon's Diary, Ko-ehr-pi-chi in the Chinese text of the *K'ang-hsi shih-lu,* with a variation in the third character (see list of Chinese

28th year of K'ang Hsi, called the year of the scarlet serpent (which is the name of the current year in the calendar), in the 7th moon, on the 24th day,[241] in order to repress the insolence of certain rovers, who passing beyond the bounds of their land to hunt, robbed, murdered, and committed other outrages, as also for settling the bounds between the two Empires of China and Russia, and, finally to establish everlasting peace and good understanding, have mutually determined and agreed upon the following articles.

1° The river named Kerbichi,[242] which is next to the river Chorna,[243] in Tartarian called Urum,[244] and which falls into the Sagalien Ula, shall serve for boundaries between the two Empires. The long chain of mountains[245] which is the source of the said river Kerbichi, and extends as far as the eastern sea, shall also serve as bounds of both Empires insomuch that all the rivers and brooks, great or small, which rise on the southern side of those mountains, and fall into the Sagalien Ula, all the lands and countries from the top of the said mountains southward shall belong to the Empire of China. All the lands, countries, rivers and brooks which are on the other side of the mountains extending northward shall remain to the Empire of Russia; with this restriction, nevertheless, that all the countries lying between the said mountains and the river Udd[246] shall continue undecided till the ambassadors of both powers on their return home shall have gotten proper information and therefore shall decide this matter either by Legates or by letters. Moreover, the river Argun which falls into the Sagalien Ula shall serve for bounds to the two Empires so that all the lands and contries lying to the south thereof shall appertain to the Chinese Empire, and whatever lies to the north of it shall remain to the Empire of Russia. All the houses and dwellings which are at present to the south of the said Argun at the mouth of the river Meirelue[247] shall be removed to the north side.

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terms in Appendix) in the *Hei-lung-chiang wai-chi*, and Gorbitza in the Russian text. See all these texts reproduced in W. FUCHS, *Der Russisch-Chinesische Vertrag ...*, pp. 573, 582, 579, 585, 586.

[243] Chorna, written Corna in the Manchu text, Chou-ehr-na in both the above mentioned Chinese texts, Tschorna by MULLER (*Sammlung Russ. Geschichte*), Chernoi in the Russian text and Tschernaya in the English translation. W. FUCHS, *op. cit.*, pp. 573, 582, 585, 586, 592, 590.

[244] Urum, written Uruma in the Manchu text, Ouroun by Gerbillon, (for the two Chinese renditions see Appendix) W. FUCHS, *op. cit.*, pp. 573, 579, 582, 585.

[245] Stanovoi or Outer Kingan Mountains.

[246] For the different readings see W. FUCHS, *op. cit.*, pp. 573, 578, 579, 585, 592.

[247] Mei relue, Meirelke bira in the Manchu text. For other read-

2º Arx seu fortalitia in loco nomine Yagza a Russis extructa funditus eruetur [17r] ac destruetur: omnesque illius incolae Ruthenici Imperii subditi cum omnibus suis cujuscumque generis rebus in Russi Imperii terras deducentur, atque intra hos limites determinatos nullam ob causam utriusque venatores transeant. Quod si unus aut duo inferioris notae homines extra hos limites determinatos vel venabundi, vel latrocinandi [causa] divagabuntur, statim in vincula conjecti ad illarum terrarum constitutos in utroque imperio praefectos deducentur, qui cognitam illorum culpam, debita pena multabunt. Si vero ad decem, aut quindecim simul congregati, et armis extructi aut versabuntur, aut alterius imperii homines occiderint, aut depraedabuntur, de hoc ad uniuscuiusque imperii Imperatores referretur, et omnes hujus criminis rei capitali paena multabuntur. Nec bella propter quoscumque particularium hominum excessus suscitabuntur, aut sanguinis effusio procurabitur.

3º Quaecumque prius acta sunt cuiuscumque generis, aeterna oblivione sopiantur.

4º Ab eo die, quo inter utrumque imperium haec aeterna pax jurata fuerit, nulli in posterum ex altero imperio transfugae in alterum imperium recipiantur, sed in vincula conjecti statim reducentur. Quicumque vero Ruthenici Imperii subditi in Sinico, et quicumque Sinici Imperii in Ruthenico nunc sunt, in eodem statu relinquantur.

5º Propter nunc contractam amicitiam atque aeternum faedus stabiliendum, cuiuscumque generis homines literas patentes itineris sui afferentes licite accedent ad regna utriusque dominii, ibique vendent et ement quaecumque ipsis videbuntur necessaria mutuo comercio.

6º Concilio inter utriusque imperii legatos celebrato, et omnium utriusque regni limitum contentionibus diremptis, paceque stabilita et aeterno faedere amicitiae percusso, si hae omnes determinatae conditiones rite observentur, nullus erit amplius perturbationis locus. Ex utraque parte faederis conditiones scripto mandabuntur, duplexque exemplar huic conforme sigillo munitum sibi invicem tradent magni utriusque imperii legati.[248] Demum et

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1 *for* Arx *t2* A || 5 causa *t1* || 6 homnines *t1* || 8-9 imperio *om. t2* || 19 actae *t2* || 19-20 aeternae *t1 and t2* || 21 Ab eo dic *t1 and t2* || 26 reliquantur *t1* || 35 deremptis *t1* || 36 aeterna *t1*

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ings see W. Fuchs, *op. cit.*, pp. 574, 579, 583, 585, 588. According to Muller the houses in question were those of Arginskoi [Argunsk] *ostrog* founded in 1655.

2° The fortress built by the Russians in the place called Yagza shall be entirely demolished, and all the subjects of the Empire of Russia now dwelling in the said fortress shall be transported with all their effects to the lands appertaining to the crown of Russia. The hunters of the respective Empires may not, on any account whatever, pass beyond the bounds settled as above. That in case one or two ordinary persons should happen to make excursion beyond the limits, either to hunt, steal or plunder, they shall be immediately seized and brought before the governors and officers established on the frontiers of both Empires, and said governors after being informed of the nature of the crime shall punish them duly. That if people assembled to the number of ten or fifteen shall go armed to hunt or pillage on the lands beyond their limits or shall kill any subjects of the other Empire, the Emperors of both Empires shall be informed thereof and those found guilty of the crime shall be put to death. But no excess whatever committed by private persons shall kindle a war, much less shall blood be shed by violent means.

3° Everything that has passed hitherto, of what nature so ever it may be, shall be buried in everlasting oblivion.

4° From the day that this perpetual peace between the two Empires shall be sworn to, neither side shall receive any fugitive or deserter. But if any subjects of either Empire shall flee into the territories of the other, he shall be immediately secured and sent back. All the subjects of the crown of Russia who are at present in the Empire of China, and all those belonging to the crown of China who are in the Empire of Russia shall remain as they are.

5° In regard to the present treaty of peace and mutual union, all persons, of what condition so ever they be, may go and come reciprocally, with full liberty, from the territories subject to either Empire, provided they have passports, and they shall be able to buy and sell whatever they think fit and carry on mutual trade.

6° All the differences that have arisen relating to the frontiers of both crowns being thus terminated, and a sincere peace and eternal union being settled between the two nations, there will be no longer any ground for uneasiness, provided the above mentioned articles of the present treaty, which shall be reduced to writing, be punctually observed. The chief ambassadors of the respective crowns shall reciprocally give each other two copies of

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[248] One of the two copies the Russians handed to the Chinese was in Latin and the other in Russian; and one of the two copies the Chinese handed to the Russians was in Latin while the other was in Manchu. LIU HSÜAN-MIN, *op. cit.*, p. 422, 438-40; W. FUCHS, *op. cit.*, p. 548; HALDE, *Description ...*, IV, p. 203.

juxta hoc idem exemplar, eaedem conditiones sinico, ruthenico et latino idiomate lapidibus incidentur, qui lapides in utriusque imperii limitibus in perpetuum ac aeternum monumentum erigentur.

Na mesma forma está o que escreverão os Moscovitas, mudadas as circunstancias assima ditas,[249] e demais esta ultima destas pedras em memoria da dita paz mudou o Moscovita: " Relinquimus arbitrio Sinici Imperatoris ". Bem creyo que os Moscovitas farião escrever mais algumas cousas e condições mais claras, a saber, que nunca o Emperador por obra, palavra ou escrito trataria a seu Duque inferior,[250] e outras ainda semelhantes, mas as apertadas circunstancias em que se achavão com a rebelião dos Hal ha (que actualmente estavão passando o rio, e se os não impedião lhes escapavão das unhas, voltando a suas antigas terras com grande numero de animais e grande detrimento no tributo que disso pagão aos Moscovitas cada anno), lhes fiserão esquecer, o que faltando ellas, não deixarião passar por alto pera ensinar aos Chinas que há mais homens no mundo. Tanto que as pases se jurarão, tocarão os Moscovitas suas trombetas e charamellas, que às orelhas de anjos parecendo-lhes matinada e não melodia de homens, procurarão logo estes se calassem, deixando seus companheiros não pouco mortificados, que si non cantabant, audiebant canticum, si non novum, peregrinum in terra aliena. Acabado isto se levantou o embaixador moscovita e, inclinando-se a hum de nossos embaixadores, se abraçou com elle e foi proseguindo o mesmo com os mais com comum aplauso e alegria, falando entre si com mostras de verdadeira e não fingida amisade. Depois de breve conversação se despedirão, acompanhando-os como em terra sua o Moscovita, o que os nossos em summo estimarão, e com alinternas navegando em parte e em parte caminhando, chegamos à meya noite a nossas tendas bem cançados, tendo aquelle dia comido somente o que aqui não digo com resão. Mas si miseris solatium est socios habere, nos não faltaram neste dia os penachos, que bisarros nas cabeças de nossos grandes lhes podião servir de azas pera voarem, de leves que estavão aquellas horas.

Antes de nos apartar rogou muito o embaixador moscovita aos nossos que se não partissem [17v] logo, porque os queria convidar e tratar como amigos em banquete, e que não convinha partirem logo no dia seguinte como determinavão, pello frio que todos já padecião. Depois de muitos rogos só alcançou hum dia, não pera banquete[251] que não se compadecia com tanta pressa, mas pera

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6 as cunstancias *t1* || 10-1 sue Duque *t1* || 12 achava *t1 and t2* || 32 socius *t1*

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[249] Refers to the order in which the respective rulers and the signa-

the aforesaid treaty,[248] sealed with their seals. Lastly, this present treaty, with all its articles, shall be engraved in the Chinese, Russian and Latin languages, upon stones, which shall be placed as everlasting monuments on the frontiers of both Empires.

54. The copy written by the Moscovites is the same except for the aforementioned circumstances[249] and the last part about the stones to be erected in memory of the peace which was changed thusly : " We leave this to the judgment of the Chinese Emperor. " I think the Moscovites would have insisted on more things and clearer conditions — namely that the Emperor should not treat their Duke as his inferior by acts, words or written documents[250] — if the situation had not been tense on account of the rebellion of the Qalqa. The Qalqa were actually crossing the river and, if not prevented, would have escaped from the Moscovites and returned to their old homes with all their animals. This would have been costly for the Moscovites because they exacted tributes from them every year. Were it not for this circumstance, they would not have missed the occasion to make it clear that there were other people in the world besides the Chinese. While the oath-taking was going on, the Moscovites played trumpets and fifes, which to the angels of peace seemed like heavenly melody. When the music stopped our companions were sorry, for if they could not sing themselves they enjoyed listening to others, and if they could not sing a new song at least they appreciated an alien one in a foreign country. When this was finished the Moscovite ambassador rose and, inclining, embraced our ambassadors one after the other and talked to them with true friendship to the joy of all. After a short conversation they parted, the Moscovites as host accompanying us, a gesture which was appreciated highly by our ambassadors. After a boat ride and a land trip we arrived exhausted at our tents around midnight. The only thing I ate during that whole day I have good reason not to mention here. If it is true that it is a consolation to unfortunate people to have companions, we did not miss the feathers which looked bizarre on the heads of our ambassadors and could well have served them as wings to fly at that hour of night.

55. Before our departure the Moscovite had asked our ambassadors not to leave on the following day, as they had been persuaded to do by the cold from which they suffered, because he wanted to invite them as friends to a banquet. After long insistence he succeeded only in getting them to agree to stay for one day. But they wished to rest instead of accepting his invitation

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tures of the signatories were written down.

[250] See Note 221.

[251] According to Gerbillon on the 7th a delegation was sent to Alba-

todos nelle descançarem. Pello que o dia seguinte, 8 de Septembro, nos detivemos em nosso antigo arrayal, aonde o embaixador moscovita mandou no dia sobredito seu presente a nossos embaixadores, que foi avaliado em 460 taeis, que em moeda portuguesa me parece chegão a outros tantos mil reis, cujo computo deixo aos mais exercitados. Havia 4 relogios da rodas, hum grande oculo de longa mira de 4 vidros, hum mediano espelho, dous fermosos vasos de prata, de que assima falei, em que bebia o Moscovita, varias pelles de preço, e alguns brincos de pouco porte. A cada huma destas cousas trasia o lingoa acomodado hum engenhoso epigrama, que causarão em os nossos grande admiração, não se podendo conter de o louvar, ainda oje, os que os ouvem referir, disendo à boca cheya não menos que soberba o seguinte: " De sorte que entre os estrangeiros se achão homens semelhantes? " E isto tenho eu ouvido muitas veses com a paciencia com que convem tenhão os estrangeiros em terra alheya. Não occorreo nesta occasião huma pequena difficuldade nacida do erro de hum lingoa ignorante na explicação dos presentes às pessoas, estando eu ausente. Mas em chegando se abafou logo tudo com a mesinha com que as passadas se curarão. Neste mesmo tempo me convidou o embaixador moscovita e a meu companheiro, o que nunca tinha feito, mas o tinha mostrado no desejo.[252]

Fomos logo e elle nos recebeo com muito amor e cortesia, praticando comnosco de muitas cousas passadas. No discurso de todas ellas lhe pedi perdão de algumas cousas que enfadando-me no exterior tinha insinuado estranhar em presença sua, e acrecentei que como estava entre gentios e vivia há muitos annos na China, sendo mandado do senhor della, devia mostrar-me e obrar como vassallo seu verdadeiro e que do contrario se seguião justos e graves males. Elle como prudente que era sorrindo-se respondeu: " Nisto mostrais quem sois e do contrario mostrarieis o que não deveis ser. Comeis o pão da China, vestis seus trages, deveis vestir tambem novo homem e obrar conforme, no que mostrastes ser verdadeiros. Com tudo bem conhecemos o muito que vos devemos e o quanto nos ajudastes pello bem commum. Sabei que o não ignoro e vos asseguro que ouvireis dentro de poucos tempos em Moscovia o fruito de vossos trabalhos com igual retribuição. " De modo que se mostrou tão obrigado, que ao não ser em propria causa, não me sobejaria o tempo de inculcar o muito que explicou seu grato coração. Faça Deos por sua misericordia que esteja pella promessa e vejamos em nosso tempo em mais altura naquelle grande imperio a

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9 porte *om. t1, but he left its place vacant* || 28 vasllo *t1* || 31 mostrareis *t2* || 36 pouco tempo *t2* | em Moscovita *t1* || 40 misercordia *t1*

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zin to promulgate the treaty as that place had to be demolished

to a banquet.[251] On the following day, the 8th of September, we stayed in our camp. The Moscovite ambassador sent presents for our ambassadors which were evaluated at four hundred and sixty taels, in Portuguese money about one thousand reis, the exact computation of which I leave to the experts. There were four watches, a field glass with four lenses, a medium size mirror, the two silver cups of which I spoke and from which the Moscovite used to drink, some precious furs, and a few other things of lesser value. The interpreter accompanied his presentation of the gifts to the individuals with an appropriate epigram, and this caused such admiration in our grandees that they were unable to refrain from praising the Moscovite. I heard some of those who heard this from others repeat it proudly and ask, " Even among foreigners are there such people ? " This, which I heard several times, I took with the patience that we, living in foreign countries, must have. As I was absent during all this, there arose a little difficulty on account of an error made by the interpreter in explaining the presents to each individual. However, when I arrived the thing was hushed up in the same manner as similar things in the past. At this time the Moscovite ambassador invited me and my companion to his tent. He had shown his desire to do this before but had never actually done so.[252]

56. We went immediately and were received by him with charity and courtesy, and he chatted with us about many things of the past. During the conversation I begged his pardon for having, in certain instances, shown an irritation which might have seemed improper behavior in his presence. I said that since I was among foreigners and had lived for many years in China, and since I had been sent by the Emperor of that country, I had to show myself as his true subject and that my not doing so could have had grave consequences. He, prudent man that he was, answered smilingly, " In this way you showed what you are ; had you acted differently you would have shown yourself to be what you ought not to be. You eat the bread of China, you wear her clothes ; consequently you must also become a new man, acting accordingly, and if you do, you show yourself to be genuine. All in all, we know very well how much we owe you and how much you helped us for the common good. I want you to know that I am aware of your help and I reassure you that in a short time you shall with equal recompense know the results of your work in Moscovy. " He showed himself grateful, and since his thanks did not concern only

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Golovin released two Solon prisoners at the request of the Jesuits. Halde, *Description ...,* IV, p. 204.

[252] See Note 125.

fé romana.[253] No mesmo tempo que estavamos praticando, a gente de nossos embaixadores chegou com o retorno de presentes que lhes mandarão, o qual sem duvida foi ainda mais grandioso, em que entravão grande numero de peças fermosissimas de muito preço de damasco, dous copos de ouro e huma fermosa sella que o mesmo Emperador tinha dado a seu tio pera cavalgar nesta embaixada. Folgou muito o Moscovita e desejava mais dias de comunicação, mas os nossos apostados a partir-se lhe não derão este gosto. Neste dia lhe pedi a liberdade dos Tartaros feitos captivos e em justa guerra, respondendo o embaixador com muita urbanidade e disendo que se tivesse hum cento todos mos entregaria, o que não me causou entre estes gentios pouco respeito considerando a charidade com que os libertava e juntamente largava. Demais lhe pedi hum menino a quem tinhão os Moscovitas morto o pay e mãy que trouxe comigo a esta corte aonde em lugar do cativerio de seu corpo ficou a alma em liberdade, a qual espero na divina misericordia está já gosando o premio gratuito dos predestinados, porque em aqui chegando, adoecendo de bexigas (que naquellas terras não experimentão os naturais) o instrui como convinha na santa ley e baptisado se foi ao ceo, deixando-me igualmente magoado e admirado dos caminhos que Deos abre àquelles que da eternidade de suas riquesas tem escolhido pera collocar entre os tesouros de sua bemaventurança.

Vendo nossos embaixadores o bom coração e vontade com que se pedião estes escravos e a liberdade christam com que se largavão, levantarão de pretenções rogando-me que pedisse [18r] tambem alguns Halha de consideração que estavão tambem em escravidão. Considerando eu na diversidade de petição e pessoas, julguei primeiro ir nisto mais devagar, pello que consultando primeiro com o lingoa latino, apalpando o disposição se convinha ou não falar nesta petição, me respondeo elle que aquelles Halha no caminho depois que como amigos os tratarão os Moscovitas, " com mais de 40 mil homens (do qual numero porem duvido muito) atreiçoados nos acometerão ", disia elle, " e roubarão mil e dusentos cavallos, que nós ajudados de Deos tornamos a restaurar, vencendo-os e captivando estes mesmos cabeças de que falamos. Logo sua excellencia avisou ao Gram Duque do successo e perguntou o que faria destes homens. Isto supposto, julgo que não pode já sua excellencia dispor delles sem esperar reposta do Gram Duque. Comtudo se com esta noticia Vossa Padernidade quer que lhe falle no nego-

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3 mandara *t1 and t2* || 9 liberdade *add. t1* de | cativos *t2* || 11 todos os *t2* || 16 misercordia *t1* || 42 elles *t1*

me personally, I do not consider it a waste of time to indicate the overflowing gratitude of his heart. May the mercy of God grant that he keep his promise and we see the Roman faith rise to new heights in that great Empire.[253] While we were talking to the Moscovite, people sent by our ambassadors came with return presents which were even more magnificant than those sent by him, consisting of a great number of beautiful and very expensive pieces of damask, two golden cups, and a beautiful saddle which the Emperor himself had given to his uncle for use during this trip. The Moscovite was much pleased and desired a few more days of communication, which pleasure our ambassadors, anxious to depart, did not grant him. On this same day I asked him to free some Tartar captives who were taken in a just war, and he was very civil about it and said that there were about a hundred and that he would set them all free. As he generously freed those people, my respect for him rose very much. I also asked him to give me a little captive orphan whose father and mother had died. I brought this child back to this Court, because in spite of the fact that his body was in captivity his soul remained free. I hope now he is already enjoying, as a result of divine mercy, the reward of the predestined, because upon our arrival here he contracted smallpox (which among his own people is not a common disease). After having instructed him in the holy law, I baptized him, and he went to heaven leaving me sad but at the same time with admiration for the ways of God Who in His eternal generosity puts the chosen among the treasures of blessedness.

57. When our ambassadors saw with what good will I asked for these prisoners and the Christian charity with which the Moscovite gave them to me, they asked me to intercede for some more important Qalqa who were also captives. Realizing, however, the difference in this request by reason of the persons involved, I decided to proceed with caution. I first consulted the Latin interpreter to ascertain whether or not it was wise to make this petition. These Qalqa whom the Moscovites had treated as friends during this trip " atrociously attacked us ", he said, " with more than forty thousand men (of the number I am suspicious) and stole twelve hundred horses, which, with the help of God we succeeded in regaining when we defeated them and took as prisoners the chiefs in question. Afterwards, his Excellency notified the Grand Duke about what had happened and asked him what to do with these people. I think that his Excellency cannot dispose of them without an answer from the Grand Duke, but if, in spite of all this, Your Paternity wants me to talk to him I will do so right

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[253] These facts are also mentioned by Gerbillon. HALDE, *Description ...*, IV, pp. 205-206.

cio o farei logo". O que considerando eu, vistas as circunstancias não sortiria o effeito desejado, lhe disse não tocasse nada. Deo a entender o lingua nesta occasião que folgaria o embaixador de comprar hum tentorio de campo a modo tartaro (em que estes como exercitados na arte levão ventagem), pera delle no caminho se servir por acomodado aos frios. Logo lhe disse lhe custaria pouco, e chegando ao Som go tu, tio do Principe herdeiro, o avisei do sobredito, o qual com sua innata liberalidade lhe offereceo o seu proprio fermosissimo, cujo valor passava de 300 mil reis. Não se houve assim o Moscovita, porque às secas o recebeo, só com diser o quanto delle se contentava. Abateo com esta acção alguma cousa da grandesa já referida, sendo que lhe não faltava modo em que se mostrasse com igual dadiva igual aos arremessos de Cezar.[254]

Aos 9 nos partimos muito cedo e, mandando o Moscovita gente sua pera nos acompanhar hum dia de caminho, nos não achou, mas vindo em nosso alcance nos achou já aquartelados. Vinha com elles hum olandez, que seguindo a fortuna, o tinha esta levado à quellas terras. Aos 10 voltando elles a Nip chu continuamos nós nosso caminho. Neste dia mandarão nossos embaixadores dous mancebos pella posta, que devião chegar a esta corte em oito dias de caminho, a dar as novas e pedir alviceras ao Emperador do sucesso desejado. Estando eu ausente e meu companheiro, estando mais de 100 mandarins presentes, instruirão nossos embaixadores aos que vinhão a dar nova ao Emperador do modo como havião de falar, e disserão tais cousas de mim e meu companheiro, que me impede o resguardo da enveja e respeito à modestia o escrevê-llo. Só liceat vera scribenti in omnibus totaliter non claudicare. Pello que só direi a conclusão, deixando a bem intencionados as premissas : " Disei ao Emperador (lhes mandarão os embaixadores) que à ventura de Sua Magestade se deve todo o bom sucesso e fim desejado. Demais disei que tem Sua Magestade os olhos prodigiosos em saber conhecer os homens, pois escolheo estes dous Padres a quem tudo devemos e o confessamos, os quaes arruinado o negocio muitas veses, o redusirão a bom estado e verdadeiramente se comnosco não viessem nada concluiriamos ; a elles se deve tudo. Isto disei assim e não haja falta ou esquecimento". Passado isto, encontrando-me varios mandarins, me davão os parabens com grande alvoroço. Não sabendo eu a causa delles, ma disserão acrescentando que assim devia ser nullo excepto, no que a mesma gente inferior universalmente concordão ainda hoje e concordavão então.

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7 de Principe *t1* || 8 offereço *t1* || 10 assi *t1* || 16 acompahar *t1* | de *om. t1* || 19-20 nós continuamos *t2* || 39-40 acrecentando *t1*

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[254] According to Gerbillon, the two Jesuits also exchanged presents with Golovin during their visit. They also visited Vlasov and a Ger-

away." In view of the circumstances, I asked him not to do anything. The interpreter, on this occasion, gave me to understand that his ambassador would like very much to buy a Tartar-style tent (the Tartars are talented in making these tents) for his own use during the trip as such tents are more adapted to the cold. I said to him immediately that it would not cost him much, and returning I told Songgotu, the uncle of the heir apparent, who with his natural generosity immediately offered his own beautiful tent, the value of which was more than three hundred thousand reis. The Moscovite did not seem to be impressed by this; he accepted it dryly, saying only that he was content with it. By this conduct he destroyed a little my estimation of him, as he did not lack the means with which to show himself equal to the gifts of Caesar.[254]

58. On the 9th, we broke camp very early. The Moscovite sent some of his men to accompany us the first day, and they did not leave us until they saw us encamped. Among them was a Dutchman who had come to these parts seeking his fortune. On the 10th the Moscovites returned to Nipchu, and we continued on our way. On this day, our ambassadors sent two persons to the Court to inform the Emperor and to ask for reward for our success. My companion and I were absent when, in the presence of a hundred mandarins, the ambassadors gave instructions to those who were sent to the Emperor as to how they should report. They said such things about me and my companion that, in order to prevent envy and because of my respect for modesty, I ought to refrain from repeating. As a truthful man, however, I cannot be silent about anything. I shall repeat only the conclusion, leaving the premises to those with good intuition: "Tell the Emperor", the ambassadors ordered, "that the desired success is due to the good fortune of the Emperor; also say that the Emperor has great human wisdom, for he selected the two Fathers to whom, we are not ashamed to confess, we owe everything. Many a time when the whole business seemed ruined, they saved everything. If they had not come with us, we would not have accomplished anything. Say this and do not forget anything." After this meeting, some of the mandarins congratulated me with great fervor. I did not know the reason for this, but they said it was as it should be. And the lower people even today are all as unanimous in this opinion as they were then.

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man colonel, a good Catholic, who was ill and wished to make his confession. But since the two Jesuits could not understand him they gave him absolution. Halde, *ibid.*

Sabendo eu finalmente a causa dos parabens, julguei ir agradecer aos embaixadores a mercê. E estando falando juntamente inclinei a cabeça a modo tartaro algum tanto, disendo-lhes agradecia seu bom animo e coração que o que eu tinha obrado e meu companheiro era em serviço fiel do Emperador, por cuja causa tudo devia e por paga me sobejava o saber Sua Magestade o que eu era, e não como mal intencionados antigamente calumniaram a nossos Padres antepassados. Vendo elles que eu lhes inclinava a cabeça, inclinarão logo tambem a sua e dissarão: " Nós devemos ir a vossa casa a bater-vos a cabeça e vós nos vindes a agradecer o que em justiça vos devemos? Seriamos ladrões de vosso bom nome e honra se obrassemos de outro modo, pois todos sabem que tudo fisestes e todo o merecimento hé vosso ". Disse o outro: " A honra e o rosto que levamos vo-lo devemos a vós, porque sem vós, com que rosto entrariamos em Pe Kim? " E estes modos de falar lhe ouvi diser em muitas occasiões quando outros lhe davão os parabens do bom sucesso, [18v] virando-se pera nos repetião sempre o sobredito, acrescentando o tio do Emperador: " Eu ainda que não me enganey no conceito que de vós tinha, comtudo não cuidava que pera serviço do Imperador tinhas tal animo e valor ". E o outro: " Não cuidava que ereis homens semelhantes ". E em outra occasião querendo verter em tartaro 2ª vez as condições das pazes e disendo eu que era escusado reverter o que era já vertido, trasendo algumas resões a este fim, as não quiserão ouvir disendo: " Nos disemos e confessamos ser todo o merecimento vosso, quanto mais nisto vos devemos dar credito: basta que vós digais não ser necessario, pera que amontoar resões de conveniencia pera nós? " E alem desta publicidade e verdade, tenho em minha mão huma carta do tio do Principe herdeiro (que do meyo do caminho por ordem do Imperador se adiantou e chegou dantes alguns dias a sua presença com as novas mais miudas) nos escreveo disendo como tinha informado pessoalmente ao Imperador de tudo o sobredito e em abono desta verdade, a qual guardo por uterina testemunha em caso que haja quem queira explicar o sobredito com outros olhos. Seja o Senhor louvado que em ramo tão esteril se dignou fertilisá-llo em circunstancias tão arriscadas e contingentes. Chegando a Pe Kim os sobreditos mancebos e dando ao Imperador a nova sobredita, sahio elle com estas palavras: " O negocio de vinte e mais annos está concluido ", donde se vê o muito que nisto tinha cuidado e o muito que com a nova se alegrava, e disse em outra occasião estas palavras: " Desta vez se obrou conforme o meu desejo ".[255]

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9 logo *om. t2* || 10 a *(quater) om. t1* || 29 mey *t1* || 36 contigentes *t2 and t2*

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[255] K'ang-hsi expressed similar sentiments on Chinese New Years

59. When I finally found out the reason for the congratulations, I thought I should go to the ambassadors and thank them. As they were all together talking, I inclined my head a little as the Tartars do and said that I was grateful to them for their goodness. I said that everything I and my companion had done was in service of the Emperor and that it was more than a just reward for me if the Emperor knew this and if they did not maliciously keep quiet as did some who calumniated our earlier Fathers. Seeing that I bowed my head they did the same and said, " We should go and praise you, and yet you come to thank us ? We would have robbed you of your good name and honor if we had acted in any other way, because everyone knows that all the merit is yours. " Another said, " All the honor and the face which we have we owe to you, because without you with what kind of face would we be entering Peking ? " And many a time I heard them speak in the same manner on occasions when people congratulated them on their success ; they turned toward us and repeated the things I mentioned above. Once the uncle of the Emperor added, " Although the idea I had formed of you was substantially correct, I never realized that your service to our Emperor was so whole-hearted and valorous. " And another one said, " I never realized that you were people of this kind. " On another occasion they wanted to make a new translation in the Tartar language of the conditions of the peace treaty, and when I said that it was unnecessary to translate it again, they refused to listen to the reasons I was going to give them, saying, " We confess that the merit for this is all yours ; it is enough if you say that this is not necessary, so why multiply the reasons to convince us ? " And besides these public statements I have in my possession a letter written to us by the uncle of the their apparent (who during our trip was sent ahead at the order of the Emperor with more detailed news) testifying that he had informed the Emperor personally about the things mentioned above. I shall keep this letter as proof in case someone tries to explain all these things in a different light. Be the Lord praised that he deigned to produce fruits in such a sterile branch and in such difficult and dangerous circumstances ! When the envoys reached Peking and informed the Emperor, he said, " Negotiations which went on for twenty and more years have been brought to a conclusion. " Whence it can be seen how much he had this matter at heart and the great joy this news caused him. On another occasion he said, " In this matter things were done according to my wishes. "[255]

Day, 1690. Ch'en Fu-kuang, *op. cit.*, IV, p. 508. These messengers brought in all probability the China letter of Gerbillon to the Jesuits

Aos onze passamos o rio Um du,[256] aonde se afogarão tres pessoas, pera que na ida a fortuna tinha reservado este triste infortunio na volta, e aos 14 passamos o rio Porchi,[257] em cuja passagem desapareceo tãobem hum homem sem ninguem ver o fim que teve, mas só se achou o cavallo sem aparecer o cavalleiro. Foi cousa lastimosa os muitos cavallos e camellos que estes dias se deixarão cançados pello caminho, por serem estas terras ainda boas e sem salitre, unico condimento daquelles animais, sem a qual a melhor erva, que a outros animais engordaria, os emmagresse, mas em entrando nas terras steriles e salitrosas com triste pasto melhorarão os que com vida chegarão. Voltando por estes desertos, aos 25 estando já aquartelados veyo hum a quem indignamente ouvi chamavão Imperador,[258] que se no nome tinha de grande a sombra inter orientales, muito mais exercitava a pobresa do santo Job entre os amigos que desemparando-o o deixarão. Cousa verdadeiramente redicula esta gente inerte pera tudo, e só pera comer e não o que buscão, mas o que achão ou lhe dão aparelhada. Derão-lhe de esmolla nossos embaixadores mais de tresentos carros de milho em nome deste Imperador, que aquelle de joelhos recebeo com igual pressa e vontade. Encontramos tambem nestes desertos alguns duas ou tres vezes a semelhantes pastores cuja conversação hé só com seus cavallos, camellos e carneiros e aqui serve de pouco. Aos 6 de Outubro chegamos perto de lagoa Taal[259] e daqui viramos pera o oriente em derrota do monte Pecha[260] pera ir ao Imperador que nos estava esperando fora desta corte oito dias de caminho, occupando-se na caça por entretanto. Aos 12 chegamos ao Imperador, a quem em commum perguntamos da sauda já de noite escura, e respondeu elle com rosto alegre perguntando tambem da nossa. Ficou tam satisfeito do bom sucesso, que levou desta corte muitos boyõis de vinho e não poucos de manteiga que neste dia destribuiu aos soldados com mostras de muita satifação e amor, e não menos alegria sua e muito mais dos soldados, por ser esta acção na China fora de seu custume aonde o dar vinho hé de amigo e não de Imperador.

Fui eu depois com meu companheiro dentro do seu quartel em particular a perguntar de sua saude e pedir resolução, se o devia acompanhar ou voltar diante a esta corte. Recebeo-nos com incriveis mostras de adequada satisfação, mandando diser em alta voz pera que todos a entendessem e ouvissem o seguinte: " Eu estou

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1 *before* ondze || 2 *before* pessos || 6 e camellos *om. t2* || 13 se *om. t1 and t2* || 21 *for* duas *t2* dous || 22 e qui *t1* || 33-4 do Imperador *t1* || 40 e ouvissem *om. t2*

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in Peking about the conclusion of the treaty. ARSI *Jap. Sin. 164*, f. 178.

[256] See Note 59.

60. On the 11th we crossed the river Umdu,[256] where three of our people whom fate had reserved for misfortune on the return trip drowned, as did the fourteen who perished when we crossed the river Porchi.[257] Among the latter was one whose disappearance went unnoticed until his horse turned up riderless. It was a sad spectacle to see so many horses fall to the side of the road from the fact that this region, although otherwise bountiful, has no salt. Without such seasoning the best grass on which the animals would get fat caused our beasts to become thinner and thinner, until we arrived at a sterile country with salt where, though the fodder was poor, the condition of those animals who were still alive improved. On the 25th we had already put up our camp in this desert when there came some Tartar whom they called emperor,[258] and whose name sounded great among those orientals, though his poverty exceeded that of Job, whom even his friends deserted. The laziness of these people is incredible. They are too lazy even to provide food for themselves. The only exception to inactivity is eating, but the things they eat are either given to them or are found by chance. Our ambassadors gave him three hundred cartloads of corn as alms in the name of the Emperor, which he accepted on his knees with haste and pleasure. In these deserts we also met twice or three times shepherds whose only conversation had been with their horses, camels, and sheep. But that, however, is of no great interest here. On the 6th of October we came to Lake Dal[259] and from there turned eastward, following the paths of Mount Pecha,[260] to meet the Emperor who was hunting while waiting for us at a point which is eight days travel from Peking. On the 12th we reached the Emperor and, although it was already late at night we all asked him about his health, and he answered happily and asked us the same. He was so satisfied with our success that he had wine and food brought from his Court to distribute, on this occasion, among the soldiers. There were signs of joyous satisfaction on his part and greater joy on the part of the soldiers as such action is not customary in a country where wine is given only as a sign of friendship.

61. Afterwards he received me and my companion in his living quarters where I wished to greet him and find out whether I was to accompany him or go back to Peking in advance. He received us with incredible signs of satisfaction and had the following statement read aloud so that all could hear it, "I am well,

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[257] See Note 51.

[258] Gerbillon tells us that this was the Sečen Qan, HALDE, *Description* ..., IV, p. 208.

[259] See Note 30.

[260] See Note 28.

bem e pergunto tambem de vossa saude. Sei o muito que tendes trabalhado em meus serviços ; sei que vos tendes esforçado em me dar gosto ; sei que por vossa habilidade e agencia se concluirão as pases, em que esgotastes vossas forças. Amanhão ide em companhia de meu tio pera caza " ; aonde chegamos aos 18 e esperamos a volta do Imperador da caça. Ao qual em chegando, indo nós perguntar da saude, encontramos hum eunucho que nos disse o seguinte : " O Imperador me disse que vós sem duvida virieis hoje ao Passo e não acharieis quem vos fisesse penetrar ao Imperador vosso intento (porque estava doente hum mancebo, alcunha Chao,[261] fiel amigo e cursor de nossas cousas pera [19r] o Imperador). Pello que vos manda diser o Imperador que vós digais o que tendes, porque vos estima não como homem de fora, mas como homem de sua casa interior. Assim que como tal lhe faleis e digais tudo por miudo o que obrastes nas pazes com os Oruzes, e ainda que seja falar de vossos merecimentos e em cousa propria, e ainda que o Imperador dis sabe já tudo, comtudo o folga de ouvir de vossa boca ". Estavão presentes todos os mais Padres, com os quaes pondo-me de joelhos logo respondi, seguindo o uso da terra o seguinte :

" Em primeiro lugar agradeço muito a Sua Magestade a honra e extraordinaria lembrança de mandar gente que aqui nos esperasse, pera avisar a Sua Magestade de nossas cousas. Demais o que diz Sua Magestade de nos estimar como gente sua e não de fora, e que de tudo que obrei nos Moscovitas desse conta, não olhando a serem cousas proprias, que comtudo as quer ouvir de minha boca, respondo que sou hum homem estrangeiro e que só o sofrer-me Sua Magestade na China e em sua corte e presença me sobejava : que era hum manipulo de palha seca, a qual não podia tolerar peso semelhante, que ouvindo o que Sua Magestade me mandava diser, que me tremia o corpo incapaz de tanta honra : que o diser diga tudo o que tinha obrado nesta embaixada, digo que nada, mas só tinha feito o que Sua Magestade me tinha ensinado. E se tinha obrado conforme isto, o tinha por grande ventura, sendo isto só o melhor premio que podia esperar e ventura minha ; se tinha errado pedia perdão a Sua Magestade de tudo ". Instou o eunucho : " Não tendes outra reposta de vossos merecimentos ? " Respondi que não, porque o falar em minhas cousas, não tendo cousa de bom, que direy ? E ainda que o tivesse que diser, não tenho esta habilidade nem destreza de engenho. Rio-se o eunucho e voltou com a reposta ao Imperador, a cuja presença não cheguei por estar actualmente morta a Imperatris, e estar com dó o Impe-

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2 meu serviço *t2* || 4 que *om. t1* || 7 eunnucho *t1* || 8 Viries *t1*, vireis *t2* || 9 achareis *t2* || 15 pasez *t1* || 27 estrageiro *t1* || 36 Istou *t1*

and I inquire about your health. I know how much you have worked in my behalf endeavoring to please me; I know that it was through your ability and effort that this peace was concluded in which you have exhausted your energies. Tomorrow you shall proceed home in the company of my uncle." We arrived home on the 18th and waited until the Emperor returned from the hunting trip. Upon his return, when we went to greet him, we were met by a eunuch who said, "The Emperor said to me that since you would certainly come today and would not find anyone who would convey your intentions to him (our faithful friend and messenger, the man by the name of Chao,[261] was ill) he sent me and wants you to tell me what you have to say, since he does not consider you as people from the outside but as people of his inner court. Therefore you must speak as such and must tell in detail everything that you did in concluding the peace with the Russians, even though it is to speak about your own merits and in your own cause and even though he already knows it, for it will give him pleasure to hear it from your lips." All the other Fathers were present and so we all knelt down, this being the custom of the country, and I said:

62. "First of all, I thank His Majesty for the honor of thinking of us and of sending someone to receive us and to convey our thoughts to His Majesty. As to His Majesty saying that he regards us as his own people and not as foreigners, and that in spite of the fact that the events concern me he wants to hear my own account of all our dealings with the Moscovites, my answer is that for me, a foreigner, to be tolerated by him is more than I can ask. I was as useless as a bundle of straw, and hearing that His Majesty orders me to speak I tremble with the unaccustomed honor. Regarding his command to tell everything that I did during the trip, I say it is nothing, as I did only what His Majesty had ordered me to do. If I have acted according to his wishes, I consider this reception the best reward I could expect; if I made a mistake, I beg His Majesty's pardon." The eunuch insisted, "You have nothing else to say with regard to your merits?" I said, "No, since speaking about my own affairs there is nothing good I could say. And even if I had something to say, I do not have the ability nor the ingenuity to say it." The eunuch smiled and went to the Emperor with my answer. We were not admitted to His presence as the Empress had died and the Emperor was mourning.[262] The eunuch returned after a while, and said that the Emperor had given orders that *cha* be served for all of us,

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[261] See Note 10.

rador.[262] Passado algum tempo voltou, disendo que o Imperador nos mandava dar chá, mimo na estimação nam pera todos, ainda que na valia da materia de pouco preço; e isto sendo elle bem servido e melhor satisfeito, e nós contentes nos voltamos.

Aquelles principios, aquelles meyos e este fim teve nossa embaixada, cuja noticia bem considerada, mostra claro o quanto Deos (pondo tanto obstaculo meus peccados a todo o bom sucesso) quis aparecessem nossos trabalhos e recta intenção. Porque quem com pura intenção bem reparar em todo o discurso della, verá claro que se eu fisesse, digo quisesse dirigir o caminho com premeditados fins e intenções a nossos trabalhos e merecimentos aparecerem, o não poderia melhor inventar, do que a divina bondade, piedade e sabedoria (parece esquecida de minhas maldades) o dirigio fortiter et suaviter a tão bom fim, assim pera Moscovia entre sismaticos, que nos ficarão tão obrigados, como pera a China entre gentios, que não menos obrigados que admirados nos atribuem tudo ore pleno, e o mesmo Imperador o reconhece como se vê no sobredito paragrafo e outros assima referidos. Fui tão miudo na relação de todas as circunstancias destas pazes, referindo igualmente o que houve de huma e outra parte digno de algum louvor e com não menor sinceridade tudo o que parecerá com resão digno de nota em huns e outros, pera que assim se veja a verdade com que escrevo, dando as noticias verdadeiras sem mais inclinação a huns do que a outros, que no louvor e nota tiverão mais ou menos parte, mas referindo ad literam tudo o que sucedeo não me obrigando mais ao sisma que ao gentilismo, aos quais com tudo, atendendo ao bem comum e meu Instituto e profissão, pertendi servir e agradar pera mayor gloria de Deos e bem das almas, que diante do mesmo Senhor são semelhantes. Sei que poderia errar em muitas cousas, mas declaro que não foi ex voluntate, sed intellectu. O em que se reparar foi desasserto, a nenhum outro se deve atribuir, mas a mim só e meus peccados dignos ainda de mayores. O que se achar digno de meu Instituto, ou (atendendo às circunstancias) não fora de caminho, mas asserto algum, ou sucesso, com toda a sinceridade lhe peço o atribuão a Deos e a sua divina misericordia que não permitio em mim mayores erros, e à prudencia de meus Superiores que a tempo me avisarão à cautella (que eu tambem não ignorava como ensinado em cabeça alheya) com que devemos os religiosos obrar em semelhantes empenhos, não nos entremetendo nelles, mas desviando modesta e não soberbamente quantum in nobis est, como cousas muito alheyas de nosso Instituto, ao que só a obrigaçam do bem das almas, e não menos valerosa e bem commum nos obriga em semelhantes occasiões (e não em outras)

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2 chá *underlined* || 14 Moscovita *t1* || 23 escreveo *t1* || 35 misercordia *t1* || 41 alhayas *t1*

which is a sign of estimation not extended to all though in itself *cha* is of little value. Since the Emperor was well served and satisfied we returned contented.

63. These were the origins, these the means, and this the end of our mission. The facts, if one considers them thoroughly, show clearly how much God wanted our contribution and good intentions to appear clearly, even though my many sins could only be an obstacle in the way of success. Anyone who considers the development of this mission carefully without prejudice will see clearly that, even if I had intended to direct everything in such a way that our work and good will should appear, I could not have done better or improved on the way in which the Divine Goodness, Mercy, and Prudence, which seems to have forgotten my sins, has directed our mission surely and deftly toward the good end. The schismatic Moscovites remained obliged to us, as did the pagan Chinese who, attributing everything to us, are indebted to us and admire us much. Even the Emperor himself recognized what we have done, as can be seen from the above remarks and from other statements. I related in detail all the circumstances of this peace, mentioning everything praiseworthy on both sides, telling with equal sincerity everything of note concerning each party. To show my sincerity in writing and to demonstrate that I am giving truthful information without undue inclination toward either side, I have told straightforwardly all that happened. I did not show greater partiality toward the schismatics than toward the pagans. I tried to serve both for the common good, according to my Institute and profession, to the greater glory of God and for the welfare of souls. Schismatics and pagans, in the eyes of the Lord, are equal. I know that I may have erred in many things, but I do declare that this was not willful. If I were negligent, I and my sins are to be blamed; I deserved to fall into even greater errors. If, taking into consideration the circumstances, I am found worthy of my Institute for having acted sincerely in accordance with it, I attribute all the success in the first place to the mercy of God Who did not permit me to fall into greater mistakes, and in the second place to the prudence of my Superiors who advised me. It is their cautious direction (of which I myself was aware, having learned this lesson in other matters) which we religious must follow in such cases. We should not enter upon these undertakings, but rather modestly and humbly keep away from them as alien to our Institute. Nothing but the welfare of souls and the equally important common good can oblige us to take up

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[262] This was on the 22nd of October. HALDE, *Description ...*, IV, pp. 215-216.

a sogeitarmos ao desejo arbitrario dos principes e não aquisito, a quem pello amor de Deus desentereçados [19v] servimos. Pedindo ultimamente a todos que me perdoem, se faltei em alguma cousa ou circunstancia que por esquecimento terei deixado, offerecendo-me a todos igualmente com os desejos de o obrar como escravo. Em Pe Kim dez de Janeiro de 690.

Todo de todos em o Senhòr

Thomás Pereyra.

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1 sogeitarnos *t1* || 5 escrevo *t2* || 7 em o Senhor *om. t2*

affairs of this kind, and then only on occasions when we must submit to the wishes of the Princes whom, for the love of God, we serve disinterestedly. Finally, I ask all to forgive me if in some matter or circumstance I have omitted anything out of forgetfulness, and I offer myself to all as one desirous of acting, as I
a slave in Peking, 10 January 690, All to all in the Lord

Thomas Pereira

Appendix I

THE URAL-ALTAIC PEOPLES IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY[1]

I. The Finno-Ugrian Division

A. *The Finns*
- *a.* Western or Baltic Finns
  - a. Karelians
  - b. Other Western Finns
    - 1. Vespas
    - 2. Votes
    - 3. Esthonians
    - 4. Livonians
  - c. Lapps
- *b.* Eastern or Kama Finns
  - a. Peryaks
  - b. Zirians
  - c. Votjaks
  - d. Volga or Bulgar group
    - 1. Mordvins
    - 2. Cheremisses
    - 3. Chuvashes

	Habitat
B. *Ugrians* (*Yugras or Iougras*)	On the Lower Ob and Irtysh bounded by the Samojeds in the north, Tartars in the south, Ural Mts. in the west, Nadim River in the east.

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[1] The following list of the Ural-Altaic Peoples has been compiled from: SaΓang Sečen, *Erdeni-yin Tob či Mongolian Chronicle* (Edited by Cleaves with a critical Introduction by Mostaert). Serruys, *Genealogical Tables of the Descendants of Dayanqan.* Halde, *Description* ..., IV; *The General History of China* ... IV. Baddeley, *Russia, Mongolia, China*, 2 Vols. Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, 4 Vols. Brunnert and Hagelstrom (transl. by Beltchenko and Moran), *Present Day Political Organization of China.* Zambaur, *Manuel de généalogie et de chronologie pour l'histoire de l'Islam*, 2 Vols. Lattimore, *The Mongols of Manchuria. A Manuel on the Turanians and Pan-Turanism* (A compilation. No date. Published around 1919 in London). Chang Mu, *Meng-ku yu-mu chi* (Japanese edition of 1940). *Man-Mō sōsho* (Editors Naitō Torajirō and others), 7 Vols.

	Habitat
a. Ugrian Ostiaks	Along the Ob, Irtysh, Konda and Vsyugan Rivers in the Tobolsk and Tomsk region.
b. Voguls	On both sides of the Ural Mts. but mostly between the Urals and the Ob, Irtysh and Tavda.
c. Magyars (Hungarians)	
II. THE SAMOJED DIVISION	Along the northern coast of European and Asiatic Russia from the White Sea to the Khatanga River, and from the Arctic Ocean in the north to the Sayan Mountains in the south. Their chief abode is the Tundra.
a. Yuraks	Along the coast from the White Sea to the Enisei River. Their chief center is near Obdorsk.
b. Tavghis	East of the Yuraks in the Taimir Peninsula extending from the Enisei River to the Khatanga River.
c. Ostiak Samojeds	South of the former two in the forest zone of Tobolsk and Eniseisk (latitude 60th degree N., and between longitudes 80 and 90 degrees E.).
d. Sub-tribes of the Southern Samojeds (Tartarized)	
1. Soyotes or Soyones	Between the Altai and Sayan Mountains from Khobdo to Lake Kossogol.
2. Karagasses	Along the northern slopes of the Sayan range.
3. Motars	To the north of the Karagasses.
4. Kamassins	North of the Motars in the Kansk district of Eniseisk.
5. Khoibals	Along the Upper Enisei.
6. Beltirs	In the Abakan steppes.
III. THE TUNGUS DIVISION	
A. *Northern or Siberian group*	
a. Chapogir	In the territory between the Lower and Middle Tunguska.

	Habitat
b. Lamut	North of the Stanovoi Mts. between Chaun Bay and the Anadyr River; and in the districts of Kolyma and Verkhoiansk.
c. Orochon	From the north of Lake Baikal eastward to the Amur between the Oldoi and the Zeya Rivers (northern tributaries of the Amur). They do not extend to the Amur.
d. Manegir	East of the Orochon on the right bank of the Amur between the Oldoi and the Zeya Rivers. They are a clan of the Birar.
e. Birar	In the valley of the Bureya and its tributaries to about latitude 52 degree North.
f. Kile	East of the Birar in the valleys of the Urmi and Kur Rivers (northern tributaries of the Amur). They do not extend to the Amur.
g. Negda	Along the Amgun to its confluence with the Amur.
h. Sanagir	Along the upper and middle course of the Gorin River; extend northwestward to Lake Ovoron.
i. Olcha	East of the Sanagir on both sides of the Amur from the Gorin River to the coast.
j. Oroke	Northern half of Shakhalin.
B. *Southern or Manchurian group*	
a. Daur or Daghor	Along the Amur reaching as far east as the Zeya River.
b. Ducher	Along the Amur from the mouth of the Zeya to about four days travel beyond the Ussuri River.
c. Achan	Along the Lower Amur east of the Ducher.
d. Gilyak	Near the delta of the Amur.
e. Solon	Along the Nonni River north of Tsitsikar
f. Manchu	Manchuria.
g. Goldi	Along the Sungari and the Ussuri Rivers
h. Oroch	East of the Ussuri River.

IV. THE MONGOL DIVISION

Spelling of names as given by:

F.W. Cleaves A. Mostaert H. Serruys	H.S. Brunnert— V.V. Hagelstrom A.W. Hummel	Halde	*Habitat*
A. *Eastern Mongols*			
1. Čaqar	Chahar	Tchahar	
2. Mongols divided into 6 Leagues (čiγulγan or meng), 49 Banners (qosiγun or ch'i) and Arrows (sumun)			What today is Inner Mongolia.
a. Jerimüd League: 10 Banners, 204 Arrows	Cherim		
(1) Qorčin 6 Banners	Khortchin	Cortchin	These 4 tribes live along the rivers Shira müren (Γorlos), Kuiler (Qorčin), Nonni (Jalayid), Haitahan (Dürbed).
(2) Jalayid 1 Banner	Djalait	Tchalei	
(3) Dürbed 1 Banner	Durbed	Tourbede	
(4) Γorlos 2 Banners	Ghorlos		
b. Josutu League: 5 Banners 223 Arrows	Chosotu		
(1) Qaračin 3 Banners	Kharacin	Caratchin	The Qaračin live outside the Gate Hsi-feng-k'ou and their principal city is Cagan subarhan hotun.
(2) Tümed 2 Banners	Tumet	Toumet	The Tümed live east of the Qaračin between the Great Wall and the Willow Palisade.
c. Jō (<Ja'u< Jaγu) Uda League: 11 Banners 298 Arrows	Chao-Uda		

			Habitat
(1) Auqan 1 Banner	Ao-Khan	Ohan	Northeast of the Tümed along the river Narat-i; principal place Cagan col gasan.
(2) Naiman 1 Banner	Naiman	Naimann	North of the Auqan on the southern bank of the Shira müren around Topir tala.
(3) Önggüd 2 Banners	Ongiod	Onhiot	North of the Gate Ku-pei-k'ou along the Ingin River.
(4) Bārin (<Ba'arin< Baγarin) 2 Banners	Barin	Parin	North of the Önggüd on the northern bank of the Shira müren along the Hara müren.
(5) Kešigten (<Kesigten) 1 Banner	Keshikteng	Ketchicten	Southeast of Bārin.
(6) Jarūd (<Jara'ud< Jaraγud) 2 Banners	Djarut	Charot	Near the place where the Lohan falls into the Shira müren.
(7) Aru Qorčin 1 Banner	Aru-Khortsin	Aroucortchin	North of the Jarūd along the Aru kundulun.
(8) Qalqa Left Wing			
d. Sili-yin γool League: 10 Banners 111 Arrows	Silinghol		
(1) Üjümüčin 2 Banners	Uchumuchin	Outchoumouchin	Northwest of Bārin mainly along the river Holugor.
(2) Abaγanar 2 Banners	Abaganar	Abahanar	Southwest of Üjümüčin chiefly along Lake Dal
(3) Qūčid (<Qa'učid< Qaγučid)	Khaochit	Hoachit	North of Abaγanar and west of the Üjümüčin along the Jirin River.
(4) Sünid 2 Banners	Sunit	Sunid	Northwest of Abaγanar around Kur Kagan omo
(5) Abaγai 2 Banners	Abaga	Abahai	West and southwest of Sünid around lakes and ponds the southernmost of which is Kuisu omo.

			Habitat
e. Ulān (<Ula'an< Ulaγan) Čab League : 6 Banners 62 Arrows	Ulan-Chap		
(1) Dürben-Keüked 1 Banner	Durban-Keuket	Touintchouse	West and southwest of the Sili-yin γool League around Onggon alin.
(2) Muu (<Mū< Ma'u<Maγu) Mingγan 1 Banner	Maomingan	Maomigan	West of the Dürben-Keüked.
(3) Urad 3 Banners	Urat	Ourat	West of the Muu Mingγan.
(4) Qalqa (1653 broke away from Tüsiyetü Qan) 1 Banner	Kalka	Kalka	North of the Urad along the Aibaka River.
f. Yeke Juu League : 7 Banners 274 Arrows	Ikh-Chao		
(1) Ordos 7 Banners	Ordos	Ortos	Within the great bend of the Yellow River.
3. Qalqa Mongols	Kalka	Kalka	In what today is Outer Mongolia.
These Qalqa Mongols were divided into 4 ayimaγs and 87 Banners			
a. Jasaγtu Qan's ayimaγ	Chasaktu Khan	Tchasaktou Han	East of the Altai Mountains along the rivers Selenga, Orhon and Tula.
b. Tüsiyetü Qan's ayimaγ	Tushetu Khan	Touchetou Han	East from the Jasaγtu Qan to Mount Kentei.
c. Sečen Qan's ayimaγ	Tsetsen Khan	Tchetching Han	East of the Tüsiyetü Qan's territories along the Kerülen to its fall into Lake Dal and beyond to the Solon.
d. Sayin Noyan Qan's ayimaγ	Sain Noin Qan		Established in 1725 from parts of the Tüsiyetü Qan's ayimaγ.

			Habitat
4. Buriyad Mongols	Buriat		
a. Western Buriyads			West of Lake Baikal. They are divided into four sub-tribes.
b. Eastern Buriyads			East of Lake Baikal mostly along the Uda and Onon Rivers.
c. Barga Buriyads			In the Barga territory between the Kingan Mountains and the Argun River.
B. *The Western Mongols*			
or Ölöd	Olod	Eluth	West of the Altai Mountains.
(<Ögeled)	Oeloed	Eruth	
or Qalmuq	Eleuth		
(<Qalimaγ)	Kalmuk		
1. Qošūd	Khoshote		Under Guši Qan (d. 1656) and his successors they helped the Dalai Lama and settled in the Kökenoor (Kukunor) region.
2. Turγūd (<Turγa'ud) (Turγaγud)	Torgut		Under Jün Γar pressure emigrated to the Volga and lived on the Lower Volga.
3. Qoros	Choros Khoros		
a. Jün Γar (<Je'ün Γar Jegün Γar)	Dzunghar Joungar Sungar		They came to dominate the others. Lived west of the Altai range in Khobdo and in Eastern Turkestan; also in the eastern part of the T'ien-shan range and on the southern border of the Gobi.
b. Dörbed	Derbet		
c. Qoyid	Khoyt		

The alliance of the Qošūd, Turγūd, Jün Γar and Dörbed was called Oyirad or the four Oyirad (Uriad) which, by a change of sound, was known to the Chinese of the Ming Dynasty as Wa-la or Wei-la.

V. THE TURKISH DIVISION

- A. *Siberian Turks*
  - a. Eastern Branch
    - Iakut
  - b. Central or Altaian Branch
    - 1. Altaians
    - 2. Black Forest Tartars
    - 3. Kumandins
    - 4. Lebed Tartars
    - 5. Shors
    - 6. Teleuts
    - 7. Sagais
    - 8. Kachins
    - 9. Kyzyls
    - 10. Tartars of the Chulim
  - c. Western Branch
    - 1. Baraba Tartars
    - 2. Tara Tartars
    - 3. Tobol Tartars
    - 4. Tiumen Tartars

- B. *Central Asian Turks*
  - a. Eastern Branch (Chinese Turkestan)
    - Taranchis
  - b. Western Branch
    - 1. Qazaq
    - 2. Qirghiz
    - 3. Qara-Qirghiz
    - 4. Qara-Kalpaks
    - 5. Turkmen
    - 6. Tadjiks
    - 7. Sarts
    - 8. Kipchaks
    - 9. Kuramas
    - 10. Uzbeks

- C. *Volga Turks*
    - 1. Kazan Turks
    - 2. Astrahan Turks
    - 3. Bashkirs
    - 4. Chuvashes
    - 5. Meschchers
    - 6. Tepters

- D. *Black Sea Turks*
  - a. Nogais

- b. Caucasian Turks
    - 1. Kumuks
    - 2. Karachais
- c. Crimean Turks

E. *Western Turks*
- a. Persian Turks
- b. Ottoman or Osmanli Turks

Appendix II

LIST OF CHINESE CHARACTERS

A

Abaγai 阿巴噶
Abaγanar 阿巴哈納爾
Aibaka 愛畢哈(河)
Ai-hun (Aigun) 愛琿
Ai-ma-ko (Ayimaγ) 愛瑪克
A Kuei, *Ch'in-ting Man-chou yüan-liu k'ao.* 阿桂, 欽定滿洲源流考
A-lo-pen 阿羅本
Altan (Anda, Yen-ta) Qan (Han) 俺達汗
A-lu-tai (Aruγtai) 阿魯台
Amursana 阿睦爾撒納
An-chiang-t'un 鞍匠屯
Anda Qan *see* Altan
Arukundulun 阿魯昆杜輪
Aru Qorčin 阿嚕科沁
Auqan 敖漢
Ayimaγ *see* Ai-ma-ko
Ayuki 阿玉氣

B

Bandarša 班達爾沙
Barga Buriyad 巴爾呼布魯特
Bārin (<Ba'arin<Baγarin) 巴林
Bātur qung-taiyiji 巴圖爾琿台吉
Birar 畢陳兒
Bunyašri (Pen-ya-cho-li, Pu-ni-ya-shih-li) 本雅失里, 布尼雅實哩
Buriyad 布魯特

C

Cagan col gasan 察罕郭爾村
Cagan subarhan hotun 察罕蘇巴爾漢城
Čaqar 察哈爾
Cha Chi-Tso, *Tsui-wei lu* 查繼佐, 罪惟錄
Chamo (Sha-mo) 沙漠
Chang Ch'ao (Yang Fu-Chi, Shen Mou-Te), *Chao-tai ts'ung-shu.* 張潮, 楊復吉, 沈楙德, 昭代叢書
Chang Ch'eng 張誠
Chang Chü-cheng 張居正
Chang Hsing-Lang, *Chung-hsi chiao-t'ung shih-liao hui-pien.* 張星烺, 中西交通史料匯編
Chang Mu, *Meng-ku yu-mu chi.* 張穆, 蒙古游牧記
Chang P'eng-Ho, *Feng-shih O-lo-ssu hsing-ch'eng lu.* 張鵬翮, 奉使俄羅斯行程錄
Ch'aṇg-pai shan 長白山
Chang Po-Ying, *Hei-lung-chiang chi-kao.* 張伯英, 黑龍江志稿
Chang Wei-Hua, *Ming-shih Fo-lang-chi Lü-sung Ho-lan I-ta-li-ya ssu-chüan chu-shih.* 張維華, 明史佛朗機呂宋荷蘭意大里亞四傳註釋
Chang Yü-Shu, *P'ing-ting shou-mo fang-lüeh.* 張玉書, 平定朔漠方略

— *Wai-kuo chi* 外國紀
Chao Ch'ang 趙昌
CHAO I, *Nien-ehr shih cha-chi* 趙翼, 廿二史劄記
Chao-tai ts'ung-shu 昭代叢書 *See* CHANG CH'AO.
Cha-sa-k'o-tu Han (Jasaγtu Qan) 札薩克圖汗
Ch'e-ch'en Han (Sečen Qan) 車臣汗
Ch'en Fu-kuang 陳復光
Ch'en Shih-an 陳世安
Ch'eng-kuo wang 成國王
Ch'i (qosiγun) 旗
Chia-ch'ing ch'ung-hsiu i-t'ung chih 嘉慶重修一統志
Chiang-chün 將軍
CH'IEN LIANG-TSE, *Ch'u-sai chi-lüeh.* 錢良擇, 出塞記略
Ch'ing shih kao (Kuan-wai edition) 清史稿(關外)
Čiγulγan (meng) 盟
Chiu-chiu 舅舅
Chiu-pai 力白
Ch'iu Fu 丘福
Chorna (Corna, Tchernaya) 綽爾納(河)
Ch'ou ta-tzu 臭韃子
Chung-hua pien-fang yü-ti ts'ung-shu. 中華邊防輿地叢書
Chung-yung wang 忠勇王
CHU SHIH-CHIA, *Ming-tai ssu-i shu-mu.* 朱士嘉, 明代四裔書目
Chu Yung Ch'eng-kuo wang 朱勇成國王
Chün-t'un 軍屯
Chün-wang 郡王
Colao (Ko-lao) 閣老

D

Daghor (Daur, Ta-ho-ehr) 達和爾
Dahan omo (Tahan nor) 大漢鄂模
Dalai (Ta-la) 達賴
Dalai Qan (Han) 達賴汗
Dal omo 達兒鄂模
Daur *see* Daghor
Davatsi 達瓦齊
Delbek 答里巴
Dörbed 杜爾伯特
Dürbed *see* Dörbed
Dürben Keüked 四子部落

E

Esen (Yeh-hsien) 也先

F

Fei-ya-ko 費雅喀
FU HENG, *P'ing-ting Chun-ko-ehr fang-lüeh.* 傅恆, 平定準噶爾方略
Fu-ping (system) 府兵(制)
Fu Sen-o 富僧阿

G

Gabula 噶布拉
Galdan 噶爾丹
Galdan Tsereng 噶爾丹策棱
Gilyak 奇勒爾
Ginseng (jen-shen) 人參
Guši Qan (Han) 顧實汗

Γ

Γorlos 郭爾羅斯

H

Haise 海色

Haitahan 哈達漢
Hara müren 喀喇木倫(河)
Hei-lung-chiang (Sagalien ula, Amur) 黑龍江
Ho Chang-Ling, *Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien.* 賀長齡, 皇朝經世文編
Ho-chen (Achan) 赫直
Ho Ch'iu-T'ao, *Shuo-fang pei-sheng* 何秋濤, 朔方備乘
Holugor 咊魯咊爾(河)
Hsia Hsieh, *Chung-hsi chi-shih* 夏燮, 中西紀事
Hsiao-ch'eng Jen (Empress) 孝誠仁皇后
Hsiao-fang-hu chai yü-ti ts'ung-shu 小方壺齋輿地叢書
Hsiao-k'ang Chang (Empress) 孝康章皇后
Hsiao-wang-tzu 小王子
Hsi Ch'ing, *Hei-lung-chiang wai-chi* 西清, 黑龍江外記
Hsieh Yü-Tsai, *Ming-tai wei-so chih-tu hsing-shuai k'ao*, in *Shuo-wen yüeh-kan.* 解毓才, 明代衛所制度興衰考, 說文月刊
Hsi-feng-k'ou 喜峯口
Hsi-ta-tzu 西韃子
Hsüeh-shih 學士
Hsü Hung-Hsiao, *Ming-tai t'u-ti cheng-li chih k'ao ch'a*, in *Shih-huo pan-yüeh-kan.* 許宏烋, 明代土地整理之考察 食貨半月刊
Hsü Jih-sheng 徐日昇
Hsü Tsung-Liang, *Hei-lung-chiang shu-lüeh.* 徐宗亮, 黑龍江述略
Huang-ch'ao ching-shih wen-pien, see Ho Ch'ang-Ling
Huang-ch'ao t'ung-tien 皇朝通典
Huang-ch'ao wen-shien t'ung-k'ao 皇朝文獻通考
Huang P'eng-nien 黃彭年
Huang Po-Lu, *Cheng-chiao feng-pao* 黃伯祿, 正教奉褒
Huang Tso 黃佐
Huang-yang 黃羊
Hu-chün t'ung-ling 護軍統領
Hu-chün-ying 護軍營
Hu-ma (Kumarsk) 咊瑪

I

I-cha-ehr 衣扎兒
Ingin 英金(河)
I-shan 奕山

J

Jalayid 扎賚特
Jarūd (<Jara'ud<Jaraγud) 扎嚕特
Jasaγtu Qan (Han) 扎薩克圖汗
Jen-shen (ginseng) 人參
Jerimüd čiγulγan (meng) 哲里木盟
Jirin 雞林(河)
Josutu čiγulγan (meng) 卓索圖盟
Jō (<Ja'u<Jaγu) Uda čiγulγan (meng) 昭烏達盟
Jün Γar 準噶爾

K

K'ai-chung 開中
K'ang-hsi shih-lu 康熙實錄
See *Sheng-tsu Jen huang-ti shih-lu*
Kentei 肯特(山)
Kerbichi (Gerbici, Gorbitza) 格爾必齊, 格爾畢齊
Kešigten (Kesigten) 克什克騰
Kilko (Khilok) bira 啓兒活(河)

[illegible]

L

[illegible]

M

[illegible]

N

[illegible]

O

[illegible]

Ologoi Alin 敖魯龜山
O-lo-ssu 俄羅斯
Onon 敖嫩(河)
Onuhu 鄂努和
Ordos 鄂爾多斯
Orhon 鄂勒昆(河)
Orochon 俄樂春
Ortai 鄂爾泰
Oyirad 衛拉特

Ö

Ölöd 額魯特
Önggüd 翁牛特

P

Pei-chiao chieh-pei k'ao 北徼界碑考
Pei-chiao t'iao-li k'ao 北徼條例考
Pei-le-ehr 倍勒兒
Pengčun 彭春
Pen-ya-cho-li *or* Pu-ni-ya-shih-li *see* Bunyašri
Pien-ch'iang 邊牆
P'ing-ting lo-ch'a fang-lüeh 平定羅刹方略
Po-la-huo-chi ho *or* Po-ehr-chi ho 撥拉活即河, 博爾集河

Q

Qalqa 喀爾喀
Qaračin 喀喇沁
Qorčin 科爾沁
Qoros 綽羅斯
Qosiγun (ch'i) 旗
Qošūd 和碩特
Qoyid 輝特
Qūčid (<Qa'učid, Qaγučid) 浩齊特

S

Sabsu 薩布素
Sagalien ula (Hei-lung-chiang) 黑龍江
Sagalien ula hotun 黑龍江城
San-fan 三藩
Sansin 三姓
Sarhuda 沙爾虎達
Sayin Noyan Qan 三音諾顏汗
Sečen Qan 車臣汗
Selenga (Se-leng-o) 色楞厄, 澤倫厄, 塞倫厄河
Senga 僧格
Seyelhi 色也皃即(山)
Sha-mo (Chamo) 沙漠
Shang-t'un 商屯
Sheng-tsu Jen huang-ti shih-lu 聖祖仁皇帝實錄
Shih-lang 侍郎
Shih-lu 實錄
Shih-wei 侍衛
SHIMIZU TAIJI, *Chugoku kinsei shakai keizaishi.* 清水泰次, 中國近世社會經濟史
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— *Min dai no denji menseki,* in *Shigaku zashi* 明代の田地面積
— *Min dai ni okeru guton no tenkai to sono soshiki*, in *Shigaku zashi* 明代二於†□軍屯の展開乙乞の組織
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— *Min dai ni okeru sozei ginno no hattatsu*, in *Tōyō gakuho* 明代二於|□租稅銀納の發達
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Shira müren 西喇木倫(河)
Shuo-fang pei-ch'eng see Ho Ch'iu-T'ao
Sibo 錫伯
Sili-yin γool čiγulγan (meng) 錫林郭勒盟
So 所
Solon 索倫
Songgotu 索額圖
Soni 索尼
Sosan 索三
Sose 碩色
Sünid 蘇尼特

T

Ta-Ch'ing hui-tien shih-li 大淸會典事例
Ta-Ch'ing i-t'ung chih 大淸一統志
Ta-Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu 大淸歷朝實錄
Ta-ehr-o-mo (Dal omo) 達兒(爾)鄂模
Tahan nor (Dahan omo) 大漢
Ta-ho-ehr (Daghor, Daur) 達和爾
Ta-hsüeh-shih 大學士
T'ai-chi (taisha, tayiji) 台吉
Tai Ming 太明
Taisha (tayiji) *see* T'ai-chi
Ta-la (Dalai) 達賴
Tan 石
T'an Ch'i-Hsiang, *Ch'ing-tai tung-san-sheng chiang-li chih*. 譚其驤, 淸代東三省疆理志
T'ang Yeh 唐埜
Ta-sheng huang-ti 大聖皇帝
Ta-tzu 韃子
Tayiji *see* T'ai-chi
T'ien-hsia 天下
Ting Ch'ien, *Ming-shih ko wai-kuo chüan ti-li k'ao-cheng*, in *Che-chiang t'u-shu-kuan ts'ung shu*. 丁謙, 明史各外國傳地理考證, 浙江圖書館叢書
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T'o-Ching, *Ch'in-ting li-fan-yüan tse-li*. 托津, 欽定理藩院則例
Topir tala 多碧兒塔拉
Tou 斗
Tseng Yu-Hao, *Chung-kuo wai-chiao shih* 曾友豪, 中國外交史
Tsewang Araptan 策旺(妄)拉布坦
Tsou Tai-Chun, *Chung-O chieh-chi*. 鄒代鈞, 中俄界記
Tsu 租
Tsung-li ko-kuo shih-wu ya-men 總理各國事衙門
Tsung-li ya-men 總理衙門

Ts'ung-shu chi-cheng ch'u-pien 叢書集成初編
Tu chih-hui shih 都指揮使
T'u-ehr-hen, I-cha-ehr 圖兒艮, 衣扎兒
T'u-hsieh-tu Han (Tüsiyetü Qan) 土謝圖汗
Tula 圖拉
T'u-li-ko ho, T'u-ehr-ko ho 圖里格河, 圖爾格河
Tulisen 圖理琛
T'u-mu 土木
Tung-hua ch'üan-lu 東華全錄
Tung-hua-lu 東華錄
T'ung Kuo-kang 佟國綱
T'ung T'u-lai 佟圖賴
T'un-kuan 屯官
T'un-t'ien 屯田
T'un-t'ien ssu 屯田司
Turγūd 土爾扈特
Tümed 土默特
Tüsiyetü Qan 土謝圖汗
Tu-yu-shih 都御史

U

Udi (Uddi, Oudi) 烏第河
Ulān (Ula'an, Ulaγan) Čab čiγulγan (meng) 烏蘭察布盟
Unda 温達
Urad 烏喇特
Urum (Uruma, Ouroun) 烏倫穆烏魯木
Üjümüčin 烏珠穆沁

W

Wai-wu-pu 外務部
Wa-la (Wei-la) 瓦剌 (衛剌)
Wang Ch'en 王振
Wang Ch'ung-Wu, *Ming-tai ti shang-t'un chih-tu*, in *Yü-Kung pan-yüeh-k'an* 王崇武, 明代的商屯制府, 禹貢半月刊
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Wang Hsien-Ch'ien, *Tung-hua ch'üan-lu* 王先謙, 東華全錄
Wei 衛
Wei-so chih 衛所制
Wei Yüan, *Sheng-wu chi* 魏源, 聖武記
Wen-tou (Umdu, Unda) ho 温多河
Wu-chün tu-tu fu 五軍都督府
Wu Han, *Yu seng-po tao huang-ch'üan* 吳晗, 由僧鉢到皇權
Wu San-kuei 吳三桂

Y

Yaksa (Ya-ku-sa) 雅克薩
Yano Jinichi, *Shina kindai gaikoku kankei kenkyū*. 矢野仁一支那近代外國關係研究
Yehenara (Yehonola) 葉赫納喇
Yeh-hsien *see* Esen
Yeh-lo-tzu 野騾子
Yehonola *see* Yehenara
Yeke Juu čiγulγan (meng) 伊克昭盟
Yen Sung 嚴嵩
Yen-ta Han (Altan, Anda Qan) 俺達汗
Yen-wang Ti 燕王棣
Yen-yin 鹽引
Yin-jeng 胤礽
Yin Kuang-Jen and Chang Ju-Lin, *Ao-men chi-lüeh*. 印光任, 張汝霖, 澳門紀略


CARTA ITINERIS ex MOSCHOVIA IN CHINAM, a Moschis facta
MARE GLACIALE
Noua Zemla
Vaygatz
Fretum
MARE TARTARICUM
SIBERIA
SAMOIEDI
TINGOSKI POPULI
BOGDOI POPULI
S. Michael
Tobol Metropolis Siberiae
Tumen
Surgut
POPULI
Narim
Fl. Nada
Makow
OSTIARI
Jenisea
Fl. Jenisea
Iter in Chinam
POPULI BRATSKOI & BALAGANSKOI
POPULI TAN
Lena flu.
Yacu
Gesane
Wologda
Permsk
Veholaune
Nisni Nouogrod
Volga fluuius
Mosqua
Tumen fl.
Irtis fl.
Tobol fl.
Tumber fl.
MAGNI DUCIS MOSCHOVIAE
DITIONES
Baykal lacus
Baladan
TARTARI ELUSIH
TARTARI KALMUKI
Selenga
Fl. Selenga
Iter in Nip. chu
Nipchu
Locus habitationis
Fl. Kerlon
Fl. Amur
Albasin
Fluu. Sagalien Vla
TARTARI
HALHA seu MONGULI
Halha
TARTARIA ORIENTALIS
TARTARIA OCCIDENTALIS
DESERTUM XAMO
Kabchoton
Astracan
MARE CASPIUM
Chegel flu.
Samarcand
REGNUM CASCAR
Yarcan
Turfon
Oxus flu.
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
40
45
50
55
60
65
70

Th. I. Dunin Szpot, S. J. Journey from Moscow to China (ARSI, *Jap. Sin.* 105 I, f. 68).

Tabula Geographica Orientis, iuxta Autographum P. Antonij Thomæ Belgæ è Soc. Iesu missum Pekino an. 1690, in qua demonstrantur etiam itinera in Chinam ex Moschouia Persia, & Mogor.


MARE GLACIALE
MARE TARTARICUM
Hæc lingula an adjaceat Americæ Septentrionali an detur adhuc fretum Anian incertum est.
Hoc totum spatium lustrarunt Moschi sed non ad usq finem
MARE ORIENTALE
SAMOIEDA
TINGOESII
SIBERIA
MOSCOVIA
DITIONES DUCIS MOSCHOVIÆ
Fines Imperij Moschouitici
Hæc Regio inter duos montes in contractu pacis cum Moschis mansit indecisa
Vologoda
Nouogrod
Moscua
Kazan
S. Michael
Tobol
Tomsco
Iter in Sinam
Paikal Lacus
Selenga
Nipchou
Albasim eversa
Gefant
Yacu
Chiesu
TARTARIA ELUTH
TARTARIA KALMUKI seu alij Populi bellicosi simul & crudeles
Fines ditionum Moschouiticarum
Astracan
MARE CASPIUM
Samarcand
Regnum CASCAR
Oxus fl.
TARTARIA HALHA seu MONGULI
XAMO seu LOP
TARTARIA OCCIDENTALIS
TARTARIA ORIENTALIS
Limites Sinici
Hungan lacus
Terra Yesso
Regnu HUYE
ORA PISCARIA
MARE COREANUM
COREA
IAPONIA
Yendo
Nangasachi
Iter ex Persia in Sinam
Tauris
PERSIA
Hispahan
MOGOR REGNUM
Lahor
Agra
Indus flu.
Regnum Nepal
Regnum TIBET
Bengala
Suratte
Pegu
Aua
Laos
Tumkin
Cocincina
Macaum
CHINA
Pekim
P. Xansi
P. Xantum
P. Honan
P. Huquam
P. Suchuen
P. Yunnan
P. Queicheu
P. Quamsi
P. Quantum
P. Fokien
P. Chekiam
P. Kiamsi
P. Nankim
Canton
Insula formosa
Tropicus Cancri
Cheuxan
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
190
75
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